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 Numerous reforms have improved the supply and quality of federal financial, 
budget, and performance information.  Debate persists, however, about the value of 
information and how to best use it to improve decisions and outcomes.  To make 
information more powerful, some reforms move beyond enriching information to using it 
as the basis of decision rules that dictate or constrain decisions, actions, or outcomes.  A 
motivation behind decision rules is the concern that information alone does not suffice, 
but decision rules raise fresh challenges and disagreements.   
 The dissertation’s case studies examine the emergence and evolution of federal 
budget decision rules.  The first case – the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) - 
examines a budget decision rule that has been sustained for almost three decades.  The 
second case - budgeting for tax expenditures – examines reforms that resulted in more 
analytical information but stopped short of a tax expenditure specific budget decision 
rule.  In both cases, concerns emerged decades ago about a lack of budget oversight and 
control; analytical tools were improved; and budget decision rules were proposed.  By 
juxtaposing a “successful” reform (i.e., enacted and sustained) and an “unsuccessful” 
reform (i.e. non-enacted) the dissertation examines the factors and conditions influencing 
whether analytical information is reformatted into a workable and sustained budget 
decision rule.   
   The case study experiences suggest a cautioned approach to the establishment of 
federal budget decision rules with a first principle of avoiding overloading the budget and 
budget processes, especially when existing budget processes are not fully functioning.  
While sound budget principles and technical expertise help shape budget decision rules, 
the quest for analytical improvement must be balanced with political, institutional, and 
implementational realities.  The case studies indicate that analytical tools and budget 
decision rules matter, but that those seeking to establish new budget decision rules should 
consider the fragile role they play, and avoid overpromising benefits and underestimating 
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Introduction, Background, and Emerging Themes 
 
 In today’s digitally-connected age, information is increasingly abundant.  As in 
the private sector, governments are producing more financial, budget, and performance 
information in the hope of improving policy, management, and oversight.  For decades, 
government officials, practitioners, and researchers have emphasized the importance of 
transparency and accountability, including the need for accurate and timely financial, 
budget, and performance information.  Numerous public-sector reforms have improved 
both the supply and quality of information.  Along with more information has come 
heightened expectations for information-based, performance-based, and evidence-based 
decision making and accountability.  Yet, despite these efforts, uncertainty and debate 
persist about the value of information and how to best use it to improve policymaking, 
management, and oversight (Apfel, 2008; Joyce, 2008; Maron, 2008; Posner, 2008, 
Rivlin, 2008, and Rubin, 2002). 
 To make information more powerful, some reforms move beyond enriching 
information to using it as the basis of “decision rules” that prescribe or proscribe certain 
actions or outcomes (Schick, 2007, p.109).  Rather than simply providing information to 
guide and inform policy, decision rules use information to dictate or constrain decisions, 
actions, or outcomes (Schick, 2007; GAO, 1997b; and GAO, 2003c).  A key motivation 
behind decision rules is the concern that information alone does not suffice to improve 
decision making or policy outcomes.  Decision rules, however, raise fresh challenges, and 
significant disagreement remains about their effectiveness in policy and political 
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processes.  Nevertheless, some decision rules have been enacted and sustained, and calls 
for new decision rules abound.    
 Federal budgeting and related accountability systems provide a window into these 
issues.  I present two case studies pertaining to the emergence, establishment, and 
evolution of decision rules.  The first case, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 
(FCRA), examines a budget decision rule that has been sustained for over two decades.1 
The second case, tax expenditures,2 is an area where policy concerns have led to 
significantly more information and some budget constraints,3 but not to a tax expenditure 
specific budget decision rule.  I provide a more detailed discussion of the cases in 
Chapter Two, which provides an overview of the dissertation’s objectives, scope, and 
methodology.   
 Based on the case study findings, literature review, and cross-case analysis, the 
dissertation contributes to understanding of the following:  
 
• What key factors or conditions influence whether analytical information is 
reformulated into a sustained and workable budget decision rule?  How and why 
do these factors influence the emergence, establishment, and use of budget 
decision rules?  
 
                                                          
1 FCRA’s objective was to improve the transparency and budget control of federal direct loans 
and loan guarantees by changing how their costs are measured, funded, and recognized in the 
federal budget. 
2 Tax expenditures are commonly described as special tax provisions that provide preferential tax 
treatment for select taxpayers or for select activities.  
3 As discussed in Chapter Seven, the establishment of new tax expenditures is indirectly 
addressed by the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) budget rules, but these rules do not directly control 
tax expenditures or the growth in existing tax expenditures.  
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In examining this question, the dissertation examines the relationship between analytical 
information and budget decision rules and their role and limits.   
 
Background and Literature Review  
 The dissertation research builds on and applies Schick’s distinction between 
“analytical tools” and “decision rules” (Schick, 2007, p.  111).  Analytical information 
can be generated and reported solely to inform decisionmakers without prescribing or 
proscribing actions or outcomes.  In these cases, information is an analytical tool to help 
assess and guide policies or actions.  Alternatively, information may be formulated as the 
basis of a decision rule with the aim of dictating or constraining decisions, actions, or 
outcomes.  Schick (2007) describes the critical difference between analytical tools and 
decision rules in terms of the discretion permitted to decisionmakers.   
 In the first phase of the research, I conducted an extensive review of decades of 
literature and other documents related to the use of analytical tools and decision rules in 
U.S. federal budget process as well as some related accountability processes.4 My review 
included but was not limited to: (1) government reports and research; (2) academic 
articles; (3) legislative reviews, including congressional testimonies; and (4) reports and 
commentary from research and advocacy organizations.  The primary focus was the 
United States federal level; however, when relevant, lessons were drawn from state-level 
and international experiences.  While the scope for case study selection was narrowed to 
program- or policy- specific budget decision rules, this initial literature and document 
review was broader, including more general federal budget and fiscal rules.   
                                                          
4 Detailed literature and document reviews were also conducted as part of the case study research.   
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 This literature and document review: (1) provided background for the case study 
selection and research; (2) helped shape a framework to guide the case study research; 
and (3) informed and provided context for the cross-case analysis.  It also identified 
examples from federal budgeting to help clarify concepts and highlight differences 
among federal budget decision rules.  In the following subsections, I summarize 
background and context drawn from the literature review. 
 
Perennial quest for information, but uncertainty and debate remain about its 
value.   
 
 Public management and budgeting, both theory and practice, has been marked by 
a quest for improved information driven by the belief that better information will result in 
better outcomes.  Joyce (2008) reminded us that Stein (1989) argued that informing 
choices is the most important budget reform that the country can make.  Decades of 
performance budgeting literature has stressed the potential benefits of information to link 
resources and results (GAO, 2005c; Joyce, 2008; Schick, 1966 and Schick, 1971).  
Studies of long-term fiscal challenges and risks have called for innovations, such as net 
present value estimates5 and options-pricing to recognize the impact of certain decisions 
on future budgets (Brixi and Schick, 2002; GAO, 2003c; and Kotlikoff, 1993).  Joyce 
(2008) explains the underlying premises behind these efforts is that “more information is 
necessarily better” and “better information will result in better decisions” (Joyce, 2008, 
p.  955).  He argued “[i]t is almost an article of faith that more accurate and transparent 
                                                          
5 Net present value is a single number that expresses current and future cash flows in terms of an 
equivalent lump sum received (or paid) today. Payments or receipts are discounted to an 
equivalent present value using an interest rate, referred to as the discount rate (CBO, 2012c).     
5 
 
budget information leads to a better budget process, and (presumably) better budget 
outcomes” (Joyce, 2008, p.  945).   
 Importantly, these issues have moved beyond theory into practice.  One does not 
have to look far to see the proliferation of public-sector reforms aimed at increasing the 
supply of financial, performance, and budget information.  The United States, other 
governments, and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and World 
Bank, have undertaken numerous efforts aimed at improving budget and policy decision 
making by increasing the amount and quality of information.6  
 Joyce (2008) provided a comprehensive discussion of the significant expansion in 
both the sources and amount of information related to U.S. federal budgeting.7 For more 
than a half century, the Federal Government has undertaken many governmentwide 
reforms aimed at expanding and enriching budget, financial, and performance 
information.8 Building on earlier reforms, two notable reforms occurred during the 
                                                          
6 The IMF’s establishment of a Code of Fiscal Transparency in 1998, which outlines best 
practices for governments to provide a clearer picture of government finances, is just one 
example of the international emphasis placed on public sector information transparency and 
disclosure (IMF, 2014 and Joyce, 2008).  
7 Joyce (2008) specifically highlights three sources of increased budget information: (1) the 
increasing amount of information available in the president’s budget; (2) the explosion of data 
produced by the Congress; and (3) the proliferation of thinks tanks, including the increased 
attention of think tanks to budget issues.  
8 The federal government has undertaken various governmentwide reforms aimed at improving 
the performance information available to support federal budgeting and better linking spending 
decisions with performance (CBO, 1993; Joyce, 2008, and GAO, 1997c). In 1949, the first 
Hoover Commission sought to integrate more performance data into the budget process and shift 
the focus away from control of expenditures or inputs to focus on efficiency and effectiveness 
(CBO, 1993; and GAO, 2005c). The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (BAPA), 
among other things, required the President to present his budget submission to the Congress by 
the functions and activities of government. President Johnson mandated the governmentwide 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems (1965-1971) for budget formulation which focused 
on presenting and analyzing choices among long-term policy objectives and alternatives for 
achieving them (GAO, 2005c).  Management by Objectives (1973-1975) established a process to 
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1990s: The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 19909 and the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act).  These laws, and their subsequent 
expansions, significantly increased the amount and quality of information available.  The 
CFO Act, as expanded by the Government Management and Reform Act (GMRA) of 
1994, requires the annual preparation and audit of organization-wide financial statements 
for 24 executive departments and agencies.10 Government financial statements now 
include basic financial statements, e.g.  the balance sheet and the statement of net cost, 
and supplemental information, e.g.  stewardship information11 (FASAB, 2012 and OMB, 
2013).  Federal accounting standards also now require the accumulation and reporting of 
the cost information for federal programs, activities, and outputs (FASAB, 1995).   
 The Results Act focuses on performance.  It requires federal agencies to develop 
strategic and performance goals and measure and report annually on progress toward 
achievement of those goals (GAO, 1997c, 2003a, 2013).  Pursuant to the Results Act, 
agencies provide strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance 
                                                          
hold agency mangers responsible for achieving agreed-upon outputs and outcomes (GAO, 
2005c). Zero-based budgeting (1977-1981) was intended to provide a comprehensive review of 
federal budget, rather than the traditional, incremental approach (CBO, 1993). The National 
Performance Review (1993-2001) was an executive branch effort that emphasized results and 
managerial flexibility.   
9 The CFO ACT- as expanded by the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 and 
amended by the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 – was designed to 
improve federal financial management. It established chief financial officers across the federal 
government and required the preparation of audited annual financial statements. 
10 The requirements for the annual preparation and audit of organization wide financial statements 
were further extended to the remainder of the executive agencies10 by the Accountability of Tax 
Dollars Act (ATDA) of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-289) and to “mixed ownership” or “wholly-
owned” government corporations by the Government Corporation Control Act (59 Stat. 597, 
codified at 31 U.S.S. § 841-869) 
11 Stewardship Information refers to the reporting for the federal government’s stewardship over 
(1) certain resources entrusted to it and (2) certain responsibilities assumed by it, identified as the 
current service assessment These items do not meet the criteria of asset and liability reporting but 
are important for understanding the operation and financial condition of the government.  Some 
examples include: museums, library collections, parks, or memorials (FASAB, 2012).   
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reports.  Subsequent reforms built on this foundation.  The Bush Administration 
introduced its President’s Management Agenda (PMA) to improve performance and 
management by focusing on several key areas.12 The Obama Administration undertook 
several initiatives to support evidence-based policy and improve the quality and use of 
performance data (Haskins, 2011 and Joyce, 2011).  The GPRA Modernization Act 
(GPRAMA) of 201013 requires additional information and analytical tools.14  
 Numerous government publications provide additional information to support 
federal budget decisions.  The President’s budget includes multiple documents containing 
information on a wide range of issues, such as economic and budget analyses; historical 
trends; detailed appropriation and fund data; performance and management issues; and 
analyses related to specific policy areas.15 The Fiscal Year 2016 Analytical Perspectives 
volume of the President’s budget presents information on a variety of topics, such as aid 
to state and local governments; federal investments; tax expenditures; and federal credit 
                                                          
12 These areas included: strategic management of human capital, budget and performance 
integration, expanded electronic government, improved financial performance, and competitive 
sourcing. As part of the budget and performance efforts, the Performance Assessment and Rating 
Tool (PART) was established as a diagnostic tool to help provide more evaluation of federal 
programs during executive budget formulation (GAO 2004).  Efforts in this area also sought to 
change budget decision rules to better integrate performance information into budget accounts 
(GAO, 2005c). 
13 Pub. L. No. 11-352, 124 Stat. 3866 
14 Under GPRAMA, among other things, OMB is required to establish federal government 
priority goals (known as Cross-Agency Priority goals) and certain agencies are required to 
develop a limited number of Agency Priority Goals every 2 years. GPRAMA also required OMB 
to develop a single, governmentwide performance website to communicate governmentwide and 
agency performance information (GAO, 2013b).   
15 The President’s budget documents for Fiscal Year 2016 include: (1) Budget of United States 
Government that provides information on the President’s priorities, overviews by agency, and 
summary tables; (2) Analytical Perspectives  that provides supplemental information to highlight 
specific policy areas or present budget data to help place the budget in perspective; (3) Historical 
Tables that provide a variety of budget data, such as receipts and outlays, over an extended period 
of time, generally from 1940 to the current budget window;  and (4) Appendix, that provides 
detailed information on appropriations and funds.     
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and insurance.  Mikesell and Mullins (2011) found that a comparison over years shows 
“…easier accessibility of fiscal information, improved organization of information for 
making budget decisions, more information provided for making these decisions….” 
(p.6). 
 Legislative support agencies also publish information to support federal budget 
decisions.  CBO provides various, and arguably increasingly sophisticated, budget 
analyses.  CBO’s Budget Outlook reports include long-term budget analyses under 
varying assumptions and discussions of specific spending, such as health care.16  Other 
CBO publications provide detailed analyses of specific policy topics or programs, such as 
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), federal investment spending, and federal 
credit programs.  CRS provides information on appropriations and a wide range of 
analyses of fiscal policy and the budgetary implications of legislation (Kaiser, Olsezek 
and Tatelman, 2011).  GAO conducts reviews and analyses of governmentwide financial 
management issues as well as of specific policies and programs.  As discussed by Joyce 
(2008), the creation of the congressional budget committees led to a significant expansion 
in the analytical capacity of and information provided by Congress on budget matters (p.  
951).   
 The information described above serve as analytical tools.  Even required 
government reporting does not (and is not intended to) dictate or constrain how 
decisionmakers use the information.  As an example, information on federal liabilities 
and the long-term estimated costs of Social Security is available in numerous sources, 
such as the Financial Report of United States Government, the Analytical Perspectives 
                                                          
16 For example, see Congressional Budget Office The 2015 Long-term Budget Outlook 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50250   
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volume of the President’s Budget, the Trustee’s Reports, and various CBO and GAO 
analyses.  These costs, however, are not recognized in the primary measure used for 
budget funding and control -- the cash flows over the budget window (GAO, 2006a and 
2006b).  While this information is widely available, current budget rules do not require 
policymakers to fund or otherwise address these future costs.    
 When used as an analytical tool information can be expanded to incorporate 
varied perspectives.  For example, budget information may be presented using differing 
assumptions and methodologies to provide a range of perspectives and estimates.  CBO’s 
long-term budget forecasts present a range of estimates.  The Medicare and Social 
Security Trustees and CBO estimate the future costs of Social Security and Medicare 
using alternative scenarios.  GAO conducts long-term fiscal simulations using different 
sets of policy assumptions (GAO, 2018).  Adding more information and perspectives can 
help make an analytical tool more robust and potentially more useful, but also may 
increase complexity and confusion.   
 Despite the emphasis on the potential benefits of improved information and the 
seemingly endless succession of reforms, questions remain about whether and how 
information (and, more generally, expertise) can be used to improve public sector 
decision making and accountability (Arnold, 1990; Esterling, 2004; Joyce, 
2003/2008/2011; Mayhew, 1972; Mikesell and Mullins, 2011; and Schick, 2007).  Joyce 
(2008) noted that with respect to budgeting “… there have been substantial strides made 
in the quality and amount of information available to decisionmakers.  This has not, 
unfortunately, carried with it an improvement in the quality of budget decisions” (p.  
10 
 
946).  Mikesell and Mullins (2011) argued that the sheer number of reform efforts reflect 
that “success” has been elusive (p.5).    
 Importantly, significant debate surrounds the role and value of information within 
political processes, such as federal budgeting.  Wildavsky (1964) argued that the budget 
lies at the heart of the political process.  In exploring the complexities of implementation, 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argued for skepticism “…when anyone suggest that 
inherent features of political life can be summarily abolished” (p.  162).  Other 
prominent congressional scholars have presented theories for a limited role of 
information and expertise in policymaking given the pressures faced by and motivations 
of individual policymakers (Arnold, 1992, Fiorina, 1989; and Mayhew, 1972).  Joyce 
(2008) reminded us that Wildavsky made distinctions between the supply of information 
and the demand for information.  Wildavsky (1969) argued that it is one thing to talk 
about “measuring effectiveness, estimating costs, and comparing alternatives, but that is 
a far cry from being able to take the creative leap of formulating a better policy” (p.255).  
Mezey (1989) questioned Congress’s ability to bring information to bear upon its public 
policy decisions.  Reischauer (1983) argued that “[w]hether Congress chooses to use 
information or not is a political question” (p.  59).   
 Other experts and policy participants, however, have suggested a more positive 
role for information.  Posner (2008) and Apfel (2008) acknowledged limits but argued 
that information has an important, if contingent and episodic, role in federal budgeting.  
Esterling (2004) noted that other researchers, including Smith (1992) and O’Day (1995) 
found (to varying degrees) a positive role for expertise in several policy areas.  Based on 
11 
 
his own research, Esterling (2004) asserted that research and empirical evidence matter in 
lobbying politics, and thus in legislative policymaking.   
 Regardless of the potential benefits of information-based reforms, there is the 
potential for information overload.  Jones and Baumgartner (2005) argue that “… there is 
so much information in the U.S. political system that winnowing through it is more of a 
problem than finding more of it” (p. viii).  Reflecting this sense of information overload, 
one policy participant described information in the political system as “…taking a drink 
from a firehose.” Mullen (2006) argued that the sheer volume of reporting requirements 
results in crowded management space.  Hedley (1994) suggested that “implementing 
accounting rules in the wrong context can be extremely dysfunctional to the government, 
by increasing bureaucracy without a commensurate increase in individual accountability 
or reductions in government spending” (p.161).  Schick (2007) warned that “the more 
information that is provided, the greater the likelihood that some of it will get in the way 
of completing budget tasks on schedule…” (p.112).   
 Despite the above concerns, proposals to expand and improve information remain 
widespread.  GAO has suggested that net present value estimates be required for all 
major proposals whose costs escalate outside the 10-year budget window (GAO, 2006b).  
GAO’s “fiscal exposures”17 work recommended publication of supplemental information 
on the expected future spending arising from commitments made today (GAO, 2003c and 
GAO, 2013a).  In 2010, Congressman Quigley recommended information expansions, 
including: (1) net present value (NPV) estimates for any major legislation for which costs 
escalate outside the 10-year window; (2) annual reports on fiscal exposures and (3) 
                                                          
17 GAO uses the term “fiscal exposures” to describe responsibilities, programs, and activities that 
may legally commit or create the expectation for future federal spending.   
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Quadrennial Fiscal Sustainability Reviews (Meyers, 2014 and Quigley, 2010, pp.  29-33).  
The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reforms (2010) also offered 
recommendations, including: (1) displaying tax expenditures together with spending 
programs; (2) reorganizing the President’s budget to focus on mission and objectives; and 
(3) establishing a system of national indicators (Peterson-Pew, 2010, pp.30-32).  The 
President’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting (1999) concluded that there is a need 
for better budget information on the cost of maintenance and the implications of deferred 
maintenance.  Concern about federal investment led to calls for analytical tools, such as 
societal return on initial investment (SORI) and budget presentations of investment 
spending relative to other spending (GAO, 1995 and Redburn, 2017).      
 Decision rules vary in design and objective.   
 Decision rules seek to change behavior and outcomes not by informing choices, 
but by incentivizing, constraining, or enforcing them (Schick, 2007 and GAO, 1997b, 
2000a, 2003).  Decision rules, however, vary significantly in design and objective.  The 
literature makes broad distinctions between (1) process rules that focus on the 
procedures, measures, and concepts that govern decisions and (2) outcome or 
prescriptive18 rules that specify particular budget or policy actions or outcomes (GAO, 
2003c: Hanushek, 1986; Joyce, 1994; Poterba, 1996; Primo, 2007; and Schick, 2007).   
 In budgeting, a process decision rule might change the cost measurement basis or 
organizational structure used to recognize, fund, and control budget decisions.  Process 
rules matter because information relevant to budget decisions may be presented in 
                                                          
18 Schick (2007) refers to these as substantive decision rules.  
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numerous ways in the budget, but only one measurement basis (e.g.  cash or accrual) and 
account structure (e.g.  program, organization unit, or expenditure item) can serve as the 
primary basis for budget recognition, funding, and control (GAO, 1997b, 2003; and 
Schick, 2007).  In Schick’s words, [t]here are many ways to tell the budget’s story, but 
there can be only one way to decide the budget” (Schick, 2007, P.  113).  However, while 
process decision rules attempt to influence behavior by changing the way decisions are 
funded or controlled, they stop short of directly dictating specific actions or outcomes.  
FCRA is an example of a process-based rule.   
 My GAO work on the budget treatment of federal insurance programs and other 
fiscal exposures helps illustrate ways analytical information might be used to support 
federal budget decisions (GAO, 1997b, 2003).19 One approach for federal insurance 
programs is to provide supplemental budget information on the long-term cost of these 
programs.  This information would be available as an analytical tool, but no new budget 
decision rules would be established.  While this approach may stimulate consideration of 
long-term costs, policymakers would be free to address or ignore these costs.  Going 
further, a process budget decision rule could require long-term costs be used as the 
budget cost measure for federal insurance programs.  Specially, the net present value of 
the risk assumed20 by these programs could be used to measure budget authority and/or 
                                                          
19 These examples draw from the author’s previous work as a key contributor to several GAO 
reports, including: (1) Budget Issues: Budgeting for Federal Insurance Programs; (2) Accrual 
Budgeting: Experiences of Other Nations and Implications for the United States; and (3) Fiscal 
Exposures: Improving the Budgetary Focus on Long-term Costs and Uncertainties.  
20 GAO uses the term “risk assumed” for federal insurance programs to refer to the portion of the 
full risk premium based on the expected cost of losses inherent in the government’s commitment 
that is not charged to the insured. Under such an approach, the government subsidy cost is 
defined as the difference between the full-risk premium and the actual premium charged (GAO, 
1997b, p. 62).  
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budget outlays, instead of the traditional cash-based measurement.  This type of process 
budget decision rule would go beyond simply requiring information on these costs to 
requiring that they be recognized, funded, and subject to budget enforcement procedures, 
as applicable.  As a result, policymakers would have a greater incentive to consider these 
costs at the time decisions to extend insurance are made.  However, the decision rule 
itself would not dictate a particular policy action or outcome with respect to the level or 
composition of federal insurance (GAO, 1997b).  Going further, a prescriptive or 
outcome budget decision rule could dictate a specific action or policy outcome with 
respect to the level or composition of federal insurance e.g.  a predetermined ceiling on 
long-term cost of federal insurance (GAO, 1997b).21  
 
 U.S. experience with two fiscal rules.   
  “Fiscal rules” that pertain to budget aggregates (such as the deficit/surplus or 
aggregate revenue and spending levels) are not the dissertation’s specific focus, but they 
help illustrate divergent approaches to rules as constraints on budget policy.  Two 
significant budget rules aimed at constraining deficit spending include: (1) Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) 22and (2) the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990.    
 GRH was a major milestone in thinking about the role and objectives of budget 
decision rules (Joyce, 1994 and Schick, 2007).  GRH set a timeline for progressive 
                                                          
21 CBO (2018) outlines three approaches for policymakers to expand the use of accrual and other 
long-term measures in the federal budget process, including: (1) using accrual and other long-
term measure as supplemental information; (2) require the use of  accrual-base measurement for 
purposes of Congressional rules while maintaining the cash budgetary treatment  and (3) 
expanding the use of accrual for all aspect of budget treatment and accounting for activities where 
changes believed to be helpful.   
22 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is commonly referred to as 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, after the bill’s principal sponsors.  
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reductions in the federal deficit with predetermined deficit targets for each fiscal year 
from 1986 to 1990.  Under the original GRH timeline, budget balance would be achieved 
in FY 1991.23 GRH did not specify what spending cuts should be made to achieve the 
deficit targets, but it did specify that if the projected deficit exceeded the GRH target for 
a fiscal year by more than $10 billion, then across-the-board cuts (or sequestration) 24 
would be used to reach the target.  Actual deficits exceeded GRH’s targets in each fiscal 
year the law was in effect.  When sequestration proved too politically difficult, GRH was 
suspended and replaced with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.     
 GRH was different from earlier budget reforms.  While earlier foundational 
budget rules established overarching processes and procedures for the federal budget 
process these rules avoided specifying or dictating budget or policy outcomes (Joyce, 
1994).  As noted by Joyce (1994) “…the drafters of the Congressional Budget Act viewed 
it as very important the process not be biased in the direction of particular budget 
outcomes” (p.  15).  In contrast, GRH, for the first time, aimed to control deficit spending 
(and thus policymakers’ actions) by specifying budget outcomes (Joyce, 1994 and 
Schick, 2000).  Schick (2000) notes that GRH incorporated “…the notion that politicians 
should be restricted by budget rules when making revenue and spending decisions” 
(p.22).  Implicit in this was the premise that politicians’ actions should and could be 
controlled by budget decisions rules i.e. that politicians would follow the rules.   
 While it is impossible to know the impact of GRH on deficit spending without a 
counterfactual many researchers and policy participants view it as largely a failure 
                                                          
23 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (Public Law 
No: 100-119), also known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II, replaced GRH in September 1987.  
The target for budget balanced was delayed to 1993 (Reischauer, 1993).   
24 Sequestration refers to the automatic cancellation of budgetary resources.     
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because it did not achieve intended deficit reduction and was suspended.25 As noted by 
Poterba (1996), Primo (2007), and others, statistically assessing GRH’s impact on budget 
outcomes is very challenging.  The results from the limited number of empirical studies 
conducted have varied and somewhat inconclusive results.26 Fortunately, for purposes of 
this dissertation, the general lessons learned from GRH’s design and implementation are 
more relevant than its precise impact on budget outcomes.  Primo (2007) argues that 
political compromise resulted in ineffective design and that the law lacked credible 
enforcement.  Reischauer (1993) argues policymakers sought to avoid the rule with 
“overly optimistic economic assumptions and outright budget gimmickry” (p.  3).  A take 
away from the GRH experience was that prescriptive or outcome-based rules (such as 
fixed deficit targets) can be manipulated and become unworkable and ineffective due to 
unforeseen events, such as economic changes, that are beyond the direct control of 
policymakers (Joyce, 1994, Primo, 2007; Reischauer, 1990b and 1990c; and Schick, 
2000).   
 In response to GRH, the lawmakers tried a different approach with BEA.  Rather 
than setting predetermined deficit targets, BEA focused on those revenue and spending 
                                                          
25 Porteba concludes that “[t]he difficulty of performing the counter-factual experiment of 
observing spending in the absence of GRH makes it difficult to evaluate observed budget 
outcomes, and the lessons from the GRH experience may simply be too subtle to interpret with 
confidence” (p. 22).  
26 Porteba (1996) provides an overview various research on GRH’s impact on deficits. Gramlich 
(1990) concludes that GRH seem to have little effect on budget outcomes, concluding “the fact 
the GRH was instituted as primary deficits were dropping seems largely coincidental ... changes 
in the process due to GRH seemed to have little to do with the improvement”  (p.80 as cited in 
Porteba, p. 21). Hahm et al (1992) state that their analysis suggests that that GRH reduced total 
spending and the deficit by $59 billion by fiscal year 1989. The authors, however, note that while 
this is a nontrivial amount the uncertainties in model used are such that this estimated reduction is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels and their result results may describe budgeting 
during the GRH era rather than identify the precise effects of GRH itself (Hahm et al, 1992, p. 
207, 222-224).   
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actions under the legislative control of Congress and the President (Joyce, 1994, Rubin, 
2002 and Schick, 2000).  BEA placed limits on the level of discretionary spending27 and 
established a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) process28 to ensure that any tax or direct spending 
changes were deficit neutral (CRS, 2001 and Joyce, 1994).  29  The PAYGO process and 
discretionary caps effectively superseded the GRH deficit targets.  The sequestration 
process was retained as a means of enforcing the spending caps and PAYGO provisions 
(Marples, 2015).  Importantly, while BEA’s PAYGO process placed indirect constraint 
on the creation of the new entitlement programs and tax expenditures, it did not control 
growth in existing entitlements and tax expenditures.  Under PAYGO, spending for major 
entitlement programs, including Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, has continued 
to grow.30 The continuing growth in these major entitlement programs and tax 
                                                          
27 Discretionary spending is budget authority (other than appropriated entitlements) and outlays 
provided in annual appropriations acts.   
28 All direct spending and tax legislation enacted for a fiscal year must be deficit-neutral in the 
aggregate. If Congress enacts direct spending or receipts legislation that cause a net increase in 
the deficit, it must be offset by either increasing revenues or decreasing direct spending in the 
same fiscal year.  The PAYGO requirement is enforced by sequestration (GAO, 1993a and 
Heniff, 2001).  
29 Direct spending authority is under the control of the authorizing committees.  It is treated 
differently than discretionary spending which is under the control of appropriations committees 
and controlled through the annual appropriation process. Direct spending is mandatory – not 
controlled with appropriations (GAO, 1993a and Heniff, 2001).  
30 The statutory PAYGO process and discretionary spending limits were extended by the Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1997.  Both discretionary caps and PAYGO were in effect from 1991 to late 
2002. The discretionary caps expired and the statutory PAYGO process was effectively 
terminated in late 2002 (CRS, 2010). While there were a series of proposals to restore the 
statutory PAYGO process over the next few years, none were enacted.  The 2008 and 2009 
budget resolutions reestablished PAYGO as a procedural rule.  In February 2010, the Statutory 
Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 established a new budget enforcement mechanism generally 
requiring that direct spending and revenue legislation enacted into law not increase the deficit. 
(CRS, 2010). The new PAYGO process was established on permanent basis with no expiration 
dates included in the Act.  The Budget Control Act of 2011 established discretionary spending 
cap for each of the fiscal year 2012-2021 (Levit, 2014).   
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expenditures have renewed calls for both enhanced reporting and new (stronger) budget 
decision rules.   
 
 Continued debate on feasibility and value of decision rules.   
 Reformers use concerns about the role of information to argue both for and 
against the establishment of new (and presumably stronger) budget decision rules.  
Proponents of budget decision rules argue that information alone does not go far enough 
(Brookings-Heritage, 2008 and Penner and Steuerle, 2005).  They argue that failure to 
recognize, fund, and control costs directly in the budget at the time decisions are made 
limits incentives to address costs, or worse, may create perverse incentives (Brixi and 
Schick, 2002; Elliott, 2011; GAO, 1997b, 2003, 2013; Surrey and McDaniel 1985; and 
Burman and Phaup, 2011).  In this view, decision rules are necessary to make 
information powerful in the political process.  As pointed out by Schick (2007), 
“reformers want information to be more than available; they want it to transform the way 
governments go about budget work.  They want different information to produce different 
results” (p.  110).  Some proponents have credited rules as a providing political cover for 
tough policy decisions (Brookings-Heritage, 2008; Penner and Steuerle, 2005; and 
Posner, 2009).  Primo (2007) and Posner (2008, 2009) suggested the effectiveness of 
decision rules may increase if the public is aware of the rule and supports its intended 
outcome.  The Commission on the Fiscal Future of the United States argued that “…a 
well-designed rule can nudge them [policymakers] in the right direction and can provide 
political “cover” (p.  191).   
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 Critics of rules argue that they are often futile, serving only to present the 
appearance of change.  In this view, rules may fail for many of the same reasons that 
information alone fails (Aaron and Schultze, 2008; Meyers, 2009, 2014; and Reischauer, 
2001).  Some public sector decision rules are viewed as limited because they generally 
are endogenously designed and enforced (Primo, 2007 and Meyers, 2009, 2014).  Kettl 
(2003) argued “[p]rocedures simply cannot force elected officials to make decisions that 
they do not want to make” (p.  129).  In discussing fiscal rules, Primo (2007) noted “[t}o 
the extent that rules are determined as part of a collective choice process the 
determination of what rules to enact will suffer from the same problems that plague 
policymaking.” Further, rules are not self-executing and policymakers can choose to 
ignore or circumvent them just as they can choose to ignore information ((Aaron and 
Schultze, 2008; Meyers, 2009; Primo, 2007; and Reischauer, 2001).  Meyers (2009) 
argued “…[r]ules fail because they are endogenous to the political institutions that write 
them, meaning they can be changed whenever the institutions want” (p.  214).  Primo 
(2010) reminds us “…that Congress has extraordinary leeway to write budget rules, even 
statutory ones, and then choose to ignore them” (p.  11).   
 Some critics view decision rules as more than ineffective, arguing that they may 
make matters worse by creating perverse incentives and other harmful effects.  
Opponents of budget rules argue that some they complicate the budget process, create an 
illusion that a problem has been solved, encourage brinkmanship, delay hard choices, and 
create incentives for the use of gimmicks (Aaron and Schultze, 2008 and Meyers, 2009, 
2014).  Meyers (2014) argued that “action-forcing mechanisms” such as caps, triggers 
and sequesters have contributed to a “...implosion of the federal budget process” and that 
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even if proponents “…aspirations were partially realized, their logic was flawed, and the 
collateral damage was substantial” (p.  1).   
 While experts and reformers articulate strong views on both side of the issue, 
empirical research on the effects of budget rules has been limited.  Some researchers, 
such as Poterba (1996) draw from the limited research available on fiscal rules to suggest 
“fiscal institutions” or rules may make a difference, noting that that “preponderance of 
this evidence suggests that these rules matter….” (p.  4).  Primo (2007) argued for fiscal 
rules in cases where there is agreement at a macro-level (such as the need for reduced 
spending), but disagreement on micro-level decisions (such what specific spending cuts 
to make) a fiscal rule might be useful.  Other proponents are more cautious, arguing that 
while rules may serve to support or reinforce consensus or previous agreements they are 
not effective in forcing hard decisions or creating consensus where it does not already 
exist (Hoagland, 2007; Joyce, 2005; Meyers, 2009, 2014; Primo, 2007; Posner 2009; 
Schick, 1996; Reischauer, 2010; and Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004).   
 
 Proposals for new decision rules.   
 Despite these controversies and challenges, proposals for new decision rules 
abound.31 The following provides examples of program- or policy- specific decision rules 
                                                          
31 The United States has a long history of reforms aimed at improving the overarching 
procedures, processes, or timelines used in the federal budget process. Notably, the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921, requires the president to submit an annual budget to Congress and bars 
agencies and departments from submitting their request directly to Congress. The CBA of 1974 
greatly expanded the congressional role in the federal budget process. These types of foundational 
rules provide the overall framework for the federal budget process.  However, the focus of this 
dissertation research and its case study selection was narrowed to decision rules that are: (1) 
related federal resource allocation; (2) applied to particular programs or types of programs; and 
(3) formulated using analytical information that was not previously used as a budget measure.     
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(or proposed rules) related to federal resource allocation.  These examples were drawn 
from my review of federal budget reforms as well as some related accountability reforms.  
These examples are intended for illustrative purposes only.  They are not intended to (and 
do not) provide an exhaustive list.  As can be seen, within the two board categories –
process rules and prescriptive rules – decision rules vary significantly in their objectives 
and design.   
 Table 1.1 briefly describes more than a dozen enacted or proposed budget process 
decision rules.  Some process budget decision rules based on previously supplemental 
information have been enacted and sustained.  Accrual-based accounting provides an 
important example.  Federal financial reporting, with limited exceptions, is accrual-
based32 and there is a long-standing interest in extending accruals into the federal 
budget.33 In 1967 the President’s Commission on the Budget recommended that spending 
and receipts be reflected in the federal budget on an accrual basis.  The Commission 
argued an accrual basis provides a more comprehensive and accurate measure of how 
federal financial activities affect the economy, but the Commission’s recommendation 
was not adopted.  Rather, the Federal Government has selectively adopted budget 
decision rules requiring accrual measurement for particular programs.  FCRA, which is 
one of the dissertation’s case studies, moved beyond providing information on the 
subsidy costs of federal credit programs to using this information as the basis for 
                                                          
32 Two federal financial statements: (1) the Reconciliation of Net Operating Revenue (or Cost) 
and Budget Surplus (or Deficit) and the (2) Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Budget 
and other Activities are reported using a budget accounting basis (GAO, 2018). 
33 A few countries, such as New Zealand and Australia, have adopted comprehensive, accrual-
based, outcome-focused budgets.  Other countries, such as the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, have incorporated accrual budgeting concepts to address specific programmatic or 
policy concerns (GAO, 2000a). 
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measuring, recognizing, and funding the budget costs of direct loan and loan guarantee 
programs.  Some federal pensions and military retiree health benefits are partially 
budgeted for on an accrual basis (CBO, 2018c and GAO, 1998, 2000a).  Accrual-based 
budget measurement is also used for: (1) contributions to the International Monetary 
Fund; (2) federal interest costs; (3) capital leases and lease-purchase agreements; and (4) 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (CBO, 2018c).   
 Process budget decision rules have been proposed (but not enacted) for a wide 
range of other policy issues and concerns, including federal insurance, environmental 
liabilities, post-retirement health benefits, government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
capital assets, federal investment, and tax expenditures.  Rubin (2002) refers to some of 
these reforms as perennial reforms because they “…reoccur multiple times, with little 
chance of passage and little change form on iteration to the next” (p.1).   
Despite on-going concerns about budget rules for these areas, proposals for new 
budget decision rules have not gained traction.   As can be seen, many of these proposals 
seek to expand the use of accrual measurement in the budget to recognize long-term costs 
or to better align costs with the production of goods and services.  A common theme 
surrounding these proposals is that unless this information is included in the budget, it 
will not get the attention it deserves.   
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Table 1.1 Examples of Process Budget Decision Rules (Enacted and Proposed) 
Rule  Status  Description  
Accrual budgeting for 
federal loans and loan 
guarantees  
Adopted  Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) of 1990 changed the measurement of 
budget costs for federal direct loans and loan guarantees from net cash flows 
in a given year to the net present value of the government’s subsidy cost 
over the life the loan.   
Partial accrual budgeting 
for federal employee 
and military retirement  
Adopted The government’s share of retirement costs for federal employees in the 
Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) and Military Retirement 
system are budgeted for on a partial accrual basis.  The government’s 
expected costs for these retirement benefits are recognized at the program 
level as they are earned, but because payments are offset through 
intragovernmental transfers to federal retirement funds these accrued costs 
are not included the deficit and surplus (GAO, 2003c).   
Partial accrual budgeting 
for military retiree 
health care costs  
Adopted Since 2003, the retiree health care costs for Medicare-eligible military 
retirees has been budgeted on an accrual basis at the program level.  These 
accrued costs are not included in the deficit or surplus.   
Accrual budgeting for 
the Trouble Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) 
Adopted  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 requires the purchases 
and sales of financial assets though the TARP be recorded in the budget 
using procedures similar to FCRA, but with an adjustment for market risk.  
Market risk refers to the undiversifiable risk that is a consequence of the 
fluctuation of all assets.   
Accrual budgeting for 
capital leases and lease-
purchase agreements  
Adopted  The federal budget records the cost of capital leases and lease-purchases 
agreements upfront on a net present value basis.  Operating leases continue 
to be budgeted on a cash basis.    
Partial accrual budgeting 




Proposals call for budgeting for the government’s share of accruing pension 
costs for civilian employees in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).    
Partial accrual budgeting 




not adopted  
Proposals call for partial accrual budgeting for the costs of retirement health 
benefits for civilian or military retirees under the age of 65 as they are 
earned.  Currently, none of these accruing costs are included in the budget.   
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Rule  Status  Description  
Full accrual for deferred 
payment programs  
Proposed; not 
adopted 
Hearn and Phaup (2016) propose the use of full accrual budgeting for 
deferred payments for mandatory spending programs, such as deferred 
pension benefits.  Rather than using program level approach with intra-
government transfers as described above, under their proposal the cost of all 
present and deferred compensation would be treated as a current period 
outlays.  As such, thee accrued costs would be in included in budget totals, 
including the deficit and surplus.   
 





Proposals call for accrual budgeting for federal insurance programs.  In the 
1990s, OMB and CBO published reports on budgeting for deposit insurance.  
In 1998, GAO published a report on budgeting for a range of federal 
insurance programs.  These reports outlined several options for using 
accrual-based measurement in the budget for federal insurance programs.  
No new budget rules have been enacted.   
 
Accrual budgeting for 
environmental liabilities  
Proposed, but 
not adopted  
Proposals call for accrual budgeting for environmental liabilities but there 
are significant definitional and estimation challenges.  No new budget rules 
have been enacted.   
 





For decades, accrual budgeting has been proposed for government-sponsored 
enterprises to better recognize and control the implicit risk to the government 
posed by these entities.  The idea remains controversial and there are 
significant estimation and implementation challenges.  Currently.  CBO and 
OMB use different approaches to estimate the budget cost for Fannie Mae 
Freddie Mac.  CBO treats these GSEs as effectively part of the U.S.  
Government and measures their cost using FCRA’s approach with 
adjustment for market value and risk (known as a fair-value approach).  
Conversely, OMB treats the GSEs as nongovernmental entities, and includes 
only the cash transactions between these GSEs and the Treasury in the 
budget (CBO, 2018a)  
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Rule  Status  Description  
Budgeting by GNP Proposed; Not 
adopted  
Budgeting by share of GNP has been proposed to provide a more rational 
structure for federal budget choices and to encourage more explicit 
consideration of consequences of those choices on national output (Stein, 
1989).  No new budget rules requiring this approach have not been adopted.   
   
Regulatory budget  Proposed; not 
adopted  
Proposals for a regulatory budget have been periodically introduced for 
decades.  One recent proposal is for regulatory costs to be included as 
imputed revenues and outlays in the budget.   
Restructuring budget 







The Bush Administration proposed budget “restructuring” to better align 
budget resources with performance.  Budget restructuring involved changes 
to congressional budget justifications and, in some cases, appropriation 
accounts.  (GAO, 2005c).  The initiative was abandoned. 
 
Tax expenditure 
“budget” and related 
proposals   
Proposed; Not 
adopted  
A tax expenditure “budget” and other approaches have been proposed to 
more directly recognize and control the costs of special tax provisions in the 
budget.  While PAYGO rules provide some indirect constraint on tax 
expenditures, no tax expenditure specific budget decision rules have been 
enacted.  See chapters 7-10.   
 




GAO, OMB, and others periodically propose the use of capital acquisition 
funds (CAFs) to better align the cost of capital assets with their use over 
time.  A capital asset fund could finance the purchase of capital assets with 
up-front funding borrowed from the Treasury.  The CAFs could then rent the 
asset to one or more programs, charging a rate that would be sufficient to 
cover repayments of principal and interest on the Treasury loan (GAO, 









A capital budget has been repeatedly suggested and remains controversial 
(Rubin, 2002).  While proposals for capital budget vary, many require that 
spending for long-term capital assets be included in a separate budget.  The 
costs of the asset would then be included in the operating budget over time 
by using a depreciation charge (CBO, 2008, GAO, 1996, and Penner, 2008).  
No new budget decision rules for a capital budget have been enacted.   
 
Budgeting for federal 
investment   
Proposed; Not 
adopted 
Various policy participants raise concerns that the federal budget creates bias 
against investment spending e.g.  spending that yields primarily long-term 
economic and social benefits.  Proposals call for changing budget decision 
rules in order to facilitate more explicit consideration of and improve 
decisions about investment spending (GAO, 1993a and Redburn, 2017).  No 
new budget decision rules for an investment budget have been enacted.   
 
Dynamic scoring  Proposed; 
adopted 
selectively  
Budget estimates generally include certain behavioral effects but exclude the 
impact of policy changes on the overall economy or the secondary 
“feedback” effects which occur as a result.  Dynamic scoring is the process 
of including these macroeconomic effects into a budget score.  (Committee 
for Responsible Federal Budget, 2012 and CBO, 2015d).  The Concurrent 
Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 2016 (S.  Con.  Res.  11) requires CBO to 
provide dynamic budget score, if practicable, for major legislation or 
legislation designated by a Chairman of the Budget Committees (CBO, 
2018b).    




 Some enacted (or proposed) budget decision rules go further than process rules.  
Table 1.2 briefly describes several enacted (or proposed) prescriptive or outcome-based 
decision rules.  These prescriptive (or outcome-based) rules, which dictate or constrain 
pre-determined actions or policy outcomes, also vary significantly in objective and 
design.  Some, such as the Medicare Trigger use predetermined caps or targets to dictate 
outcomes and constrain actions e.g.  limit spending.  Others, such as No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB), used federal budget resources as a lever to dictate or constrain actions or 
policies.  Others established a hard constraint and also attempted to incentivize some 
related behavior.  For example, Medicare’s Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) limited 
Medicare Part B spending and it also created incentives for physician behavior through 
fee adjustments.   
 Some of these decision rules faced significant opposition after enactment and 
were not sustained as initially intended or, in some cases, abandoned.  Medicare’s SGR 
was routinely overridden by legislative action34 and had become a significant source of 
uncertainty and controversy before being repealed in 2015.  The Medicare Trigger has 
resulted in the Medicare Trustees issuing a Medicare “funding warning” (which requires 
Presidential and Congressional action) every year from 2007 through 2013.  In response 
to a determination made in both the 2006 and 2007 Medicare Trustee’s reports, President 
Bush submitted a proposal in 2008, but no action was taken (Davis et al, 2018).  No other 
legislative proposals have been submitted as required by the triggers (Davis et al., 
                                                          
34 For the first few years of the SGR system, actual expenditures did not exceed the targets (Hahn 
and Mulvey, 2011). However, beginning in 2002, actual expenditures have exceeded allowed 
expenditure targets each year. With the exception of a 4.8% reduction in physician payment rates 
in 2002, Congress has taken actions each year to override the required reductions (CBO, 2012 
and Hahn and Mulvey, 2011).34 The CBO reported that, under current law, payments were 




2018).35  The NCLB, which established an accountability system for education linked to 
federal funding, began with strong bi-partisan support only to end up mired in 
controversy about the law’s logic and effectiveness.  After years of controversy and 
failing to be reauthorized, the law was replaced in 2015.     
 Despite these challenges, calls continue for new (and presumably better) outcome 
decision rules.  Various proposals call for the expanded use of “triggers” (TBOFF, 2008, 
and Penner and Steuerle, 2007).  For example, some Social Security proposals require 
presidential and congressional action if the Social Security Board of Trustees determines 
that the balance ratio of either the Social Security trust funds will be zero for any calendar 
year during the succeeding 75 years (GAO, 2006b).  Some proposals call for a regulatory 
budget, with limits or caps on regulations either in the aggregate or by agency. 
 When analytically useful information becomes available, it is tempting to use that 
information as the basis of decision rules to prescribe or proscribe decisions, actions, or 
outcomes.  However, even when the underlying logic of rules is relatively 
straightforward, the path from information to workable, sustained decision rule is not, as 
discussed in the case studies.   
 
                                                          
35 The Obama administration took the position that the Recommendation Clause prevents 
Congress from directing the President to submit legislative proposals that the President does not 
personally find to be necessary and expedient (CRS, 2014).  In each of its reports from 2014 to 
2016, the Medicare Trustees projected that Medicare general revenue funding would not exceed 
45% of total Medicare outlays within seven fiscal years, and the President was not required to 




Table 1.2 Examples of Outcome-based Budget Decision Rules (Enacted or Proposed) 
Rule Status Brief Description 
Medicare Sustainable 
Growth Rate (SGR) 
Adopted, 
repealed   
The Medicare SGR, enacted in 1997, was designed to automatically limit growth in 
Medicare spending on physician services by comparing cumulative actual 
expenditures on physician services with a cumulative target (Hahn and Mulvey, 
2011).  The target was based on information such as economic growth, increases in 
the number of beneficiaries, and expansions of benefits.  The SGR was intended to 
bring future spending in line with the targets by reducing future physician fees if past 
spending exceeded the targets and by increasing physician fees if past spending was 
below the targets (CBO, 2012).  Before its repeal in April 2015, Congress routinely 
overrode the SGR targets (Hahn and Mulvey, 2011).   
Medicare Trigger  Adopted  The Medicare Trigger was established by Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) (.  P.L.108-173).  The MMA requires 
Medicare Trustees determine each year whether the general fund revenue funding for 
Medicare is projected to exceed 45 percent of Medicare revenues in the current year or 
any of the next six years.  If such a determination is made in two consecutive years, a 
Medicare funding warning is issued.  This warning trigger requires presidential and 
congressional action, including that the President submit a proposal for action to 
Congress (Davis, 2011 and GAO, 2006b and 2006c).  While the trigger requires 
action, it is a “soft” trigger, meaning that while the President is required to submit a 
proposal, there is no requirement that legislation be enacted and there is no automatic 
sequester (Davis, 2011 and GAO, 2006b and 2006c). However, as discussed in the 
text, proposals have not been submitted as required by the trigger (Binder et al, 2018).   
Triggers for the 
major Entitlement 
Programs 
Proposed Proposals call for new budget decision rules for major entitlement programs.  Social 
Security proposals have included language requiring presidential and congressional 
action if the Trustees determines there if the balance ratio of either the Social Security 
trust funds will be zero for any calendar year during the succeeding 75 years (GAO, 
2006b).  The report Taking Back Our Fiscal Future recommended enactment of 
explicit long-term budgets, including limits on automatic spending growth for 











The Bipartisan Policy Center (2011) proposed what they called a Save-As-You-Go 
(SAVEGO) mechanism.  Under the proposal, Congress would establish specific 
amount of annual budget savings in different budget categories with an automatic 
enforcement mechanism.  The categories outlined include: (1) discretionary spending, 
(2) health care savings (including Medicare Medicaid, other health care programs, and 
health-related tax expenditures) and (3) other mandatory spending and revenue 
savings.   
Regulatory Budget  Proposed, 
not 
adopted  
Proposals for regulatory budget have been periodically introduced for decades.  These 
proposals vary, but generally call for Congress to approve an annual ‘budget” for 
regulations.  Some proposals would require limits or caps on regulations either in 
aggregate or by agency. 




In January 2002, President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
(P.L.107-110) into law.  NCLB made sweeping changes in the 37-year old Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) by establishing an assessment and 
accountability system linked to federal funding.  NCLB required states receiving Title 
I funding to develop academic standards, test students, measure progress of individual 
schools and school districts, and implement consequences for those schools and 
districts that fail to achieve required progress (Vinovskis, 2009).  After much 
controversy, NCLB was replaced with Every Child Achieves Act in 2015.    
 
The NCLB provides an example of the evolution from using information inform and 
guide policy to using information as the basis of accountability.  NCLB grew out of 
the standards-based school reform movement.  While standard-based assessments 
began at the state level, NCLB is cited as the turning point at which test-driven 
accountability systems became the norm (Jennings, 2012).    




Chapter Two:  
Overview of Research Objectives, Scope, and Methods 
 In this chapter, I provide an overview of the dissertation’s objectives, scope, and 
methods.  I discuss specific research methods for the case studies in the case study 
chapters.     
 
Overview of the Research  
The primary research components included:  
(1) Literature and document review related to the use of analytical tools and decision 
rules used in U.S. federal budgeting and resource allocation.  The scope of this 
review as well as the background drawn from it are discussed in Chapter One. 
(2) Development of a framework to guide and focus case study research. 
(3) Case studies of two reforms that reformulate (or propose to reformulate) 
analytical information into a budget decision rule.  The case studies focus on the 
factors and conditions surrounding the emergence, design, enactment, and 
evolution of the budget decision rule; and  
(4) Comparative case analysis of the factors or conditions that influence emergence 
of analytical information and whether this information was reformulated into a 
sustained and workable decision rule.   
(5) Cross-cutting analysis of common themes based on the case study findings and 






Based on the above research, the dissertation contributes to understanding of the 
following:  
• What key factors (conceptual, technical, and political) influence whether 
analytical information is reformulated into a sustained and workable budget 
decision rule?  How and why do these factors influence the establishment and use 
of budget decision rules?  
 
In examining this question, I examine the relationship between analytical information and 
budget decision rules and their role and limits.   
 
 Introduction to the case studies.   
 I conducted two detailed case studies as a lens for examining budget decision 
rules.  Numerous reforms increase or improve analytical information, but the 
dissertation’s focus is on reforms that go beyond providing information to establishing 
(or proposing) a budget decision rule.  As discussed in Chapter One, budget rules vary by 
design and objective.  To focus the research, the dissertation’s case study selection was 
narrowed to decision rules that are: (1) related to federal resource allocation; (2) applied 
to particular programs or types of programs; and (3) formulated based on information 
previously provided as an analytical tool.36 Foundational budget rules, which establish 
the overall framework or process for the federal budget, and fiscal rules, which apply to 
                                                          
36 These decision rules generally either: (1) use analytical information to change the basis (e.g. 
measurement or organizational structure) used for budget decisions; (2) use analytical 
information as the basis for constraining or enforcing budget decisions; or (3) use federal budget 
resources as the lever within a decision rule that prescribes or proscribes actions or policies based 




existing federal budget aggregates, such as debt and the primarily cash-based deficit, are 
beyond the dissertation’s case study scope.  These types of more general budget rules, 
however, provided important background and context, as discussed in Chapter One.   
 The first case – the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), examines a 
budget decision rule that has been sustained for almost three decades.  FCRA was 
enacted to improve the transparency and budget control of federal direct loans and loan 
guarantees by changing the rules for how their costs are recognized, measured, and 
funded in the federal budget.  FCRA’s design reflects the underlying premises that budget 
decision rules influence budget outcomes and that significantly influencing behavior 
requires moving beyond providing information as an analytical tool.  In the second case, 
tax expenditures, policy concerns resulted in increased analytical information and the 
establishment of some budget constraints, but reforms have stopped short of establishing 
a tax expenditure specific budget decision rule.  37 
The long and unresolved path of tax expenditures provides a valuable case for 
considering the issues surrounding decision rules, especially when compared to the 
FCRA experience.  For both tax expenditures and federal credit programs, concerns 
emerged decades ago that shortcomings in budget treatment, and a resulting lack of 
budget oversight and control, were contributing to their use and rapid growth.  In both 
cases, analytical tools were improved, and new budget decision rules were proposed.  
However, a new budget decision rule (FCRA) was enacted for federal credit programs 
while no direct budget decision rule was enacted for tax expenditures.   
                                                          
37 The establishment of new tax expenditures is indirectly addressed by the PAYGO process, but 
these rules do not directly recognize or control tax expenditures or the growth in existing tax 
expenditures. None of the proposed decision rules that would more directly control tax 




 By providing a detailed examination and juxtaposition of a “successful” reform 
(i.e. enacted and sustained) and an “unsuccessful” reform (i.e. not enacted) the 
dissertation contributes to understanding of the factors and conditions influencing budget 
decision rules.  During the case study research, I focused on the why and how behind the 
emergence, design, enactment, and evolution of each case study decision rule.
 Because FCRA has been sustained for almost three decades this case provided an 
opportunity to gain additional insights on implementation issues and the rule’s role within 
the policy and political process.  As noted by George and Bennett (2004), the use of 
consistent data compilation, including asking the same general questions across cases, 
“…does not prevent the researcher from addressing more specific aspects of the case to 
bring out idiosyncratic features of each case that may also be of interest for theory 




 Overview of Research Questions and Methods  
 For each case study, I traced the evolution of the reform(s) from identification of 
the policy problem to the development of enriched information to the budget decision 
rule (or proposed decision rule).  To help ensure comparability across case studies, the 
central research objective, research questions, and overarching approach were the same 
across the case studies.  For each case study, I examined the following questions:   
 
1. What prompted the development and reporting of enriched information?  
During this part of the research, I focused on the policy concerns or dissatisfaction 
that prompted initial efforts to increase the availability and quality of information.  
Examples of issues I examined include: What policy problem(s) triggered 
concerns? To what extent did there appear to be consensus (or disagreement) 
surrounding problem definition and the underlying causes? What was the 
perceived information gap? What steps were taken to enrich analytical 
information and tools?   
 
2. Why did reform efforts move (or propose to move) beyond improving 
information to establishing (or proposing) a new decision rule? 
For this part of the research, I focused on the reasons and motivations for the 
introduction of reforms that move beyond improving information to establishing a 
budget decision rule.  Examples of issues I examined include: What types of 




limitations of existing information and analytical tools alone? To what extent was 
there consensus (or disagreement) on the need for a new budget decision rule?  
 
3. How was analytical information reformulated into a new (or proposed) decision 
rule?   
For this part of the research, I examined the rule’s design and how factors 
(conceptual, technical, and political) influenced its design and enactment (or 
failure to be enacted).  Examples of issues I examined include:  Which policy 
participants were involved in the design phase?  Which stakeholders took the lead 
in advocating for (opposing) the rule? What issues were raised about rule’s 
objectives, design, and feasibility? Were disagreements mainly technical in nature 
or were there more fundamental concerns about rule’s conceptual framework or 
underlying logic? What were the key unresolved issues or points of contention?   
 
4. What were the key factors which facilitated or created barriers to the enactment 
and implementation of the decision rule? 
For this part of the research I examined how the rule was (or was proposed to be) 
operationalized and implemented with a focus on its translation from theory to 
practice.  Examples of issues examined include: To what extent did the analytical 
information required to support the decision rule already exist? What types of 




5. What happened to the rule? 
For this part of the research, I focused on what happened to the rule (or proposed 
rule).  Examples of issues examined include: If the rule was enacted, was its 
sustained as originally intended? Were significant modifications made after 
enactment?  Did support (opposition) to rule change after enactment? If not 
enacted, did concerns continue and were there subsequent efforts to establish a 
rule?   
 
 Based on the literature and document review discussed in Chapter One, I 
identified several dimensions as potentially influencing analytical information and budget 
decision rules.38 The dimensions included: (1) Trigger, (2) conceptual, (3) political and 
institutional, and (4) technical and implementation.  Table 2.1 outlines these dimensions 
with examples of related issues.  Importantly, for understanding the scope of the 
dissertation’s research, I developed this framework to guide case study research and help 
support general comparability across case studies.  It was not intended to be and was not 
used as an audit plan or checklist requiring strict coverage of each element.   
 The dimensions focus primarily on the why and how of the decision rule (or 
proposed rule).  The trigger dimension, which relates to research questions 1 and 2, 
examines the reasons and motivations behind the decision rule i.e. why analytical 
                                                          
38 As discussed in Chapter Once, the literature and documents reviewed, included, but was not 
limited to, academic research, including journal articles and books; government reports and 
research; working group documents, including, for example, Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board; and congressional testimony.  While the development of the framework and the 
identification of the dimensions drew from a wide variety of sources, it particularly built on 
Rubin’s (2003) article on perennial budget reforms and the author’s knowledge gained working 





information was generated? Why was there was a transition from improving analytical 
tools to proposing a decision rule?  The conceptual dimension, which relates to questions 
2 and 3, examines the conceptual framework or logic underlying the rule i.e. how the rule 
was designed to address the underlying problem?  The technical and implementation 
dimension, which relates to question 3 and 4, considers the more practical aspects of the 
rule’s design and implementation i.e. was sufficient information to available to support 
the rule? How did sufficiency of information influence the rule’s evolution? 39   The 
political and institutional dimension, which relates to all the questions, examines how the 
rule was influenced by and used in the broader political, ideological, and policy 
environment as well as how the rule fits with existing institutional structures and norms.   
  
                                                          
39 The initial literature review and my prior GAO work indicate that estimation issues are more 
important and potentially more problematic for budget rules than for analytical tools (Diamond 




Table 2.1 Framework to Focus and Guide Research 
Dimension Examples of Related Issues 
Trigger 
 
Underlying policy problem and information concerns, e.g.: 
 
• Identification of policy problem (e.g.  by whom, evidence, 
over what time period) 
• Policy participants’ views on problem and underlying causes 
• Development of enriched information (e.g.  by whom, what 
type, where reported) 
• Perceived benefits and limits of initial information and 
analytical tools  
Conceptual  Design Issues related to rule’s conceptual basis or logic, e.g.: 
 
• Design elements (e.g.  process or outcome; underlying logic; 
objectives; and information used as basis of the rule) 
• Process used to design rule (e.g.  stakeholders involved) 
• Policy participants’ views on whether proposed decision rule 
would likely to address problem  
• Alignment of rule with relevant norms and existing institutional 
structures (e.g.  budgeting conventions; congressional processes, 
existing budget rules)  
• Consideration of alternative designs  





Interaction between rule and policy and political 
environment, e.g.   
• Modifications to rule after enactment  
• Evidence of gaming  
• Rule’s role in and interaction with policy and political processes 




Measurement challenges and other implementation issues, 
e.g. 
• Estimation methods and assumptions used for decision rule 
• Discussions of alternative definitions and methodologies 
• Experience with (and consensus on) definitions, measures, and 
estimates 
• Level of consensus on definitional, methodological, and 
estimation issues 
• Disputes over definitional, methodological, and estimation issues  
• Need for modifications during implementation  
• Indicators of adequacy of information used as basis of rule i.e. 
accuracy of estimates 
• Alignment of rule with administrative capacity and institutional 
structures 




For each case study, I conducted the following steps:  
• Archival research and historical document review related to the rule’s trigger, 
design and enactment:   
I identified and examined historical documents covering each case study’s budget 
decision rule proposal(s).  This review included: (1) legislative proposals and 
related legislative histories, including written and recorded records of 
congressional hearings; (2) non-governmental proposals introduced by 
researchers from academia, think tanks, and advocacy groups; (3) government 
oversight and research reports; and (4) budget documents and related executive 
branch reports, testimonies, and guidance.   
 
• Document review related to rule’s operationalization, implementation and use: 
I also examined various documents related to the operationalization, 
implementation, and use of case study decision rules.  This review included but 
was not limited to: (1) congressional hearings related to implementation and 
refinements to the budget decision rule; (2) case study agency documents, 
guidance, and reports; (3) OMB reports, requirements, and guidance; (4) 
government oversight reports and research, e.g.  GAO, CBO, CRS, and Office of 
Inspector Generals; (5) academic research, including books and journal articles; 
(6) working group documents, such as FASAB discussion papers; (7) financial 
statements and audits, where applicable; (8) executive agency reports, where 




• Data collection and analysis: 
I compiled and examined trend data on federal loans and tax expenditures.  I 
examined credit subsidy estimates and reestimates.  More detailed discussion on 
data sources and methods are included in case study chapters. 
 
 The case study research questions and framework outlined above provided a 
structure for gathering and analyzing case-specific information.  Wherever appropriate 
and feasible, triangulation among sources was used to strengthen case study findings.   
 The final phase included cross-case analysis and identified common themes 
across the cases.  I identified, examined, and compared the factors or conditions that 
influence the emergence of analytical information and whether this information was 
reformulated into a sustained and workable budget decision rule.  I identified common 
themes related to: (1) the relationship between analytical tools and decision rules and (2) 
the use and limitations of budget decision rules within the political and policy process.   
 
 Justification of Research Objective and Methods  
 Given the dissertation’s research objectives and questions, the mix-method, case 
study approach along with cross-case analysis provided several advantages, including 
importantly looking at the issues from numerous angles.  A case study approach is the 
preferred approach for answering the “why” and “how” questions which are central to 
the dissertation’s objectives (Yin, 2003).  As noted Yin (2003), “the case study’s unique 




 Addressing the dissertation’s research objectives required understanding the 
interactions between the reform (the decision rule or proposed decision rule) and the 
policy and political processes from which it is created and in which it would be used.  
Yin (2003) describes the case study inquiry as “cope[ing] with a technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interests” and as a result 
“[relying] on multiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion.” (pp.13-14).  George and Bennett (2004) also note that even 
“within a single case we can look at a large number of intervening variables…” (p.  21).  
The use of mixed methods also accommodated the variation among the two cases, 
including the extent and relevance of existing case study research.  For these reasons, the 








Federal Credit Reform Act: Getting to the Rule  
 
 The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA)40 is a case where a budget 
decision rule was enacted and successfully sustained for more than two decades.  During 
the 1970s and 1980s, rapid growth and changing composition of federal credit 
programs41 heightened concerns about their budget impact.  FCRA aimed to improve the 
budget oversight and control of federal direct loans42 and loan guarantees43 by budgeting 
for these programs on a subsidy cost rather than the traditional cash basis.  44 FCRA’s 
innovative design reflects the underlying premise that: (1) budget decision rules influence 
budget outcomes and (2) to significantly influence behavior one must move beyond 
providing information as an analytical tool to establishing authoritative budget decision 
rules.  In other words, budget decision rules matter.   
 Consistent with the dissertation’s research objective, this case study focuses on 
the emergence, enactment, and evolution of FCRA’s budget decision rule.  This chapter 
                                                          
40 FCRA was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508). 
41 Federal credit assistance has long been recognized as an important policy instrument. As 
discussed in Elliott (2011), the federal government had some early roles in credit assistance, 
including, the establishment of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913, but the first major expansion of 
federal credit programs came in response to the Great Depression. Today, numerous federal credit 
programs with varied policy objectives serve a wide range of borrowers.  The fiscal year 2016 
Federal Credit Supplement listed 60 direct loan and 56 guarantee loan programs, not counting 
legislative proposals (OMB, 2015b).      
42 A direct loan is “a disbursement of funds by the government to a nonfederal borrower under a 
contract that requires the repayment of such funds with or without interest.”  (Section 502 (1) of 
the Federal Credit Reform Act)  
43 A loan guarantee is “a pledge with respect to the payment of all or part of the principal or 
interest on any debt obligation of a non-federal borrower to a non-federal lender” (Section 502 
of the Federal Credit Reform Act) 
44 The stated objectives of FCRA include: (1) measure more accurately the costs of federal credit 
programs; (2) place the cost of credit programs on a budgetary equivalent to other federal 
spending; (3) encourage the delivery of benefits in the form most appropriate for the need of 
beneficiaries; and (4) improve the allocation of resources among credit programs and between 




begins by briefly explaining FCRA’s budget rule before examining the “trigger” which 
promoted concerns about the budget treatment of federal credit programs.  The chapter 
then examines decades of information expansion, incremental budget process reforms, 
reform proposals, and consensus building that preceded FCRA’s enactment.  Chapter 
Four then examines the implementation and use of FCRA’s rule.  Chapter Five examines 
trends in direct loans and loan guarantees, before and after FCRA.   Chapter Six 
concludes the case study by providing summary thoughts and observations on the FCRA 
experience.   
 
The Rule: Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 changed budget rules for federal 
direct loans and loan guarantees.   
 The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) significantly changed budgeting 
for federal credit programs by requiring policymakers to recognize and fund the long-
term costs of federal direct loans and federal loans guarantees.  Under FCRA, the 
government’s estimated subsidy cost measured on a net present value basis 45 is the basis 
of budget recognition, funding, and control.  This was a significant change because cash-
based measurement is the general rule for the federal budget.46  
 FCRA defines the cost of federal direct loans and loan guarantees as “the 
estimated long-term cost to the government for a direct loan or loan guarantee or 
                                                          
45 Net present value is a single number that expresses current and future cash flows in terms of an 
equivalent lump sum received (or paid) today. Payments or receipts are discounted to an 
equivalent present value using an interest rate, referred to as the discount rate (CBO, 2012).     
46 The U.S. federal budget is a cash- and obligations- based budget. The budget occurs in three 
stages. Budget authority is provided by law to incur obligations that will result in cash outlays.  A 
budget (cash) outlay is a cash payment to liquidate an obligation. An obligation is a legally 
binding agreement that will result in cash outlays either immediately or in the future. With limited 




modification thereof, calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative 
costs and any incidental effects on government receipts or outlays (Section 502(5A)).  
These costs commonly referred as “subsidy costs”47 are calculated by discounting the 
government’s expected cash flows over the life of the loan.  Credit program cash flows 
generally include: loan amounts disbursed, principal repaid, interest received, fees 
collected, and net losses from defaults.  Under FCRA, the discount rate used to calculate 
subsidy costs is the Treasury’s borrowing rate.48 This choice of discount rate has been 
controversial from the start, as will be discussed later in the case.      
 FCRA requires that appropriations cover subsidy costs of direct loans and loan 
guarantees.  For discretionary credit programs, FCRA requires agencies receive 
appropriations for the subsidy costs before credit is extended.49  For mandatory programs, 
indefinite budget authority50 is provided to cover the cost of authorized loans (CBO, 
1991).  In another somewhat controversial decision, FCRA excludes administrative costs 
from the calculation of subsidy costs and these costs continue to be funded on a cash 
basis.    
                                                          
47 Although FCRA does not use the term “subsidy costs” it is used widely in operationalization 
and implementation.  
48 Under FCRA Section 502 (5E), the discount rate used to calculate subsidy costs was the 
“average interest rate on marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity.”  The required 
discount rate was revised by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  According to OMB (2014) for 
loans made, guaranteed, or modified in FY 2001 and thereafter the cash flow estimated for each 
year is discounted using the interest rate on the marketable, zero-coupon Treasury security with 
the same maturity from the date of disbursement as that cash flow. For example, the cash flow for 
a two-year loan is discounted using the Treasury rate for a two-year zero-coupon note.  Discount 
rates are based on Treasury rates used in the economic assumptions for the budget year. OMB 
provides these rates to credit agencies (OMB, 2014b).    
49 The appropriated subsidy amount and the estimated subsidy rates limit credit programs. To 
prepare the budget, estimated subsidy rates are multiplied by the projected or authorized loan 
volume to arrive at estimates of subsides expected to be obligated or committed by a credit 
program (CBO, 2003).   
50 Indefinite budget authority is budget authority that, at time of enactment, is for an unspecified 




 A central element of FCRA is the separation of subsidy costs from nonsubsidized 
cash flows.  To do this, FCRA established three main types of budget accounts for credit 
programs: (1) program accounts, (2) financing accounts, and (3) liquidating accounts 
(OMB, 2014b).51 For direct loan obligations52 and loan guarantee commitments53 made 
after the start of fiscal year 1992, program accounts record the subsidy costs and the 
administrative costs while the finance account records incidental (non-subsidized) cash 
flows.54 Liquidating accounts, which are still measured on a cash-basis, are only used for 
direct loans and loan guarantees made before FCRA’s effective date (GAO, 1997a and 
OMB, 2014b).    
 The program and financing accounts affect the budget totals and the 
deficit/surplus differently.  Program accounts are included in budget totals.  Financing 
accounts are non-budgetary; they are included in the Budget Appendix for informational 
                                                          
51 OMB also requires that agencies with negative subsidies must have special fund receipts 
accounts (GAO, 1998 and OMB, 2014b). These receipt accounts receive and hold receipts 
generated when a credit program’s net present value cash inflows exceed its net present value 
cash outflows. The receipt accounts also receive and hold receipts when there is a downward 
reestimate of subsidy costs that indicate that the financing account balance is too high.    
52 A direct loan obligation means a binding agreement by a federal agency to make a direct loan 
when specified conditions are fulfilled by the borrower (OMB, 2014b).   
53 A loan guarantee commitment means a binding agreement by a federal agency to make a loan 
guarantee when specified conditions are fulfilled by the borrower, the lender, or any other party 
to the guarantee agreement (OMB, 2014b)  
54 The program accounts receive separate appropriations for the subsidy costs and the 
administrative costs.  Administrative costs continue to be budgeted for on a cash basis and are 
outlayed from the program account as they are disbursed.  Budget obligations for the subsidy 
costs are recorded when the government enters into a loan obligation or guarantee commitment.  
When a direct loan or loan guarantee is disbursed, the program account records outlays for the 
subsidy amount and simultaneously transfers it to the financing account (OMB, 2014b). The 
financing account is used to record the cash flows associated with direct loans and loan 
guarantees over their lives. As explained in OMB Circular A-11, for direct loans, the financing 
account combines the subsidy payment from the program account with Treasury borrowing to 
finance the direct loans.  It repays Treasury over time using principal and interest collected from 
borrowers. For loan guarantees, the financing account holds the subsidy payment from the 
program account as a reserve against future default claims.  This reserve, including earned 




purposes only and they are not included in the budget totals.  As a result, subsidy costs 
(rather than annual net cash flows) are now included in a primary focus of budget 
decision making – the budget deficit or surplus. 
 Recognizing the uncertainty associated with subsidy cost estimation, FCRA 
requires the reestimation of subsidy costs.  Federal credit agencies must reestimate 
subsidy cost throughout the life of each loan cohort55 to reflect actual cash flows and 
changes in assumptions about future cash flows (OMB, 2014b).  These reestimates are 
penalty-free from a budget stand point, meaning that permanent indefinite budget 
authority56 is provided for upward reestimates of subsidy costs and upward reestimates of 
discretionary programs are not limited by BEA spending constraints.  A loan’s actual, 
realized subsidy equals the initial subsidy estimate plus the sum of lifetime reestimates.  
So at the end of a loan’s life, total subsidy cost reconciles with the government’s cash 
payments over the life of the loan.  In this way, FCRA is still cash-based, but it changes 
the timing of recognition of cash flows.   
 
The Trigger: Rapid Growth and Changing Composition of Federal Credit 
Programs Prompted Concerns About Budget Rules.   
 Rapid growth and changing composition of federal credit programs during the late 
1970s and 1980s triggered concerns about their budget impact.  Numerous government 
reports, research papers, and congressional testimonies raised alarms that: (1) federal 
credit programs were growing faster than direct federal expenditures and (2) federal loan 
                                                          
55 A loan cohort includes all direct loans or loan guarantees of a credit program for which a 
subsidy appropriation is provided for a given fiscal year (OMB, 2014b).  
56 Permanent indefinite authority is budget authority for an unspecified amount that is available as 




guarantees were growing faster than federal direct loans.  Government officials, federal 
budget experts, and other policy participants concurred that shortcomings in the 
budgeting for federal credit programs, namely the use of cash-based measurement, 
contributed to these trends (CBO, 1978, 1984, 1989; Gale, 1989; GAO 1980, Ippolito 
1984; Lenard and Rhye, 1981; Rivlin, 1979; and OMB, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1989). 
 Figure 3.1 shows the significant growth in the face value outstanding for federal 
direct loans and loan guarantees in years leading up to FCRA’s enactment.  While both 
direct loans and loan guarantees increased between 1970 to 1990, by the mid-1980s, 
guaranteed loans were growing significantly relative to direct loans and direct loan were 
declining.    
Figure 3.1 Face Value of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantee, Fiscal Years 1970-1990 
 
 








































 The composition of loan guarantees also was changing.  Federal loan guarantees 
to large, single borrowers (such as Lockheed,57 Chrysler,58 and New York City59) were 
first made during the 1970s (Rivlin 1981f, p.4 and Ippolito 1984, pp.  77-87).  CBO 
(1978) outlined congressional concerns about a shift in proposed guarantees from 
“actuarially sound small-loan programs to the more venturesome proposals for financing 
specific projects, especially large capital plants” (p.  16).  As evidence of the shift, CBO 
and GAO pointed to the declining share of federal credit assistance made up of housing 
credit programs backed by liens on marketable property (CBO, 1978, Bowsher, 1990, and 
Rivlin, 1981).  Rivlin (1981f) reported that the share of all new federal loan guarantee 
commitments accounted for by FHA and VA mortgages fell from 97 in 1950 to 54 
percent by 1980 (p.3).   
 
Consensus emerged about shortcomings of cash budgeting for federal credit 
programs.   
 FCRA grew out of considerable consensus on both: (1) the nature of the problem, 
i.e., the unchecked growth and changing composition of federal credit programs and (2) 
the contributory role of budget rules i.e. the use of cash-based measurement.  Budgeting 
for federal credit programs is complicated by the mismatch between the federal budget’s 
use of cash-based measurement and the long-term nature of federal credit programs.  For 
most federal programs, cash-based measurement provides a reasonable measure of the 
budget cost of the government’s commitment at the time policy decisions are made 
                                                          
57 P.L. 92-70 
58 P.L. 86-185 




(GAO, 1997b).  However, in the case of federal credit programs, a cash-based budget, 
with its focus on annual net cash flows, fails to accurately recognize the government’s 
total budget cost at the time decisions to provide credit are made.   
 To illustrate the issue, Table 3.1 provides a simplified, hypothetical example 
comparing cash-based budgeting for a direct loan and loan guarantee, assuming each has 
the same ultimate cost to the government.60 While the shortcomings of cash-based 
budgeting for federal loans were more complicated than portrayed in this simplified 
example it provides a useful starting point for understanding the problem.  61 As can be 
seen, using cash-based measurement results in different budget information and 
incentives for these credit instruments at the time they are issued even when they have 
the same ultimate cost to the government.  Cash-based measurement overstates the cost 
of direct loans because the full amount of the loan is recorded in the budget when the 
loan is extended, ignoring expected future repayments.  As noted by Gale (1989) and 
others, this treatment implies the cost of a direct loan is its total face value and that this 
cost occurs at the time the loan is made.  Conversely, for loan guarantees, cash-based 
measurement understates the government’s costs when guarantees are issued.  Further, 
there is no budget recognition when direct loan defaults occur.  For loan guarantees, no 
budget cost is recorded when a guarantee is issued, ignoring that future defaults may 
result in significant costs to the government.  Thus, under cash-based measurement, at the 
time policymakers were deciding whether to provide credit assistance, new loan 
guarantees appeared “free” while new direct loans appeared as expensive as grants.   
                                                          
60 Similar examples are included in existing literature.   
61 Because budget cash flows are recorded on a net basis and cash flows from new and previous 
credit activities were comingled, the government’s cost of new credit may be either be overstated 





Table 3.1 Cash-based Budgeting, Direct Loans Vs.  Loan Guarantees 
 
Source: Table created by author.   
 
 Historical documents detail long-standing concerns that cash-based budgeting for 
federal credit programs distorted incentives for sound policy and management decision-
making.  Almost three decades before FCRA’s enactment, a 1963 report of the 
Committee on Federal Credit Programs raised concerns about the budget control and 
oversight of these programs.  In 1967, the widely-recognized report by President’s 
Commission on Budget Concepts included a chapter on federal credit programs and noted 
that the appropriate treatment of federal loan outlays was “one of the most difficult 
questions” the Commission faced (U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 47).   
 While the CBA of 1974 offered another opportunity to address budgeting for 
federal credit programs it did not.  Rather, the CBA explicitly excluded of loan 
guarantees from the definitions of budget authority.  62The main justifications for this 
                                                          
62 For budget authority [Section 3(a)(2)] and new spending authority [section 401(c)(2)] the CBA 
states, “Such term does not include authority to insure or guarantee the repayment of 
indebtedness incurred by another person or government” (as cited in CBO, 1978, p. 30). 
Simplified, Hypothetical Example 
Cash-based Budget Measurement of Direct Loan and Loan Guarantee 
 
 Amount recognized 
and funded in the 
budget in fiscal year 
credit issued 
Defaults or repayments Government’s subsidy 
cost over life of loan 
Direct loan $100 million $90 million repayments 
(negative cash outlays, i.e., 
cash inflows from loan 




$0 $10 million default 
payments 





exclusion were that loan guarantees are contingent (not direct) liabilities of the 
government as well as political considerations aimed at protecting loan programs, 
particularly for agriculture, from spending constraints (Schick, 1979).  However, while 
the CBA did not change the budget treatment of federal credit programs its establishment 
of the CBO opened the door for influential analysis that informed and shaped the debate 
leading up to FCRA. 
 During the late 1970s and 1980s, government officials and budget experts 
continued to warn that cash-based budgeting did not provide adequate information or 
incentives to assess and control federal credit programs (CBO, 1989 and Gale, 1989).   
CBO Director, Alice Rivlin, testified multiple times, that loan guarantees were a 
significant problem because many people viewed them as a “no-cost financing device” 
(CBO, 1978 and Rivlin, 1981).  CBO’s 1978 report on federal loan guarantees argued: 
“…proposals to use loan guarantees as a means of financing have great appeal: 
the appearance of low budgetary costs and minimal federal intervention in the 
economy.  Budgetary costs appear low because guaranteed loans are excluded 
(by statue) from the definition of budget authority and hence are not adequately 
addressed in a budget process designed to control new budget authority and 
hence outlays” (CBO, 1978, p.  xii).     
 
 Cash-based budgeting not only made guarantees appear costless, but, in some 
cases, it made them appear “profitable.” When the government charged initiation fees for 
new guarantees (a relatively common practice) budget outlays for the new guarantees 
could be negative (i.e., reflecting cash inflows or “income”), even when the guarantees 
would ultimately have a cost.  As expressed by Gale (1989), under cash-based budgeting, 
“[n]othing remotely resembling the expected government costs of newly issued 




 Various policy participants cited the shortcomings of the cash-based budget as a 
key factor in the faster growth of loan guarantees relative to direct loans (CBO, 
1978/1979; Cuny, 1991; Elliott, 2004; Gale, 1989, Ipollito, 1984, and Penner, 1984).  63 
In 1977, GAO testified: 
 “[w]hen some particular policy instrument such as guaranteed loans is not 
included in the budget totals, it becomes more attractive to an agency than it 
should be.  Because loan guarantees and other off-budget programs avoid budget 
ceilings, there is a tendency to use them when some on-budget programs -- direct 
loans, direct subsidies, etc.  – might be more efficient” (Havens, 1977, p.  3).   
 
A decade later, CBO (1989) expressed similar concerns, arguing that “a cash-basis 
treatment of credit encourages spurious attempts to reduce the budget deficit by 
substituting guarantees for direct loans” (p. 6).   
 While loan guarantees received significant attention, cash-based budgeting also 
created misleading information and perverse incentives for direct loans.  Reform 
proponents argued that because budget outlays included the full value in the first year of 
a loan there was significant disincentive to expand even worthy direct loan programs 
(CBO, 1989, Bickley, 2012, Elliott, 2004, and Gale, 1989).  Further, the shortcomings of 
cash-based budgeting for direct loans were even more complicated than portrayed in the 
above simplified example because the federal budget measures net cash flows and 
comingles credit activities from various years.  Netting means that new loans are offset 
by repayments or sales of existing loans.  This netting and comingling of cash flows 
                                                          
63 As an example of budget incentives leading to poor policy decisions CBO (1978) highlighted 
the New Communities Program. Grants for the programs were terminated in 1973, but the 
program’s projects continued to be financed with loan guarantees, with poor results (p. 25).  CBO 
provided additional examples of proposals to replace loan programs with federal guarantees of 
privately-issued loans. See Congressional Budget Office, Credit Reform: Comparable Budget 




further increased the difficulty of deciphering the cost of new credit activities, resulting in 
distorted incentives and opportunities for budget gimmicks. 
 For direct loans, proceeds from loan sales and repayments of principal and 
interest were recorded as collections in the fiscal year they were received and thus offset 
all or part of the cost of the new loans.  Because cash flows from previous and new loans 
were comingled it was often difficult to decipher the cost of new loan activity.  As an 
example of the problem, CBO (1978) explained that the fiscal year 1979 budget totals for 
direct loans were $4.3 billion while new direct loans were estimated at $26.6 billion (p.  
49).  As another example, CBO (1982) reported that in 1980, the Commodity Credit 
Corporation extended almost $6 billion in loans, but because repayments of earlier loans 
were greater, the net budget outlays were negative (p. 7).  64   
 Finally, for both loan guarantees and direct loans, the cash-based budget did not 
address the differing risk levels of credit programs.  The government’s cost for loans 
relates more closely to loan characteristics, such as interest rates, likelihood of default, 
and maturity, then to the volume of loans (Reischauer, 1990c, p. 4).  However, under 
cash-based measurement, all newly-issued direct loans were budgeted for their full face-
value regardless of underlying terms and risks, (GAO, 1987).  All newly-issued loan 
guarantees were budgeted at zero costs even if they had different levels of default risk.  
                                                          
64 There also were concerns about the role of off-budget credit activities and the Federal 
Financing Bank (FFB) in obscuring the government’s cost. A significant problem was the sale of 
direct loan obligations from on-budget federal agencies to the FFB. When the FFB purchased an 
agency’s loans, the sale counted as a loan repayment (rather than as a means of financing) and, as 
a result, these transactions offset the agency’s outlays for credit activities (Bennett and 
DiLorenzo, 1983).  Importantly, these loan sales reduced total expenditures and the deficit, even 





Thus, at time decisions to extend credit were made, the budget did not facilitate 
understanding and consideration of the specific or relative risks associated with various 
credit programs.   
 Fiscal constraints exacerbated the shortcomings of the cash-based budget for 
federal credit programs.  The 1967 Commission warned:  
“continuing pressure on Congress and the Executive to hold down the level of apparent 
Federal spending and the budget deficit establish artificial incentives to shift from direct 
loans to indirect lending whether or not the guarantee or insurance of private loans 
represents a fully satisfactory substitute” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).   
 
Almost two decades later, Ippolito (1984) argued: 
When pressures develop to control budget totals, as has been the case in recent 
years, credit programs offer a loophole.  Substantial amounts of financial 
assistance can be distributed to a wide range of borrowers with little or no direct 
budgetary costs” (p. xiii).   
  
Pre-FCRA: Better Information, Piecemeal Budget Controls, Reform Proposals, and 
Consensus Building  
 Decades of information expansion, incremental budget process reform, reform 
proposals, and consensus building preceded FCRA’s enactment.65 By the early 1950s, 
OMB had added supplemental information on federal credit programs in the budget.  
Over the next several decades, OMB expanded the information on federal credit 
programs included in various budget documents.  In response to continuing concerns, 
lawmakers, government officials, and outside experts proposed a range of reforms to 
further improve budget oversight and control of credit programs.  Over time, considerable 
consensus emerged that subsidy costs, as opposed to net cash flows, is a more appropriate 
                                                          
65 While there were heightened concerns about federal credit programs, the expansion of 
information on federal credit programs was consistent with governmentwide reforms to expand 




budget cost measure for federal credit programs.  Table 3.2 provides a snapshot of 






   Source: Table compiled by author  
Table 3.2 The Path to FCRA Enactment, 1950s to 1990 
1950s: President’s fiscal year 1952 budget includes federal credit as part of “Special 
 Analyses”  
 
1960s: Committee on Federal Credit Programs (1963) reports on federal credit 
 programs 
 
 President Commission on Budget Concepts (1967) addresses federal credit 
 
1970s:  Special Analyses of budget began to include “illustrative” subsidy cost 
 estimates 
 
 President’s fiscal year 1972 budget message calls for legislative action 
 
Fiscal year 1978 budget includes legislative proposals to address budgeting for 
loan sales and recommends “reconsideration” of the exclusion of guarantees 
from budget authority 
 
CBO publishes a comprehensive report on budget treatment of loan guarantees   
 
Congressional hearings on budgeting for credit programs 
 
Carter administration pledges its intention to improve budget control of federal 
credit programs, but does not submit legislative proposals 
 
Representatives from CBO, GAO, OMB, Treasury, and the Federal Reserve 
Board all endorse the need for reform  
 
1980s: President’s fiscal year 1981 budget includes the first-ever credit budget 
 
OMB revises circular A-70 to require federal agencies calculate and transmit 
subsidy cost data to OMB for all their direct loan and loan guarantee programs. 
 
GRH requires that all new direct loans and loan guarantees be on-budget 
 
CBA amended to require allocations of new direct loan obligations and loan 
guarantee commitments 
 
  Reagan and Bush Administrations submit credit reform proposal 
 
 GAO and CBO issue comprehensive reports reviewing credit reform proposals 
 
Proposals from Senate Budget Committee, CBO, GAO, OMB and Treasury 
require the appropriation of subsidy costs before credit extended 
 
1990:   The Federal Credit Reform Act signed into law as part of the Omnibus Budget  







 Enhanced budget information and analytical tools preceded FCRA. 
 In the decades preceding FCRA, OMB significantly increased the analytical tools 
included in the federal budget, including those for federal credit programs.  Starting with 
fiscal year 1947, the President’s budget included a separate section entitled “Special 
Analyses and Tables.” Initially, these Special Analyses did not include federal credit 
programs.  However, credit programs were included, for the first time, in the fiscal year 
1953 budget as “Special Analyses E, Federal Credit Programs” (OMB, 1951, pp.  976-
981).66 67 The Special Analyses for credit programs generally included narrative 
discussion as well as tables listing new commitments, credit expenditures, and the status 
of credit authority for major credit programs (OMB, 1951).  Some presentations included 
both the gross and net levels of credit activities (OMB, 1951).   
 By the mid-1960s, these analyses also included short discussions of credit 
program interest rates, but they did not specifically discuss the government’s subsidy 
costs.  The fiscal year 1972 volume provided (for the first time) summary estimates of 
loan subsidy costs (OMB, 1971b).  These estimates of subsidy costs, however, were 
meant to be illustrative, rather than precise measures of budget costs.  The fiscal year 
1972 Special Analyses stated:  
“[p]recise subsidy measurements are not available as several assumptions have 
been required.  These estimates are mainly intended to be illustrative rather than 
exact or comprehensive measures.  The data provided here are a first step toward 
the difficult task of meeting widespread interest in the measurement of the costs of 
loan subsidies…” (OMB, 1971b, p.78). 
 
                                                          
66 Beginning with the 1967 budget, OMB removed all special analyses from the main budget 
document and included them in a separate budget volume entitled Special Analyses.  
67 In addition to the direct loan and loan guarantee programs that were eventually covered by 
FCRA, the volume provided information on other federal credit assistance, such as federal 




 Subsequent Special Analyses expanded information on interest subsidies.  
Analyses included subsidy cost estimates for loans as well as discussions of the 
importance of interest rate assumptions on these estimates.  Over the years, OMB dealt 
with interest rate assumptions differently.  The Fiscal Year 1973 Special Analyses noted 
that “[t]he selection of an appropriate rate might vary with analytical objectives” (p.79).  
Some analyses, including those for fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1974, provided 
subsidy estimates using one, uniform discount rate (OMB, 1972, 1973).  Alternatively, 
the fiscal year 1978 volume presented subsidy costs using three different discount rates to 
“…illustrate the importance of interest rate differences to the value of the subsidy” 
(OMB, 1977, p. 113).    
 These experiments and expansions of analytical tools for federal credit programs, 
however, did not fully address concerns surrounding the budget oversight and control of 
federal credit programs.  The fiscal year 1972 President’s budget identified the lack of 
budget control over federal credit programs as a major problem and suggested the need 
for “legislation to enable these credit programs to be reviewed and coordinated with 
other federal programs” (OMB, 1971a, p.18).  The fiscal year 1978 budget included 
legislative proposals, calling for the repeal of off-budget entities and changes to the 
budget treatment of loan sales.  It also recommended a “reconsideration” of the 
exclusion of loan guarantees from budget authority (OMB, 1977).  No action was taken 
on these proposals.   
 The Carter Administration continued to support reform, but it did not submit 
legislative proposals.  The fiscal year 1979 budget stated a commitment “to work closely 




acceptable system” (OMB, 1978, p. 27).  The fiscal year 1980 budget repeated the need 
to “establish a system of controls” over federal credit programs, but again the 
Administration did not submit proposed legislation (OMB, 1979, p. 27 and Rivlin, 1979).  
The next year, however, the President’s fiscal year 1981 budget, included the first-ever 
federal credit budget. 
 
Credit Budget Was Important Milestone but Did Not Fully Address 
Concerns.   
 The publication of the first credit budget was an important milestone in the path to 
FCRA.  The Administration described the credit budget as a “comprehensive and 
systematic review of Federal credit activities” (OMB, 1980, p. 80).  While the unified 
budget (the primary focus of budget policy) continued to measure federal credit programs 
on a net cash-basis the separate credit budget provided a statement of federal credit 
program activity for the fiscal year.  It included gross (as opposed to the net) level of 
credit activity.  By using gross levels, the credit budget focused on total new credit, rather 
the incremental portion resulting from netting new credit with prior credit (CBO, 1982).  
It also recommended appropriation limits for a range of direct loan and loan guarantee 
programs.  Appropriation limits (which were included in appropriations language) for 
some credit programs, set annual ceilings on the authority to incur direct loan obligations 
or to enter into loan guarantee commitments (CBO, 1980 and OMB, 1980).  As part of 
the implementation process, CBO tracked congressional action on the credit budget and 
periodically reported to the Budget Committee on the status of credit activities (CBO, 




 While the credit budget was an important milestone on the path to new budget 
decision rules for credit programs it had significant shortcomings.  Because the credit 
budget was separate from the unified budget and focused on loan volume (rather than 
subsidy cost) it did not facilitate comparisons or tradeoffs with other federal programs.  
Policy participants expressed concerns that: (1) it did not establish (or propose legislation 
to establish) a formal credit control system; (2) its appropriation limitations were of 
questionable effectiveness; and (3) it did not focus attention or control on subsidy costs 
(CBO, 1989, 1991; Cuny, 1991; and OMB, 1988).   
  In introducing the credit budget, the Administration did not propose legislation to 
change rules to establish a formal, permanent credit control system.68  Rather, the 
Administration suggested that the Congress could establish a framework for considering 
individual credit program limits by setting targets and ceilings on gross direct loans and 
loan guarantees.  In congressional hearings, representatives from CBO, OMB, the 
Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve all recommended that 
Congress establish its own credit budget to set aggregate targets and ceilings on federal 
credit, as well as limitations for individual credit programs (CBO, 1980; Control of 
Federal Credit Programs, 1979 and Reischauer, 1980, p.5).69  Congress choose not to 
establish such a process. 
 While Congress did not adopt its own credit budget, beginning in the early 1980s, 
it selectively imposed some budgetary controls on direct loans and loan guarantees 
(Bickley, 2003; CBO, 1982; GAO, 1989; and Ipollito, 1984).  Congressional action 
                                                          
68 The credit budget was implemented as part of OMB’s budget preparation process.   
69 CBO (1981) argued that only a process which sets overall targets and ceilings would: (1) 
provide Congress an opportunity to make allocations among competing programs and (2) help 




included; (1) setting targets in the budget resolution and (2) enacting limitations for some 
individual credit programs in appropriations language.  In the fiscal year 1981 budget 
resolution, Congress, for the first time, set targets for direct obligations and loan 
guarantee commitments (Rivlin, 1981, p. 8).  These targets, however, were not binding.  
Congress continued to set targets for federal direct loans and loan guarantees in the 
budget resolutions for fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 1985.  Beginning with the 
fiscal year 1982 these targets were allocated among budget functions, but, except for the 
fiscal year 1983 budget resolution, these targets were nonbinding.70  In 1985, the CBA 
was amended to require allocations of new direct loan obligations and new loan 
guarantee commitments (CBO, 1989 and GAO, 1989).   
 Congress also included annual volume limitations on the direct loan obligations 
and loan guarantee commitments in appropriations language, but these were of 
questionable meaningfulness and effectiveness.  First, significant categories of federal 
credit programs were excluded.71 The proposed limitations included in the fiscal year 
1981 budget covered only about 45 percent of total new direct loan obligations and about 
40 percent of new loan guarantee commitments72,73 (CBO, 1980, p. 7).  Further, even 
                                                          
70 According to CBO (1984), Congress went further in fiscal year 1983 resolution than it had in 
the past.  Among other things, it included point-of-order enforcement on the second budget 
resolution ceiling for the credit budget. It also required the allocation of the credit budget to 
appropriation and authorizing committees by the Budget Committees and allocation of the credit 
budget among major programs and subcommittees by the committee of jurisdiction. 
71 According to CBO (1980), two general categories of program were exempted: (1) emergency 
assistance programs, such as disaster loan programs and (2) entitlement programs, such as 
veterans’ credit assistance. There also were several one-time exceptions. In 1984, 28 percent of 
direct loans obligated and 35 percent of primary guarantees committed were subject to annual 
limits (CBO, 1985).  
72 Another concern was there were no direct limitations on FFB activities which left “open a door 
through which activities may escape the bounds of the unified budget” (CBO, 1980, p. 7). 
73 In its report on the Administration’s fiscal year 1982 Credit Budget, CBO (1981) argued that 
“to achieve systematic control over credit programs, the Congress will have to develop a policy 




when volume limits were in place, the legislated levels often exceeded demand so that 
they did not provide any real constraint (CBO, 1991 and Pariser, 1992).  CBO (1982) 
reported that the fiscal year 1982 requested limit for the Central Liquidity Faciality of the 
National credit Union Administration was $750 million above the estimated obligation 
level.  CBO (1991) reported that the loan limits for Export-Import Bank loan guarantees 
and FHA’s mortgage insurance far exceeded actual levels. 
 Most importantly, the focus of control in the credit budget was on the volume (not 
the subsidy cost) of credit programs.  As discussed in the next section, over time, the 
analytical focus shifted from the volume of credit activities to the government’s subsidy 
costs.  Reflecting this shift, in August 1984, OMB revised Circular A-70 Policies and 
Guidelines for Federal Credit Programs to require federal agencies to calculate the 
subsidy costs for all their direct loan and loan guarantee programs and transmit this data 
to OMB (CBO, 1989).74 While this requirement was generally viewed as a positive step 
and a catalyst for improving data for estimating subsidy costs, there was significant 
concern that subsidy costs were not directly integrated into budget reporting and control 
(Bickley, 1991; Cuny, 1991; CBO, 1989; Wolf, 1987; Ippolito, 1984; and OMB, 1987).  
Cuny (1991) explained: 
“….  a fairly general agreement emerged that the credit budget places limitations 
on the wrong control point.  The limitations are on the face value of new credit 
activity whereas more recent analyses generally agree that the most critical point 
of control is the level of subsidies subsumed within the new loans or guarantees” 
(p.  26).    
 
 
                                                          
74 The required method for calculating subsidy costs was comparison of private financing terms 





President Reagan expressed similar concerns: 
“The credit budget has the advantage of focusing attention on the decisions that 
commit the government to new expenditures.  But it does not show the cost of 
these expenditures – the subsidies.  Instead it shows the total volume of credit 
assisted.  Thus, it does not distinguish between programs with deep subsidies and 
those with small ones.  Moreover, the credit budget is separate from the unified 
budget so trade-offs between credit and other spending cannot be made” 
(Reagan, 1987, p.1).   
 
The fiscal year 1990 budget continued to highlight the shortcomings of the credit budget, 
stating that it “….  does not measure subsidy, nor does it place any direct restriction on 
the level of subsidy that a program offers to the borrower” (OMB, 1989).   
 
Elite consensus75 emerged that appropriated subsidy cost is the appropriate 
budget measure for federal loan programs, but unresolved issues remained.   
 
 The concept of subsidy cost was introduced as a useful budgetary measure for 
federal credit programs more than two decades before FCRA’s enactment.  In 1967, the 
President’s Commission on Budget Concepts discussed subsidy cost and recommended 
that, to the extent practicable, the subsidy portion of federal direct loans be identified and 
included in the receipt/expenditure account of the budget (CBO, 1989 and U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1967).  Specifically, the President’s Commission argued: 
 “… the subsidy elements in all such loans should be included and specifically 
disclosed in the expenditure rather than the loan account of the budget to the 
extent practicable since such subsidies are much more like grants than loans.  
This will make a meaningful separation of loans from the other budget 
                                                          
75 In this dissertation, elite consensus is used to refer to consensus among key stakeholders, including:  (1) 
political leaders associated with the rule’s establishment and implementation (such as Chairs and ranking 
members of relevant committees, such as the appropriations, budget or tax writing committees) and (2) 
prominent experts and technicians (from government, e.g. CBO, OMB, and GAO; academia; and non-




expenditures possible.  Measurement of the subsidy in loans would reflect the 
interest rate subsidy, capitalized at the time the loan is made, and the provision of 
adequate allowances for losses.  (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 47).   
 
 The Commission did not provide specific recommendations for federal loan 
guarantees, but it expressed “…  concern about the need for coordinated surveillance and 
direction of all Federal lending activity – direct and guaranteed” and recommended 
further study of the budgetary treatment of the loan guarantees (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967, pp. 49-50).  While no immediate action was taken on the 
Commission’s recommendations, some elements of these recommendations were 
reflected in FCRA’s design more than two decades later.    
 During the 1970s and 1980s various policy participants provided a range of 
proposals to improve the budget oversight and control of federal credit programs (CBO, 
1984, 1989; OMB, 1987, 1989).  These proposals varied significantly.  One reform 
option was to further improve and expand analytical tools without changing budget 
decision rules.  One idea was that the subsidy cost information already in the Special 
Analysis could be included more directly in budget account presentations, such as: (1) the 
Budget Appendix presentation for federal credit programs’ budget accounts, (2) CBO cost 
estimates, and (3) Appropriations Committee reports (CBO, 1984).  However, as 
explained by CBO (1984), under this type of approach, subsidy cost estimates would be 
“memoranda items.” Because net cash flows, rather than subsidy costs, would continue 
to be the basis of budget measurement and control CBO and others raised significant 
doubts about whether this type of reform would sufficiently improve the oversight of 





“[a]n informational analysis for many years has been included in a special 
analysis on credit programs in the President’s budget.  Although this analysis has 
provided an indispensable tool for specialists, it has not provided the Congress 
with an effective mechanism for understanding or controlling credit activities.  A 
new analysis likely would not improve Congressional control” (p. 35).   
   
 However, moving beyond analytical tools to establish authoritative budget 
decision rules involved numerous design choices and political hurdles.  An important 
issue was determining and reaching workable consensus on the objective of a new budget 
decision rule.  If the objective was to constrain policymakers’ decisions about the level 
and composition of federal credit, then hard spending limits on volume or subsidy costs 
would be appropriate.  Alternatively, if the objective was to improve budget parity76 then 
it would be appropriate to focus on improving budget measurement and recognition of 
subsidy costs.   
 As shown in Table 3.3, over time, the focus of reform efforts generally shifted 
from the controlling the volume of federal credit programs to establishing a spending-
equivalent, namely subsidy costs.  In the decade preceding FCRA, key players, including 
CBO, GAO, OMB, and the budget committee, articulated strong support for using 
subsidy costs to measure the budget costs of federal credit programs.  Some, however, 
continued to argue that to make significant difference a process rule – such as subsidy 
budgeting – might need to be combined with a hard constraint.  In an April 11, 1990 
congressional hearing, OMB director, Richard Darman expressed his view that subsidy 
budgeting alone “won’t do the trick” and should be combined with a limitation on 
aggregate credit exposure (C-SPAN, 1990).  He argued 
                                                          
76 Budget parity generally refers to transactions with equivalent economic effects receiving equal 




“a more accurate accounting of credit program subsidies and costs will be of 
little more than academic interest if it is not linked to an effective system to limit 
and control overall credit exposure” (C-SPAN, 1990). 
 
However, the enactment of an outcome-based rule providing a constraint on the 
level of federal credit did not appear politically viable at the time.  In response to 
Darman’s suggestion, Rep.  Schumer (D-NY), who was chairing the hearing, stated that 
passing such limits on credit would be “problematic” (CSPAN-1990).   
 
Table 3.3 Examples of Shift from Volume Control to Subsidy Costs 
Year Proposal Focus of Reform  
Volume  Subsidy 
Cost 
1979 H.R.  568 Federal Credit Program Control Act of 1979 X  
1979 H.R.  6056 Federal Credit Program Control Act of 1979 X  
1979 S.  2151 Federal Credit Program Control Act of 1979 X  
1981 S.  265 Federal Lending Control Act of 1981 X  
1981 H.R.  2372 Federal Lending Oversight and Control Act X  
1982 S.  2454 Federal Credit and Tax Expenditure Control Act 
of 1982 
X  
1983  S.1582 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1983  X  
1987 H.R.  1745, S.745 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1987  X 
1988 H.R.  5568, S.  2785 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1988  X 
1989 H.R.  1127, S.584 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1989  X 
 H.R.  3929 Budget Process Reform Act of 1990  X 
1990 H.R.  5437 Truth-in-Budgeting Reform Act of 1990  X 
 CBO report and testimony   X 
 OMB testimony  X X 
1990  Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990  X 
Source: Table compiled by author.  
 Even though considerable consensus emerged among key policy participants that 
subsidy cost is the appropriate budgetary measure for federal credit programs, significant 
debate surrounded the specific design of a new budget decision rule, including: (1) how 




include subsidy costs in the budget.  In the debate preceding FCRA, the term “subsidy 
cost” was described and defined in different ways.  As noted by Gale (1989), the 
“subsidy” for federal credit was defined in terms of:  
(1) “Benefits to borrower:” Estimates of the economic benefit to the borrower as 
measured by the difference between the amount paid by the borrower with and 
without the federal loan or loan guarantee (Gale, 1989, p.12); 
(2) “Cost to government” Estimates the government’s cost of holding the credit 
asset as measured by the difference between the interest rate on the loan and the 
government’s borrowing rate (i.e. the interest rate on comparable Treasury note) 
(Gale, 1989, p.12); or  
(3) “Market-loss” Estimates the difference between the government’s costs and 
the amount received from selling or reinsuring assets on the private market (Gale, 
1989, p.12).   
 Further complicating the matter, CBO (1989) disputed that the distinction 
between the “benefit to borrower” versus “cost to government” that was often used in 
the literature and debate.  CBO argued that if the estimate of government’s subsidy cost 
includes market risk (as it suggested it should) than these cost measures are essentially 
the same.  This debate about whether market risk is part of the government’s budget costs 
reemerged and remains a major point of contention.   
 Proposals also outlined different approaches for including subsidy cost in the 
budget.  In the early-1980s, two main proposals emerged: (1) “market-plans”77 and (2) 
                                                          
77 CBO provided a comprehensive review of options for budgeting for federal credit, including 
introducing the market-based plan, in its 1984 report New Approaches to the Budgetary 




“appropriation plans” (Bickley, 1991; CBO, 1984, 1989; Wolf, 1987; and Gale, 1989).  
Early versions of market-plan proposals involved altering federal credit programs’ 
operations so that the government’s subsidy costs of new federal credit transactions 
would be included in the budget without directly changing budget decision rules i.e. the 
federal budget would still use cash-based measurement.  The Reagan Administration’s 
1987 proposal, called for new decision rules with respect to credit program operations 
that required new federal direct loans to be immediately sold to private investors and new 
federal guaranteed loans to be reinsured through private companies (CBO, 1984 and 
1989; Phaup, 1985; Gale, 1989 and OMB, 1987).78 The subsidy cost of a direct loan 
would be the difference between its face value and the market price paid by private 
lenders i.e. the cash amount needed to cover the government’s market loss on the sale.  In 
the case of a loan guarantee, the government’s subsidy cost would be the market price for 
private reinsurance.  Importantly, since the transactions for these loan sales or reinsurance 
purchases would involve cash payments to entities outside the government the budget’s 
cash-based outlays and the deficit/surplus would include the government’s subsidy costs 
(CBO, 1989).  Thus, by altering decision rules for credit program operations, the 
government’s subsidy costs would be reflected in the budget without the government 
having to estimate subsidy costs or make changes to budget measurement or account 
structures.   
                                                          
(1984), the appropriation-based plan was proposed in 1983 by David Mathiasen, Deputy 
Associate Director for Budget Review, OMB.   
78 Under some market-based approaches, federal credit agencies would be required to have 
budget authority to cover these subsidy costs before issuing loans. Other variations of market 
approaches included proposals to pay subsidy costs to a GSE that would in turn disburse 




 Proponents of a market-based approach argued it would provide a straightforward 
way of addressing the problems of cash-based budgeting for federal credit programs.  
Phaup argued: 
“the simplest conceptual solution to the misrepresentation of costs arising under 
current policy is to require the open-market sale of all direct loans originated by 
government and the reinsurance with private firms of all government guarantees” 
(Phaup, 1985, p. 34).  
  
 Cited advantages of a market-based approach included: (1) the use of verifiable 
market valuation to determine government’s subsidy costs and (2) more timely 
recognition of these costs (CBO, 1989, Darman, 1990, Gale, 1989, and Phaup, 1985).79 
Significant concerns, however, surrounded the uncertainty involved with market-based 
transactions, including that underdeveloped credit markets and a lack of comparable, 
private instruments could result in underpricing of loans and overpricing of reinsurance 
(Gale, 1989 and Phaup, 1985).  In addition, market-based plans created political 
challenges because of the visibility of the government’s immediate loss on these 
transactions.  Gale (1989), concluded that [a]lthough loan sales have much to offer under 
ideal circumstances, across-the-board divesture of federal credit as envisaged by the 
Market Plan is currently not a feasible alternative” (p. 20).   
 Alternatively, “appropriation plan” proposals sought to establish new budget 
decision rules and procedures to recognize and fund subsidy costs (CBO, 1984, 1989 and 
Gale, 1989).  Under an appropriation-based approach, the government’s subsidy costs 
would be included in the budget through appropriations and intra-governmental transfers 
                                                          
79 Other cited advantages of the market-based approach were that it would reduce the 
government’s administrative costs and create incentives to improve loan management and 




(CBO, 1984, 1989).  Appropriations would be required to cover subsidy costs before 
credit is extended.  As noted by CBO (1984, 1989), unlike the market-based approach, an 
appropriation-based approach would require: (1) the establishment of procedures to 
estimate and track the government’s subsidy costs and (2) the creation of new budget 
account structures to isolate subsidy costs from incidental cash flows.  Cited benefits of 
an appropriation-based approach included that requiring appropriations for subsidy costs 
would create a spending-equivalent budget measure and provide for upfront control of 
budget costs (CBO, 1984).  Disadvantages, however, included significant difficulties in 
estimating subsidy costs, the potential for gaming, and that subsidy cost would be viewed 
merely as a technicality (CBO, 1984 and Phaup, 1985). 
 By the late 1980s, key proposals, including those from the Senate Budget 
Committee, OMB, GAO and CBO, aligned behind the use of an appropriations-based 
approach.  These proposals all had key elements in common, including: (1) the use of 
subsidy costs measured on a net present value basis as the budget measure for direct 
loans and loan guarantees, and (2) the appropriation of funds for subsidy costs before 
credit is extended (GAO, 1989).  Each proposal also called for a new budget account 
system to separate the government’s subsidy costs from non-subsidized cash flows 
(GAO, 1989).  80 As noted by CBO (1989),  
“The central fiscal agencies of the ederal overnment – including OMB, GAO, and 
CBO – agree on how the costs of federal credit programs should be treated in the 
budget.   They all believe that costs should be calculated in terms of present value 
of the long-term costs of extending credit assistance….  Furthermore, the 
                                                          
80 Phaup (1985) also describes a “remarkable consensus” on key aspects of credit budgeting, 
including, among other things: (1) “The current system produces measures of credit costs that are 
not helpful in policy analysis or budgeting” (2)“The present value of credit subsidies ought to be 
substituted for current cash outflow in budget expenditures…..” and (3) “The substitution could 
be achieved by valuing loans and guarantee in terms of expected payment streams to which they 




agencies agree that the subsidy costs of federal credit programs ought to be 
subject to the annual appropriation process” (p.68). 
  
 Although consensus emerged on the new budget rule’s basic conceptual 
framework there was significant debate and disagreement about exactly how to calculate 
subsidy costs and how to include these costs in the budget.  Key issues debated with 
respect to the calculation of subsidy costs were: (1) the choice of discount rate and (2) the 
treatment of administrative costs.  While issues ultimately were resolved in the sense that 
FCRA was enacted, the method of subsidy cost estimation remained subject of debate 
and recently reemerged as point of significant controversy. 
 During the debate leading up to FCRA, policy participants were divided about the 
appropriate discount rate to use in calculating subsidy costs.81 Two widely discussed 
approaches included: (1) market-risk approaches which included the cost of market risk 
into subsidy costs, and (2) cost to government approach which uses the Treasury rate as 
the discount rate.  Table 3.4 provides a comparative overview of proposals’ approach and 
choice of discount rate.   
 Proposals calling for market-based discount rates evolved from earlier market-
based approach that sought to use market-based transactions to sell or reinsure loans.  82   
                                                          
81 The present value method involves using a discount rate to adjust future cash flows to current 
value and the choice of discount rate was (and remains) a critical issue in measuring credit 
subsidy costs. While the key reform proposals directly preceding the enactment of FCRA had 
similar conceptual frameworks, they had important differences in the choice of discount rate. 
82 Faced with feasibility concerns and Congress’s failure to act on market-plan, modifications 
were made to the market-based approach.  While initially the market-based approach had called 
for requiring the sale of loans and purchase of reinsurance, later versions of market-based 
proposals adopted an appropriation-based approach with the use of a market-based discount rate 
for calculating subsidy costs. Proponents argued that rather than using direct market operations, 
private market value could be estimated by discounting expected cash flows using a market 




Faced with continuing concerns about the feasibility of selling and reinsuring loans and 
Congress’s failure to act modifications were made to market-based proposals.  Later 
iterations of market-based proposals adopted the appropriation-based approach but called 
for the use of a market-based discount rate.  The CBO and the Administration’s fiscal 
year 1989 plan endorsed the use of market-based (or risk-based) discount rates.  The 
Federal Credit Reform Act of 198983 proposed by the Bush Administration called for the 
use of market prices to calculate subsidy costs.   
 Alternatively, the GAO and the Senate budget committee proposals supported the 
cost to government approach, which would use of the risk-free Treasury rate as the 
discount rate.  GAO (1989) argued in favor of this approach based on the notion that “the 
budget should report only direct budgetary costs” and that the use of the Treasury rate 
most appropriately measures subsidy costs in terms of the government’s budgetary cost 
of extending credit (p.4).  In GAO’s view, this approach was consistent with the treatment 
of other federal programs and, would provide a comparable basis to other federal 
programs (GAO, 1989, p.  4 and Wolf, 1987).  The use of the Treasury discount rate also 
was consistent with the earlier recommendation of the President’s Commission on 
Budget Concepts and academic theory 84 at the time (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1967).   
                                                          
83 Proposed, but not enacted.  
84 The theory that the government is not risk-adverse is grounded in the work of Arrow and Lind 
(1970) which argued for using a risk-free rate because any credit losses from a program would 
extremely small relative to the totality of the federal budget.  In addition, the government could 
use its taxing and borrowing authority to spread any costs over time (Elliott, 2012; GAO, 1987; 




Table 3.4 Comparative Overview of Select Proposals Preceding FCRA’s Enactment 





















ly using the 
government’s 
borrowing 
rate as the 
discount rate 
1987 S.745; 
H.R.  1745 
Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 
1987 
No X   
1987 Academic 
proposal 
Bosworth et al. 




1988 H.R.  5568 
S.  2785 
Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 
1987 
No  X  
1989 H.R.  1127 
S.584 
Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 
1988 
No  X  
1989 GAO n/a   X 
1989 CBO n/a  X  
1990 H.R.  3929 
Budget Process 
Reform Act of 
1990 
   X 
1990 H.R.  5437 Truth-
in-Budgeting 







  X 
1990  Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 
1990 
   X 




 The treatment of administrative costs also was a source of debate.  Administrative 
costs are those associated with loan origination, servicing, and collection.  Various 
practical, institutional, conceptual, and political arguments surrounded whether these 
costs should be included in subsidy costs (CBO, 1992).  On the practical side, there were 
limitations in many agencies’ accounting systems to accurately measuring and allocating 
the administrative expenses.  Some questioned the conceptual merits of including 
administrative costs, noting that outlays for federal grants generally do not include 
administrative expenses upfront and thus excluding these costs from federal credit 
subsidy estimate enhanced comparability (Bickley, 1991).  Opponents also noted that 
funding for future operations years in advance would reduce congressional control and 
oversight of these funds.  As noted by Lucas and Phaup (2008), “the Appropriation 
Committees were especially wary of giving agencies control of future outlays for salaries 
and expenses by drawing on past appropriations and the authority to reestimate these 
costs” (p. 100).  There also were political concerns that inclusion of administrative costs 
would disadvantage credit programs in the political process by increasing their absolute 
and relative costs.  While FCRA excluded administrative costs from subsidy costs, it 
required CBO and OMB to study the issue and provide recommendations.   
 Proposals also handled nonsubsidized cash flows differently, with important 
implications for the reporting of credit program costs in the deficit/surplus (Bickley, 
1991; C-SPAN, 1990; and Cuny, 1991).  Under some proposals, the impact of federal 
credit programs on budget totals, including the deficit/surplus, would not have changed.  
The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1989,85 called for appropriating funds for the subsidy 
                                                          




costs of direct loans and for these costs to be included in the program accounts of credit 
agencies.  However, the impact on the deficit would remain the same, with both 
subsidized and unsubsidized amounts of direct loans included in budget totals.  86 The 
amount of loan guarantees still would not be included in the budget totals because of the 
use of offsetting intragovernmental transfers. 
 Other proposals reflected concerns that retaining incidental (unsubsidized) cash 
flows in the budget would undermine the objectives of credit reform (Cuny, 1991).  
Under this approach (which eventually was adopted in FCRA) only the subsidized 
portion of the loan was included in budget totals and incidental cash flows were handled 
“below” the line in non-budgetary financing accounts.  Proponents of this approach 
argued that leaving the nonsubsidized cash flows of federal credit programs in the budget 
“would allow for the same sort of manipulation of the outlays and deficit totals ….  that 
credit reform was designed to eliminate” (Cuny, 1991, p.  29).   
 By the late 1980s, there were signs of a growing willingness to compromise on 
specifics to address the larger issue.  The Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis had called 
attention to problems with the government’s credit and risk exposure.  Lawmakers were 
under considerable pressure to show action on these issues.  In his opening statement for 
                                                          
86 Specifically, under this approach, when loans were made the subsidized amount would be 
transferred from the agency to a Direct Loan Fund and the nonsubsidized amount would be 
borrowed by the Direct Loan Fund from Treasury. Because both the subsidized and 
nonsubsidized portions would be outlayed from the Loan Fund to the borrower the entire amount 
of the loan would continue to be included in total outlays and the deficit/surplus (Bickley, 1991).  
For loan guarantees, the subsidy would be paid into a Guaranteed Loan Fund and then invested in 
Treasury securities.  This offsetting intragovernmental transaction would leave the deficit/surplus 
totals unaffected. As a result, the costs of loan guarantees still would not be included in total 
outlays or the deficit/surplus until defaults occurred and payments were made to lenders (Bickley, 





at a April 1990 credit reform hearing, Rep.  Charles Schumer (D-NY) declared it the 
“opportune time for credit reform” and argued that recent crises had “lit a fire under 
people” (C-SPAN, 1990).  Rep Gradison (R-Ohio) also framed his opening remarks with 
the Savings and Loan crises noting that it is now apparent “..., as a result of the savings 
and loan debacle that there is a problem and that it does require action” (C-SPAN, 
1990).  Although FCRA did not address the largest and most complicated programs, such 
deposit insurance and GSEs, it allowed lawmakers to show action addressing the 
government’s exposure to credit risks.    
 At the same hearing, expert witnesses testified that need to get something done 
was more important than disagreements about specific reform details.  OMB Director 
Richard Darman testified that credit reform “merits prompt legislative action” and that 
“second order technical differences should not delay the institution of a more rigorous 
system of credit control and credit program budgets” (C-SPAN, 1990).  Comptroller 
General Bowsher testified that that “[r]arely will you see a matter on which there is such 
broad agreement among those who have studied it” (p.  1).  He added that while 
differences exist “the areas of agreement outweigh any differences among these 
proposals and provide a sound basis for moving ahead with needed reform” (Bowsher, 
1990, p, 14).87,88    
                                                          
87 Comptroller General Bowsher noted that “… the need for credit budgeting reform is a matter 
on which the Budget Committee, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the General Accounting Office (GAO) are in substantial 
agreement” (Bowsher, 1990, p. 1).   
88 Cuny (1991) noted that “[b]y early 1990 consensus on the merits of credit reform had spread 
so far that the directors of OMB and CBO and the comptroller general all testified in favor of 




 FCRA’s budgetary impact was expected to be relatively small relative to the total 
budget.  During congressional hearings preceding FCRA’s enactment, CBO Director 
Robert Reischauer explained that if subsidy costs were treated “below the line” (the 
approach enacted under FCRA) there would be a “slight increase in the measure deficit” 
(C-SPAN, 1990).  Reischauer estimated the increase as somewhere between $3-$6 billion 
per year for the next 2 to 3 years (C-SPAN, 1990). 
 In the end, FCRA required an appropriation-based approach using the risk-free 
Treasury rate.  Of the design issues discussed above the choice of discount rate has been 
the most controversial.  Unsettled disagreement on the discount rate issue continued after 
FCRA’s enactment as part of very large (over 600-pages) and significant Omnibus 
budget bill, which included among things, a controversial tax increase and the BEA.89  
There were no separate roll call votes in this session on federal credit reform legislation.   
 The use of the cost of government approach was preferred by the Democratic-
controlled Budget Committees.  Further, the cost-of-government approach generally 
results in lower estimates than a market-based approach and therefore lowered the impact 
of FCRA on the deficit.  However, while the cost to government approach favored by the 
Budget Committee won out, decades later the strong disagreement about treatment of 
market risk in subsidy cost estimates continues.  As discussed below, this seemingly 
technical issue reveals deep conceptual and political differences about what constitutes a 
cost to government as well as about the role, scope, and limits of the budget and the 
budget process.     
                                                          






Federal Credit Reform, Implementing and Using the Rule 
 This chapter examines how FCRA was translated from theory to practice.  While 
FCRA faced implementation challenges, it benefited from on-going refinements and 
alignment with existing institutional structures and concurrent reforms.  A key issue in 
assessing FCRA’s experience is whether subsidy cost estimates have been reasonably 
accurate.  However, recent attention has turned from the accuracy of agencies’ subsidy 
estimates generated using FCRA procedures to concerns about the adequacy of FCRA’s 
estimation procedures.  A central concern - FCRA’s exclusion of market risk from 
subsidy costs - has led to calls for amending FCRA to adopt a fair-value approach.  The 
debate about FCRA’s estimation procedures and competing subsidy cost estimates have 
informed and complicated policy and political debates about federal loan programs.   
   
FCRA faced implementation challenges but benefited from on-going refinements 
and alignment with existing institutional structures and government reforms.   
 FRCA’s operationalization and implementation involved significant challenges.  
As is often the case with legislation, FCRA was brief and lacked implementation 
details.90 As a result, in the years following its enactment, key participants, including 
federal credit agencies, OMB, Treasury, and FASAB worked to address various 
implementation issues including those for which FCRA did not provide explicit 
directions (Bickley, 2012, and GAO, 1998, p.  41).  Further, early implementation efforts 
occurred in an environment of pre-existing and significant federal financial management 
                                                          
90 FCRA was approximately five and half pages of the U.S. Code, Congressional and 




problems.  For years prior to FCRA, GAO, the IGs, and others had reported major 
problems with federal credit agencies’ financial information and reporting systems, 
including incomplete and unreliable federal credit data.91 FCRA added new and complex 
requirements to these weak financial management processes and systems (GAO 1993 and 
OMB, 1992).  One policy participant noted that the challenge was compounded to some 
extent by deficiencies in staffing levels and technical expertise at both OMB and credit 
agencies.  (Criscitello, 2016).  Given these challenges, policy participants raised concerns 
about credit agencies’ ability and willingness to reasonably estimate credit subsidy costs 
(Criscitello, 2016 and GAO, 1989, 1993).    
 As implementation began, oversight reports reported federal agencies’ difficulties 
complying with FCRA’s requirements (GAO, 1989, 1993).  As an example, GAO and the 
Department of Education’s IG were unable to express audit opinions on the federal 
student loan guarantee program’s fiscal year 1992 and 1993 financial statements due to a 
lack of reliable student loan data.  Further, GAO and the IG reported that ineffective 
internal controls and inadequate student loan data impaired the program’s budget 
estimates (GAO, 1993b).  Similarly, USDA’s IG testified that “[t}he Departments loan 
accounting systems were not equipped to provide the extensive detail necessary to fulfill 
credit reform requirements.”  GAO found that the credit agencies it reviewed 
                                                          
91  GAO’s work prior to FCRA repeatedly found credit agencies could not accurately measure 
credit losses. As examples: (1) GAO’s audit of FHA’s fiscal year 1988 financial statements found 
a significant understatement of losses and cited numerous, significant financial management 
weaknesses as contributing to these losses; (2) GAO’s audit of the Department of Education’s 
fiscal year 1990 financial statements found a lack of proper accounting for billions of dollars in 
estimated loan losses; and (3) GAO’s audit of the Department of Agriculture’s fiscal year 1991 
financial statements found inaccurate loss estimates for the farm loan program (GAO. 1990, 
1991, 1993b). Given the severity of the problems, several credit agencies were included in 
GAO’s and OMB’s “high risk” initiatives, which aimed to call attention to significant 




“experienced significant problems meeting virtually every one of the basic aspects of 
OMB’s credit reform accounting requirements” 92 (GAO, 1993b, p.6). 
 As agencies worked to resolve issues, oversight reports reported continuing 
challenges.  Audits of credit agencies’ financial statements and GAO’s first-ever audit of 
the fiscal year 1997 governmentwide financial statements found that most federal credit 
programs were unable to properly estimate and report credit costs and the related loans 
receivable and loan guarantee liabilities (GAO, 1999).93 In 1998 and 1999 reports, GAO 
raised serious concerns about the ability of credit agencies to reasonably estimate subsidy 
costs for both financial statement and budget purposes.94 GAO (1998b) warned: 
“Until federal credit agencies correct these serious data deficiencies information 
supplied by them about the cost of their credit programs, including information to 
support annual budget request for these programs, should be used with caution in 
making future budgetary decisions, managing program costs, and measuring the 
performance of credit activities” (p.17).  
 
 These implementation challenges, however, were not unexpected and efforts to 
address them occurred within an existing institutional framework with established roles.  
                                                          
92 In summarizing its findings, GAO stated: “Overall, the major domestic lending agencies could 
not fully implement OMB’s credit reform requirements because agencies’ (1) financial systems 
and controls have long been flawed so that basic data was unavailable or incorrect (2) existing 
financial systems were not designed to handle the information prescribed, and (3) staff resources 
were insufficient to meet the added requirements” (GAO, 1993b, p. 5).  
93 Only two of five major credit agencies reviewed by GAO – Education and SBA -- made 
reasonable cost estimates in their 1997 financial statements (GAO, 1999, p. 3). However, 
Education and SBA undertook additional work and made significant adjustments in order to 
achieve reasonable subsidy estimates for the financial statements and their audit reports raised 
significant concerns about their budget estimates (GAO, 1999, p. 3).  
94 GAO’s reviews included five credit agencies:  The Department of Agriculture, The Department 
of Education, The Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Small Business 
Administration and the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. GAO reviewed two domestic credit 
programs from each agency.  GAO found that reliability of credit data remained questionable for 
a number reasons, including (1) the poor results of financial statement audits; (2) discrepancies 
between subsidy rates reported in the budget and data provided to GAO by credit agencies; (3) 
missing documentation for subsidy estimates; (4) credit agency staff acknowledgements that 
subsidy cost component data were questionable; and (5) credit agency staff reports of deficiencies 




In line with its long-established role in the federal financial management and budget 
process, FCRA gave OMB primary responsibility for operationalizing and overseeing 
implementation.  Under Section 503(a), the director of the OMB has final responsibility 
for subsidy cost estimates.  The OMB director may delegate authority to calculate 
subsidy cost estimates to credit agencies, but OMB is responsible for issuing instructions 
and overseeing implementation.  Specifically, FCRA directs OMB to establish written 
requirements and guidelines consistent with the FCRA’s definition of costs.95   
 OMB provided additional guidance and support to federal credit agencies in 
preparing subsidy cost estimates, including training sessions, memos, assistance from 
OMB budget examiners, and other technical support (Criscitello, 2016; GAO, 
1993b,1998 and OMB, 2012).  To help establish a consistent approach to subsidy cost 
estimation, OMB developed the Credit Subsidy Calculator, a computer model, which 
provides federal credit agencies to calculate the total estimated subsidy rate and the 
subsidy cost components96 based on the cash flows developed by the credit agency 
(Bowsher, 1990 and OMB, 2014b).  All agencies covered by FCRA are required to use 
OMB’s Credit Subsidy Calculator and discount rates to calculate subsidy cost estimates 
and reestimates “to ensure government-wide comparability and uniformity of 
                                                          
95 To provide agencies requirements and guidance for preparing and monitoring of subsidy 
estimates, OMB revised Circular A-11: Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates and 
Circular A-34, Part IV Instructions on Budget Execution, Credit Apportionment and Budget 
Execution (Cuny, 1991 and GAO, 1993b).  A-129 Managing Federal Credit Programs also 
provides guidance on managing credit programs. OMB requirements and guidance were to be 
developed after consultation with the CBO director and both the OMB and the CBO director are 
responsible for developing more accurate historical data on credit programs, which are used in 
subsidy cost estimation (Bickley, 2012).   
96 OMB’s Credit Subsidy Calculator calculates the portions of the subsidy cost attributable to 




discounting” (OMB, 2014b, p. 13 of Section 185).  Treasury provided guidance97 in the 
document Basic Transactions Relating to Guaranteed Loans and Subsidies, which 
illustrated how to account for credit transactions.  Interagency working groups98 and 
training sessions provided venues for raising questions with respect FCRA’s 
implementation and to provide feedback on the challenges faced by agencies (GAO, 
1993b).   
 Importantly, FCRA was aligned with and supported by other governmentwide 
reform efforts aimed at improving financial management, including the Chief Financial 
Officers Act Of 1990 (CFO Act)99 and the establishment of the Federal Accounting 
Standards Advisory Board (FASAB).  The CFO Act, as amended, requires annual 
financial statement audits for 24 CFO agencies100 (which includes key federal credit 
agencies) and the preparation and audit of consolidated financial statements for the U.S. 
government (GAO, 1999).101 These reforms increased attention and resource commitment 
                                                          
97 Treasury guidance developed by its Financial Management Services is illustrative, rather than 
authoritative.   
98 Several interagency working groups were formed. In 1995, the Governmentwide Credit Reform 
Subgroup was established to resolve issues faced by: (1) agencies in implementing FCRA and 
preparing quality cash flow data and (2) auditors reviewing credit subsidy estimates (GAO, 
1997a).  In 1997, the Credit Reform Task Force of the Accounting and Auditing Policy 
Committee was formed in order to address key issues surrounding FCRA’s implementation and 
the related federal accounting standards (GAO, 1999). 
99 The CFO Act (which laid the foundation for comprehensive reform of the federal government’s 
financial management) established CFO positions in 24 departments or agencies and required, 
among other things, the development and maintenance of integrated agency accounting and 
financial management systems (FASAB, 2012 and GAO, 1991).  The Act also required OMB to 
provide necessary leadership on financial management issues (GAO, 1999). 
100 The CFO Act had required that financial Statements be prepared and audited for trust and 
revolving fund operations and for agency programs that are substantially commercial functions, 
including direct loans and loan guarantees.  The Act also established a pilot program for the 
preparation and audit of agency wide financial statements for select agencies for specific years 
(GAO, 1991).  
101 Additional reforms related to Debt Collection also support improvements in systems and 
processes related to FCRA. The Debt Collection Act of 1982, called for OMB to require agencies 




to improving financial management systems, including those used for credit subsidy cost 
estimation.   
 The alignment of federal financial accounting standards with FCRA’s objectives 
and budget rules increased attention to and supported development of subsidy cost 
estimates.  In 1993, FASAB issued Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards 
No.  2, Accounting for Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees which calls for the general 
alignment of financial reporting to FCRA’s requirements and guidelines.  This alignment 
is significant because financial audits provided additional impetus to improve subsidy 
cost estimates (CBO, 2003 and GAO 1999, 2002c).102103 As noted by GAO (2002c), a 
credit agency’s financial statement audit “helps provide integrity to the budget estimates, 
as long as consistency is maintained between the processes and data used to estimate 
subsidy costs for both the budget and financial statements” (p. 4).    
 FCRA, in conjunction with the CFO Act reforms, placed considerable pressure on 
credit agencies to improve subsidy cost estimates in order to receive a clean audit 
opinion.  In discussing the Department of Agriculture’s financial statements GAO 
(2000b) argued that until the agency Rural Development mission area  
“makes significant progress in developing well supported and reasonable 
estimates of its credit program costs, an unqualified opinion of the Department of 
Agriculture’s financial statements will not be possible.  Further since USDA is the 
largest direct lender in the federal government and the credit program amounts 
are material, the inability to properly implement credit reform will continue to 
contribute to our inability to give an unqualified opinion on the consolidated 
financial statements of the U.S. government” (p. 1). 
                                                          
of 1986 expanded collection tools and authority available to agencies (GAO, 1998).  These efforts 
to improve credit data paralleled the efforts undertaken as part of FCRA implementation.  
102 Some federal credit programs are material to their agency’s financial statements or to the 
government’s consolidated financial statements and thus subject to financial audit 
103 For example, as part of financial statement audits, auditors are to assess a credit agency’s cash 
flow models and assumptions to determine if agency management has a reliable basis for their 






 FCRA underwent numerous administrative and legislative refinements based on 
stakeholder input and implementation experiences.  GAO (1998a) found that “OMB and 
Treasury have refined their guidance to agencies based on greater experiences with the 
processes and data requirements for implementing credit reform and on more 
information on agencies’ limitations and abilities” (p. 41). As an example, in response to 
agency concerns, OMB eliminated the requirement of tranche accounting (GAO, 1993b).  
To eliminate questionable volatility in subsidy reestimates, OMB eliminated the 
requirement to reestimate annually for changes in interest rates as loans were disbursed.  
Under revised guidance, agencies are required to do an interest rate reestimate only when 
a cohort is 90 percent disbursed (GAO, 1998 and OMB, 2014b).  Legislatively, the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) amended FCRA to make technical changes aimed 
at clarifying and simplifying subsidy estimation procedures (Bickley, 2012 and OMB 
1998).104  
 FASAB’s work developing financial reporting standards in the context of FCRA’s 
budget requirements also provided a forum to identify, debate, and address FCRA’s 
implementation.105 FCRA’s budget rule was in place as FASAB began its work to 
develop financial reporting standards for direct loans and loan guarantees and historical 
documents indicate that FCRA’s budgeting requirements helped shape the accounting 
                                                          
104 Under BBA amendments, the definition of the term “cost” was modified so that the discount 
rate is based on the timing of cash flow instead of the loan term (Bickley, 2012).  
105 FASAB’s standard for direct loan and loan guarantees was developed as part of a deliberative 





standards.106 Over time, FASAB published amendments and a technical release to clarify, 
refine, or expand financial reporting requirements and guidance (FASAB, 2000, 2001, 
and 2004).  These revisions have sought to ensure the consistency of financial reporting 
standards with FCRA’s budget requirements and to improve the financial information on 
federal credit programs.  In 1998, presentations to the FASAB Board, agency 
representatives explained how the systems and procedures needed to meet FCRA’s 
budget requirements supported information used for financial reporting (FASAB, 2000). 
 Efforts were undertaken to provide financial statement users with more 
information to improve understanding of changes in subsidy costs.  In the late 1990s, 
FASAB conducted surveys and questionnaires on how difficult it had been for credit 
agencies to prepare and report subsidy cost data and on the use and useful of subsidy data 
in decision-making process.  FASAB’s amendments of standards considered survey 
findings that showed congressional staff needed more rather than less detailed data on 
subsidy costs for direct loans and loan guarantees.  In 2000, FASAB issued Statement of 
Federal Financial Accounting Standards No.  18, which amended reporting 
requirements, to among other things, require disclosure and discussion of changes in 
program subsidy rates, subsidy expense, and subsidy reestimates.  Reporting entities now 
are required to disclose, discuss and explain events and changes, such as changes in 
economic conditions and other risk factors, that have had significant and measurable 
effects on subsidy rates (FASAB, 2000). 
                                                          
106 During the deliberative stage, some respondents to the financial statement’s exposure draft 
opposed the use of the net present value accounting.  However, Board argued that “[t]he Federal 
Credit Reform Act of 1990 requires using present value for the budget. The Board does not 




 While FCRA’s implementation has been challenging, there are signs that it 
supported long-needed improvements in information necessary for the oversight and 
management of federal credit programs.  One indicator is recent financial statement 
audits of major credit agencies.107 As discussed above, as FCRA was implemented, 
several credit agencies received disclaimers108 or qualified109 opinions, at least in part, 
due to issues related to their credit programs.110All the major credit agencies that were 
the focus of the dissertation’s research now have “clean” or unqualified opinions.   
 My review of the status of GAO recommendations relevant to FCRA’s 
implementation found that recommendations had been acted upon.  Oversight reports also 
provided examples of how FCRA (in conjunction with other financial management 
reforms) prompted actions to help improve data and processes related to subsidy cost 
estimation.  OMB testified that agencies, including, USDA and VA, worked with OMB 
to refine cash flow spreadsheets or reestimation calculations (Dorn, 2002 and GAO, 
1998).  Both Education and SBA adopted new computer systems and significantly 
refined their historical information (GAO, 1998 and GAO, 2005a).  In 1999, USDA’s 
CFO established a task force to assist in resolving the agency credit reform problems 
(GAO, 2000c and Vinadero, 2000).  These types of improvements to data and processes 
                                                          
107 Financial audit results, however, must be used with some caution as agencies’ subsidy cost 
estimates for financial statements are not always fully based on the same data and processes as is 
used for budget estimates or agencies may have made adjustments to financial statement data that 
is not reflected in budget estimates.  Nevertheless, improvements in financial statement reporting 
of credit agencies provide one indicator of improvements in underlying data and cost estimate 
methods. 
108 A disclaimer means the auditor was unable to obtain sufficient audit evidence and is unable to 
issue an opinion on the financial statements.  
109 A qualified opinion includes exceptions to conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards (GAAP) such as limitations in audit scope or specific deviation from GAAP.  
110 For example, the Fiscal Year 1996 financial statements audits for three of the largest federal 
credit agencies – USDA, Education and HUD – received disclaimers or qualified opinions due at 




are ongoing.  GAO reported that the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service 
hired a Chief Risk Officer and is developing an econometric model intended to support 
portfolio analysis and help improve estimates of credit subsidy costs for the single-family 
guarantee program (GAO, 2015b, 2016c and GAO 2017, p.14).   
 FCRA’s budget requirements also prompted significant expansion to 
supplemental budget and financial information on federal credit programs.  The Federal 
Credit Supplement, which is now included as part of the President’s budget submission, 
provides tabular information on federal credit programs subject to FCRA.  My review of 
the supplement, over the years, shows expansions of the information provided including, 
a presentation providing the components of subsidy cost: (1) financing costs, (2) fees, (3) 
defaults (net of recoveries) and (4) “all other” costs.  The Supplement also provides 
breakdowns of subsidy reestimates between the percentage point change due to interest 
and technical assumptions.   
 
  Subsidy cost estimation involves significant challenges. 
 A key issue in assessing FCRA’s experience is whether subsidy cost estimates 
have provided reasonably accurate signals of the government’s cost for federal credit 
programs.  Under FCRA, the federal budget records outlays for the net present value of 
expected cash flows.  Actual cash flows, however, remain uncertain until the end of the 
loan, which may be decades after the initial estimate (CBO, 2003b and GAO, 2014b).  
Given that loans occur over long time periods and involve uncertain variables, some 




In anticipation of estimation uncertainty, FCRA requires subsidy cost reestimation 
over the life of the loan.  Specifically, OMB requires two types of reestimates: (1) interest 
rate reestimates and (2) technical reestimates.  Interest rate reestimates adjust for the 
difference between actual interest rates and the discount rates assumed when subsidy 
estimates were made for budget formulation and obligation (OMB, 2014b).111Technical 
reestimates, which include all changes in assumptions other than interest, make 
adjustments based on actual cash flows to date, new assumptions about loan performance, 
or improvements in the data or methods used to estimate cash flows (OMB, 2014b).112 
The following subsection looks at subsidy estimates and reestimates prepared in 
accordance with FCRA procedures.  The next subsection explores the continuing debate 
surrounding the appropriateness and completeness of FCRA’s subsidy estimation 
procedures.   
 
Aggregated net subsidy reestimates over extended periods relatively small in 
relation to total federal loans and total federal budget.   
 
 My calculations found that net subsidy reestimates aggregated over an extended 
period are relatively small when gauged in the context of the entirety of federal credit 
activities over the same period.  Using data reported in the fiscal year 2019 Federal 
Credit Supplement.  I calculated the total net lifetime reestimate of subsidy costs for 
                                                          
111 Interest rate reestimates must be made when a cohort is at least 90 percent disbursed (OMB, 
2014b). 
112 Technical reestimates must be made after the close of each fiscal year, unless OMB has 




federal credit programs’ fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 2017 cohorts.  113 Reestimates for 
TARP were excluded.  114 The sum of the net lifetime reestimate was $50.9 billion 
upward when the interest rate component was included.  When the interest component is 
excluded, the sum of net lifetime reestimates of subsidy costs is $34.9 billion upward.115 
While significant dollar amounts, these reestimates represent less than 1 percent of the 
loan amounts disbursed or guaranteed.   
 Other analyses, which used different groupings of credit programs and different 
time periods, had the same overall message.  Each found that aggregated net reestimates 
over an extended period are relatively minor when considered in the context of total 
federal credit activities over the same period.  In the FY 2015 Analytical Perspectives of 
the President’s Budget, OMB described FCRA estimates as “fairly accurate overall” 
with lifetime reestimates representing less than one percent of face value of loans and 
guarantees made under FCRA (OMB, 2014a, p.  338).116 GAO (2016a) conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of direct loan and loan guarantee cohorts for fiscal year 2001 
through 2014 and found upward reestimates of $3.1 billion and $39 billion, 
                                                          
113 Summation of net lifetime subsidy reestimates across cohorts of loan disbursed to date as 
reported in the FY 2019 Federal credit Supplement. Data from Table 7 - Direct loans: Subsidy 
Reestimates (OMB, 2018c). and Table 8 -Loan Guarantees: Subsidy Reestimates (OMB, 2018c).   
114 The TARP programs were excluded for two reasons.  TARP was created and operated under 
highly unusual circumstances during the recent financial crisis.  Further, while these programs 
were required to estimate subsidy costs, these costs were required to be calculated using a market 
discount rate as opposed to the Treasury rate as required by FCRA.   If TARP reestimates are 
included, the reestimate, including the interest component, is $25.3 billion downward.  If the 
interest component is excluded the reestimate, is a $33.8 billion downward.   
115 The full subsidy rate reestimates provide useful information on the extent to which signals 
about a program’s costs, including the impact on the deficit, differ from those available when 
credit was extended. However, as noted by OMB, removing the interest rate provides better 
insights into the accuracy of agencies’ cash flow projections that underlie subsidy cost estimates.   
116 OMB (2014a) reported the net lifetime reestimates of subsidy costs for credit programs since 
FCRA has been in place as $17 billion upward (p. 338).  OMB, however, did not provide detail 




respectively.117 According to GAO, these reestimate amounts also represented less than 1 
percent of the loan amounts disbursed or guaranteed during the period.   
 Annual reestimates, while significant dollar amounts, generally are negligible in 
the context of total net budget outlays.  Figure 4.1 shows the outlays and receipts from 
credit subsidy reestimates for loans disbursed between 1992 and 2014 as reported in the 
Fiscal Year 2016 Federal Credit Supplement.  For the reasons noted above, I excluded 
TARP.  As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the annual impact of subsidy reestimates on net 
outlays has fluctuated over time, but generally it is not significant when gauged in the 
context of the total net outlays.  As shown in Table 4.1, for each fiscal year, the annual 
subsidy reestimates were .5% or less of total net outlays.  However, when TARP is 
included, the picture looks different for several years.  With TARP included the negative 
outlays for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are significantly larger at $107 billion and $63 
billion, respectively.   
 
                                                          
117 GAO (2016a) conducted a comprehensive review of trends in subsidy cost reestimates across 
and within federal credit programs for the fiscal 2001 thorough fiscal 2014 cohorts.  GAO used 




Figure 4.1 Reestimates of Credit Subsidies (excluding interest), Loans Disbursed 
Between Fiscal Year 1992 and 2014, excluding TARP 
 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on data from OMB (2015b), Table 20.6 Reestimates of 
Credit Subsidies of Loans Disbursed Between 1992 -2014. 
Table 4.1 Outlays and Receipts for Subsidy Cost Reestimates as Percentage of Total 



























TARP) In billions of dollars  
2003 2,160 (.1) 0% (.1) 0% 
2004 2,293 3.5 .2% 3.5 .2% 
2005 2,472 6 .2% 6 .2% 
2006 2,655 9 .3% 9 .3% 
2007 2,729 (3.4) (.1%) (3.4) (.1%) 
2008 2,983 2.0 .1% 2.0 .1% 
2009 3,158 2.2 .1% 2.2 .1% 
2010 2,457 (.6) .0% (107.2) (3.1%) 
2011 3,603 (11.3) (.3%) (63.4) (1.8%) 
2012 3,537 (7.0) (.2%) 7.5 .2% 
2013 2,455 8.7 .4% (1.2) 0% 
2014 3,506 8.7 .2% 4.5 .1% 
2015 3,759 18.8 .5% 18.2 .5% 
Source: Table compiled by author based on data from Budget of the U.S. Government, Analytical 
Perspectives, Table 20.6 Reestimates of Credit Subsidies of Loans Disbursed Between 1992 -
2014 and Historical Tables, Table 1.1 Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits 























































 Another issue is how reestimates influence the total subsidy costs for a given 
fiscal year.  CBO raised concerns that current method for budgeting for reestimates may 
distort budget information.  Under current methods, annual reestimates for all a 
program’s cohorts may be combined into a single budget adjustment.  CBO notes that 
“… “combining reestimates that tend to move in the same direction can result in an 
adjustment that is large compared with account activity.” This is like the issue of netting 
cash flows over fiscal years that was a concern leading up to FCRA.  Table 4.2 compares 
new subsidy budget authority with reestimated subsidy budget authority for fiscal years 
1998 to 2014.  As can be seen, in some fiscal years, subsidy reestimates do significantly 




    Table 4.2 Subsidy Budget Authority, New and Reestimated, Fiscal Years 1998-2017 











Authority as Percentage of 
Total Subsidy Budget 
Authority 
In billions of dollars  
1998 2.5 6.6 9.1 72.5% 
1999 1.6 5.3 6.9 76.8% 
2000 2.9 -4.1 -1.2 341.7% 
2001 2.6 -8.9 -6.3 141.3% 
2002 2.9 -1.9 1 -190.0% 
2003 4.5 -0.6 3.9 -15.4% 
2004 7.7 4.6 12.3 37.4% 
2005 12.2 7.3 19.5 37.4% 
2006 21.9 10.1 32 31.6% 
2007 7.1 -3.4 3.7 -91.9% 
2008 2.3 2.8 5.1 54.9% 
2009 132.3 0.4 132.7 0.3% 
2010 (14.1) (117.5) (131.6) 89.3% 
2011 (23.1) (70.8) (93.9) 75.4% 
2012 (34.1) 11.9 -22.2 -53.6% 
2013 (47.7) 1.1 -46.6 -2.4% 
2014 (36.1) 0.4 -35.7 -1.1% 
2015 (7.0) 9.0 2 450% 
2016 (16.5) (5.6) (22.2) 25% 
2017 (9.8) 49.3 39.5 125% 
 
Source: Table compiled by author based on OMB data.  These amounts are drawn from summary 
charts included in the Analytical Perspectives.  Prior to fiscal year 1998 breakouts of new and 
reestimated subsidy budget authority were not reported.  Author calculated percentages.   
 
Existing research does not indicate consistent downward bias in initial subsidy 
estimates   
 When FCRA was enacted, there was concern that credit agencies would have 
incentives to underestimate initial subsidy cost estimates (CBO, 2000 and GAO, 1998).  
This concern stemmed from differences in the budget treatment of the initial subsidy cost 
estimates and subsequent upward subsidy reestimates.  FCRA provides permanent 
indefinite authority for upward reestimates.  As a result, initial subsidy costs must 




visible and exempt from spending controls (CBO, 2001 and GAO, 1998).  Torregrosa 
explained the concerns as follows: 
“….  proponents of discretionary programs at an agency might underestimate 
initial subsidies in order to lend more and then make up the difference with a 
“costless” reestimate.  For mandatory credit programs, which do not require 
appropriations, low initial estimates could reduce a program’s visibility and 
attractiveness as a target for budgetary savings” (Torregrosa, 2001, p. 116)  
 
 While existing research is not conclusive, it does not indicate consistent or 
widespread downward bias in initial subsidy estimates.  GAO (1998a) found “somewhat 
similar patterns” in credit subsidy estimates for discretionary and mandatory 
programs.118  CBO (2000) examined subsidy reestimates for evidence of a downward 
bias in initial subsidy estimates and concluded: 
 
“The pattern of reestimates under credit reform provides no visible evidence to 
support the idea that departments and agencies are abusing the permanent and 
indefinite spending authority provided for reestimates.  Moreover, most 
reestimates have not substantially raised overall spending” (p.  21).    
 
 
 More recently, Griffith and Caperton (2012) conducted an analysis of 104 credit 
programs comparing fiscal year 1992 initial estimates with current reestimate shown in 
fiscal year 2013 budget and found that of the credit programs included in their analysis 
56 programs overestimated their costs while 48 underestimated their costs over time 
period examined.119 Most recently,  GAO (2016a) conducted a comprehensive analysis of 
                                                          
118 GAO (1998a) looked at subsidy estimates and reestimates for two domestic programs from 
each of the five largest credit agencies. GAO found that the estimated subsidy rates of 8 of the 15 
discretionary cohorts increased in the first reestimate following the initial appropriation while 
reestimates for the 7 of 12 mandatory cohorts decreased.  GAO (1998a) qualified its finding by 
stating “[n]o real conclusions can be drawn from this observation about whether some 
discretionary programs may have sought to benefit from initially underestimating subsidy costs” 
(p. 20).  




reestimates for fiscal years 2001 through 2014 cohorts and “did not identify any overall 
consistent trends in under – or overestimates  of subsidy costs across federal credit 
programs government-wide”  (p. 17).  However, as discussed in the next subsection 
significant reestimates for some credit programs, including some of the largest programs, 
illustrate estimation challenges.   
 
 Significant reestimates for some programs illustrate estimation issues.   
 An important issue is whether subsidy cost estimates provide reasonable budget 
information and incentives for individual credit programs.  My review of almost two 
decades of oversight reports found numerous examples of program level subsidy 
reestimates.  Multiple GAO reports have found significant subsidy reestimates for federal 
student loan programs (GAO, 1998a; GAO, 2001a; GAO, 2005a; GAO, 2014b; GAO, 
2016a).  GAO’s recent examination of trends in subsidy reestimates found that “a few 
credit programs had significant upward or downward reestimates, which could generally 
be explained by portfolio or economic changes, as well as revisions in estimation 
methodologies” (GAO, 2016a, p.  24).120 CBO projected that FHA’s guarantee program 
for single-family mortgages extended from 1992 to 2013 would cost of $2.2 billion over 
their lifetime, rather than the large negative subsidy (budgetary income) of $63 billion 
projected by the initial subsidy estimates121 (CBO, 2014a, p.1).    
                                                          
120 GAO (2016a) conducted a comprehensive examination of net lifetime reestimates for the fiscal 
years 2001 through 2014 cohorts. 
121 As an example of the assumptions and uncertainty associated with some subsidy cost 
estimates, CBO (2014a) notes that when its subsidy estimate is adjusted for inflation using the 
GDP price index its projection of subsidy costs is $1.5 billion.  CBO also notes that in 
simulations of the estimates two-thirds of outcomes were between subsidy costs of $15.4 billion 




 I examined reestimates of subsidy rates across a range of federal credit programs 
by comparing the initial subsidy rate to the most current revised subsidy rate for selected 
credit programs by cohort.  My initial review used the subsidy rates reported in the Fiscal 
Year 2015 Federal Credit Supplement.  When data was available, the comparisons were 
run both with and without the percentage point change due to interest rates.  The full 
subsidy rate adjustment provides useful information on the extent to which signals about 
a program’s costs differ from those available when credit was extended, including the 
impact on the deficit.  However, as noted by OMB, removing the interest rate 
component122 is necessary to isolate agencies’ ability to project expected cash flows.  
Reestimates without the interest component provide better insights agencies’ 
improvements to the accuracy of cash flow projections that underlie subsidy cost 
estimates.   
 My analyses of reestimated subsidy rates using data from the Fiscal Year 2015 
Federal Credit Supplement found a mixed picture of reestimates, indicating no consistent 
pattern across programs reviewed.  Most of the programs had mix of upward and 
downward reestimates of subsidy rates across cohorts, but these reestimates generally did 
not change the sign123 of the subsidy rate.  A few programs, however, had significant 
reestimates, including a change in the sign of the subsidy rate.  For programs with 
significant reestimates based on this initial analysis, I updated the analysis using data 
from the Fiscal Year 2019 Federal Credit Supplement and examined factors behind the 
                                                          
122 The percentage point change due to interest rates 
123 Sign refers to whether the subsidy is positive (a budget cost to the government) or negative (a 




reestimates with a focus on the implications for the feasibility and usefulness of budget 
decision rules. 
 For some programs with both upward and downward adjustments to subsidy rates, 
the current net lifetime subsidy reestimates showed lower cost than initially expected.  As 
an example, the direct loan programs from the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund within 
the Department of Agriculture had both upward and downward subsidy rate adjustments 
across cohorts of its various credit programs, with net lifetime reestimates for all the 
Fund’s programs having a downward adjustment of $1 billion, about 3 percent of the 
programs’ total loan disbursements.   
 Other programs with both upward and downward subsidy rate adjustments across 
cohorts are now estimated to cost the government more than originally projected.  As 
shown in Figure 4.2, the Education’s Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) had mostly 
upward adjustments to cohort subsidy rates.  For a few cohorts, the sign of the subsidy 
rate changed significantly, shifting from projecting a negative subsidy rate (budget 
savings or “profit”) to having a positive subsidy rate (budget cost).  The program’s net 
lifetime reestimates totaled $48 billion upward, which while represents less than 1% of 
program’s total loan disbursements is a significantly higher cost to taxpayers than 
initially projected.124   
 
                                                          





Figure 4.2 Federal Direct Loan Program, Original vs.  Revised Subsidy Rate,  
by Fiscal Year Cohort 
 
Source: Graph created by author using data from  Federal Credit Supplement, Fiscal Year 2019 
 
  
 The Federal Family Education Loan Guarantee program (FFELP) also had 
significant subsidy reestimates, but in the opposite direction.  As shown in Figure 4.3 for 
almost every cohort, subsidy rates were revised downward, meaning lower cost to (or 
more income for) the government.  The program’s net lifetime reestimates totaled $64 
billion downward, which is about 7.1 percent of the program’s total loan disbursements.  
This downward adjustment represents significant lower costs to taxpayers than initially 
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Figure 4.3 Federal Family Education Loan Guarantee Program,  
Original vs.  Revised Subsidy Rate 
 
Source: Graph created by author using data from  Federal Credit Supplement, Fiscal Year 2019 
 
 The subsidy rate adjustments for the FDLP and FFELP illustrate difficulties in 
estimating subsidy costs for some credit programs.  The cash flow projections used in the 
student loan programs’ subsidy estimates are dependent on various assumptions about 
loan performance and borrower behavior, which are affected by economic conditions.  
Estimated subsidy costs fluctuate with a variety of factors, such as: the government’s 
borrowing rate; interest rates charged to borrowers; whether and how quickly borrowers 
repay their loans; whether borrowers default on their loans; and the recovery amounts on 
defaulted loans (GAO, 2014b, 2016a).   
 As discussed by GAO and others, subsidy estimates for both programs (but 
especially the FDLP) are sensitive to interest rate fluctuations.  Differences between the 
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the programs (GAO, 2001a, 2005a, 2014a).125  Because interest rates cannot be 
accurately predicted there will be volatility in subsidy estimates. 
GAO’s recent review of reestimate trends found that interest rates (along other 
factors) were a significant factor in the reestimates for both the FDLP and FFELP 
programs.  According to GAO (2016), other factors driving the FDLP’s upward 
reestimate were revised assumptions related to income-driven repayment plans126 and 
public service loan forgiveness and rising borrower default rates.  GAO reported that 
many factors were involved for the FFEL program’s downward reestimate, but key 
drivers were interest rate changes and the treatment of programmatic changes as 
modifications under FCRA (GAO, 2016a).  127 
 FHA’s Single-family mortgage program also had significant changes in subsidy 
rates (See Figure 4.4).  For each cohort from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 2010 the 
program’s subsidy rate was adjusted upward, meaning an increase in a positive subsidy 
rate or a reduction in a negative subsidy rate.  The fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2009 
cohorts shifted from negative subsidy rates to positive subsidy rates.  In other words, the 
program went from being projected to make the government money to being projected to 
                                                          
125 GAO discusses that interest rates have significant but differing impact on the two student loan 
programs. For the direct loan program, lower than expected interest rates result in lower than 
expected borrower payments to the government and thus higher than expected subsidy costs.  For 
the guarantee program, lower than expected interest rates result in lower special allowance 
payments from the government to private lenders, which results in lower than expected subsidy 
costs (GAO, 2005a, 2014b). 
126 Income-driven Repayment (IDR) plans primarily base payment amounts on a borrower’s 
income and extend prepayment periods from the standard 10 years to up to 25 years with any 
remaining balance forgiven at the end of that period (GAO, 2016a and GAO, 2016b).  
127 Oversight reports during the last decade that other factors have contributed to reestimates of 
the student loan programs, including, for example, changes in anticipated borrower behavior, 
such as greater than anticipated loan consolidation or use of Income-driven Repayment Plans 
(GAO, 2001a, 2005a, 2016a). In addition, reestimates have resulted from improvements in data 





cost the government money.  This is particularly important because the FHA is intended 
to be self-financing.  The largest shifts occurred in the fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 
2007 cohorts, which changed from -1.7% to 8.7% and from -.37% to 12%, respectively.  
The program’s net lifetime reestimate is $77 billion upward, which represents 2.3 percent 
of the program’s total loan disbursements.  While recent fiscal year cohorts have negative 
subsidy rates the net lifetime reestimate represents a significantly greater cost to the 
government than initially anticipated. 
 
Figure 4.4 FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Program, Original vs Revised Subsidy Rate,  
by Fiscal Year Cohort 
 
Source: Graph created by author using data from  Federal Credit Supplement, Fiscal Year 2019 
 
 The FHA’s credit subsidy estimates are heavily influenced by economic 
conditions.  FHA’s credit subsidy estimates rely on cash flow projections of: (1) 
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FHA, and (3) recoveries to be collected by FHA from selling foreclosed properties 
(Jones, 2018a, 2018b and U.S. HUD OIG, 2013).  These cash flow projections require 
various assumptions about the borrower and mortgage characteristics as well as economic 
conditions, such as housing prices, unemployment, and interest rates.  Housing prices, for 
example, influence probability of default and foreclosure as well as the severity of losses 
on defaults.  (Jones, 2018a, 2018b and HUD OIG, 2013). 
 The FHA mortgage insurance program was significantly affected by the severe 
recession and sharp downturn in the housing market in the late 2000s.  FHA had made 
improvements to its cash flows models, but projections did not fully anticipate or 
incorporate the implications of extreme economic scenarios (GAO, 2010a, p.  8-9).  
According to CBO (2013), the higher subsidy costs for FHA’s single-family mortgage 
guarantees reflected higher–than-expected defaults by borrowers and lower–than-
expected recoveries when defaulted on homes were sold.  GAO (2016a) found that 
downward adjustments to housing prices and interest rates assumptions were important 
factors in the program’s upward subsidy cost reestimates during the financial crisis.128  
As economic condition improved, premiums increased, and the quality of newly issued 
loans improved the program returned to negative subsidy rates beginning with the fiscal 
year 2010 cohort (Jones, 2018a, 2018b).  129  
                                                          
128 GAO also found that higher than expected losses stemming from portfolio and mortgage 
market developments contributed to the upward reestimates (GAO, 2016a, p. 29). 
129 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, FHA adopted policy changes including raising fees and 




 SBA’s loan programs also were significantly impacted by the financial crisis.  
Some cohorts for SBA’s Section 504130 and Section 7(a) 131 programs were originally 
estimated to have zero (or very little) cost to the government but were adjusted upwards 
resulting in significant positive subsidy rates (See Figures 4.5 and 4.6).  According to the 
SBA, upward reestimates for both programs were driven mostly by the negative effects of 
the severe economic downturn, including high unemployment and the distressed housing 
market, which led to higher than projected purchases of defaulted guarantees and lower 
recovery rates (SBA, 2010).  Loan defaults were a key factor driving 7(a) subsidy 
estimates, with purchases of defaulted guarantees for fiscal year 2009 85 percent higher 
than fiscal year 2008 (SBA, 2010).  As the economy recovered, both programs returned 
to negative subsidy rates.  For the Section 7(a) program, the sum of net lifetime 
reestimates showed a $2.6 billion upward adjustment, which amounts to less than 1 
percent of the program’s total loan disbursements.  For the Section 504 program, the sum 
of the net lifetime reestimates totaled $2.2 billion upward adjustment, which amounts to 
3.4 percent of the program’s total loan disbursements.132  
 
                                                          
130 The 504 program uses SBA guarantees to assist small business.  Under the program, SBA 
provides its guarantee through certified development companies (CDC), which are private, 
nonprofit corporations.   
131 The 7(a) program guarantees loans made to small businesses that are unable to obtain 
financing on similar terms in the private credit market. 
132 As another example of the how the picture of a credit program’s costs can change, my initial 
analyses (using data from the FY 2015 supplement) showed the net lifetime reestimates for the 
section 7(a) program as a $4 billion upward adjustment, which was just over 2 percent of the 
program’s total loan disbursements. The sum of the net lifetime reestimates for the Section 504 
program was $4.6 billion upwards, which represented 9.6 percent of the program’s total loan 
disbursements.  Using the data from the FY 2019 for the same cohorts as the initial analysis (FY 
1992-FY2014) showed a sum of net lifetime estimates of $2.5 billion, which amounted to 4.4 





Figure 4.5 7(a) General Business Loan Guarantees, Original vs.  Revised Subsidy Rate 
 







































































Fiscal Year Cohort 
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Revised subsidy rate, including interest






Figure 4.6 Section 504 Certified Development Companies Debentures,  
Original vs Revised Subsidy Rate 
 
Source: Graph created by author using data from  Federal Credit Supplement, Fiscal Year 2019 
  
 SBA’s subsidy estimation experience helps illustrate some of the technical and 
political challenges associated with subsidy cost estimation.  In the early 2000s, just a 
few years before the financial crisis, some policy participants expressed concern that 
SBA’s subsidy cost estimation methodology was too conservative because it used all loan 
performance data since 1986, which some believed overestimated defaults and 
underestimated recoveries.  At the time, the program had a net lifetime reestimate of 
nearly $1 billion downward, indicating that the expected cost to the government would be 
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overestimation of SBA subsidy costs led to the introduction of legislation133 that directed 
SBA to use a new, updated subsidy model. In voicing support for the legislation 
congressional lawmakers expressed concerns that OMB’s and SBA’s overestimation of 
subsidy costs was impeding the program’s mission.  Representative John Spratt (D, SC) 
argued that OMB and SBA were using an “overly conservative credit subsidy calculation 
model.” He asserted:  
“OMB has had chronic problems with overestimating the credit subsidy rate for 
general business loans, the so-called 7(a) program and related programs.  As a 
result, SBA has historically underestimated the volume of loans that can be 
supported by a given level of appropriations” (Cong. Rec. H355, 2003)  
 
 SBA adopted a methodology that uses the five most recent years of actual loan 
performance.  At the time, some experts noted that the proposed methodology would be 
more sensitive to fluctuations in economic conditions.  GAO reported that with the new 
approach “a sudden downtown in the economy would be much more likely to result in 
actual performance being different than estimated and thus would likely result in larger 
upward reestimates than under the current approach” (GAO, 2001b, p. 2).  Later, when 
financial crisis hit, SBA was significantly affected by the downturn in the economy, 
resulting in large upward reestimates.  This experience highlights the inherent 
uncertainty, but also the political challenges associated with estimating expected cash 
flows over long periods.   
                                                          
133 S.141 “A bill to improve the calculation of the Federal subsidy rate with respect to certain 
small business loans, and for other purposes.” The bill was introduced in the Senate on January 
10, 2003 and became Public Law No. 108-8 on February 25, 2003. Legislation was necessary 
because OMB cannot change the assumptions in the President’s budget request after it has been 




 DOE’s loan programs experienced significant subsidy rate adjustments, which 
exemplifying the challenges of estimating costs for unique risks.  The DOE provided a 
relatively small number of loans for innovative projects.  134, 135 These projects tended to 
be complex and inherently difficult to forecast.  An independent consultant’s report 
outlined several factors that make estimating subsidy costs for these loans particularly 
challenging, including: (1) many covered projects use novel technologies and/or involve 
significant scale-up risk; (2) many covered projects are in early development stages; and 
(3) loans tend to have longer terms than are typically found in the commercial market 
(Allison, 2012, p. 32).   
 The program’s subsidy reestimates reflect these challenges.  The combined net 
lifetime reestimate for the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) 
program and Loan Guarantee Program (LGP) was 2.9 billion downward adjustment, 
which is 26 percent of loans disbursed.  The ATVM program had a significant net 
lifetime downward reestimate totaling 2.8 billion, which is 39 percent of the loans 
disbursed.  The net lifetime reestimate for the LGP program was smaller showing .1 
billion downward, which is 2.5 percent of loans disbursed.  Most of ATVM’s reestimate 
stemmed from the fiscal year 2009 cohort, which has a significant downward subsidy rate 
adjustment from 38.3 percent to 1.8 percent.  The fiscal year 2011 cohort subsidy rate 
was revised significantly upward adjustment from 22.9 percent to 81.8 percent.  
                                                          
134 The Loan Guarantee Program (LGP) was established in Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 to accelerate deployment of innovative clean energy technology.  The Advanced 
Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program was established in Section 136 of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 to support production of fuel-efficient, advanced 
technology vehicles and qualifying components in the United States.   
135 As of November 2014, DOE’s portfolio consisted of 34 direct loans and loan guarantees 





However, the level of loans disbursed for the fiscal year 2011 cohort was much lower 
($.04 billion) than the fiscal year 2009 cohort ($7.2 billion).  GAO (2015a) reported that 
while two ATVM loans defaulted, the estimated subsidy costs for the program dropped 
primarily as the result of a significantly improved credit rating for a single loan, which 
was repaid in full 9 years ahead of schedule, resulting in a net gain to the Treasury (GAO, 
2015a).   
 
Figure 4.7 Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loans,  
Initial vs.  Revised Subsidy Rate, by Fiscal Year Cohort 
 













































Figure 4.8 DOE Loan Guarantee Program, Initial vs.  Revised Subsidy Rate,  
by Fiscal Year Cohort 
 




Despite Challenges, Subsidy Estimation Process Has Prompted Attention to Policy 
and Management Issues    
 While subsidy estimation has been challenging and some significant reestimates 
have occurred, the process can provide useful signals to policy participants about risks 
associated with and management of loan programs.  Oversight reports and hearings 
provide examples of FCRA’s subsidy estimates and reestimates being used to prompt 
attention to and investigation of policy and program management issues.  FHA’s subsidy 
estimates and reestimates prompted examination of risk factors and areas for improved 
oversight and management (GAO, 2005a and GAO, 2013c).  In response to FHA’s 
substantial credit subsidy reestimate of $7 billion at the end of the fiscal year 2003 Rep.  
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GAO examine the reestimate, including determining the factors which contributed to the 
reestimate and the underlying loan performance factors (GAO, 2005b).  Based on GAO 
recommendations, FHA’s contractor incorporated the source of down-payment assistance 
and borrowers credit scores in subsequent actuarial reviews (GAO, 2007, p.15).136 
 The interaction between FHA’s subsidy cost reestimates for its single-family 
mortgage insurance program and the program’s capital reserve fund137 helped call 
attention to the program’s changing role and financial condition.  Transfers from the 
capital fund to the program account were made to cover the large upward reestimates 
discussed earlier.138 Both depletion of the capital reserve account and concerns that FHA 
would need to draw on permanent, indefinite budget authority in the future to cover 
subsidy cost reestimates helped prompt attention to the program’s policies and financial 
condition.   
 Difficulties estimating subsidy costs and significant reestimates called attention of 
USDAs financial and risk management of its loan programs.  Significant upward 
reestimates for the Rural Housing Services (RHS) Single-Family Mortgage guarantee 
program prompted a congressional request for GAO to review the agency’s subsidy 
estimation procedures and management of its loan programs.  GAO (2016c) identified 
                                                          
136 Specifically GAO was asked to: (1) assess the significance of the $7 billion reestimate, (2) 
determine what factors contributed to the $7 billion reestimate and the underlying loan 
performance variables influencing these factors, (3) assess how the loan performance variables 
underlying the reestimate could impact future estimates of new loans, and (4) assess what the 
reestimate and the underlying loan performance variables mean for the long-term viability of the 
Fund.   
137 The capital reserve account holds reserves in excess of those needed for estimated subsidy 
costs and helps cover costs unexpected increases in costs.  As with other programs covered by 
FCRA, the financing account holds reserves need to cover estimated subsidy costs (GAO, 2011b).    
138 Historically the programs had estimated negative credit subsidies.  Based on these estimates 
the negative subsidies in excess of those need for estimated subsidy costs were transferred from 




several areas where RHS policies and procedures were not fully consistent with OMB 
standards for managing credit programs.  RHS has undertaken several steps to improve 
its loan management, including: (1) hiring a Chief Risk Office to lead risk management 
function, (2) developing an econometric model to help predict and assess potential risk 
and (3) strengthened its Credit Policy Committee (GAO, 2017a),   
 A 2014 GAO report highlighted the inherent risks associated with the federal 
student direct loan program and the implications for policy proposals.  The report found 
that borrower interest rates cannot be set in advance to consistently balance government 
revenue and costs because subsidy cost estimates are too sensitive to certain variables and 
fluctuate significantly over time.  GAO concluded that the risks inherent in the program 
and the resulting estimation variability would impede proposals aimed at precisely tying 
borrower’s interest rates to the government’s costs (GAO, 2014b). 
 FCRA subsidy cost estimates have been used to heighten awareness of or explain 
the risks inherent in the mission and design of some credit programs.  CBO and GAO 
reviews highlighted the difficulties associated with estimating subsidy cost for programs 
covering small numbers of loans or unique or complex risks.  As discussed earlier, one 
concern prior to FCRA was the changing composition of federal credit programs from 
being primarily large actuarially sound programs to including risker, larger loans to a 
smaller number of borrowers or a single borrower.   CBO testimony on a proposed loan 
guarantee program to increase access to local television signals in rural areas discussed 
the factors affecting the program’s subsidy cost estimates, warning that the venture was 




structured to mitigate the government’s subsidy costs.  CBO also provided information 
on the subsidy cost and risks involved with loan guarantees of nuclear power plants. 
 Analysis of subsidy estimates were cited in debates about credit programs’ design, 
including zero-subsidy programs or proposals.  In its 2008 review of DOE’s LGP, GAO 
highlighted the potential for self-section bias due to combination of the inherent 
difficulties estimating program’s cost and the “borrower pays” design.  GAO cautioned 
about the potential for an unbalanced portfolio leading to increased taxpayer costs 
because the risks inherent in DOE’s loan guarantee program “… will make it difficult for 
DOE to estimate subsidy costs with a reasonable degree of accuracy, which could lead to 
financial losses and may introduce biases in the programs that ultimately receive loan 
guarantees” (GAO, 2008, p. 5).   
 
FCRA subsidy estimation methods remain significant source of debate.   
 Concerns about credit subsidy estimates go beyond how accurately agencies are 
applying FCRA’s estimation procedures to concerns about the estimation procedures 
themselves.  Vigorous debate reemerged in recent years about the treatment of market 
risk and the associated choice of discount rate.  To a lesser extent, concerns also continue 
about the treatment of administrative costs.  While almost all reform efforts focus on 
modifying FCRA’s net present value approach, Marron (2014) raises the possibility that 
FCRA’s use of discounted net cash flows is itself misguided.   
 Critics claim that FCRA’s subsidy cost estimates create some of the very 
problems it was meant to prevent: perverse budget incentives, distorted policy debates 




2015; Holt-Eakin, 2015; Lucas, 2014; Lucas and Phaup, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2014; and 
Phaup, 2012).  The following section examines the key conceptual and technical 
arguments on both sides of the debate.  The next two sections then examine the extent to 
which fair-values are now available and how the existence of competing subsidy cost 
estimates (FCRA and fair-value) have been used the policy and political process.  This 
ongoing debate over complicated issues illustrates some of the challenges associated with 
bringing analytical information directly into the budget. 
 
 Treatment of market risk remains highly controversial   
 Echoing voices of the past, some policy participants challenge FCRA’s use risk-
free Treasury rates to discount cash flows for subsidy cost estimates.  Elliott notes that 
despite “near-universal” agreement that subsidy costs should be measured on a 
discounted cash flow basis there continues to be a “critical policy argument” about the 
appropriate discount rate (Elliott, p.15).  Proponents of reform argue that, by failing to 
capture the cost of the market risk,139 FCRA provides incomplete and misleading 
estimates of the government’s subsidy cost.  Others, however, strongly oppose the 
inclusion of market risk in credit subsidy estimates, arguing that doing so violates 
budgetary norms, overstates budget costs, and skews cost comparisons with other federal 
programs.  Table 4.3 provides a summary snapshot of positions of some participants in 
this debate from government, academia, and the think tank community.   
 
                                                          
139 Market risk is the component of financial risk that cannot be eliminated through portfolio 
diversification. Market risk arises from shifts in macroeconomic conditions, such as productivity 
and employment, and from changes in expectations about future macroeconomic conditions 




Table 4.3 Examples of Positions in Recent FCRA vs.  Fair Value Debate (2000-Present) 




CBO (2003b, 2004, 2012b, 2014b, 2015c, 2016, 2018f) 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (April 2013)  
OMB (2018a) 
Senate Budget Committee (Warren, 2016) 
Academic/research 
community 
Lucas (2014)  
Lucas and Phaup (2008, 2010) 
Phaup (2012) 
Swagel (2013) 
Think Tank Affiliated 
Researchers  
American Action Forum (Holtz-Eakin, 2015 and Miller, 2014)  
American Enterprise Institute (Capretta, 2018) 
Brookings Institution (Elliott 2009, 2011, 2012, 2015) 
Center for Federal Financial Institutions (Elliott, 2012) 
Heritage Foundation (Katz, 2017) 
Mercatus Center (de Rugy & DeHaven, 2017) 
New America (Delisle, 2015) 
Commissions  Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform (2010) 
 
Other  National Affairs (Delisle and Richwine, 2014) 
Financial Economist Roundtable (2012) 
 




OMB (2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015)  




Think Tank  Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (Van de Water, 2015; 
Kogan, 2014; Kogan, et al., 2013; and Bernstein, 2013) 
Center for American Progress (Griffith, 2012) 
Other Letter to congressional member (Reischauer, 2013) 
 
Support Alternative Reform  (not FCRA or fair-value) 
Think Tank Affiliated 
Researcher 
Urban Institute and Tax Policy Center; Marron (2016, 2014) 
Source: Table compiled by author. 
 
 Nearly all reform efforts advocate for a fair-value approach, which includes the 
cost of market risk in subsidy cost estimates.  Both FCRA and fair-value estimates are 




default risk captures the cost of expected losses from defaults, market risk measures the 
cost associated with bearing the uncertainty surrounding these estimates.  Private 
investors require a risk premium (i.e. additional compensation above the expected return 
for risk-free Treasury securities) as compensation for bearing exposure to market risk.  A 
fair-value approach recognizes the government’s assumption of market risk as a cost to 
the government above the average expected losses from defaults (CBO, 2018f and 
Bickley, 2012). 
A commonly discussed reform approach adjusts the discount rate to account for 
market risk.140 CBO uses this approach for its annual updates of credit subsidy estimates 
(CBO, 2018f).  Under this approach, FCRA and CBO’s fair-value subsidy cost estimates 
are based on similar cash flow projections, but the fair-value approach uses market-based 
discount rates while FCRA uses treasury rates.  141  CBO (2014b) explains “the difference 
between the FCRA and the fair value discount rates can be interpreted as the additional 
compensation that investors would require to bear the risk associated with federal 
credit” (p. 4). Because the fair-value approach includes a risk premium the subsidy cost 
of federal credit programs generally is higher using the fair-value approach than FCRA’s 
approach (CBO 2018c, p.3).142 
                                                          
140 Several methods can be used to estimate and incorporate market risk, including: observable 
market prices, (2) adjusted discount rates; and (3) options-pricing (CBO, 2004, 2012b, and 
2014b). CBO has used more sophisticated techniques, such as options-pricing, to estimates the 
fair value of some credit, such as FHA’s Mortgage Insurance (CBO, 2004 and 2014a). CBO 
(2004) explains the application of options pricing for valuing federal loan and loan guarantees.   
141 For most direct loan programs CBO uses the cash flows that OMB uses for its FCRA-based 
subsidy estimates.  However, CBO uses its own cash flow estimates for the Department of 
Education student loan programs and FHA’s single-family mortgage program. For other loan 
guarantees, CBO use cash flow information from OMB, but also its own approximations of 
interest payments and principal based on OMB data.  See How CBO Produces Fair-value 
Estimate of the Cost of Federal Credit Programs: A Primer.  
142 The risk premium is added to the risk-free Treasury rate.  The resulting difference between 




 For over a decade, CBO has actively advanced the use of fair-value cost 
estimation for federal credit programs.  In a series of reports and testimonies, CBO 
outlined concerns about FCRA’s budget information and incentives; provided arguments 
for a fair-value approach; and applied a fair-value approach to various federal credit 
programs (CBO 2018f, 2014b, 2012b, 2007, 2004).  The agency’s technical expertise, 
reputation, and role as official budget scorekeeper added credibility and increased 
attention to the issue.  Prominent academics and researchers (some with prior affiliations 
with CBO) were instrumental in laying out arguments for the inclusion of market risk and 
applying fair-value approaches to federal credit programs (Lucas et al., 2004; Lucas and 
Phaup, 2008, 2010).  Various commissions also articulated support for revising FRCA to 
adopt a fair-value approach for credit programs.  In 2010, the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform indicated potential support for a fair-value approach.  
The Pew-Peterson Commission on Budget Reform proposed fair-value accounting for 
federal credit programs.  In 2012, the Financial Economist Roundtable (FER)143 issued a 
statement endorsing amending FCRA to adopt a fair-value approach (Financial 
Economist Roundtable, 2012).    
 Presidential administrations and Congress have weighed in on the debate.  While 
the Obama Administration strongly supported FCRA’s estimation method,144the Trump 
                                                          
underlying loan, the average life of the loan, and for loan guarantees, the structure of the 
guarantee.  The effect of the difference in discount rates is larger the longer the average life of the 
loan (CBO, 2018f, p. 3).   
143 The Financial Economist Roundtable (FER) is a group of senior financial economists who 
have made significant contributions the finance literature and seek to apply their knowledge to 
current policy debates.  FER statements are distributed to relevant policymakers and the media 
(FER, 2012)  
144 The Analytical Perspectives for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 included discussions that 
concluded the drawbacks of fair-value budgeting for federal credit programs outweighed its 




Administration has signaled support for a fair-value approach (OMB, 2018a, p. 124).   
Numerous Congressional Committees and lawmakers have requested CBO provide 
information on the fair-value approach or for subsidy cost estimates using this approach.  
In June 2015, the Joint Economic Committee held a hearing during which experts 
testified strongly on both sides of the issue (U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
2015).  GAO recently conducted a congressionally requested review of FCRA’s credit 
subsidy estimates and the fair-value approach (GAO, 2016a).145 Congress mandated the 
use of fair-value cost estimation for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  The 
Economic Emergency Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008146 required that OMB and CBO 
estimate TARP cost consistent with FCRA’s approach, but with discount rates adjusted 
for market risks (OMB, 2015a).  147  
 In recent years, Republican lawmakers introduced legislation to amend FCRA to 
require fair-value subsidy cost estimates.  From 2011 to 2015, lawmakers introduced bills 
that would have required the cost of federal credit programs be estimated using a fair-
value approach or that would have required CBO, upon request of the budget committee, 
to provide supplemental estimates of subsidy costs using the fair-value approach.  In 
                                                          
fair-value approach estimates in the budget would “… represent a step backward from the 
methods in use today” (OMB, 2014a, p. 340).  OMB stated that doing so “would not be an 
improvement over the methods in use today” (OMB, 2013, p. 399).  
145 The GAO study was requested by Senator Christopher Coons (D), Ranking Member, 
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations  
146 As discussed earlier, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 (P.L. 110-
343) authorized the Treasury to purchase or guarantee troubled assets to restore the liquidity and 
stability of the financial system (OMB, 2015a).  Section 123 of the Emergency Stabilization Act 
of 2008 required that TARP be scored using a net present value calculation with a discount rate 
that incorporates market risk.   
147 A fair-value approach also is used to budget for some International Monetary fund lending 
facilities (CBO, 2012).  In addition, CBO, but not OMB, uses fair-value for baseline budget 




2012 and 2014, the House passed legislation amending FCRA to require fair-value 
estimates for federal credit programs, but both bills died in the Democratic-controlled 
Senate.148 In both cases, votes were almost completely along party lines, with 
Republicans heavily favoring and Democrats strongly opposing the bills.  The Budget 
and Accounting Transparency Act of 2012 (H.R.  3581) passed the House in February 
2012, with a vote of 245 to 180.149 Democratic lawmakers introduced two proposed 
amendments to delay bill or narrow the bill, but both failed on almost entirely along party 
lines.150 The Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2014 passed the house in April.  
2014, with a vote of 230-155.151 No legislation was enacted into law.  In 2015, legislation 
to amend FCRA to require fair-value subsidy estimates again was introduced, but it was 
not voted on (H.R. 119 and S. 399).  
 Although FCRA has not been amended to require fair-value subsidy cost 
estimates, recent budget resolutions included provisions requiring CBO to provide 
supplemental fair-value subsidy cost estimates.  The fiscal year 2018 concurrent budget 
                                                          
148 These bills would have required fair-value using SFAS 157 as promulgated by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, which sets accounting standards for the private sectors.   
149 Of voting Republicans, 238 voted for and 2 voted against the bill.  Of the 185 voting 
Democrats, 7 voted for the bill and 178 voted against. One Republican and 7 Democrats did not 
cast votes. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll042.xml  
150 Rep. Tonko (D-NY) offered an amendment to convene a commission of budget and 
accounting experts to provide recommendations to Congress about the best measure to account 
for the costs of Federal credit programs. The Congress would then have an opportunity to vote on 
the commission’s recommendations.  The Tonka amendment failed by vote of 187 to 238, with 
almost all Republicans voting against and almost all Democrats voting for the amendment. Two 
Republicans voted for the amendment and 236 voted against the amendment. Two Democrats 
voted against and 185 voted for the amendment. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll040.xml  Rep 
Waltz (D-Mn) offered an amendment to exclude loans to students and veterans from including 
market risk in subsidy estimates. The amendment failed by vote of 190 to 238.  All 189 voting 
Democrats voted against the amendment.  One Republican voted for and 238 voted against the 
amendment. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll041.xml 
151  263 Republicans voted for the bill.  Of the 181 voting Democrats, 16 voted for the bill and 





resolution152 directs CBO, if requested by a Budget Committee Chair, to include 
supplemental fair-value estimates of any legislation modifying or establishing a direct 
loan or loan guarantee program, regardless of program or policy area.  In the cases of 
student financial assistance and housing (including residential mortgages), CBO is 
directed to include fair-value estimates for all estimates for legislation modifying or 
establishing a direct loan or loan guarantee programs.  No request from a Chairman is 
required for these estimates.  In the House, it is permitted to use fair-value estimates as 
the basis for budget enforcement.  CBO also is required to include in its The Budget and 
Economic Outlook 2018 to 2027 a comparative baseline projection using both FCRA and 
fair-value approaches for student financial assistance, housing (including residential 
mortgage) and other major credit programs.   
 Fair-value subsidy cost estimates are more available for federal credit programs, 
but the debate and controversy surrounding their appropriateness and usefulness 
continues.  Over a decade of debate has clarified some issues, but it has done little to 
resolve fundamental disagreements.  Central technical issues include whether the Federal 
Government is exposed to market risk and if so whether this exposure is a budget cost.  
For lawmakers, debate is about whether credit program costs are higher or lower than 
FCRA cost estimates and whether the government is making a profit or loss on credit 
programs.   
 Proponents of a fair-value approach, including the CBO, argue that market risk is 
a cost to the government and as such it should be included in the budget.  CBO (2014b) 
explained: 
                                                          





“The government is exposed to market risk through its credit programs because 
when the economy is weak, borrowers default on their debt obligations more 
frequently and recoveries from defaulting borrowers are smaller.  That market 
risk is effectively passed along to taxpayers and beneficiaries of government 
programs because they bear the consequences of the government’s financial 
losses.  Moreover, that risk is costly to those taxpayers and beneficiaries because 
they also tend to value resources more highly when the economy is weak.” (pp. 3-
4).   
 In this view, the role of the budget is to record is to quantify all the costs that are 
present in the economic environment, which in the opinion of fair-value proponents 
includes the cost of market risk for credit programs (Joint Economic Committee, 2015).  
Former CBO Director, Holtz-Eakin testified:  
You cannot pretend that the Federal Government is a riskless entity.  All it does is 
transmit the risk in the economic environment through it back to the taxpayers 
who are subject to those risk to begin with.  So measure them comprehensively.  
Trace them back to the taxpayer because that is ultimately who is going to pay 
(Joint Economic Committee, 2015, p.  24)  
 
 Fair-value proponents claim that, by excluding the cost of bearing market risk 
from subsidy cost estimates, FCRA understates the cost of federal credit programs (CBO, 
2004, 2018; CRS, 2014; Delisle, 2010, 2015; Elliott, 2011, 2015; FER, 2012; Lucas and 
Phaup, 2008; and Miller, 2014).  CBO (2004) argued:  
“Using the Treasury rates to discount expected cash flow neglects the cost of 
market risk and results in the systematic understatement of costs for both direct 
and guaranteed loans.  Using risk-adjusted discount rates, which include the cost 
of market risk, would correct that understatement and improve the comparability 
of budgetary costs for credit and other programs” (p. 3).   
 
 Further, proponents stress that FCRA’s exclusion of market risk is not just a 
technical issue but misleads policymakers and creates incentives for the overuse of credit 




“…FCRA accounting creates a budgetary incentive to expand the programs 
beyond the scale that would be chosen if the budget reflected comprehensive 
estimates of the costs of those programs” (Elmendorf, p. 8).  
 
 Worse, some such as Delisle, a former Republican budget committee staffer, 
argues that FCRA’s estimation methods create a significant “loophole” that may have 
been “unintentional” but “… now threatens to undermine the benefits and intent behind 
this important law….” (Delisle, 2010a, p. 1). 
 How FCRA creates “profits” and what subsidies are reflected in the budget and 
provided to borrowers remain points of confusion in the debate.153 Under FCRA’s 
approach, the government may show a “profit” (or negative budget outlays) when it 
extends credit at rates above the risk-free Treasury rate.  As a result, the government can 
appear to be “profiting” even when it is extending credit to borrowers at below market 
rate i.e. subsidizing borrowers.154 Because the government has gains from lending at rates 
higher than its borrowing rates, the government may be able to take over risker lending 
and turn it into federal lending without showing budget costs and perhaps even showing a 
“profits.”  As discussed later.  these types of issues create confusion and challenges when 
FCRA subsidy estimates are used in the policy and political process.   
 Opponents of fair-value argue that: (1) market risk is not relevant to the Federal 
Government or (2) if it is relevant, it is not a budget cost.  A long-held premise is the 
Federal Government is not exposed to market (or its exposure is much lower) because it 
                                                          
153 Marron (2014) provided a detailed discussion of these issues, which informed the summary 
provided here.   
154 As discussed in Marron (2014), FCRA’s subsidy number combines the gains taxpayers receive 
as compensation for bearing risk with the costs from subsidies given to borrowers.  Because these 
two components are combined into a single number, Marron concludes “FCRA does not measure 
subsidies; instead it measures the returns the government expects to net on the loan, which equal 




can borrow at lower rates than private institutions and it can spread risk more widely and 
over long periods of time.  155 One assertion is that because the Federal Government can 
borrow to cover losses, it can avoid market risk by postponing tax increases or spending 
cuts until good times.  (Sastry and Sheiner, 2015, p. 6).  The government’s sovereign 
power to collect payments is also credited with reducing its risk exposure and lowering 
its lending costs.  Some argue that given the complexities involved about which elements 
of market risk apply to the Federal Government it is a “better approximation to treat the 
government as risk neutral than to treat it as having the same risk aversion as the 
marginal investor” (Sastry and Sheiner, 2015, p. 7).   
 CBO and other fair-value proponents, however, rebut claims that the Federal 
Government’s characteristics eliminate its exposure to market risk (CBO, 2004/2014; 
Lucas (2014, 2016 and Lucas and Phaup, 2008).  CBO argued: 
“even if the government can spread risk widely, it cannot eliminate the 
component of risk that is associated with fluctuations in the aggregate economy 
(market risk) and that risk is costly to the taxpayers and beneficiaries of 
government who ultimately bear it” (Elmendorf, p. 5). 
  
 Fair-value proponents also dispute that the government’s cost is best defined by 
its borrowing costs (CBO, 2004 and Lucas and Phaup, 2010).  In discussing the issue, 
CBO (2004) distinguishes between the financing of risk and the existence of risk as 
follows:  
                                                          
155 The theory that the government is not risk-adverse is grounded in the work of Arrow and Lind 
(1970) which argued for using a risk-free rate because any credit losses from a program would 
extremely small relative to the totality of the federal budget.  In addition, the government could 
use its taxing and borrowing authority to spread costs over time.  Recently, Lucas (2014) 
challenged Arrow and Lind’s theory and presented a case for governments using market rates for 




“The authority to draw on the resources of others to ensure repayment of debt 
obligations does not reduce the risk the government assumes by extending risky 
loans and guarantees.  Rather, it is the means by which such risk is shifted to 
taxpayers and beneficiaries of government programs, who are in essence, equity 
holders in the government’s financial activities” (p. 4).   
 
 Some FCRA supporters conceded that market risk is relevant to the Federal 
Government and thus important to decisions about federal credit programs, but they 
strongly dispute that it is a budget cost.  Rather, market risk is a social cost.  In a widely-
cited letter to Representative Van Hollen, Former CBO Director Reischauer objected 
strongly to the inclusion of market risk in the subsidy cost estimates used in the budget.   
 
A society’s aversion to risk may be an appropriate factor to take into account in a 
cost-benefit assessment of any spending or tax proposal, but adding a cost to the 
budget does not make sense.  Nor is it clear that the cost of societal risk aversion 
should be based on individual or institutional risk which is what the private 
market reflects.  Inclusion of a risk aversion cost for credit programs would be 
inconsistent with the treatment of other programs in the budget … and would add 
a cost element from a traditional cost-benefit analysis without adding anything 
based on the corresponding benefit side of such an analysis.  It would also make 
budget accounting less straightforward and transparent (Reischauer, 2012, p. 1).    
 
 Opponents of adding market risk as a budget cost argue that the budget should 
only include cash transactions of the government.  The Senate Budget Committee stated 
that while market risk may carry societal costs “those are not same as budget costs” 
(U.S. Senate Budget Committee, 2014, p. 2).  Karmin (2012) argued “...the key point – 
and the point that should be decisive in deciding whether to reflect risk in the federal 
budget – is that the “cost of risk” does not create a fiscal effect and so should not be 
recorded in the federal budget” (p. 32). The Center for Budget and Program Priorities 




committee staff, has been vocal in its view that “risk aversion is not, in fact, a budgetary 
cost” (Kogan et al., 2014, p. 1).  Marron, who is a proponent of reforming FCRA, argues: 
 
 “the government’s ability to bear financial risk has no bearing on how we should 
measure the fiscal effects of federal lending.  It is relevant to whether and how the 
government should extend credit but it should not influence how we construct 
budget projections.” (Marron, 2014, p.19)  
As was the case in the debate leading up to FCRA, GAO put itself at odds with CBO by 
reaffirming its support for FCRA’s use of the Treasury rate.  GAO (2016a) states: 
“… we do not support the fair-value approach to estimate subsidy costs for the 
budget and believe the current FCRA methodology is more appropriate, as it 
represents the best estimate of the direct cost to the government and is consistent 
with current budgetary practices (p. 33).   
 
 The issue of non-cash cost remains a significant source of confusion.  Both FCRA 
and fair-value account for the time value of money which create differences between the 
reported cash deficit and Treasury borrowing during the life of a loan.156 However, in 
FCRA’s case, it is a timing difference and over time a credit program’s ultimate costs are 
tied to cash flows, which are observable and measurable.  Under FCRA, at the end of a 
loan’s life the government’s costs (the initial subsidy estimate and subsequent 
reestimates) will measure the actual net cash flows to and from the government.  Fair 
value estimates also account for the time value of money, but its inclusion of a risk 
premium creates an unobservable factor that may always remain unknown.  As a result, 
                                                          
156 Under FCRA, the difference between outlays and the deficit results from timing differences. 
The subsidy costs for direct loans are outlayed to the financing account when loans are obligated.  
At that point subsidy costs included in the deficit, even though the draw on Treasury funds will 
not occur until loan disbursement.  Similarly, the deficit includes the subsidy costs for loan 
guarantees in the year the guarantees are extended even though the cash outlay from the 




under a fair-value approach, at the end of a loan an adjustment would be necessary even 
if estimated cash flows occurred exactly as expected (Kogan et al, 2013; Lucas and 
Phaup, 2008 and OMB, 2014a).157   
 Given the differing opinions about whether market risk is a budget cost, it is not 
surprising that policy participants are strongly divided about whether FCRA or fair-value 
subsidy estimates best support cost comparability among credit programs and between 
credit and other federal spending.  Phaup (2012) argued that “… some credit programs 
expose taxpayers to much more market risk than others, but FCRA accounting does not 
recognize those differential costs between credit programs” (p. 4).  Lucas (2014) 
explains that one reason given for using the treasury rate is to ensure consistent 
application across programs but argues that “…using the same discount rate for different 
program favors high-risk programs and therefore does not meet the goal of consistency 
across programs (p. 89).  In articulating support for fair-value, Elliott questioned 
Congressional members, “Do you as a Member of Congress want ta budget number to 
reflect the difference between very certain results and very uncertain results?” (JEC, 
2015).   
 Fair-value proponents also argue that FCRA’s understatement of subsidy costs 
results in a bias in favor of credit programs over other types of federal programs (Castelli 
et al, 2014b; CBO, 2004; Phaup, 2012; and Lucas, 2010).  The premise is that a fair-value 
approach improves comparability because for most non-credit federal programs the cash 
                                                          
157 This occurs because at the end of a loan’s life the full accounting should result in the net cash 
flows to the Treasury; however, under fair-value, an adjustment is necessary to adjust the risk 




costs used in the budget are fair-value costs since they are based on the market prices of 
goods and services purchased by the government. 
 Opponents, however, counter that uncertainty associated with market risk is not 
unique to credit programs; it can be a significant factor for many federal programs, 
especially mandatory programs, such as unemployment benefits, which are closely tied to 
general economic conditions.  Reischauer stated “… inclusion of a risk aversion cost for 
credit programs would be inconsistent with the treatment of other programs in the budget 
(many of which have costs that are at least as uncertain as the costs of credit programs – 
for instance, many agricultural programs and Medicare)” (Reischauer, 2012, p. 1).  In 
this view, the use of the fair-value subsidy estimates would create a bias against credit 
programs by making them appear more expensive that other forms of federal spending.   
OMB (2015) states that inclusion of premium for uncertainty was scored only for credit 
programs it “could distort decision making, placing a thumb on the scale against credit 
assistance” (p. 338).  
 While almost all reforms focus on modifying FCRA’s estimation procedures, but 
Marron goes further to challenge the conceptual soundness of the net present value 
approach used by both FCRA and fair-value.  Marron contends that both FCRA and fair-
value approaches are flawed.  In his 2014 report, he argued:  
“FCRA does a good job measuring the lifetime fiscal effects, but it therefore 
cannot measure fiscal effects at origination or over the budget window or the 
subsidies given to borrowers.  In fact, FCRA negative subsidy estimates suggest 
that the government profits at borrowers’ expense even when it offers subsidized 
loans” (Marron, 2014b, p. vi).   
 
 
“Fair-value does the reverse; it measures subsidies well but therefore cannot 
measure fiscal effects over the budget window or the loan’s life” (Marron, 2014b, 






Rather than focusing on a single lump sum (as FCRA and fair-value approaches do), 
Marron’s “expected returns” approach would track the year-by-year net financial returns 
that a loan is expected to generate (Marron, 2014b).  While Marron's work provides 
valuable insights into the complexities of measuring and budgeting for the costs of 
federal credit, it has its own unresolved issues158 and so far, it has not resulted in new 
reform efforts.  I have not found any legislative proposals calling for using the expected 
value approach as the basis for amending or replacing FCRA.  I also have not found 
significant statements about or endorsement of the expected value approach by other key 
players in the debate, including CBO, GAO, OMB, or recent budget reform commissions.    
   
 Treatment of administrative costs remains a source of concern.   
 Concerns also remain about FCRA’s exclusion of administrative costs from 
subsidy costs.  Reflecting unresolved debate, Section 503 of FCRA directed the CBO and 
OMB to analyze and report on FCRA’s treatment of administrative costs.159CBO’s 1992 
report outlined key advantages and disadvantages of revising FCRA’s subsidy estimation 
procedures to include administrative costs.  CBO’s analysis confirmed that budget 
treatment of administrative costs for federal credit programs matters because these costs 
can be significant, and their size and timing vary significantly across credit programs 
(CBO, 1992).  According to CBO, a key argument for the inclusion of administrative 
                                                          
158 It is unclear how the Marron proposals would fit the principle of recognizing upfront costs.  
159 Section 503 directed CBO and OMB to “each analyze and report to Congress on differences 
in long-term administrative costs for credit programs versus grant programs by January 31, 
1992.”  These reports were “… to recommend to Congress any changes, if necessary, in the 




costs is that their exclusion understates the cost of federal credit programs, but there also 
are practical and conceptual arguments for not including them.160 After weighing the 
issues, CBO (1992) concluded: 
 
“… the Congressional Budget Office does not recommend changing the 
budgetary treatment of the administrative costs of credit programs at this time.  
The apparent disadvantages associated with moving administrative costs into the 
subsidy outweigh the apparent advantages.” (p.  xii)  
 
Pariser (1992) notes that the OMB report generally concurred with CBO’s analysis and 
outlined several issues that would need to be resolved before administrative costs could 
be included in subsidy cost estimates, such as, the establishment of a common definition 
of administrative costs (p.25).161  
 In 1993162 and 1994,163 bills were introduced to among other things amend FCRA 
to include administrative costs in subsidy estimates.  While no action was taken on these 
proposals, concerns continue to be raised periodically that FCRA’s exclusion 
administrative costs distorts the costs of federal credit programs (Lucas and Phaup, 
2008).  Ironically, given the concerns prior to FCRA that the cash-based budget created a 
bias towards loan guarantees over direct loans, several policy experts and commentators 
now argue that because FCRA’s excludes administrative costs of direct loans, it creates a 
                                                          
160 CBO (1992) explains that including administrative expenses in subsidy costs would reduce 
Congress’s “contemporaneous control over funding for these costs” (CBO, 1992). The inclusion 
of administrative costs may also reduce the comparability of costs between credit and some other 
federal programs because noncredit programs do not budget for these costs on a present-value 
basis. Further, agencies’ accounting systems would require significant changes to sufficiently 
account and track administrative costs (CBO, 1992).  
161 Other issues outline by OMB included: (1) improvements in the quality and availability of 
accounting information on administrative costs, (2) development of a basis for determining the 
proper level of spending for federal administrative costs, and (3) design of budget procedures to 
help control but allow for changes administrative costs (Pariser, 1992, p. 25). 
162 H.R. 2053 The Administrative Cost Inclusion Act of 1993. 




bias towards direct loans over loan guarantees (Lucas and Phaup, 2008, 2010, and Lucas 
and Moore, 2007).164  
 More recent oversight reports provide some evidence with respect to the 
magnitude of these costs and thus their significance in assessing credit program costs.  A 
2006 CBO report on FHA’s mortgage insurance found that adding administrative costs 
would change the program’s subsidy per $100 of insurance sold from a gain of 37 cents 
to a cost of 33 cents (CBO, 2006).  CBO (2005) found that including the costs of the 
federal student direct loan programs would raise its subsidy rate by approximately 1.5 
percentage points.  Similarly, the Department of Education estimates show that inclusion 
of administrative costs would reduce the estimated negative subsidy rate for the FDLP 
program for fiscal year 2016 by 1.7 percent from -14.65 to -12.95.165  While these costs 
may be significant enough to influence budget and policy decisions, revising FCRA’s 
subsidy estimation procedures to include administrative costs raises complicated issues as 
discussed above.  To date, most fair-value estimates have not included administrative 




                                                          
164 Under FCRA, administrative expenses paid directly by the federal government are excluded 
from subsidy cost estimates and included in the budget on a cash basis when they are paid. Lucas 
and Phaup (2008) and others argue this creates a bias because administrative costs occurred by 
private lenders are included in subsidy cost estimates for guaranteed loans as part of the payments 
made to guaranteed lenders (Lucas and Phaup, 2010).   
165 The Department of Education includes a table in the fiscal year 2016 Budget Appendix with 
subsidy rates for administrative costs projected on a comparable basis to the programs’ subsidy 




Debate about subsidy estimation procedures and fair-value estimates have 
informed and complicated the policy and political debate.   
 The on-going debate about FCRA’s estimation procedures and the increasing 
availability of fair-value estimates has informed and complicated policy and political 
debates.  In recent years, CBO has provided fair-value subsidy cost estimates for various 
federal credit programs in addition to its official cost estimates using FCRA procedures.  
Table 4.6 shown later in the chapter provides examples from CBO reports and 
testimonies.  Table 4.7 provides examples from CBO cost estimates, including 
correspondence with congressional members.  As can be seen, the FCRA and fair-value 
approaches provide significantly different estimates of subsidy costs, and therefore 
different signals and incentives with respect to specific federal credit programs and the 
impact of federal credit programs on the budget deficit (CBO, 2014b; Elliott, 2011; and 
Marron, 2014b).  In other words, the choice matters in real-world policy and political 
debates.   
  The aggregate effect of federal credit programs on the budget deficit is different 
depending on the cost estimation method used.  A 2012 CBO illustrative analysis of the 
cost of new federal direct loans and loan guarantees for more than 100 federal credit 
programs in fiscal year 2013 found that the deficit would be $56 billion greater using a 
fair-value approach than using FCRA procedures (CBO, 2012b).  New loans were 
projected to have budget savings of $45 billion using FCRA procedures and a budget cost 
of $11 billion using a fair-value approach (CBO, 2012b, p. 1).  In another analysis, CBO 
(2012a) projected the cost of discretionary spending for federal credit program as a 




value, resulting in a difference of $24 billion subject to budget controls.166 More recently, 
CBO (2018e) projected the costs for 79 credit programs, including the guarantees for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and found a $75.3 billion difference between the two 
estimation methods.  CBO projected that using FCRA procedures new loans and 
guarantees for fiscal year 2019 would have a budget savings of $37.4 billion but using a 
fair-value approach would have a budget cost of $37.9 billion (CBO, 2018e, p.  3).  
Removing Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae from this analysis results in a difference of 
$49.3 billion.167    
 The choice of estimation methods also has significant implications at the program 
level.  Table 4.4 shows CBO’s projections for fiscal year 2019 for the loan programs of 
six departments or agencies.  In each case, subsidy cost estimates are higher using the 
fair-value approach than using FCRA.  In four of the six cases, the subsidy shifted from 
zero or negative (budget savings) to positive (budget costs).Table 4.4 CBO's Projected 
Subsidy Costs for Fiscal Year 2019, FCRA vs Fair-value 
Department or Agency  Average Subsidy rate 
Percent 
Subsidy 
(Billions of Dollars) 
FCRA  Fair-value  FCRA Fair-value Difference  
HUD -3.7 2.7 -9.5 7.1 16.6 
Education  -4.1 16.2 -4.1 16.1 20.2 
VA .7 2.8 1.0 4.0 3.0 
SBA * 9.7 ** 4.3 4.3 
Agriculture  -1.3 5.2 -.5 2.1 2.6 
Export-Import Bank  -5.6 -2.7 -.9 -.4 .5 
Source: Table adapted from CBO, 2018, Table 1: Projected Costs of Federal Credit Programs in 
2019(CBO, 2018, p.  3).  Author calculated differences.   
 
 
 CBO has also reported fair-value estimates over the 10-year budget window for 
some major credit programs.  As shown in Figure 4.9, CBO’s April 2018 baseline for the 
                                                          
166 CBO cost estimate for H.R. 3581 Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2012. 
167 CBO’s projected costs for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together are budgetary savings of 
$23.5 billion using FCRA procedures and $2.4 billion cost using a fair-value approach (CBO, 




Student Loan Program Budget Account is significantly greater using a fair-value 
approach.  Using FCRA, CBO projected budget savings of $45 billion over the 2016-
2028 budget window, but using a fair-value approach, CBO projected a budget cost of 
$199 billion, a difference of $244 billion.  CBO projected the cost of the FHA single-
family mortgage guarantees for fiscal years 2015-2024 as $63 billion in budget savings 
on a FCRA basis, but a budget cost of $30 billion on a fair-value basis, a difference of 
$93 billion (CBO, 2014b).  CBO (2014b) projected the subsidy cost for the Export-
Import Bank for fiscal year 2015-2024 as budget savings of $14 using FCRA and as a 
budget cost of $2 billion using a fair-value approach, a $16 billion difference. 
 
Figure 4.9 CBO April 2018 Baseline, Student Loan Program Account 
 
 Source:  Figure created by author based on CBO data.    
 The choice of estimation methods results in significant (and somewhat confusing) 
differences in the projected budget impact for various policy options.  In cases where the 
FCRA baseline estimates show budget savings, reducing loan volume may result in 
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reduced budget savings (increased budget cost).  In other words, reducing government 
loans, increases costs.  CBO (2017b) found that the policy options it reviewed for FHA’s 
Single-Family Mortgage Insurance Program reduced budgetary saving relative to the 
baseline prepared using FCRA procedures (p.  12).  Table 4.5 displays CBO’s costs 
estimates for various policy options all of which reduce loan volume.  Using FCRA 
procedures, CBO projected increased budget cost (reduced savings) but using a fair-value 
approach CBO projected a decrease in budget costs.168 Other CBO analyses of proposals 
to reduce the volume of student loans showed that the proposals would reduce savings 
(increase budget costs) using FCRA procedures but reduce budget costs using a fair-value 
approach (CBO, 2013; 2016b, p. 2).  This type of counter-intuitive result has increased 
confusion and controversy about FCRA procedures.
                                                          
168 According to CBO, using FCRA procedures, the baseline projected budgetary savings 
(meaning that present value of projected insurance losses is smaller than the present value of the 
fees and premiums that FHA is projected to collect). Each policy option reduced the volume of 
loans which reduced budget savings (increased budget costs).  Under the fair-value approach, the 
baseline estimate showed a budget cost and each policy options reduced loan volumes, resulting 





Table 4.5 CBO's Projections, Effects of Policy Options  
Costs of FHA's Single-family Program in 2018 
Policy Option Fair-value Estimate for 
2018 Cohort of 
Guarantees, 
Cost of Program 
(Billions of dollars) 
FCRA estimate for 2018 
Cohort of Guarantees 
Budgetary Cost of 
Program 
(Billions of dollars) 
CBO Current Law Baseline  5.1 -7.4 
Partial guarantees    
With FHA in first loss position  1.9 -3.7 
With FHA in second loss position  3.3 -3.7 
Risk-based Pricing  4.7 -7.0 
Residual-Income Test  4.6 -6.7 
Lower Loan Limits 4.4 -5.4 
Restricted Eligibility  3.2 -5.1 
Mortgage Counseling  3.7 -5.8 
Don-payment Grants in Exchange 
for Shared Appreciation  
4.8 -6.1 
 Source: Table adapted by author from CBO: Options to Manage FHA’s Exposure to Risk from 
Guaranteeing Single Family Mortgages, Table 3, p.  12.   
 
 While competing estimates provide additional information and perspectives, they 
also create confusion and controversy.  The existence of competing estimates for 
politically sensitive programs combined with strongly conflicting views among key 
players about which estimation procedure is most appropriate confused policy 






Table 4.6 Example of FCRA vs Fair-value Subsidy Estimates, CBO Reports and Testimonies 
Agency or 
Program(s)  
Description and Source Date  FCRA procedures  Fair Value Method Difference 
All or selected 
group of federal 
credit programs 
Cost of new loans and 
guarantees to be issued in 
2019, 79 credit programs, 
including Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac 




Budget savings, $37.4 
billion  




Cost of new loans and 
guarantees issued in 2013, 
103 federal credit 
programs169 (CBO 2012b, 
p.1) 
 
June 2012  
 






loan programs  
April 2018 baseline, 
Student loan Program 
Budget Account (CBO, 
2018d)  
 
April 2018  
 




Fiscal year 2019 
(CBO, 2018e, p.1) 
 
June 2018  
 
Budget savings, $4.1 
billion 




Four largest student loan 
programs, FY 2015-2024 
CBO, 2014b). 
 
May 2014  
 
Budget savings, $135 
billion 
Budget costs, $88 billion $223 
billion 
Loans issued, FY 2010 - 
2020 (CBO, 2010c) 
March 2010 Budget savings of $46 
billion 




Federal Direct Student Loan 
Program  
June 2013 Budget savings, $37 
billion, for FY 2013  
Budget savings, $6, FY  
2013  
$31 billion  
(FY 2013) 
                                                          
169 The CBO analysis did not include: (1) Mortgage guarantees of Fannie Mar and Freddie Mac; (2) Troubled Asset Relief program and additional l 






Description and Source Date  FCRA procedures  Fair Value Method Difference 
(CBO, 2013b, p.  1)  
Budget savings, $184 
billion, FY 2013-2023  
 










Fiscal year 2019 
(CBO, 2018e, p.  1) 
June 2018  
 
Budget savings, $9.5 
billion  
Budget cost, $7.1 billion  $16.6 
billion  
Guarantees for fiscal years 
2014-2015  
(CBO, 2014b, p.  4) 
September, 
2014 
Budget savings, $16.4 
billion  
Budget cost, $2 billion  $18.4 
billion  
Guarantees issued FY 2011-
2024 
(CBO, 2014a) 
May 2014 Budget savings, $63 billion Budget cost $30 billion $93 billion  
Fiscal year 2012 May 2011 Budget savings, $4.4 
billion 
Budget cost, $3.5 billion $7.9 
billion 
Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac  





Budget savings, $44 billion Budget cost, $53 billion $97 billion 
Export-Import 
Bank  
Export-Import Bank   
(Bank’s six largest credit 
programs)  
(CBO, 2014b; Elmendorf, 
2014)  
June 2014  
May 2014  
 
Budget savings, $14 billion  Budget cost, $2 billion  $16 billion  
Small Business 
Administration  
SBA’s 7(a) program (CBO, 









Treasury  Loan guarantee to 
American West Airlines 
(CBO, 2004, p.  13) 
2004  
 
Budget savings, $47.4 
million  




 Treasury  Loan guarantee to Chrysler 
(CBO, 2004, p.13)  
2004 
 
Budget cost, $107.6 million Budget cost, $239 
million  
$131.4 
million   





Table 4.7 Examples of FCRA vs Fair Value, CBO Baseline and Cost Estimates 
Program(s)   Description (Cost estimate unless 
noted)  
Date  FCRA procedures  Fair Value Method Difference 
All or selected 
group of credit 
programs 
H.R.  3581 Budget and Accounting 
Transparency Act of 2012.  
Estimate for discretionary 




Budget savings, $4 
billion  
Budget cost, $20 billion  $24 billion  
Federal student 
loan programs 
April 2018 baseline, Student loan 




April 2018  
 
Budget savings, 8.7 
billion  




President’s proposal to eliminate 
FFEL and replace with loans from 










Budget savings of $47 $33 billion 
President’s proposal to eliminate 
FFEL and replace with loans from 
the FDLP 
(CBO, 2010c).   
 
March 2010 Budget savings, 
$62 billion  
Budget savings, $40  $22 billion  
Private Student Loan Debt Swap 
Act of 2009  
November 
2009 
Budget savings, $9 
billion  
Budget cost, $700 
million  
$9.7 billion 
Cost estimate, H.R.  4508 
“Promoting Real Opportunity, 
Success and Prosperity through 
Education Reform Act” (CBO, 
2018d) 
July 2018 Budget savings, 
$14.6 billion  
Budget Savings, $16.9 
billion  
$2.3 billion  
Small Business 
Admission  
H.R.  5297 Small Business 
Lending Act (CBO 2010a) 
May 2010 Budget cost, $1.4 
billion  
Budget cost, $3.4 
billion 




Program(s)   Description (Cost estimate unless 
noted)  
Date  FCRA procedures  Fair Value Method Difference 
Export-Import 
Bank  
H.R.3611, Export-Import Bank 
Reform and Reauthorization 




$2.3 billion  
Budget cost $.3 billion  $2.6 
Export-Import Bank 
Reauthorization and Reform Act 
of 2015  
July, 2015 Budget savings, 
$2.3 billion 
Budget cost, $1 billion  $2.3 billion  
Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs 
S.  385 Energy Savings and 
Industrial Competitiveness Act  
(CBO, 2017a, p.7) 
June, 2017 Budget cost, $6 
billion  






S.  385 Energy Savings and 
Industrial Competitiveness Act, 
Discretionary spending, Outlays   
(CBO, 2017a, p.7) 
June, 2017 Budget savings, 
$12 billion  
Budget cost, $12 billion  $24 billion  
H.  R.  3700 Housing Opportunity 
Through Modernization Act of 




$117 million  








 With more fair-value subsidy estimates available, the FCRA estimation debate 
became intertwined with policy and politics, and positions largely fractured along 
partisan lines.  In recent debate, Republicans generally supported adoption of fair-value 
budgeting for credit programs while Democrats supported FCRA’s approach.  The fair-
value approach, which incorporates a market perspective and results in higher subsidy 
cost estimates tends to support more conservative policy positions, such as the use of 
private sector approaches and the elimination or scaling back of federal credit programs.  
Conversely, the lower budget cost (or budget savings) under FCRA’s approach tends to 
support a more liberal agenda of government assistance.  As noted in the existing 
literature, policy participants’ positions on budgeting for market-risk, however, have not 
always or completely reflected this current partisan spilt, with some positions seemingly 
tied to the specific policy outcomes at stake (Chingos, 2015; Delisle, 2015; Delisle and 
Rischwine, 2014; and Richwine, 2014).   
 Debate on recent proposals to revise FCRA to require fair-value subsidy cost 
estimates reflect the current partisan split, with Republican favoring and Democrats 
opposing.  The contentious and political tone of the debate surrounding this seemingly 
technical, wonky issue signals the high stakes at hand and suggests difficulty separating 
budget decision rules from underlying policy and politics.  In introducing legislation 
calling for fair-value estimates, Senator Fischer (R-Neb) issued the following press 
release referring to FCRA:  
 
“These congressional required budget gimmicks hide the true costs of government 
spending.  Even for a wasteful federal government such spending tricks totaling 






During floor debate, Senator Garrett (R-NJ) painted FCRA as dishonest, arguing “for too 
many years, Washington has operated by a special set of rules” and “Why shouldn’t 
Washington play by the same rules every American family and business must play by 
when taking out a loan?” (Cong.  Rec. H541, 2012). 
 Arguing against a fair-value approach, Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) stated 
“…Republicans are trying to change the rules of game using an accounting system that 
will make programs like student loans look more expensive” and warned “[m]illions of 
American have something to lose if proponents of this accounting have their way” 
(Maloney, 2015, p.2).  In response to the House passing legislation to require a fair-value 
estimates, Rep.  Bill Pascrell (D- NJ) stated: 
 
“It’s nothing but a dishonest attempt to make worthy government programs 
appear more costly so that those ideologically opposed to government and 
government spending can more easily undermine those very programs” (as cited 
in Marcos, 2014).   
 
Reflecting the high policy stakes involved, Rep.  Watt (D-MN) offered an amendment to 
exclude market risk from loans to students and veterans, arguing: 
 
“My amendment would ensure that we hold them, the veterans and the students, 
harmless until we know how this unvetted, untested piece of legislation will 
work… Protect the students and veterans in this … let’s make sure there is a 
firewall between those that can least afford to have this go bad (Cong.  Rec. 
H547, 2012).     
 
  The debate about and (at times) the politicization of FCRA’s budget rule has 
been on display in various policy debates, including federal students, housing policy, and 
the reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank.  Budget rules have long played a role in 




remain at the forefront of FCRA estimation debate.  In 1958, the National Defense 
Education Act170 established the first federal student loan program using direct loans.  
However, as Congress sought to expand student financial aid cash-based budget rules 
favored guarantees and The Higher Education Act of 1965 created the student loan 
guarantee program.  Over time, some analyses found that direct federal lending would 
provide a lower cost option due to complications and inefficiencies associated with the 
guarantee program.  While some proposals called for the establishment of a direct loan 
program, cash-budgeting created a barrier and no action was taken (Delisle, 2017 and 
Lucas and Moore, 2010).  Shortly after FCRA’s enactment, however, the Higher 
Education Act was amended to create a pilot, direct leading program, the Federal Direct 
Loan Demonstration Program.  Some researchers and policy participants credited FCRA 
with clearing the way for a direct lending program (Delisle, 2017, Lucas and Moore, 
2010 and Warren, 2016).171 The Student Loan Reform Act enacted as part of the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 phased in significant expansion of the direct loan program.172    
 The student direct loan and loan guarantee programs operated side by side until 
the financial crisis and the election of President Obama provided a policy opportunity for 
eliminating student guarantees in favor of solely using direct loans.  In October 2008.  as 
an initial response to the retreat of private student loan lenders from the market during the 
                                                          
170 H. R. 13247 is Public Law 85-864 (72 Stat. 1580. 
171 Delisle (2017) argued that FCRA’s enactment “…  made the potential direct loan savings 
official in the eyes of Congress and the first estimates showed that a proposed Direct loan 
program could cut costs by as much as $2 billion a year” (p. 8). Warren (2016) argued that 
FCRA enactment “..., made federal direct lending financially feasible” (p.5). Lucas and Moore, 
2010, argued “[f}federal budget rules have had a significant effect on the structure and 
evaluation of the federal loan program.  Most notably, the federal loan program appears to have 
been made feasible form a budgetary perspective by FCRA” (p. 171).  
172 Identical bills H.R. 2055 and S.920 were introduced, but there were no separate roll call votes 




financial crisis, the Bush Administration and Congress passed the “Ensuring Continued 
Access to Student Loans Act” (ECASLA) on a largely bi-partisan basis.173  Under the 
ECASLA, the government either: (1) purchased FFELP loans, which provided lenders 
with the capital to make new loans, or (2) made loans to FFELP lenders to make loans to 
students.  With credit markets drying up and students increasingly using direct loans,174 
the Obama Administration proposed to eliminate the guarantee loan program altogether 
and expand the direct loan program. 
 During the debate over Obama’s controversial proposal, both sides pounced on 
their favored subsidy cost estimates.  CBO’s official cost estimate projected budget 
savings of about $87 billion175 over the 2010-2019 period176 using FCRA procedures 
(CBO, 2009a, p.  3).  A few days later, in response to a congressional request that the 
estimate be adjusted for market risk, CBO projected lower budget savings of $47 using a 
fair-value approach (CBO, 2009b, p.1).  The projected savings were $33 billion less 
using the fair-value, after considering a $7 billion offset for administrative costs.  These 
conflicting estimates quickly became part of the political conflict.   
 The Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009 (SAFRA), which included 
the President’s proposal, passed the House 233 to 171, largely along party lines (U.S. 
                                                          
173 Public Law 110-350.   
174 During the financial crisis, many lenders suspended or eliminated their private student loan 
programs due to sharp increase in funding costs and concerns about deteriorating credit quality of 
borrowers (CBO, 2013b, VIII).  
175 According to CBO (2009) about $7 billion of these savings were from a reduction in the 
administrative costs, which would be offset by an increase in future appropriations.  Thus, the 
estimated net budgetary savings would be about $80 billion over the 2010-2019 period.    
176 CBO cost estimate for H.R. 3221.  In March 2010, CBO estimated a savings in mandatory 
costs of $68 billion over the period from 2010 through 2020, using FCRA procedures.  After 
adjusting for in annual discretionary administrative costs, the net budgetary savings would be 
about $62 billion.   Using a fair-value approach, CBO estimated a savings of about $40 billion, a 




House of Representatives, Office of Clerk, Roll Call Vote 719).177 The bill then stalled in 
the Senate.  Democrat proponents pointed to the official budget estimate prepared using 
FCRA procedures to claim that in addition to being beneficial for students the legislation 
was fiscally responsible.  Republican opponents countered that savings touted by the 
Democrats were significantly reduced under a fair-value approach.  A press release from 
Rep Kline (R-MN) argued:   
“[t]this analysis from the Congressional Budget Office confirms once and for all 
that these savings are a myth.  A government takeover of our student loan 
programs is just a budgetary gimmick designed to finance the latest entitlement 
spending spree, leaving our children and grandchildren to pick up the tab” 
(Kline, 2009, p.1).      
 
 Democrats hit back with the official budget estimates and their own claims of 
budget gimmicks.  Rep.  Miller (D-GA) issued a press release “Republicans Try to Cook 
Books on Historic Student Aid Bill” stating:  
“It’s clear the Republicans did not like the truth- that our legislation generates 
almost $90 billion that could be used to help students, families, and taxpayers – 
so they shamelessly decided to have a little fun with the numbers.” (Miller, 2009, 
p.1) 
 
This is nothing more than a desperate attempt to confuse the public and 
manipulate a clear determination by CBO that switching to the Direct Loan 
program is the most sound, fiscally responsible policy decision we could make for 
families and Taxpayers.  This is yet another predictable political gimmick…….” 
(Miller, 2009, p.1).   
 
                                                          
177 247 Democrats and 6 Republicans voted for the bill; 167 Republicans and 4 Democrats voted 
against the bill.  Ten members did not cast a vote (U.S. House of Representatives, Office of 




In the end, SAFRA was passed as part of the large and controversial heath care 
reform bill, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (H.R.4872).178  
 Credit subsidy estimates have remained prominent in the debate about the student 
loan programs, with on-going controversy and confusion about whether students are 
subsidized and whether the government “profits” from these programs.  The clashing 
subsidy estimates came in to play during debate over interest rates on student debt.  Sen.  
Warren (D-mass), a leading voice for student loan reform, repeatedly claimed FCRA-
based negative subsidy cost estimates proved that the government is “making obscene 
profits on the back of our students” (Warren, 2013, p.2).  In a June 2013 floor speech, she 
called it “morally wrong” that     
“… the federal government is making a profit from our students…The 
Congressional Budget Office calculated the government will make $52 billion this 
year off student loans” (Warren, 2013, p.1)  
 
Senator Warren reiterated these concerns in multiple floor speeches and press 
opportunities, arguing: “[w]hile student are paying more, the federal government is 
boosting its own profits” (Warren, 2013, p.  1).  Warren was not alone in using FCRA 
estimates as support for protect borrowers from interest rate increases by claiming that 
government “profits” off students.  Senator Tom Harkin, Chairman of Senate Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions is quoted “Republicans still want to raise 
money off of students, and we don’t want to do that” (as cited in Raju and Everett, 2013).  
 Opponents countered that “profits” from student loans are “illusory” and the 
significant budgetary savings (profit) estimated for the student loan program disappear 
when subsidy costs are estimated using a fair-value approach.  In floor speech Senator 
                                                          




Lamar Alexander stressed CBO’s support of the fair-value approach, arguing that “It is 
not true that under the recommended form [emphasis added] of evaluating the cost to the 
government that taxpayers come out better than students” (Alexander, 2013, p.1).  
Delisle, researcher at New America, a conservative-leaning think tank, argued  
“ [f]ederal student loans are not profitable for the government, nor does the 
government break even on the loans, Using fair value estimates, student loans are 
the government’s most expensive loan program” (as cited in Salam, 2012, p.  2).   
 Other opponents point to CBO costs estimates for specific proposals as 
exemplifying the problems with FCRA.  In discussing Senator Warren’s proposal to 
refinance federal and private student loans,179 Matthew Chingos of the Brookings 
Institution questioned:  
“… how would this generous benefit be paid for? Miraculously, it will pay for 
itself due to the arcane accounting rules that Congress imposed on federal credit 
programs … For example, the CBO analysis of the Warren proposal estimates 
that the government can take on half of the existing balances of private student 
loan debt in the country, reduce interest rates, and still book a profit of $5 bill.  A 
method of accounting that could produce this result is lubricous, but it is the law 
of the land until Congress says otherwise” (Chingos, 2014, p.1).   
  
Another student loan refinancing proposal received attention as an example of the 
“budgetary loopholes” provided by FCRA.  Delisle (2014) claimed that the Private 
Student Loan Debt Swap Act of 2009, which would have allowed borrowers with student 
loans not backed by the Federal Government to swap their debt for new loans issued by 
the Department of Education, demonstrates the poor incentives created by FCRA.  FCRA 
                                                          
179 CBO Cost estimate for S.2432, Bank on Students Emergency Loan Refinancing Act. The bill 
would have allowed most individuals with student loans (both federal and private) to refinance 
those loans. Into new federal direct leans (CBO, 2014).  CBO projected that enacting the bill 
reduce deficits over the 2015-2024 period by about $14 billion.  Chingos is referring CBO’s 
estimate that refinancing private student loans would reduce direct spending by $5 billion over 




and fair value estimates provided very different pictures of the cost of the proposed 
program.  CBO’s preliminary estimate using FCRA estimation procedures showed the 
program would have a negative subsidy of $9.2 billion while its estimate using fair-value 
method showed the program would cost $700 million, a difference of almost $10 billion 
(CBO, 2014c and Delisle, 2014).   
 Credit subsidy estimates also were at the forefront of political fight surrounding 
the Ex-Im Bank’s reauthorization.  While the debate involved broader issues about the 
government’s role in the economy, a recurring issue was whether the Bank is self-
sufficient.  CBO found that for fiscal year 2015 to 2024 EX-IM would generate 
budgetary savings of about $14 billion using FCRA procedures but have budget cost of 
$2 billion using a fair-value approach (CBO, 2014d).180 During the 2015 reauthorization 
fight CBO estimated the cost of new loans and guarantees would have a budget savings 
of $2.6 over the 2016-2020 budget window using FCRA, but the budget effect would be 
close to zero using a fair value approach (CBO, 2015e).   
 Supporters and opponents of Export-Import Bank latched on to their preferred 
cost subsidy estimates to bolster their positions.  Bank proponents pointed to FCRA’s 
estimates as evidence of its “self-sufficiency.” In discussing the Bank’s role in supporting 
business, the Bank’s President Hochberg argued “…that we are able to support them 
while also helping to reduce the deficit is a bonus for taxpayers” (cited in Cirilli, 2014, 
p.1).  To support their position that the Bank is costly, proponents attacked FCRA’s 
legitimacy and touted the higher fair-value subsidy estimates.  In his opening statement at 
a congressional hearing on the Bank, House Financial Services Committee Chairman 
                                                          




Rep.  Hensarling (R-Texas) asserted that “proper” accounting demonstrates that the 
Bank actual costs taxpayers billions.  He emphasized “that is the difference between 
Washington accounting and main street accounting” (Examining Reauthorization, 2014). 
A 2014 National Review article portrayed the Bank’s surplus, based on FCRA cost 
estimates, as “….  another illustration of how improper accounting can conceal 
government monkey-business” (de Rugy, 2014, p.1) The Washington Examiner argued 
that the Bank’s “profit” is “accounting fiction” (Carney, 2014, p.  1).  After much delay, 
a rarely-used procedural maneuver was used to reauthorize the Bank as part of the FAST 
Act.181A proposed amendment which sought to require fair value accounting for the Bank 
failed by a vote of 133-295, with all voting Democrats against (U.S. House of 
Representatives, Office of Clerk, Roll Call Vote 615).182       
 Subsidy cost estimation was also raised in the congressional oversight of the 
FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance program.  In response to a congressional request, 
CBO (2006) found that while FCRA estimates showed the program resulting in a net 
gain, fair value estimates showed the program has a cost of between 2 and 5 percent of 
the amount to insured loans.  While not a central issue of FHA oversight hearings, 
multiple expert witnesses testified in favor of the adoption of a fair-value accounting 
(Calabria, 2011, pp. 2-3; Holtz-Eakin, 2013; Swagel, 2013, p. 6).   
 While the current partisan split generally has Democrats supporting FCRA and 
Republicans supporting a fair-value approach, policy participants’ positions have not 
                                                          
181 H.R. 361, “The Export-Import Bank Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2015” become law as 
part of H.R. 22, FAST Act, which was signed into law on December 4, 2015.  Public Law No. 
114-94.  No separate roll call votes were held on the Export-Import Bank’s reauthorization.   
182 133 Republicans voted for the amendment.  110 Republicans and 185 Democrats voted 




always or completely reflected this partisan spilt, with some positions seemingly tied to 
the specific policy outcomes at stake (Chingos, 2015 Delisle, 2015, Delisle and 
Richwine, 2014), and Richwine, 2014).183  In a 2014 National Affairs article, Delisle and 
Rawine discussed how policy participants’ position on budgeting for risk have changed 
over time.  Specifically, they pointed out that during the Social Security privatization 
debate, some conservatives ignored the market risk in assessing proposals to invest Social 
Security funds in private markets while the liberal-leaning CBPP, now a fair-value critic, 
argued for the recognition of market risk.  In a 2005 CBPP brief discussed the importance 
of considering market risk because there is “no free lunch” (Furman and Greenstien, 
2005, p.  11).184 In 2014 CBPP released a reversal of its position stating:  
 
 “… risk is an important consideration in assessing the pros and cons of a 
proposal it is not an actual cost to the government and therefore doesn’t belong in 
the budget.  This conclusion is different from the one CBPP reached in 2005 
which, upon further consideration, we now believe was mistaken” (Van de Water, 
2014, p.  1).   
 
  The reporting of seemingly technical issue in the press articles and blogs provides 
another indicator of the stakes involved and how the budget rule has become intertwined 
with policy and political debates.  Multiple press publications published articles and 
                                                          
183 Richwine (2014) argues “[f]or both parties market risk is costly except when it not” (p.1). 
Chingos (2015) argues that Democrats these days use FCRA estimates to argue for lower interest 
ratees on student loans, but in earlier years railed against use to calculate the cost of Social 
Security reform.  Republicans tended to flip-flop in the opposite direction” (Chingos, 2015, 
endnote 10.   
184 In doing so, they pointed to CBO analysis of shifting Treasury bonds to stocks where CBO 
explained: Government investment in private securities does not offer a free lunch: although it 
could increase the expected value of the budgetary resources, it would do so at the cost of 
exposing the government, future taxpayers and beneficiaries of federal programs to greater risk.  
If that risk was taken into account the returns on private securities would be no greater than the 
returns on government securities (CBO, 2003a, p. 2).  Further, CBPP pointed to the budget 




commentaries on FCRA versus fair-value cost estimation for federal credit programs.  
Some question or outright attack FCRA’s legitimacy.  FCRA has been described as: 
“bogus federal accounting” (Anonymous, 2014); “budgetary illusion” (Carney, 2014); 
“bizarre and faulty;” “cooked accounting rules”(Garrett, 2013, p.1); “phantom loan 
revenues” (Winegarden, 2013, P.1); a “budgetary malfeasance” (Richwine, 2013, p.1); 
“unorthodox budget rules” (Grunwald, 2015a);  and “widely discredited” (Phillips, 2014, 
p. 1).   
 A series of Wall Street Journal commentaries promotes the use of fair-value 
accounting, referring to the current system (under FCRA) as “… fantasy world of 
government accounting” (Winegarden, 2013b, and Anonymous, 2014).  From the other 
side of the debate, the fair value approach has been described as “a dangerous game,” 
“an accounting trick” (Griffith, 2012) and a [b]udgeting gimmick” (Flores and Zonta, 
2017).  Other articles convey frustration in deciphering not only the technical issues 
involved, but the reasons and motivations underlying the different sides of the debate.  In 
the end, some articles figuratively throw up hands in frustration about the inability to 
decipher which is the right method (Kessler, 2013). 
 While supplemental fair-value subsidy costs estimates are becoming more 
accepted and available for use as an analytical tool, the debate about the adequacy of 
FCRA’s subsidy cost estimates and the use of fair-value cost estimates in budget rules 
appears far from over.  Over a decade of recent debate has clarified some issues, but it 
has not resolved fundamental disagreements about the use of fair-value estimates for 
federal credit programs.  The lengthy debate on complex conceptual and technical issues 




However, the choice of estimation procedures is much more than an academic, technical 
issue; it has significant implications for broader policy and political debates about the 
role of government and credit policy.   
 While virtually all budget estimates certainly involve subjectivity and uncertainty, 
the issues are intensified for credit subsidy estimates because: (1) some cost differences 
are large;185 (2) there is significant confusion about the conceptual and technical 
complexities; (3) differences reflect fundamental disagreements about what constitutes a 
budget cost; and (4) the actual cash cost to the government will not be known for many 
years.  Importantly, key budget oversight institutions - CBO, OMB, and GAO - are 
divided on the issue.  The official scorekeeper, the non-partisan Congressional Budget 
Office, is at odds with FCRA’s budget rule.  Further confusing the matter, past and 
present CBO directors and staff have expressed conflicting views.  While the complex 
technical and conceptual issues surrounding subsidy cost estimation are a source of 
serious and significant professional disagreement, this expert disagreement opens the 
door for FCRA to be used as a political weapon in policy and political debates.   
 The long-term implications of the subsidy estimation debate for FCRA’s 
sustainability are not yet clear.  While the differences between the estimates are stark for 
some credit programs and make powerful sound bites, the arguments behind the different 
estimation methods are conceptually and technically complex.   
 
                                                          
185 The significant differences in cost estimates is driven in part by the sheer size of the largest 





Federal Credit Reform, Trends in Federal Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees 
 FCRA is significant because of its design and its underlying premise that budget 
rules influence budget outcomes.  A key premise before FCRA was that cash-based 
budgeting created a policymaking preference for loan guarantees over direct loans.  If this 
was the case, one would expect loan guarantees to grow faster relative to direct loans 
before FCRA and for some moderation of this trend to occur after FCRA’s enactment. 
In this chapter, I examine trends of the level and the composition (i.e. the mix between 
direct loans and loan guarantees) of federal credit before and after FCRA.  For this 
review, I constructed trends of direct loan and loan guarantee data at aggregated and 
program levels.   
 
Trends in Aggregated Federal Direct loans and Loan Guarantees, 1970-2017 
 First, I examined trends of aggregated direct loans and loan guarantees covering 
both the pre- and post- FCRA periods.  The period examined (1970-2017) includes 22 
fiscal years before and 25 years after FCRA took effect.  For these analyses, I compiled 
and examined trends in aggregated data by fiscal year for (1) the face value of direct 
loans and loan guarantees outstanding and (2) direct loan obligations and loan guarantee 
commitments.  The data are actuals for these fiscal years, not budget estimates.   
 To explore the premise that, prior to FCRA, budget rules created a preference to 
use loan guarantees over direct loans, I calculated the ratio of loan guarantees to total 
credit (i.e. direct loans plus loan guarantees) by fiscal year for both data sets.186 This ratio 
                                                          
186 In calculating these ratios, total credit refers to federal loan guarantees plus federal direct loans 




was also useful in considering the more recent concern that FCRA has created an 
incentive to use direct loans over loan guarantees.  In theory, FCRA was to neutralize the 
budget treatment of direct loans and loan guarantees so that neither credit instrument has 
a budget advantage and policymakers are “free” to make choices based on policy 
preferences without incentives distorted by budget bias.   
  To construct the trend for face value outstanding, data on the aggregate face 
value of credit outstanding by fiscal year were either obtained directly from OMB or 
drawn from the Analytical Perspectives of the President’s budget.  Specifically, for fiscal 
years 1970 to 2010, data were obtained directly from OMB staff.  Data for fiscal years 
2011 to 2017 were drawn from Analytical Perspectives of the President budget (various 
years).  These data were adjusted to constant dollars (2009) using the budget composite, 
nondefense deflator published in the President’s budget.   
 To construct the trend of direct loan obligations and loan guarantee commitments 
by fiscal year, I compiled data drawn from various volumes of the President’s budget, 
including: (1) Special Analyses (fiscal years 1972 - 1990), (2) Budget of the U.S. 
Government (fiscal years 1991–1994) and (3) Analytical Perspectives (fiscal years 1995- 
2019).  I adjusted these data to constant dollars (2009) using the budget composite 
nondefense deflator.   
 The use of credit outstanding as a measure of the level and composition of federal 
credit has several advantages.  It is a generally understood, available, and relatively 
consistently reported measure of the government’s credit activities.  However, while 
providing a useful indicator of the general trend in federal credit activities, the face value 
                                                          
they are not covered by FCRA.  A similar approach was used by Hedley (1994) shortly after 




of loans outstanding has some shortcomings for the analysis of budget decisions.  
Because it is a cumulative measure of federal credit activities over time it does not isolate 
the budget decisions made in a given fiscal year.      
 The level of direct loan obligations187 and loan guarantee commitments188 
provides another (and closer gauge) of budgetary decisions about federal credit for a 
given year.189 Because they are not cumulative over time, loan obligations and guarantee 
commitments provide a better indicator of the budget decisions made in a given fiscal 
year.  However, because these data have some significant year-to-year variations, trend 
analysis is sensitive to the specific period chosen.  Further, because these data were 
compiled from various budget volumes over a three-decade period there is potential for 
inconsistency and error.  To reduce these errors, I cross-checked data across multiple 
budget volumes where possible.  In cases of conflicting information, I used the data 
reported in the most recent volumes.  I believe that any observed inconsistencies in the 
data are not material to my analysis.   
  Both data sets have the disadvantage of not capturing the government’s cost (i.e. 
the government’s subsidy).  Although FCRA now requires the government’s subsidy cost 
for federal direct loans and loan guarantees to be reported as a budget costs, prior to 
FCRA subsidy cost information was not consistently available and was of questionable 
                                                          
187 From the mid-1970 until the mid-1980s, the use of off-budget direct loans escalated. I only 
included direct loan obligations in the main data set for direct loan obligations I compiled a 
separate trend of off-budget direct loan obligations which is discussed later in this section.  
188 For consistency across years and to avoid double counting, the data included only primary 
loan guarantees, which excludes secondary guarantees.  
189 Aggregated data on “new loans issued” in a given fiscal year were not consistently reported 
over the period under consideration. Direct loan obligations and guarantee commitments provides 
a proxy measure, which was reported in a more consistent matter across the multi-decade period 




quality.  Therefore, credit outstanding and loan obligations and commitments provide the 
best proxies for assessing the association between FCRA and policymakers’ budget 
choices with respect to the level and composition of the federal credit assistance both 
before and after FCRA.  Although there are some expected inconsistencies between the 
data sets (most likely due to timing) using both data sets provided a useful cross-check on 
the overall message.   
 I examined the face value of loans outstanding for both direct loans and loan 
guarantees.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the level of loans outstanding for the fiscal years 
1970 to 2017, in current and constant dollars, respectively.  The level of loans 
outstanding for both direct loans and loan guarantees increased significantly over this 
period.  Between 1970 and 2017, the level of direct loans and loan guarantees 
outstanding, adjusted for inflation, increased 367 percent and 263 percent, respectively.  
Loan guarantees outstanding remained at significantly higher levels than direct loans 





Figure 5.1 Face value of Federal Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, Current Dollars 
Fiscal Years 1970-2017 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.  Graph adapted from Chart 19-1 




Figure 5.2 Face Value of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, Fiscal Years 1970- 2017, 
Constant Dollars (2009)  
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
 Breaking the trend data into pre- and post- FCRA periods provides additional 
















































































   
























































































increased for both direct loans and loan guarantees, but the percent increase from the 
beginning to end of the period was almost three times higher for loan guarantees than 
direct loans.  In the post-FCRA period, the level of outstanding loans for both direct loans 
and loan guarantees increased significantly, but direct loans increased more than loan 
guarantees.  The percent increase from the beginning to end of the post-FCRA period was 
almost three times higher for direct loans than for loan guarantees.   
 Growth over the post-FCRA period, however, was not consistent, with most of 
the growth in direct loans occurring after the financial crisis of the mid-2000s.  In the 
decade immediately after FCRA’s enactment, loan guarantees outstanding continued to 
increase while direct loans outstanding remained relatively level or declined until 2008.  
The level of both direct loans and loan guarantees outstanding increased sharply as the 
Government took action in response to the financial crisis, but the increase was 
significantly greater for direct loans.  Direct loans outstanding were 251 percent higher in 
2011 than 2008.  While much of the increase in the level of direct loans outstanding 
occurred in the height of the financial crisis, the level of direct loans outstanding 
remained higher than pre-crisis levels and continued to increase after the crisis.  Loan 
guarantees outstanding also increased sharply during the crisis and remained at higher 
than pre-crisis levels.   
 Next, I examined aggregated amounts of direct loan obligations and loan 
commitments.  As shown in Figure 5.3, the dollar amount of direct loan obligations and 
loan guarantee commitments increased significantly from 1970 to 2017.  As with loans 




for the entire period, but the differences in the trends were not as significant as for the 
outstanding loans.   
  
Figure 5.3 Direct Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments, Fiscal Years 1970 - 2017 
 
 Source: Graph compiled by author based on OMB data.   
 
  Table 5.1 compares the pre-FCRA and post-FCRA periods for direct loan 
obligations and loan guarantee commitments.  Consistent with the concerns of the time, 
the pre-FCRA period shows an increase in the dollar amount of guarantee commitments 
and decrease in the amount of direct loan obligations.190 While the trends from both data 
sets are consistent with the premise that pre-FCRA budget rules created a policy 
preference for loan guarantees over direct loans, a closer examination of the data raises 
some questions and suggest other factors also played a role. 
 
                                                          
190 This increase is smaller than some reports because it includes adjustments for inflation and 
excludes secondary guarantees. Further, as noted in the text, the change between specific years 

















































































Table 5.1 Percent change in Loan Obligations and Guarantee Commitments,  
Pre and Post FCRA 
 Entire Period  Pre-FCRA 
Enactment 




Direct loan obligations 212% (53%) 547% 
Loan guarantee 
commitments 
241% 19% 145% 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OMB data.   
 
 To further examine the issues, I divided the obligations and commitments trend 
data into shorter segments and looked at percent changes across these periods to better 
assess the impact of certain events.  191 Because percent change between two points is 
sensitive to the years used, I examined the underlying data closely throughout the 
analysis.  First, I divided the pre-FRCA trend into two time periods as shown in Table 
5.2.  From the beginning to end of the entire pre-FCRA period, loan guarantee 
commitments increased and direct loan obligations decreased, but this pattern was not 
consistent across the entire period.  Direct loan obligations increased in the 1970s and 
decreased in the 1980s before FCRA enactment.  Loan guarantees increased over both 
pre-FCRA periods, including some sharp increases.  After controlling for inflation and 
adjusting for secondary guarantees and FFB activities, loan guarantee commitments were 
171% higher for fiscal year 1979 than for fiscal year 1976 and 112% higher for fiscal 
year 1986 than for fiscal year 1984.  These spikes are constant with the concerns of the 
time about the issuance of guarantees of large loans to single borrowers.  In contrast, the 
                                                          
191 While this analysis was conducted on both data sets, I provide only the findings of the 
obligations and commitments data here to provide a more concise overview. The overall findings 
were similar for the trend of loan levels outstanding, with a few inconsistencies likely the result 




pre-FCRA trend for direct loan obligations is smoother, increasing before declining 
starting in 1985.   
 





Entire period  
Pre-FCRA 
Enactment 
1970 vs 1980 
Pre-FCRA 
Enactment1 
1981 vs.  1991  
Direct loans (53%) 78% (71%) 
Loan 
guarantees 
19% 26% 44% 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OMB data.   
 
   
Figure 5.4 Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments, 
 Fiscal Years 1970-1991 
 
Source: Author based on OMB data. 
  
 These data, however, do not fully capture the issues because beginning in the 
1970s until the mid-1980s some direct loan programs were shifted off-budget as a means 
of budget avoidance until legislation moved these programs back on budget.  To help 









































































loans and recalculated percent change between beginning and end of the periods with 
these loans included.  As shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.5, when both on- and off- 
budget direct loans are considered the overall message of increased direct loans in the 
1970s followed by decreased direct loans in the 1980s remains the same, but the 
magnitude of the changes is greater.   
 
Table 5.3.  Percent change in Direct Loan and Loan Guarantees, Pre-FCRA,  
On and Off budget loans 
 Pre-FCRA 
Enactment 
1970 vs 1980 
Pre-FCRA 
Enactment1 
1981 vs.  1991  
Direct loan obligations  
(on and off budget) 
149% (75%) 
Loan guarantee commitment 26% 44% 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OMB data.   
 
Figure 5.5 Direct loan Obligations and Loan Guarantee Commitments, Fiscal Years 
1970-1991 
 






































































Direct loan obligations (on-budget)
Loan guarantee commitments




 Next, I examined the post-FCRA period more closely by dividing it into several 
shorter time segments.  After FCRA’s enactment, the level of both direct loan obligations 
and loan guarantee commitments significantly increased.  The 2017 dollar amount direct 
loan obligations was 574% higher than the 1992 level while the 2017 amount of loan 
guarantees commitments was 145% higher than the 1992 level.  The dollar amount of 
both direct loan obligations and loan guarantee commitments increased in the period 
immediately after FCRA’s enactment but rose sharply after fiscal year 2008 in response 
to the nation’s fiscal crisis.  The increase was significantly more for direct loans than loan 
guarantee commitments.  The dollar amount for direct loan obligations was 277% greater 
in 2011 than the 2008 amount.  While the dollar amounts of both direct loan obligations 
and loan guarantee commitments declined from a peak in fiscal year 2009 they remained 
higher than before the crisis.  Between 2012 and 2017, the percent increase in loan 
guarantee commitments (102%) was more than the percent increase direct loan 





Figure 5.6 Direct Loan Obligations and Loan Guarantee Commitments, Fiscal Years 
1992-2017 
 
Source: Graph created by the author based on OMB data.   
 
Table 5.4 Direct Loan Obligations and Loan Guarantee Commitments, Post-FCRA 
 Entire Period 
1992 vs.  2017 
Pre-financial 
Crisis 
2002 vs.  2007 
Financial Crisis 
Response and After 
2008 vs 2017 
Direct loans obligations 574% 86% 110% 
Guarantee Loan commitments  145% 49% 25% 
   Source: Table created by author based on OMB data.  Calculation done by author.   
  
 The significant increase in direct loans coincided with two significant policy 
events: (1) the response to the nation’s fiscal crisis and (2) the elimination of the student 
loan guarantee program and expansion of the student direct loan program.  Because it 
was thought these policy events had such a large impact on the trends, I removed them 
from the previously constructed data to better understand what was happening with the 
rest of direct loans and loan guarantees.  I first compiled data on the face value of direct 




















































































Enterprise Mortgage-backed Securities (GSE MBS) Purchase Program.192 193 These data 
were drawn from Analytical Perspectives194 and adjusted for inflation as discussed above.  
While the Treasury’s TARP program had outstanding loan guarantees for fiscal year 
2009, the bulk of the program was direct loans.195   
 Figure 5.7 compares the face value of direct loans outstanding for fiscal years 
2008 -2017 with and without Treasury’s TARP and the GSE MBS program.  Figure 5.8 
shows direct obligations with and without TARP and GSE MBS.  Figure 5.9 shows loan 
guarantee commitments with and with these programs.  While these programs result in 
higher levels for the period from 2008 to 2012, they do not explain the continued growth 
over the period.    
                                                          
192 To help provide stability to the mortgage market the Treasury purchased GSE mortgage-based 
securities in the open market. Congress granted Treasury authority to purchase in the Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Authority expired in December 31, 2009.   
193 While this analysis includes these two major direct loans and loan guarantee programs 
established during the financial crisis, it does not capture increased activity in existing loan 
programs related to the financial crisis.  
194 Data was drawn from Table “Loan Guarantee Subsidy Rates, Budget Authority, and Loan 
Levels” included in the Analytical Perspectives, various years   
195 The fiscal year 2011 Analytical Perspectives listed loan guarantees for the Troubled Asset 





Figure 5.7 Impact of TARP and GSE MBS program on Direct Loans Face Value 
Outstanding  
 
Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
Figure 5.8 Direct Loan Obligations, Impact of TARP and GSE MBS 
 

























Direct Loans Outstanding, including TARP and GSE MBS
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Figure 5.9 Loan Guarantee Commitments, Impact of TARP and GSE MBS 
 
Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
  I then compiled data on face value outstanding of student direct loans from the 
Analytical Perspectives (fiscal years 1995-2019) and the Budget of United States 
Government (fiscal years 1993-1994).  These data were adjusted for inflation.  A 
significant increase in direct loans was expected because beginning in fiscal year 2010 
federal student loans have been provided only through direct lending.  However, because 
the changes to the student loan program blurs what has happened across other direct loan 
programs I removed them from the trend.  Figure 5.10 compares the face level 
outstanding of direct loans for fiscal 2007 to 2017 with and without student direct loans.  
With student loans removed from the trend, for direct loans outstanding decreased and 
returns to pre-crisis levels over the period.  Figure 5.11 compares direct obligations for 
fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2017 with and without student direct loans.  With student 
loans removed from the trend the level of direct loan obligations decreases to below pre-























Loan guarantee obligations, all programs




fiscal year 2017 than in fiscal year 2007.  Excluding student loans, direct loan obligations 
are 20 percent lower in fiscal 2017 than in fiscal year 2007.   
 
 Figure 5.10 Direct Loans Outstanding, Impact of Student Loans, Fiscal Years 2007-2017 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
   
Figure 5.11 Direct Loan Obligation, Impact of Direct Student Loans 
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 While the examination of trends and percentage changes between fiscal years 
provides insights into the changes in the level and mix of direct loans and loan guarantees 
the ratio of loan guarantees to total credit provides additional perspective on the 
policymakers’ choices.  A key premise before FCRA was that cash-based budgeting 
created a preference to use loan guarantees over direct loans.  If this was the case, one 
would expect loan guarantees to grow faster relative to direct loans before FCRA and for 
some moderation of this trend to occur after FCRA’s enactment (Hedley, 1994).  In 
theory, FCRA was to neutralize the budget treatment of direct loans and loan guarantees 
so neither credit instrument has a budget advantage.  However, as discussed earlier, some 
policy participants have recently raised concerns that FCRA may be creating a budget 
bias to use direct loans over loan guarantees.  The ratio of loan guarantees to total credit 
is useful for examining both claims.   
 Figure 5.12 shows the ratio of loan guarantees outstanding to total credit 
outstanding.  The ratio of loan guarantees to total credit ranged from .61 in 1985 to .83 in 
several years (1996, 1998, 2004, and 2008).  The average over the period was .73.  While 
the minimum occurs in the mid-1980s, there is a sharp increase in the years immediately 
preceding FCRA with a ratio .75 in fiscal year 1990.  The ratio continues to increase after 
FCRA’s enactment before leveling off in the 2000s.  The ratio then drops sharply at the 





Figure 5.12 Ratio of Loan Guarantees Outstanding to Total Credit Outstanding   
Fiscal Years 1970-2017 
 
 Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
  
 Figure 5.13 shows the ratio with TARP and GSE MBS removed.  With TARP 
removed the decrease in the ratio after 2008 occurs but at a delayed and slower rate.  
Figure 5.14 shows the ratio with student loans and guarantees removed.  When student 
loan programs are removed the ratio of loan guarantees to total credit is much higher.  
For fiscal year 2017 the ratio is .66 with student loan programs included but .94 when 
student loan programs are removed.  This difference is ratios displays the large role 
played by student direct loans and challenges the premise that there has been a significant 

































































































Figure 5.13 Ratio of Loan Guarantees Outstanding to Total Credit Outstanding,  
Impact of TARP and GSE MBS 
 
Source: Graphed created by author based on OMB data. 
 
Figure 5.14 Ratio of Loan Guarantees Outstanding to Total Credit Outstanding 
 Impact of Federal Student Loan Programs 
 
Source: Author by author based on OMB data. 
 Figure 5.15 shows the ratio of guarantee loan commitments to total credit.  This 
trend follows a somewhat similar, but more extreme path, than for credit outstanding.  
The ratio ranges from minimum of .52 in 2009 during the financial crisis and to a 
maximum of .90 in 1994.  The average over the entire period was .76.  This range is 
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TARP and GSE MBS programs are removed the minimum .57 occurs in 1975 and 1982 
before FCRA’s enactment and the maximum is the same, .90 in 1994 (Figure not 
included).   
 
Figure 5.15 Ratio of Loan Guarantee Commitments to Total Credit 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
 Some of the findings from this comparison of pre-FCRA and post-FCRA trends 
are consistent with the pre-FCRA concern that credit programs’ unequal budget treatment 
created a budget bias for the use of loan guarantees over direct loans.  From the 
beginning to end of the pre-FCRA period, direct loans decreased while loan guarantees 
increased.  Over the post-FCRA period, both direct loans and loan guarantees increased, 
but the pattern shifted with direct loans increasing more than loan guarantees.   
 However, other findings raise some questions about what other factors were 
involved.  In the pre-FCRA period, the ratio of loan guarantees to total credit was high in 
the early- and mid- 1970s, but then declined sharply in the late 1970s and early 1980s 































































and loan guarantees increased in the decade immediately after FCRA’s enactment despite 
FCRA’s neutralizing of credit’s budget advantage over direct expenditures.  Furthermore, 
the ratio of loan guarantees to total credit remained constantly high before declining 
sharply in 2009, coinciding with the nation’s fiscal crisis.  For loan obligations and loan 
commitments, the ratio remained between .82 and .90 during the period from 1990 to 
2008.196 For both data sets, the maximum ratio occurred after FCRA’s enactment and the 
average ratio was higher in the post-FCRA period.  For loan obligations and loan 
commitments, the pre-FCRA average ratio was .72 and post-FCRA ratio was .80.  For 
face value outstanding, the pre-FCRA ratio was .68 and post-FCRA ratio was .77.  These 
findings suggest that while budget rules create incentives, additional factors such as 
market conditions, political preferences, program path dependency, and the entitlement 
nature of some loan programs, may also be important in shaping policymakers’ decisions 
and budget outcomes.   
 
Trends in Subsidy Costs, Post-FCRA  
 To examine the trends in federal credit spending during the post-FCRA period, I 
compiled and examined data on subsidy costs (data not reported as a budget outlay prior 
to FCRA).  The data used was “new subsidy budget authority” reported in the Analytical 
Perspectives volume of the President’s budget (various years)197, The objective was to 
better understand: (1) the trend in the government’s aggregate cost for federal loan 
                                                          
196 For face value outstanding, the ratio remained between .75 and .82 from 1990 to 2008.   
197 Data used was reported in table labeled “Summary of Federal Direct Loans and Loan 
Guarantees” included in (1) Analytical Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2002, Table 8-6, 167; (2) 
Analytical Perspectives Fiscal Year 2008, Table 7-5, p. 93; (3) Analytical Perspectives, Fiscal 




programs since FCRA’s enactment and (2) how these costs might affect the budget totals 
and thus the incentives provided to policy participants.   
 Figure 5.16 shows the trend in the government’s annual cost for direct loans and 
loan guarantees as measured by new subsidy budget authority for fiscal years 1993-2017.  
For more than a decade after FCRA’s enactment, credit programs had an aggregated 
budget cost (positive subsidy) each fiscal year and these amounts were small relative to 
the total budget.  However, in recent years, credit programs have resulted in aggregated 
budget savings (negative subsidy) each fiscal year.  This general trend is similar for both 
direct loans and loan guarantees, as shown in Figure 5.17.  Loan guarantees have had 
negative subsidies consistently since fiscal year 2007.  Direct loans had negative 
subsidies each year since fiscal year 2007, except for fiscal year 2015.  Table 5.5 looks 
more closely at the underlying data in the context of total budget authority.  Both new 
and total subsidy authority were 1 percent or less of total budget authority each fiscal 
year 1998 to 2004.  In more recent years (with some exceptions) the amount of subsidy 
budget authority, expressed as a percentage of total budget authority has been larger and 
these subsidies have been negative.    
 The emergence of larger negative subsidies supports concern that the FCRA’s 
recognition of upfront gains from federal direct loan and loan guarantee may create 
incentives to overuse federal credit programs to offset the costs of other federal programs.  
As discussed earlier, FCRA’s net present value approach may result in upfront gains for 
credit programs that charge interest rates above the government’s borrowing costs or 
collects fees in excess of expected costs.  While upfront recognition and control of budget 




involve some level of uncertainty) create a challenge to: (1) prevent the use of uncertain 
“savings” to offset current budget costs and (2) reduce incentives to use credit programs 
as income generators.   
   
Figure 5.16 New Subsidy Budget Authority for direct loans and loan guarantees 
 
   Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
Figure 5.17 New Subsidy Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1994-2017 
 


















































































Table 5.5 New and Total Subsidy Budget Authority 
Fiscal 
Year  





as percent of total 




Total subsidy budget 
authority as percent of 
total budget authority 
1998 3.2 0.2% 11.6 0.8% 
1999 2.0 0.1% 8.6 0.6% 
200 3.6 0.2% (1.5) (0.1%) 
2001 3.1 0.2% (7.6) (0.5%) 
2002 3.4 0.2% 1.2 0.1% 
2003 5.2 0.4% 4.5 0.3% 
2004 8.7 0.7% 13.9 1.0% 
2005 13.4 1.0% 21.4 1.6% 
2006 23.3 1.8% 34.0 2.6% 
2007 7.4 0.6% 3.8 0.3% 
2008 2.3 0.2% 5.1 0.4% 
2009 1.3 11% 132.7 11.0% 
2010 (13.8) (1.2%) (129.6) (10.9%) 
2011 (22.3) (1.9%) (90.5) (7.8%) 
2012 (32.2) (2.8%) (20.1) (1.8%) 
2013 (44.4) (4.0%) (43.4) (3.8%) 
2014 (33.1) (3.0%) (32.7) (3.0%) 
2015 (6.4) (.5%) 1.8 0.2% 
2016 (14.9) (1.4%) (20.0) (1.8%) 
2017 8.7 0.8% 28.8 2.6% 
Source: Table compiled by author based on OMB data.  Calculations done by author. 
 
 As discussed above, significant policies can make it difficult to decipher what is 
happening across federal credit programs.  To help isolate the impact of some large 
policy changes, I removed some programs from the previously discussed trend for 
subsidy costs.  Data on subsidy costs for selected programs was drawn from the 




without TARP and GSE MBS programs.  With these programs excluded, negative 
subsidies begin a year earlier, with a negative subsidy of $15.1 billion in fiscal year 2009.   
 
Figure 5.18 New Subsidy Budget Authority, Direct Loans, Fiscal Years 1994-2017,  
excluding TARP and GSE MBS Program 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
 
Most of the Agencies Reviewed Did Not Have a Significant Shift in the 
Composition of Their Loan Programs  
 I also constructed and examined trends of direct loan obligations and loan 
guarantee commitments for each of eight credit agencies that account for the vast 
majority of federal direct loans and loan guarantees.  The Export-Import Bank was later 
removed due to unresolved inconsistencies in data.  Due to changes in reporting formats, 
trend data by agency was compiled from two sources.  For fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 
2014, data was collected from the Analytical Perspectives.  Data for earlier fiscal years 
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New subsidy budget authority, direct loans, excluding




inconsistencies were observed, but these do not appear material to the overall findings of 
the trend analysis.198 All data were adjusted to constant dollars (2009) using the federal 
budget composite, nondefense deflator.   
 I calculated the percent change, annual growth rate, ratio of guarantees to total 
credit for each agency’s reported direct loan obligations and loan commitments.  Table 
5.6 provides a summary of these findings.  As discussed below, findings did not show a 
consistent shift in the composition of federal loan programs across the agencies reviewed.   
 
                                                          
198 The trend data was started with fiscal year 1995 because data on actual or enacted levels of 
loan obligations and commitments was not consistently reported by agency for earlier years.  
Neither Analytical Perspectives nor the Federal Credit Supplement had data to construct the full 
trend. The credit supplement data could not be used for the full trend because for several years 
there were continuing resolutions in place at the time the Supplement was published. The 
Analytical Perspectives only reported loan obligations and commitments by agency and programs 
in the fiscal year 2002 volume forward. The data used from the Analytical Perspectives is 
“actual” data from the prior budget year.  The data used from the Supplement was baseline data 
for the “current” budget year.  Although this may result in some inconsistencies and inaccuracies 
it is believed, given the data limitations, that this provides a reasonable approach to building the 




Table 5.6 Summary Information, Direct Loans Obligations and Loan Commitments  
Direct Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments  
Department or 
Agency 




























































Energy201 * * * * 
Treasury202 * * * * 
     
Source: Table compiled by author based on OMB data.  Calculation done by author.   
 
  The Department of Education stands out with a significant increase in total credit 
assistance and a dramatic shift from loan guarantees to direct loans.  Interestingly, 
however, given the debate about FCRA’s role in the establishment of student direct loan 
program and the more general concern that FCRA creates an incentive to use of direct 
loans over loan guarantees, the ratio of guarantee commitments to total credit continued 
to increase after FCRA’s enactment through the 1990s and early 2000s.  See Figure 5.19 
and Figure 5.20 below.  After the establishment of the direct loan programs, there was 
                                                          
199 HUD has relatively small amount of direct loans that do not appear due to rounding.  
200 VA has a relatively small direct amount of direct loans that do not appear due to rounding. 
201 DOE established new credit programs in the mid-2000s. Given the short period of time and 
small number of loans issued the calculations were not meaningful. The ratio of guarantees to 
total credit varied significantly as follows:  2009 (0%); 2010 (86%); 2011 (35%) and 2012 
(100%).  
202 The largest Treasury programs were established in response to the fiscal crisis. Given the short 




political resistance to its expansion from the Republican-controlled Congress.  Instead of 
a shift to direct loans in the years after FDLP establishment, there was an increase in loan 
guarantees.  The ratio of guarantee loan commitments to total credit was .52 in fiscal year 
1995 and the ratio increased to .85 in fiscal year 2007.   
 During the nation’s financial crisis there was a significant shift from student loan 
guarantees to direct loans.  Faced with sharp increases in funding costs and increasing 
concerns about the quality of borrowers, many private lenders in the student loan market 
suspended or discontinued their student loan programs.  Schools shifted to the direct loan 
programs due to concerns about the future availability of guaranteed loans and 
uncertainty about the FFEL program.  The ratio of guaranteed commitments to total 
credit dropped to .52 and .32 for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, respectively.  This opened 
the door for President Obama’s proposed elimination the guarantee loan programs.  
These trends suggest that in addition to the incentive created by budget rules, other 
factors, such as political preferences and private credit market conditions, also play 





Figure 5.19 Department of Education, Direct Loan Obligations and Loan Guarantee 
Commitments, Fiscal Years 1995 to 2017 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
Figure 5.20 Department of Education, Ratio of Guarantee Commitments to Total Credit 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.  Ratio calculated by author.   
 
 The Department of Treasury and Department of Energy also showed increased 
use of direct loans.  Both agencies had new federal credit activity in recent years that 



































































































































sharp increase in (primarily) direct loans during the financial crisis, but most of these 
programs have expired (no figures shown).  The Department of Energy introduced 
several new loan programs which consisted largely of direct loans.  See Figures 5.21 and 
5.22.  Congress recently rescinded funds due to lack of interest.   
 
Figure 5.21 Department of Energy, Direct Loan Obligations and Loan Guarantee 
Commitments, Fiscal Years 1995 to 2017 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
 
Figure 5.22 Department of Energy, Ratio of Guarantee Commitments to Total Credit 
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 However, other agencies’ credit programs, including HUD, SBA, and VA, did not 
have significant shifts in the composition of their credit programs.  These agencies’ credit 
programs remained mostly loan guarantees throughout the entire period (see Figures 
5.24, 5.26 and 5.28).  Some of these loan guarantee programs were established before 
FCRA and are entitlements so growth has been driven by factors unrelated to policy 
changes.    
 
Figure 5.23 Department of Housing and Urban Development,  
Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments, Fiscal Year 1995 -2017 
 











































































Figure 5.24 Department of Housing and Development,  
Ratio of Loan Guarantees to Total Credit 
  
         Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.  Ratio calculated by author.   
 
 
Figure 5.25 Small Business Administration   
Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments, Fiscal Year 1995 -2017 
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Figure 5.26 Small Business Administration  
Ratio of Loan Guarantees to Total Credit 
 
       Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.  Ratio calculated by author.   
 
Figure 5.27 Department of Veterans Affairs 
Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments, Fiscal Year 1995 -2017 
 





































































































































Figure 5.28 Department of Veterans Affairs,  
Ratio of Loan Guarantees to Total Credit 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
The Department of Agriculture presents a more mixed picture, with some shift in the 
composition of its credit assistance.  In the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s there was shift 
towards direct loans, in more recent years, there has been shift back in guarantees (see 
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Figure 5.29 Department of Agriculture  
Loan Obligations and Loan Commitments, Fiscal Year 1995 -2017 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on OMB data.   
 
Figure 5.30 Department of Agriculture, Ratio of Loan Guarantee Commitments to Total 
Credit, 
Fiscal Years 1995-2017 
 








































































































































 While it is impossible to know FCRA’s impact without a counterfactual, the 
review of trends of federal loan programs provides some support for FCRA’s role in 
shaping budget outcomes with respect to the level and composition of federal credit 
programs, but also indicates the importance of other factors.  A key premise before 
FCRA was that cash-based budgeting created a policymaking preference for credit 
programs over direct expenditures and a preference for loan guarantees over direct loans.  
If this was the case, one would expect loan guarantees to grow faster than direct loans 
before FCRA, and one would expect some moderation of this trend after FCRA’s 
enactment (Hedley, 1994).   
 Some of the findings from this comparison of pre-FCRA and post-FCRA trends 
are consistent with the pre-FCRA concern that credit programs’ unequal budget treatment 
created a budget bias for the use of loan guarantees over direct loans.  From the 
beginning to end of the pre-FCRA period, direct loans decreased while loan guarantees 
increased.  Over the post-FCRA period, both direct loans and loan guarantees increased, 
but direct loans increased more than loan guarantees.   
 However, other findings raise some questions about what other factors were 
involved.  In the pre-FCRA period, the ratio of loan guarantees to total credit was 
relatively high in the early- and mid- 1970s, but then declined sharply in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s despite the unequal budget treatment at the time.  In the post-FCRA era, 
both direct loans and loan guarantees increased in the decade immediately after FCRA’s 




expenditures.  Furthermore, the ratio of loan guarantees to total credit remained high 
before declining sharply in 2009, coincident with the nation’s fiscal crisis. 
For loan obligations and loan commitments, the ratio remained between .82 and 
.90 during the period from 1990 to 2008.203 For both data sets, the maximum ratio 
occurred after FCRA’s enactment, and the average ratio was higher in the post-FCRA 
period.  For loan obligations and loan commitments, the pre-FCRA average ratio was .72 
and post-FCRA average ratio was .80.  For face value outstanding, the pre-FCRA average 
ratio was .68 and post-FCRA average ratio was .77.  These findings suggest that while 
budget rules create incentives, additional factors such as market conditions, political 
preferences, program path dependency, and the entitlement nature of some loan 
programs, may also be important in shaping policymakers’ decisions and budget 
outcomes.   
 The post-FCRA trends also provide insights.  Declining subsidy costs and the 
emergence of large negative subsidies provide some indication that FCRA has influenced 
the design of loan programs.  The trend is consistent with the recent concern that FCRA’s 
upfront recognition of gains from federal loan programs may create incentives to use 
federal credit programs to offset the costs of other federal programs.  Another recent 
concern is that FCRA may be creating incentives to use direct loans over loan guarantees.  
However, while the large federal student loan program shifted completely to direct loans, 
the review did not find a consistent shift in the composition of federal loans programs in 
the agencies reviewed.   
                                                          




 Together these findings suggest that while budget rules create incentives, 
additional factors, such as market conditions, political preferences, and path dependency 
and the entitlement nature of existing credit programs, are also important in shaping 





Federal Credit Reform, Summary Observations and Thoughts  
 
 FCRA’s design and evolution provides signals as to why it was enacted and has 
been sustained for more than two decades.  FCRA grew out of a solid consensus among 
key policy participants and budget experts that a problem existed.  Long-standing 
concerns about the rapid growth and changing composition of federal loan programs 
preceded FCRA’s enactment.  Key policy participants (including congressional 
lawmakers, budget committees, CBO, GAO, and OMB) agreed that the rapid growth and 
changing composition of federal loan programs was problematic and needed to be 
addressed. 
 Solid consensus also existed that shortcomings of the cash-based budget were an 
important (if not primary) factor driving these changes.  Among key policy participants, 
there was general (but not universal) acceptance of the logic behind FCRA – that the way 
policies and programs are recorded, funded, and controlled in the budget matters.  While 
some like Rep.  Gradison (R-Ohio) expressed some skepticism about FCRA’ potential 
effectiveness, there was a general willingness to support credit reform.  In short, there 
was an elite consensus on the problem and the logic behind revising budget rules as a 
means of address it.   
 FCRA’s design was shaped by decades of information expansion, expert analysis, 
debate, and consensus building.  CBO was an influential source of analysis on 
complicated conceptual and technical issues.  CBO, GAO and OMB actively analyzed 
the issues, provided extensive staff comments on legislative proposals, and worked to 
improve understanding.  Expansions and experiments with analytical tools over the years 




controlling the volume of federal credit, over time, increasing attention was given to the 
development of a spending-equivalent for federal credit programs.  By the late 1980s, key 
players in budget reform, including the Budget Committees, CBO, GAO, the Federal 
Reserve, and OMB had reached substantial agreement on FCRA’s basic conceptual 
framework and essential elements,204  
 FCRA’s design is aligned with long-standing and accepted norms of federal 
budgeting.  The use of net present value to measure the government’s cost at the time 
decisions are made is consistent with the long-standing federal budget principle of the 
upfront recognition of budget costs.  FCRA’s reestimation process to reconcile subsidy 
estimates with the government’s cash transactions over the life of loan is consistent with 
the government’s long-standing use of cash as a tangible, trackable measure of budget 
costs. 
Although there was significant disagreement on specific design details, by the late 
1980s, there were signs of an increasing willingness to compromise in order to move 
legislation forward.  Momentum towards compromise was spurred by Savings and Loan 
and housing crises of the 1980s.  At an April 11, 1990 hearing, congressional lawmakers 
and officials from CBO, GAO, and OMB all expressed the view that moving forward was 
more important than disagreements about specific and long-debated design elements, 
including the choice of discount rates.   
 Arguably, FCRA’s limited objectives, scope, and budget impact eased its 
enactment and supported its sustainability.  While FCRA was a meaningful advance in 
                                                          
204 As discussed in detail in the case study, this framework included: (1) the use of subsidy costs -
measured by the net present value of expected cash flows - as the budget measure for federal 
direct loans and loan guarantees; (2) the isolation of subsidy costs from incidental, non-subsidized 




budgeting for federal loan programs, its success has been due in part to what it did not try 
to accomplish.  In the aftermath of the Savings and Loan Crisis, concerns about the 
government’s credit activities were widespread, extending beyond direct loans and loan 
guarantees to federal insurance programs and GSEs.  Reformers, however, kept the law 
relatively narrow both in scope and objective.  In the end, lawmakers avoided tackling the 
larger, more technically complicated and more politically charged programs.  They 
applied FCRA’s requirement for subsidy budgeting only to federal direct loans and loan 
guarantees and included a provision requiring OMB and CBO directors to study 
budgeting for deposit insurance and provide recommendations to the President and the 
Congress (Sec.  505).  Almost three decades later, the significant costs and lack of budget 
oversight of federal insurance and GSEs remain a serious concern with continuing calls 
for, but no action on, reform of their budget rules despite their similarities to loans and 
guarantees.   
 FCRA’s objective was limited because it is a process rule rather than an outcome 
rule.  While early proposals and some key policy participants, including OMB Director, 
Richard Darman, argued for hard limits on the level of loan exposure, FCRA stops short 
of prescribing specific policy outcomes or limits.  FCRA now requires policymakers to 
include and fund the subsidy costs for direct loans and loan guarantees in the budget, but 
it does not directly limit decisions with respect to the level and composition of these 
programs.  The continued growth in federal credit programs after FCRA’s enactment and 
the variation in the composition of credit programs across policy areas suggest policy 
preferences that FCRA does not constrain.  FCRA did not require political compromise 




enactment, it did not attempt to “force” policymakers to restrain their preferences for 
federal credit.  FCRA arguably would have met with significantly more resistance if it 
had set pre-determined limits on federal direct loans and loan guarantees.  Comments by 
Rep.  Schumer (D-NY) that passing limits on credit would be “problematic” support this 
view (C-SPAN, 1990).   
 FCRA’s limited scope and objective also meant that its initial budget impact was 
not daunting.  At the time of its enactment, FCRA’s impact on the overall budget was 
relatively low.  During congressional hearings preceding FCRA’s enactment, CBO 
Director Robert Reischauer explained there would be a “slight increase in the measured 
deficit” in the range of $3 billion to $6 billion for the next several years (C-SPAN 1990).  
As discussed in the case, estimates of FCRA’s impact on the deficit provided before its 
enactment as well as its subsidy costs after enactment were relatively small compared to 
the total budget.  It seems reasonable that FCRA’s relatively small budget impact eased 
its enactment and that a larger, more costly reform would have attracted more attention 
and resistance.  As discussed in the case, larger, negative subsidies in recent years have 
increased attention and prompted calls for reform of FCRA’s subsidy estimation 
procedures.   
 After enactment, FCRA’s implementation occurred within and benefited from a 
previously established institutional framework and its alignment with concurrent reforms.  
OMB has a long-established role in federal financial management and the budget 
processes.  As such, a structure already existed for providing instructions, guidance, and 




the FASAB205 provided a deliberative forum and authoritative structure to debate and 
address FCRA’s implementation challenges.  CBO, GAO and the Offices of Inspector 
General had existing institutional responsibilities aligned with needed oversight of 
FCRA’s implementation.    
 FCRA also benefited from its alignment with concurrent reform efforts.  OBRA 
1990 not only included FCRA but the CFO Act which enacted widespread financial 
management reform.  FCRA’s objective and design was consistent with and supported by 
efforts to improve financial management across the Federal Government.  CFO Act 
requirements, including the establishment of integrated financial systems and the 
preparation and audit of financial statements, provided additional impetus for credit 
agencies to address underlying conditions, such as a lack of historical data and weak 
financial systems.  These improvements were necessary to understand credit program 
costs and to generate reasonably accurate subsidy cost estimates.  FCRA also supported, 
and was supported, by BEA reforms.  BEA increased the importance of enacting FCRA 
because, if loan guarantees had remained on a cash basis, they would have provided a 
“loophole” to avoid BEA’s spending constraints.  BEA also strengthened FCRA by 
providing “teeth” because credit subsidy costs for discretionary credit programs must 
compete with other spending priorities under the discretionary spending caps.
 Overall, FCRA’s evolution provides a mixed picture, with examples of both 
FCRA’s contributions and challenges.  However, despite implementation challenges and 
the significant, on-going debate about its subsidy cost estimation procedures, FCRA’s 
budget rule has been sustained for almost three decades.  Most budget experts, even those 
                                                          




critical of FCRA’s subsidy cost estimation procedures, continue to agree that FCRA’s net 
present value approach is superior to the previous cash-based budget.  The strength of 
this agreement about FCRA’s conceptual framework and, importantly, its superiority 
over the previous cash-based budget treatment helps explain FCRA’s enactment and 
sustainability.  As Elliott (2004) notes “[e]conomists, policymakers, and financial market 
participants may argue about the implementation details, but there is a strong consensus 
on the general principle of discounting all cash flows relating to a year’s lending.”  206   
 In examining FCRA’s history, I found numerous recent statements of continuing 
support for FCRA’s conceptual framework.  With only one, early exception, I have not 
found proposals calling for a return to cash-based budgeting for federal credit programs.  
Marron (2014) recently proposed an expected value approach as an alternative to FCRA, 
but he does not call for a return to the cash-based system.  The primary focus of the 
recent estimation debate has remained on whether and how to revise FCRA’s subsidy 
estimation methodology to incorporate market risk, as opposed to eliminating and 
completely overhauling its budget rule.  The strong consensus behind FCRA’s conceptual 
framework along with the compromises which limited its objective, scope, and budget 
impact, helped make it politically acceptable and technically feasible.  Together, these 
issues help explain its enactment and sustainability.  
                                                          




Chapter Seven:  
Tax Expenditures, Analytical Tool, but No Direct Budget Decision Rule  
 
For more than half a century, there has been concern about the budget oversight 
of federal tax expenditures – special tax provisions that provide preferential tax treatment 
for select taxpayers or for select activities.  While the federal income tax code has 
included preferential provisions since its 1913 enactment, concern grew as reliance on 
income tax revenues and the use of special tax provisions increased over time 
(Hungerford, 2011).  207,  208 Along with tax policy concerns related to efficiency, equity, 
and fairness, significant concerns emerged about the transparency and budget control of 
these special tax provisions.   
Although the term “tax expenditures” is now widely-used in the budget and policy 
nomenclature, this was not always the case.  This case study examines the evolution of 
the tax expenditure concept and its application in the federal budget process.209 After 
providing a brief overview of tax expenditures, this chapter explores why and how the tax 
expenditure concept emerged, including its codification as an analytical tool and early 
proposals to establish budget rules based on it.  More recent concerns and proposals are 
then discussed.  The next several chapters consider factors and conditions influencing the 
                                                          
207 Tax rates and revenues were increased to help finance World War I and again to help finance 
World war II. Federal receipts were 4.1% of GDP in 1930 before increasing sharply to about 20% 
of GDP during World War II. Since the war receipts have been around 17% of GDP, with a low 
of 14.1% and high of 20%. Data from Historical Tables of the United States Government, Table 
1.2- Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2022 
(OMB, 2017). 
208 The 1913 income tax law allowed deductions for homeowners’ mortgage interest payments 
and some state and local tax payments. After the World Wars, the Congress was slow to lower tax 
rates, but instead added more special tax provisions, with the number of tax expenditures 
increasing significantly over time (Elliott, 2011).   
209 While a few insights are included from international and state experiences, the primary focus 




political acceptability and technical feasibility of a tax expenditure specific budget 
decision rule.  Chapter Eight examines the significant conceptual, definitional, and 
estimation issues associated with the tax expenditure concept.  Chapter Nine examines 
the trend and composition of the tax expenditures and explores the implications of 
politics and institutional issues on the establishment of budget decision rules for tax 
expenditures.  Chapter Ten provides summary observations and thoughts on the tax 
expenditure experience.    
Attention to budget rules for tax expenditures is not surprising given the 
significant and controversial role these tax provisions play in the budget, policy, and 
political processes.  As shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, tax expenditures have grown 
significantly over time in both number 210 211 and value (as measured by foregone 
revenue).212, Since 1974 the number of tax expenditures has more than doubled and the 
                                                          
210 While counts of tax expenditures fluctuate due to changes in the methods used to measure and 
categorize tax expenditures, rather than policy changes, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), 
GAO, and other researchers agree that these counts nevertheless provide a useful gauge of the 
general trend in federal tax expenditures. 
211 Author’s calculation based on tax expenditure listing federal budget documents. Budgets 
includes information for the upcoming fiscal year (commonly referred to as the budget year); the 
current fiscal year (commonly referred to as the current year); and the immediately prior fiscal 
year (commonly referred to as the prior year). To best capture enacted laws, counts were done 
using prior year information. For example, the fiscal year 2004 is based the listing for fiscal year 
2004 as shown in the fiscal year 2006 budget. Counts include tax expenditures enacted, but with 
amounts only for future years.    
212 Foregone revenues provide an estimate of the difference between the tax liability without the 
tax expenditure and the tax liability under current law. Aggregations of foregone revenue 
estimates are imprecise, and they should be considered with some caution. Importantly, an 
estimate of foregone revenue for a tax expenditure does not account for the interaction effects 
with other tax provisions. As a result, the foregone revenues from the elimination of several tax 
expenditures may different from than the sum of the foregone revenues for each tax expenditure. 
However, CRS, GAO, and other prominent researchers have stated that foregone revenue totals 
provide a useful gauge of trends in federal tax expenditures (Hungerford, 2008, GAO, 2005e, and 
Marron, 2012). As noted by CRS (2008), “the sum of tax expenditure revenue over time probably 
provides a good approximation of the general trend in the effect of tax expenditures on income 
tax revenue… it is unlikely that the bias from simply summing tax expenditures estimates change 




sum of foregone revenues has increased about four-fold.  The first statutorily-required list 
published as part of the federal budget recognized 68 tax expenditures in fiscal year 
1974.213 214 The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget included 169 tax expenditures with 
projected foregone revenues totaling $1.2 trillion for fiscal year 2015 and $17 trillion 
over the fiscal year 2016-2025 budget horizon (OMB, 2016).  Further, as shown in Table 
7.1, aggregated tax expenditures are significant and have grown relative to federal 
receipts, other federal spending, and the economy (GAO, 2005e and Burman and Phaup, 
2012).    
 
Figure 7.1 Tax Expenditures, Number Reported in President's Budget 
 
Source:  Graph prepared based on author’s count of tax expenditures listed in President’s budget 
documents, including: (1) Special Analyses for Fiscal Years 1976-1990; (2) Budget of the United 
States Government for Fiscal Years 1991-1994 and (3) Analytical Perspectives for Fiscal Years 
1995 -2017.   
                                                          
213  Published as a supplemental Special Analysis to the President’s Fiscal Year 1976 budget.  
214 The first official list of tax expenditures, published as part of a 1968 Treasury Report, included 





































































































Figure 7.2 Total Foregone Revenues, Fiscal Years 1974-2015 
 
Source:  Graphed prepared based on author’s summation of fiscal year data included in Analytical 
Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Years 1974 - 2016 
 
Table 7.1 Federal Tax Expenditures as Percent of Federal Revenues, Federal Spending 
and GDP  
Source: Table compiled by author.  Calculations by author based on data included in Budget of 
the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2016, Historical Tables, Analytical Perspectives, and Annual 
Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, Fiscal Year 1968 
 

































































 1974 2015 
Tax expenditures  
(billions, current dollars) 
$74 $1,232 
As percent of GDP 5% 7% 
As percent of federal outlays 25% 33% 
As percent of federal receipts  28% 38% 
As percent of total “spending”  





Tax expenditures support a wide range of policy objectives and take a variety of 
forms, including: exclusions,215 exemptions, 216deductions,217 deferrals,218 credits,219 and 
preferential rates220 (GAO, 2016d).  Tax expenditures include: exclusions for employer-
sponsored health insurance; exemptions for dependents; deductions for home mortgage 
interest; credits for child care; deferrals for foreign earnings; and reduced rates on long-
term capital gains.  In some policy areas, tax expenditures account for a significant 
portion (even the majority) of the government’s role.  For example, tax expenditures 
account for most federal assistance for housing; OMB reported tax expenditures of $246 
billion and direct expenditures of $12 billion in fiscal year 2015.221, 222 
However, the use of tax expenditures varies significantly across budget 
functions.223 While tax expenditures exist in most budget functions, their use is 
concentrated in a few.224 They provide the majority of federal assistance in 3 of the 18 
                                                          
215 Exclusions leave income from a specified source(s) out of the income tax base.  
216 Exemptions reduce the income tax base for taxpayers because of their status or circumstance.   
217 Deductions allow taxpayers to subtract specified payments from taxable income.   
218 Deferrals allow taxpayers to delay recognition of current income to a future year.  
219 Credits directly lower a taxpayer’s liability by the amount of the credit.  
220 Special rates reduce the tax rates on income from specific sources below those that generally 
apply.   
221 Author’s analysis based on tax expenditures listing included in Analytical Perspectives, 
Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2017 Table1.1 “Estimates of Total Income Tax 
Expenditures Fiscal Years 2015-2026” under the heading “Housing Programs.”   
222 Author’s calculation for direct expenditures on housing includes: (1) budget subfunction 371 - 
mortgage credit ($-84.3 billion) and budget subfunction 604 -Housing Assistance ($47.6 billion) 
from Table 3.2 Historical Tables, Budget of U.S. Government FY 2017.  Tax expenditures include 
the sum of provisions included under “housing” heading in Table1.1: “Estimates of Total Income 
Tax Expenditures Fiscal Years 2105-2016 in the Fiscal Year 2017 Analytical Perspectives.  For 
Commerce and Housing budget function (370), which includes housing activities as well as other 
activities, tax expenditures also account for more of the government assistance provided than 
direct outlays.  
223 Budget function refers to a classification of budgetary resource in terms of the principal 
purposes they serve. A budget function may be divided into two or more subfunctions (Schick, 
2000).   
224 Author’s calculation based on information included in the Table 14-1, Analytical Perspectives, 




budget functions – commerce and housing; general government; and international affairs.  
Tax expenditures provide a significant portion (over 30 percent), but not the majority, of 
federal assistance in five budget functions 225 and only a small portion of federal 
assistance in 8 budget functions.  They are not used in two budget functions – 
administration of justice and Medicare.  While tax expenditures are found in most budget 
functions over 85 percent of foregone revenues is concentrated in a few budget functions, 
including: (1) commerce and housing; (2) health; (3) income security; and (4) education, 
training, employment, and social services.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 For decades, policymakers and academics have raised concerns about the budget 
treatment of tax expenditures.  226 The central premise is that preferential tax provisions 
represent government spending that is less transparent and less controlled than other 
budget expenditures.  Vickery (1947) discussed the idea that a reduction in taxable 
income constitutes a government subsidy (cited in Wolfman, 1985).  Blum (1955) argued 
that tax preferences are “…hidden in technicalities of the tax law; they do not show up in 
the budget; their costs frequently is difficult to calculate; and their accomplishments are 
even more difficult to assess” (cited in Hungerford, 2011, p.8).  Heller (1955) argued that 
tax preferences provide “backdoor” government subsidies and that “[r]ather than run 
the gauntlet of the Budget Bureau and the congressional Appropriations Committees, 
                                                          
225 These budget functions include: (1) Community and regional Development; (2) Income 
Security; (3) General Science, Space and Technology; (4) Health and (5) Energy.    
226 Similar interests and concerns developed in Germany. In his comparative analysis of tax 
expenditure reporting in the United States and Germany, Shannon (1986) outlines Germany’s 
recognition and reporting of tax expenditures.  By the mid-1950s, Germany had recognized the 
equivalence between special tax provisions and direct government subsidies (Shannon, 1986, and 
Shaviro, 2007).  By the late 1960s, the government was required to provide parliament a biennial 
survey of all government subsidies, including tax subsidies with foregone revenue estimates 




groups seeking subsidies turn to the tax committees of Congress for Government support 
without Government interference” (cited in Bittker, 1969, p. 1).  Wolfman (1965) 
described the concept of tax preference as “…a deviation from a relatively neutral net 
income base or the application of rates which are tailored according to the source from 
which income is derived or the purpose for which it is spent” (p. 174).  He suggested the 
need for new budget rules, arguing that “sums federally allocated by tax preferences and 
special tax relief provisions should be reflected in the federal budget and accounts” (p. 
186).   
    The dominant force in developing and strongly promoting the tax expenditure 
concept, however, was Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy 
during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.  Surrey coined the phrase “tax 
expenditures” to reflect the functional equivalence of preferential tax provisions with 
direct expenditures.  In a widely-cited 1967 speech, he described tax expenditures as 
departures from a generally accepted tax code [emphasis added] and equated these items 
to a form of government spending [emphasis added].   
“Through deliberate departures from accepted concepts of net income and 
through various special exemptions, deductions, and credits, our tax system does 
operate to affect the private economy in ways that are usually accomplished by 
expenditures – in effect to produce an expenditure system described in tax 
language” (Surrey, 1967, p. 323; and 1973, p. 3).   
 
At the time, analytical information and tools (e.g.  comprehensive lists or 
analyses) did not exist for federal assistance provided through the tax system (Surrey, 
1967).  Surrey (1970) argued that “[n]o one really knew what was being spent through 





“When congressional talk and public opinion turns to reduction and control of 
Federal expenditures, these tax expenditures are never mentioned.  Yet, it is clear 
that if these tax amounts were treated as line items on the expenditure side of the 
Budget, they would automatically come under the close scrutiny of the Congress 
and the Budget Bureau.  But the tax expenditures are not so listed, and they are 
thus automatically excluded from that scrutiny.  Instead since they are phrased in 
tax language and placed in the Internal Revenue Code any examination to be 
given to them must fall in the classification of “tax reform” and not “expenditure 
control.”  There is a vast difference between the two classifications” (Surrey, 
1967, p. 333 and 1973, p.4).   
 
Surrey stressed the need for a “full accounting” of tax expenditures, including an 
approach that would “… explore the possibility of describing in the Federal Budget the 
expenditure equivalents of tax benefit provisions” (Surrey, 1967, p.4-5, as cited in 
Bittker, 1969, p.245).    
The analytical tools for tax expenditures increased significantly in the years 
following Surrey’s first articulation of the concept.  While at the Treasury Surrey 
oversaw the publication of the first ever U.S. “tax expenditure budget,” published in the 
Annual Report of Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for Fiscal Year 
1968 (U.S. Treasury, 1969).  This report included a discussion of the tax expenditure 
concept and a list of tax expenditures organized by budget function.  The report stated 
that “….  it would be appropriate and instructive to juxtapose the tax provisions and the 
revenue cost they involve with the expenditures in the same functional category in order 
to understand better the purposes to which public resources are allocated” 227 (U.S. 
Treasury, p. 329). 
                                                          
227 Foreman (1986) notes that while Surrey sought to include the tax expenditure budget directly 




After he left the Treasury, Surrey more fully developed and promoted the tax 
expenditure concept in a series of academic papers and in the book Pathways to Tax 
Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Surrey, 1970(a),1970(b),1973,1976; and 
Surrey and McDaniel, 1979; and McDaniel and Surrey, 1982).  In these works, Surrey 
reiterated his argument that tax provisions with nontax purposes are functionally 
equivalent to direct expenditures and that having different budget rules for these two 
policy instruments is problematic.  He argued that tax expenditures and their costs should 
be identified in the budget, but he also stated that even with better information difficulties 
would remain.  To further strengthen budget oversight, he suggested that “[t]he President 
could be given authority to treat tax incentive funds as direct expenditures for budgetary 
control purposes” and that tax expenditures could be “reviewed in the same way as 
direct expenditures under the appropriation and budgetary procedures” (Surrey, 1970b, 
731).  In other words, Surry called for going beyond analytical tools to establish budget 
rules that would more directly control tax expenditures.   
During the early 1970s, tax expenditure information made its way into the policy 
and budget processes.  In 1970, the Treasury published a “tax expenditure budget” for 
fiscal year 1969, using the term “tax aids” rather than tax expenditures (Surrey, 1973, p. 
3).  Several unsuccessful legislative proposals sought to establish a statutory requirement 
for a tax expenditure budget (Foreman, 1986).228 While no legislation was enacted, 
starting in 1972, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Joint Committee of Internal 
Revenue published reports on tax expenditures in compliance with a conferees request 
                                                          
228 Foreman (1986) outlines several legislative proposals aimed at establishing a statutory 




included in the Revenue Act of 1971 that tax expenditure data be regularly submitted to 
Congress229  (Surrey, 1973, pp. 4-5).   
Building on these early efforts, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 (P.L.  93-344), hereafter referred to as CBA, institutionalized the 
identification and reporting of tax expenditures.  The CBA formally defines tax 
expenditures as “those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability” (P.L.  
No.  93-344).  The CBA states the term tax expenditures budget means “...an 
enumeration of such tax expenditures” (P.L.  No.  93-344, section 3(a)).  Section 601 
requires the President’s budget list existing and proposed tax expenditures along with 
cost estimates.230Section 602 requires the CBO to annually compile and report a list of 
tax expenditures along with cost estimates.  231   
Importantly, however, the “tax expenditure budget” required by CBA is only 
informational.  Thus, the CBA codified the tax expenditures concept as an analytical tool, 
but not as a budget rule.  As such, the term tax expenditure “budget” is a misnomer – it is 
not voted on and it is not used to allocate or control funds.  While deliberations 
surrounding the CBA considered more direct control of tax expenditures, the final 
legislation stopped short of establishing budget rules to directly control these provisions 
                                                          
229 These reports were developed by Treasury staff 
230 The Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) in the Department of Treasury prepares the tax expenditure 
list that OMB publishes in the federal budget.    
231 While the CBA technically required the CBO to prepare estimates, subsequent provisions 




(GAO, 1981).  Schick (1981) notes that “… [i]n the give and take that preceded 
enactment… Congress substituted information for control” (p. 164).232  
The CBA does not require Congress to set specific budget function targets for tax 
expenditures in its budget resolution as is required for direct expenditures or to allocate 
targets for tax expenditures to the tax committees (Rivlin, 1981 and Havens, 1981).  233 
CBA provides only limited and indirect control of tax expenditures through a floor on 
aggregate revenues set in the budget resolutions (Rivlin, 1981 and Havens, 1981).234 Any 
legislation that brings revenues below the revenue floor established in the budget 
resolution is subject to a point of order.235As noted by CBO and others, while the revenue 
floor may exert some pressure on policymakers to control tax expenditures, no budget 
decision rule directly limits or requires reductions in tax expenditures (CBO, 1982 and 
GAO, 1994c).   
                                                          
232 Schick (1981) notes that whether tax expenditures should be included on only an informational 
basis was a source of debate. He explains that the while the bill from the Senate Government 
Operations Committee would have required a tax expenditure budget be included in each 
concurrent budget resolution, the Rules and Administration Committee proposed that tax 
expenditure information be moved from the budget resolution to the Budget committee report.      
233 Direct expenditures are controlled by both an aggregate ceiling on budget authority and 
outlays and a process that establishes targets for various categories of outlays. The aggregate 
ceiling on outlays is divided by budget functions.  These amounts are then allocated to the 
authorization and appropriation committees with jurisdiction over spending programs. Although 
both the budget function breakouts and the committee allocations are targets (non-binding), they 
enable “the Congress as a whole to indicate its broad priorities with respect to the allocation of 
federal spending” (CBO, 1982).   
234 The budget resolutions specify revenues and the amount, if any, by which revenues must 
increase or decrease.  
235 A point of order is an objection raised on the House or Senate floor or in committees to a 
motion or procedure that violates the body’s rules.  Usually a point of order may be waived by a 
simple majority vote.  However, in the Senate, waiver of some points of order requires a three-





However, while the CBA did not establish budget rules to directly control tax 
expenditures it significantly advanced tax expenditure analysis as an analytical tool.  As 
noted by Schick (1980): 
 “[b]y defining tax expenditures, the Budget Act converted these “preferences” 
into actionable features of the legislative process, not merely loopholes against 
which critics of the tax system could rail.  The term itself conveyed the message 
tax preferences ought to be treated in the same manner as direct expenditures of 
the federal governments” (p. 502).  
 
Further, in addition to formally defining tax expenditures and establishing annual 
reporting requirements, the CBA required the budget committees 
 
 ‘[t]o request and evaluate continuing studies of tax expenditures, to devise 
methods of coordinating tax expenditures, policies, and programs with direct 
budget outlays, and to report the results of such studies to the Senate (House) on 
a recurring basis (Surrey, 1976 and P.L.  93-44, sections 101 and 102). 
 
As required by the CBA, the President’s FY 1976 budget submission included 
information on tax expenditures published as Special Analysis F.  This analysis included 
a discussion of the tax expenditure concept, a list of tax expenditures organized by budget 
function, and a summary of proposed changes to tax expenditures.  No attempt, however, 
was made to integrate this information in the main budget document (Surrey and 
McDaniel, 1985).  Annexes to the President’s main budget document have continued to 
list and discuss tax expenditures.236 The JCT also publishes annual reports on tax 
expenditures, as required by CBA.  In addition, since 1976, CRS has prepared a report on 
                                                          
236 A section on tax expenditures was included in the Special Analyses volumes, which were 
provided as annexes to the President’s budget until the early 1990s.  Beginning in fiscal year 
1995, these special issue annexes have been known as the Analytical Perspectives volumes. In the 
interim years, special topics, including tax expenditures, were discussed directly in the main 




tax expenditures every two years for the Senate Budget Committee.237  In addition, CBO 
and GAO have issued numerous ad hoc reports on tax expenditures (GAO, 1994c, 2005e, 
2016d and CBO, 1982, 2013).  Together, the CBA requirements and these analytical 
tools converted tax expenditures from “hidden benefits into published details of the 
federal budget” (Schick, 1980, p. 502). 
Surrey and other proponents of the tax expenditure concept argued that 
identifying tax expenditures and recognizing them as government spending would lead to 
closer scrutiny and, in turn, reduce their use (Aaron, 1969; GAO, 2005e; JCT, 2008; and 
Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  As GAO (1979c) explains, “…reformers hoped and most 
of their opponents feared that highlighting tax expenditures would lead to the repeal of 
existing ones and an increasing reluctance to enact new ones”  (p.19). 
However, calls for stronger budget rules for tax expenditures reemerged almost 
immediately after the CBA’s enactment.  In 1981, CBO Director Alice Rivlin testified 
that the budget treatment of tax expenditures “… is one of the most important unresolved 
issues in the budget process” and that “[t]ax expenditures are too important to be left 
free from direct control of the budget process” (Rivlin, 1981a, p.1, p.15).  The 
Conference Report on the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 
1983 included language urging  
“…the budget committees and the other appropriate committees of Congress to study 
ways in which tax expenditures and off-budget spending can be addressed more fully in 
the budget resolutions and incorporated into the procedures of the Congressional budget 
process” (CBO, 1982 and H. Con. Res. 91). 
 
                                                          
237 The CRS reports provide both a general overview of tax expenditures and information on 
specific tax expenditures. The following is provided for each tax expenditure: (1) an estimate of 
foregone revenue, (2) the legal authorization, (3) a brief description, (4) a brief impact analysis, 
(5) the rationale for the provision at time of adoption, (6) an assessment, and (7) bibliographic 




In 1985, Surrey and McDaniel emphasized that tax expenditures remained 
“largely uncontrolled” and argued that “…[it]seems inescapable that the current Budget 
Act procedures do not enable Congress to control tax expenditures effectively or to 
coordinate them with direct expenditures” (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985, p. 65).  Thuronyi 
(1988) argued that the tax expenditure concept “…has largely failed to attain its goals” 
(p.1155).  Leonard (1986) described the treatment of tax expenditures as “an archetypal 
example of an information-based accountability program” and concluded that “if tax 
expenditures are any guide, information alone is not an adequate surrogate for the 
appropriations process” (p. 129). 
Concerns expressed in numerous reports and congressional testimonies echoed 
those when the tax expenditure concept was first introduced – e.g., a lack of transparency, 
insufficient budgetary control, and incentives to use tax expenditures as “backdoor 
spending” for activities that may not have sufficient support if presented as direct 
expenditure programs (Rivlin, 1981a, 19891c, 1982; GAO, 1994c; and Surrey and 
McDaniel, 1985).  Representative Bonior (D-Mich.) argued “[w]e have a fiscal tool of 
formidable effect and increasing use, of imprecise dimensions, of imprecise costs, under 
negligible control” (as cited in Tax Notes, 1983). Senator Bradley also echoed earlier 
concerns: 
 
I am simply trying draw the Senate’s attention to the very targeted spending we 
do through the Tax Code, spending that is not subject to the annual 
appropriations process; spending that is not subject to the Executive order 
capping the growth of mandatory spending; spending that is rarely ever debated 
on the floor of the Senate once it becomes part of the Tax Code.….  many of them 
make sense… Many, however, probably could not stand the light of day if we had 





As concerns about deficits increased, proponents of new budget rules for tax 
expenditures emphasized that these tax provisions increase the deficit like direct 
expenditures and that the failure to include them under deficit control measures creates 
perverse incentives (Rivlin, 1981a, 1981c and Surrey and McDaniels, 1985).  Policy 
participants also argued that CBA failed to provide for the systematic review of tax 
expenditures or for explicit tradeoffs among tax expenditures and direct expenditure 
programs (CBO, 1982; GAO 1979; McDaniel and Surrey, 1982; and Surrey, 1970).  In 
addition, some experts expressed concern that CBA budget rules did not: (1) make 
sufficient distinctions between changes in tax rates and changes in tax expenditures or (2) 
provide for coordinated review and control of foregone revenues from these different 
tracks of revenue policy (Rivlin, 1981c and Schick, 1981).   
During the late 1970s and 1980s, legislative proposals to improve the budget 
recognition and control of tax expenditures emerged.  As shown in Table 7.2, these 
proposals ranged from enhancing the review of tax expenditures to directly controlling 
tax expenditure spending.  “The Tax Expenditure Review Act” (introduced in 1976 and 
1979) directed a comprehensive review of tax expenditures and sought to establish 
procedures for additional congressional oversight.  At the other end of the spectrum, H.R.  
6021 (introduced in 1979) called for a budget decision rule limiting total tax expenditures 
to a percentage of GDP.238 H.R.  4882 (introduced in 1981)239 called for limits on tax 
expenditures by requiring each budget resolution to establish a level of tax expenditures 
                                                          
238  H.R. 6021 sought to amend the CBA to prohibit the adoption of any concurrent resolution on 
the budget which sets forth a level of total budget outlays and total tax expenditures in excess of 
28.5 percent of the GNP in year 1981; 28 percent of GNP in fiscal year 1982; or 27.5 percent of 
GNP in any fiscal year thereafter.   




in addition to the level of aggregated revenues.  The bill’s point of order made out of 
order any legislation that causes the recommended level of tax expenditures to be 
exceeded.  Numerous other legislative proposals also sought to establish new budget 
decision rules requiring the inclusion of tax expenditures in the budget resolution.240 In 
the end, no legislation was enacted.   
                                                          
240 The “Tax Expenditure Limitation and Control Act of 1981” (S. 193 and H.R. 2025) also 
sought to establish:  (1) a point of order if the level of revenue loss from tax expenditures 
contained in the resolution exceeds 30 percent of the recommended level for net revenues set 
forth in the resolution and (2) a requirement that any new tax expenditures or modifications to 
existing tax expenditures must be approved by the committees of jurisdiction and the Budget 
committees in addition to the tax committees. S. 2454 “Federal Credit and Tax Expenditure 
Control Act of 1982” sought to impose binding ceilings on tax expenditures in the budget 
resolution. Similarly, H.R. 1879 (introduced in 1983) sought to amend CBA to limit tax 
expenditures in budget resolutions. The “Tax Expenditure Control Act of 1995” (H.R. 1387 and 
S. 98) sought several controls over tax expenditures, including setting limits for tax expenditures 
in the concurrent budget resolutions and requiring that reconciliation directives include changes 




Table 7.2 Selected Legislative Proposals to Reform Budgeting of Tax Expenditures, 
1976-1984 
Proposal  Year  Focus and Objective  

















S.  3588: Tax Expenditure 
Review Act 
1976 X    
S.  921 Tax Expenditure 
Review Act  
1979 X  241  
H.R.  6021242 1979 X X X  
S.  686 Tax Expenditure 
Control Act  
1979 X X X  
HR 4882 and S.  2069243  1981 
1982 
X X   
H.R.  5858: Sunset 




X    
S.193 and H.R.  2025: 
Tax Expenditure and 
Limitation and Control 
Act 0f 1981  
1981 
1983 
X  X  
S.  2454 Federal Credit 
and Tax Expenditure 
Control Act of 1982 
1982 X X   
S.  2554 “Federal Credit 
and Tax Expenditure 
Control Act of 1982”  
1982 X X   
H.R.  1879245 1983 X X   
S.  2286: Tax Expenditure 
Control Act of 1984 
1984 X X   
Source: Author based on legislative search of Library of Congress (Congress.gov) and 
examination of bills and comments, including related congressional testimonies. 
 
                                                          
241Bill proposed amendments to Senate and House rules to prohibit the consideration of any bill 
or amendment providing tax expenditures which would not expire within four years.   
242 Official title as introduced was “A bill to amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to limit 
the levels of total budget outlays and tax expenditures contained in concurrent resolutions on the 
budget and to establish procedures for making loans and loan guarantees under Federal credit 
programs subject to the congressional budget process.”   
243 Ibid 
244 Similar bills H.R. 58 Sunset Review Act of 1981 and H.R. Sunset Review Act of 1983 also were 
introduced in subsequent years.   
245 Official title as introduced was “A bill to amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to 
require that each congressional budget resolution fix the level of tax expenditures for the fiscal 




As shown in Table 7.3, academics, CBO, and GAO also outlined options for 
budgeting for tax expenditures.  As with the legislative proposals, some of these 
proposals called for the inclusion of tax expenditures in the budget resolution.  Surrey 
and McDaniel (1985) proposed that the CBA be amended to: (1) require that the 
President’s budget include a more comprehensive total, including both tax expenditures 
and direct expenditures, for each budget function and (2) enable Budget Committees to 
set spending ceilings for tax expenditures in the budget resolutions.  CBO outlined a 
proposal to allocate tax expenditures by budget function and tie a spending committees’ 
spending allocation to the actions it takes on tax expenditures (CBO, 1982 and Rivlin, 
1981a and 1981c).  GAO suggested the establishment of integrated oversight procedures 
and budget reviews to compare tax expenditures more directly with spending programs 




Table 7.3 Selected Non-Legislative Proposals to Reform Budgeting of Tax Expenditures, 
1981-1985 
Proposal  Year  Focus and Objective  













Allocate tax expenditures by 
budget function and tie 
committee spending allocation 
to its actions on tax 
expenditures (CBO, 1981) 
1981 X X   
Set overall spending limits at 
the department/agency level 
that include both direct and tax 
expenditure programs (Surrey 
and McDaniel, 1985)  
1985 X X X  
Unified Budget included 
imputed revenue and spending 
for tax expenditures (Surrey 
and McDaniel, 1985)  
1985 X X  X 
Integrated budget review of 
tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures (GAO, 1981) 
1981 X    
Establish non-binding targets 
(GAO, 1981)  
1981 X X   
Source: Author based on examination of government and academic literature related to reform of 
budgetary treatment of tax expenditures. 
 
Surrey and McDaniel (1985) suggested the development of a unified budget 
showing imputed revenues and outlays for tax expenditures along with actual tax 
revenues and direct expenditure outlays.  Such a budget rule would require tax 
expenditure “spending” be included directly in budget totals along with imputed 
revenues.  This type of process rule would improve the budget parity of tax expenditures 
and direct expenditures but would not establish direct limits on tax expenditures.  Surrey 




receipts and outlays, actual or imputed, in single place, would produce a rational and 
comprehensive document for use by policymakers”246 (p.44). 
Not surprisingly, an examination of these proposals reveals differing views on the 
value and feasibility of establishing a tax expenditure specific budget rule.  Some 
opponents suggested that new budget decision rules are unnecessary because tax 
expenditures are already (or could be) sufficiently controlled within the current budget 
process.  Reflecting this view, Congressmen Rostenkowski and Conable, Jr, argued at a 
1981 congressional hearing that “[w]e are confident that we can control tax expenditures 
without radically new budget procedures” (Rostenkowski and Conable, 1981, cited in 
McDaniel and Surrey, 1982, p. 614).  Others raised general concerns about the feasibility 
and effectiveness of budget rules, especially given the challenges identifying and 
measuring tax expenditures (CBO, 1982; Havens, 1981; McDaniel and Surrey, 1982; 
Rivlin, 1981a, 1981c; and Schick, 1981).  In considering H.R. 4882, GAO concluded 
because of the inherent difficulties estimating revenue losses a ceiling on total tax 
expenditures should not be adopted at that time (Havens, 1981).  In speaking about 
proposed budget rules, Chairman Jones (1981) cautioned 
 “[t]he tax expenditures estimates have yet to be tested in the heat of policy 
differences.  It would be prudent to examine them closely before placing undue 
weight upon them” (as cited in McDaniel and Surrey, 1982, p.621).   
   
                                                          
246 Budget parity refers to making the budgetary treatment of policy instruments equivalent to 
ensure that budget rules do not advantage one policy instrument over another. This type of 
approach focuses on improving budget parity between tax expenditures and direct expenditures 
but stops short of setting limits on tax expenditures. Surrey and McDaniel offered alternatives 
how this information could be included in the budget process.  On one end the spectrum, they 
suggested this type of presentation could be used to expand and refine the information provided 
in the Special Analysis on tax expenditures.  In terms of a direct budget rule, they suggested that 
OMB set an overall spending limit for each department that includes both tax expenditures and 





 Given these definitional and estimation challenges, some proponents, including 
CBO Director Rivlin, suggested an incremental approach (Rivlin, 1981 and Havens, 
1981).  Both CBO and GAO testified in favor of an evolutionary approach, starting with 
improvements to the information base and followed by non-binding targets before 
moving to binding targets (Rivlin, 1981 and Havens, 1981).   
While acknowledging these concerns, proponents of new budget decision rules 
for tax expenditures stressed the importance of moving beyond analytical information to 
establish budget decision rules (Havens, 1981; Rivlin, 1981; and Surrey and McDaniel, 
1985).  A former OMB budget director argued “it as a matter of some urgency an effort 
to extend budget control to tax expenditures.”.  Surrey and McDaniel (1985) argued that 
“the past and projected growth in tax expenditures is simply too great to permit 
continued reliance on ad hoc measures.  Amendments to the Budget Act are needed to 
bring tax expenditures and the tax-writing committees under control...” (p.65). Chairman 
of the House Budget Committee Jones urged “[f]urther consideration and development of 
control over tax expenditures should be an important part of Congress’ agenda” (as cited 
in McDaniel and Surrey, 1982, p. 609). But, in the end, the Congress chose not to 
establish new budget decision rules for tax expenditures.   
 
PAYGO Provides Some Constraint, but Does Not Establish A Tax Expenditure 
Specific Budget Rule 
While policymakers chose to not establish budget rules for tax expenditures 
during the deficit control efforts of the mid-1980s247 a few years later the Budget 
                                                          
247 As discussed in Chapter One, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) of 1985 made 




Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)248included budget rules that indirectly influence 
policymakers’ decisions about tax expenditures.249 Specifically, BEA’s Pay-As-You-Go 
(PAYGO) offset provisions require that revenue loss from legislation establishing or 
expanding a tax expenditure be offset by legislation reducing entitlement spending or 
increasing revenues so that the net deficit is not increased.  BEA does not make a 
distinction between revenue changes resulting from changes in tax rates and changes in 
tax expenditures.  The offset requirement is enforced by sequestration250 (Hungerford, 
2011). 
Because PAYGO’s offset rules require tradeoffs between tax expenditures and 
other budget items, they arguably influence policymakers’ choices about tax policy and 
provide some constraint on creating or expanding tax expenditures.  251 As explained by 
Garrett (1998), under PAYGO rules, proponents of new or expanded tax expenditures 
must find ways to offset their costs by either: (1) raising taxes, (2) reducing current tax 
                                                          
which established fixed deficit reduction targets, primarily focused on controlling annual 
appropriations and did not directly address tax expenditures (Garrett, 1998).    
248 Unlike GRH, BEA did not establish predetermined deficit targets.  Rather BEA placed limits 
on discretionary spending (i.e. appropriations) and established the PAYGO process for direct 
spending and revenue legislation.  BEA’s PAYGO’s provisions were not designed to directly 
decrease or control growth in existing direct entitlements or tax expenditures. Rather, the focus of 
PAYGO is ensuring that actions under the control of legislators’ (i.e. the establishment of new tax 
expenditures or direct spending programs) are deficit neutral. 
249 As discussed in Chapter 1, in contrast to GRH’s fixed targets, BEA focused on controlling 
spending under policymakers’ control.   
250 Sequestration is a process of automatic and generally across the board spending reductions to 
enforce certain budget policy goals. These reductions permanently cancel budgetary resources. 
Sequestration was first authorized by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985 (Hungerford, 2011).  
251 While there is little empirical research on the role of PAYO on tax expenditures, some 
researchers, such as Garrett (1998), argue that the PAYGO offsets have led to enhanced scrutiny 
of tax expenditures by harnessing interest group competition in ways that increase the political 




expenditures, or (3) reducing spending for existing direct expenditure entitlements.252 
Block (2005) describes the pressure created by PAYGO offset rules as follows:  
 
“In this budget world, lobbyists advocating tax benefits for their clients can no 
longer simply argue the merits of their particular programs.  They must be 
prepared to look at all of the proposed revenue raisers and losers.  They must 
fend off competing predators seeking the same scarce revenue resources allocated 
the tax-writing committees and /or find weak groups with existing benefits that 
can be eliminated” (p.12). 
 
PAYGO, however, does not directly control tax expenditures or treat them as 
spending in the budget.  Importantly, PAYGO rules, by design, do not control cost 
growth in existing tax expenditures.  Like the treatment of direct expenditure 
entitlements, PAYGO rules allow existing tax expenditure to grow in response factors 
outside of lawmakers control, such as changes in population, the economy, or taxpayer 
behavior.  Further, tax expenditures are exempt from PAYGO’s sequestration 
mechanism, which does not apply to receipts.  Even if new or expanded tax expenditures 
trigger a sequester, tax expenditures would not be sequestered (GAO, 1994c).  Thus, 
while PAYGO rules may influence policymakers’ decisions about creating new or 
expanding existing tax expenditures, Congress chose not to establish tax expenditure 
specific budget rules.   
The establishment of an indirect budget constraint for tax expenditures, such as 
PAYGO, is not surprising.  Many tax expenditures have characteristics of entitlement 
programs– for which controlling spending has been notoriously difficult.  253  Like direct 
                                                          
252 Garrett (1998), however, notes that in practical terms the committee structure and other budget 
rules eliminate the possibility of offsets with direct expenditure entitlements and discretionary 
spending.   
253 The entitlement characteristics of tax expenditures have been noted by others, including but 




expenditure entitlements, many tax expenditures are permanent unless changed by law 
and are available to all qualified beneficiaries.  Under current budget rules, (with some 
exceptions) funding is automatic for existing tax expenditures with spending levels 
driven by eligibility rules and other factors (such as participation levels and economic 
conditions) that are largely out of lawmakers’ direct control (Hungerford, 2011 and GAO, 
2005d).254 255 Under current rules, controlling spending for tax expenditures requires 
Congress to make substantive program or policy changes through tax legislation or 
reconciliation.  By providing a partial solution the establishment of PAYGO’s offset rules 
arguably lessened the pressure for a tax expenditure specific budget rule while not fully 
addressing tax expenditure growth.  By allowing growth in the cost of existing tax 
expenditures and constraining the enactment of new large tax expenditures, PAYGO 
helped shape the trend and composition of tax expenditures in recent decades.   These 
issues are examined more closely in Chapter Nine.   
 
Analytical Information and Tools Expanded and Revised 
 Over time, analytical information and tools for tax expenditures have been revised 
and enhanced.  While specific measurement and estimation issues are discussed in detail 
                                                          
expenditure as “tax entitlements.” Schick (2000) concluded that “tax expenditures are a form of 
entitlement” (p. 149).  
254 Under current budget rules, the year-to-year growth for existing tax expenditures is included in 
the budget’s baseline projections without legislative action (Burman and Phaup, 2011: 
Hungerford, 2011; and Toder, 2011).   
255 In some cases, spending on specific tax expenditures has been capped.  Two widely cited 
examples include the low-income housing tax credit and the new markets tax credit (Halperin, 
2011 and GAO, 2005e).  Under the low-income housing tax credit, state housing agencies 
distribute a fixed allotment of tax credits to developers of affordable housing projects. Under the 
new markets tax credit, Treasury allocates a capped level of tax credits to designated community 
development entities and then those entities allocate the credits to investors in low-income 
communities. Other limited tax expenditures include: Credits for coal facilities, the advanced 




in Chapter Eight, Table 7.4 and the brief discussion below illustrate the various steps 
taken to revise and enhanced the way tax expenditures are measured, estimated and 
presented in the budget.  By providing additional perspectives, these changes were 
intended to better inform policy participants, but in doing so they indicate limitations of 
the original tax expenditure concept and existing analytical tools.  The wide range of 
efforts to refine the tax expenditure concept and analytical tools based on it reflect on-
going concerns about the budget oversight of tax expenditures and competing visions of 
the primary purpose of the tax expenditure concept.   





Table 7.4 Selected Revisions and Enhancements to Tax Expenditure Information 






Description of change 
1981-Present  Presentation Special Analyses (now Analytical Perspectives) section on 
federal credit programs includes discussion of tax 
expenditures programs that affect credit markets 
1982 Presentation  Direct expenditures and tax expenditures jointly displayed 
for housing and energy programs  
1983,1984  Baseline  Tax expenditures presented relative to a “reference tax” 
baseline exclusively (See Chapter 8 for discussion of tax 
structure baselines) 
1983 - 2006 Cost estimate Outlay-equivalent estimates reported (See text for 
description)  
1985 - Present  Baseline  Tax expenditures reported relative to both the normal 
income baseline and reference tax baseline (See Chapter 8 
for discussion of tax structure baselines) 
1985 - Present  Presentation Addendum listing tax expenditures providing aid to state 
and local governments  
1988 - 2003 Baseline  Tax Expenditures reported relative to the gift and estate tax 
as supplemental information  
1995 - Present  Presentation Tax expenditure reported over the full five-year budget 
window  
 
Present value estimates for certain tax expenditures 
reported as supplemental information  
1998 - 2002 Presentation  For each budget function, tax expenditures reported 
alongside outlays and credit activities (See Figure 7.3)     
2004 - 2010 Baseline  Tax expenditures reported relative to comprehensive 
income tax and consumption tax as supplemental 
information (See Chapter 8 for discussion of tax structure 
baselines) 
2004 - Present Definition   Negative tax expenditures defined and reported  
2006 - Present Specific item  Tax expenditure reported for imputed rent for owner-
occupied housing  
2004 - Present  Specific item  Treatment of accelerated depreciation changed  
2004 - Present  Specific Item  Negative tax expenditures reported for multiple taxation at 
the corporate level  
2011 - Present  Presentation  Section on tax expenditure includes a discussion of the 
need for framework to evaluate performance of tax 
expenditures 
Source: Author compiled table based on Budget U.S. Government, various years  
 The choice of tax structure is a key factor in determining which tax provisions are 




expenditures relative to two baselines.  In addition, for several years, the budget included 
supplemental presentations that identified and discussed tax expenditures relative to 
alternative baselines.  As discussed in Chapter Eight, the use of alternative baselines 
reflects complexities and disagreements about the methods used to identify and measure 
tax expenditures.  In introducing the alternative baselines for identifying tax 
expenditures, OMB (2002) argued that  
“[d]ue it part to the arbitrariness in the tax expenditure baseline, the 
Administration believes the meaningfulness of tax expenditure estimates is 
uncertain and that the “tax expenditure” presentation can be improved by 
consideration of alternative and additional tax bases” (p.95)  
 
Administrations also have included additional cost measures in the budget to 
provide additional perspective on tax expenditures.  Since FY 1995, the budget has 
included supplemental information on the present value of tax expenditures that involve 
the deferral of income or have other long-term effects.  JCT has never provided present 
value estimates for tax expenditures.  As described by OMB (2016), present-value 
estimates for a given year represent the revenue effects (net of future tax payments) that 
follow from activities undertaken during the year which cause deferrals or other long-
term effects (p. 26).  The FY 2017 Analytical Perspectives provided present value 
estimates were provided for 26 of the 169 tax expenditures (p.247).  While the choice 
between cash or present value estimates affects a relatively few items (15% of reported 
tax expenditures) a few involve significant cost differences.  For example, the tax 
expenditure for defined benefit employer plans is $66.6 billion on a cash basis, but $25 
billion on a present value basis (p. 243, 247).  Including both cash and present value 




analytical tool, but for a budget rule a determination would have to made as to which 
estimates will be used as the basis of the rule.   
While one objective of the tax expenditure concept was to facilitate comparisons 
and tradeoffs between tax expenditures and direct tax expenditures, developing 
comparable cost measures has proven difficult.  The standard measure for tax 
expenditures – foregone revenues – is not directly comparable to direct expenditures.  To 
help address this issue, the budget included outlay-equivalent estimates in addition to 
estimates of foregone revenues.  An outlay-equivalent estimate is an estimate of the direct 
subsidy (cash outlays) that would be required to provide the taxpayer the same after-tax 
income (benefit) as would be received through the tax provision (OMB, 2004).  OMB 
discontinued outlay-equivalent estimates in 2006 and the JCT has never provided outlay-
equivalent estimates.   
Administrations also have periodically revised the budget’s tax expenditure 
presentation to help facilitate comparisons between policy tools i.e., direct expenditures, 
tax expenditures, and credit activities.  In fiscal year 1982, the Administration jointly 
displayed direct and tax expenditures for housing and energy programs to illustrate how a 
tax expenditure budget might be used in the budget process to provide a more complete 
picture of government resources used for those purposes.  This presentation was not 
continued in subsequent budgets.  For fiscal years 1998 to 2002, the budget included a 
presentation of tax expenditures alongside outlays and credit activities for each budget 
function.  Figure 7.3 reproduces the presentation from the fiscal year 1998 budget.  OMB 




presentations of tax expenditures and direct expenditures be resumed.  OMB, however, 
disagrees and no executive action has been taken (GAO, 2005e and GAO, 2017, n.d.). 
Figure 7.3  
Presentation of Direct Expenditures, Credit, and Tax Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1998 
 
Source: Reproduced from Budget of United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, p.  163 
Both OMB and JCT now integrate negative tax expenditures in their tax 
expenditure presentations.  Negative tax expenditures refer to tax provisions which result 
in a penalty from inclusion of more income than relative to the tax baseline.  Negative tax 
expenditures increase, rather than decrease, tax liability.  While this information is not 
necessary for decisions relative to expenditure control and decisions about whether to 
replace tax provisions with direct expenditure programs it does provide information 
relevant to tax policy (Burman, 2003 and OMB, 2005).    
In addition, performance management initiatives have recognized the need to 
include tax expenditures.  The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires 
OMB and agencies to identify the relevant tax expenditures that contribute to each 




identify tax expenditures that contribute to their agency priority goals and strategic 
objectives.  However, there still are concerns about the need to better incorporate tax 
expenditures into the government’s performance processes (GAO, 2005e, 2016d; Harris 
et al., 2018; and Redburn, Posner, and Breul, 2014).   
 
Tax expenditures continued to grow despite analytical tools and PAYGO Rules. 
 While without a counterfactual it is impossible to know with precision the 
influence of reporting requirements and budget rules on tax expenditure growth, both the 
number256 and value of tax expenditures (as measured by foregone revenues)257 increased 
over time.  Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show the number and value of tax expenditures at several 
key points in time.258After the establishment of tax expenditure reporting in the mid-
                                                          
256 Author’s calculation based on information included in Special Analyses, Budget of the United 
States Government, fiscal years 1976 and 1988; Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1992 
and Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, fiscal years 2004, 2012, and 2017. 
While the number of tax expenditures is somewhat imprecise, and fluctuations occur due to 
changes in reporting methodology and categorization, prominent researchers state that these 
counts are a useful gauge of the trend in federal tax expenditures.     
257 Author’s calculation of sum of foregone revenues based on disaggregated information 
included in Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, fiscal years 1976 and 
1988; Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1992 and Analytical Perspectives, Budget of 
the U.S. Government, fiscal years 2004, 2012, and 2017. Sums of foregone revenues were 
adjusted for inflation using the composite budget deflator (constant 2009 dollars) as published in 
the Historical Tables, Budget of U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2018. Sums of foregone revenues 
provide a general indicator of the growth in tax expenditures, but these amounts are imprecise and 
need to be considered with some caveats.  Foregone revenue estimates for tax expenditures do not 
include the interaction effects with other provisions in the tax code. As a result, the foregone 
revenue resulting from the elimination of several tax expenditures may be greater than or less 
than the sum of the foregone revenues for each tax expenditure measured alone. However, CRS, 
GAO and other prominent researchers have stated that sums of foregone revenues provide a 
useful gauge of the general trend in federal tax expenditures (Hungerford, 2008, GAO, 2005e, 
and Marron, 2012).  
258 The milestones years include: (1) 1974, which is the earliest fiscal year for which tax 
expenditures were reported in the first statutorily-required tax expenditure budget; (2) 1986, 
which was the year of major tax reform and the peak for the number of tax expenditures before 
these reforms; (3) 1990, which was the year statutory PAYGO was enacted;  (4) 2002, which is 




1970s, both the number and value of tax expenditures grew significantly until the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986).  Between 1974 and 1986, the number of tax 
expenditures reported in the President’s budget increased by 70 percent and total 
foregone revenues, adjusted for inflation, more than doubled.   
TRA 1986 broadened the tax base259 and significantly reduced the value of the 
remaining tax expenditures.  TRA 1986 repealed some tax expenditures and curtailed 
others.260 It also indirectly reduced the value of tax expenditures by lowering marginal 
tax rates and raising the standard deduction and personal exemption which reduce the 
value of tax expenditures (Neubig and Joulfanian, 1988).  According to a Treasury 
Department study, while TRA 1986 repealed or scaled back some significant tax 
expenditures,261 much of the reduction in the value of tax expenditures resulted from the 
lower tax rates (Neubig and Joulfanian, 1988).262  
After TRA 1986, tax expenditure growth resumed, including during periods when 
PAYGO rules were in effect.  The number of tax expenditures increased about 32% 
                                                          
was reestablished; and (6) fiscal year 2015, which was the most recent fiscal year for which prior 
year budget data reported at the time of this analysis.     
259 Tax base broadening generally refers to increasing the amount of income subject to taxation 
i.e. the repealing or scaling back of existing tax expenditures. The TRA broadened the tax base in 
exchange for lower tax rates.   
260 Specific counts of repeal and revisions of tax expenditures vary based on reporting used.  
Analysis by Witte (1991) reports TRA 1986 tightened 72 tax expenditures, including the compete 
repeal of 14. 
261 Some significant tax expenditures repealed included: the investment tax credit, the special 
treatment for capital gains income; the deduction for nonmortgage interest, deduction of state and 
local sales tax, and the deduction for two-earner couples (CBO, 1988, p. 20). Another significant 
reduction in tax expenditures included new limits on the deductions for IRA contributions and 
other deferrals (CBO, 1988, p. 20).  
262 The value of most tax expenditures is directly related to the taxpayers’ marginal tax rates.  As 
a result, lower tax rates enacted in the 1986 Act reduced the value of tax expenditures.  Neubig 
and Joulfanian (1988), found that about 40 percent of the reduction in the value of tax 
expenditures resulting from the 1986 Act could be attributed to base broadening (i.e., the repeal 
or scaling back of existing tax expenditures) while the remaining 60 percent could be attributed to 




between 1990 and 2015 and the sum of foregone revenues, adjusted for inflation, more 
than doubled.   The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget included 169 tax expenditures 
with projected revenues totaling $1.2 trillion for fiscal year 2015 and just over $17 
trillion over the fiscal year 2016-2025 budget window (OMB, 2016).263 264   
 
Figure 7.4 Number of Tax Expenditures as Reported by Treasury 
 
Source: Graph created by author.  Author counted tax expenditures based on data 
included in included in Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, fiscal 
years 1976 and 1988; Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1992 and Analytical 
Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, fiscal years, 2004, 2012, and  2017. 
                                                          
263 Author’s calculation based on data from Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2017.  
264 JCT also shows a significant increase in number of reported tax expenditures since its first 
published list in 1972.  A significant increase in the number of tax expenditures since 1972 was 
followed a modest decrease in recent years primarily attributable to the expiration of temporary 
provisions associated with fiscal stimulus (JCT, 2015) JCT’s first tax expenditure list in 1972 
included 60 items (Russco, 2012). Its fiscal year 2007 report included 170 tax expenditures (JCT, 
2008). While some of this increase reflected changes JCT’s presentation, JCT (2008) notes that 
its methodology remained largely the same over time and atU.S.tributes growth to changes in law 
and increased scrutiny of the tax code (Burman and Phaup, 2011 and Buckley, 2011). As 
explained in JCT (2015), due to methodology modifications made in 2008, more recent counts of 
tax expenditures are not “strictly comparable” to counts prior to 2008. For fiscal year 2009, the 
JCT reported approximately 298 tax expenditures. The JCT publication for FY 2012- FY 2017 
shows a decline, reporting 260 tax expenditures. JCT (2015) notes that the recent decline is 






















Figure 7.5 Tax Expenditures, Total Forgone Revenues  
 
Author’s calculation of sum of foregone revenues based on disaggregated information 
included in Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976; 
Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1992 and Analytical Perspectives, Budget of 
the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2017. 
 
 
Despite More Analytical Tools and PAYGO Rule, Continuing Concerns and Calls 
for Reforms  
Tax expenditures are now more visible and receive more attention.  However, 
despite more information and PAYGO’s budget rule, continuing concerns about tax 
expenditures have renewed calls for improved budgetary oversight.265 Many current 
concerns are the same as those raised decades ago when the tax expenditure concept was 
first introduced.  Echoing voices of the past, some policy participants stress that current 
analytical tools and PAYGO rules may influence policymakers’ choices, but their 
effectiveness is limited because they do not require explicit consideration or control of 
                                                          
265 I reviewed various proposals, including: Burman, 2003; Burman and Phaup, 2011, 2012; 
Marples, 2015; Kleinbard, 2010; GAO, 2005e, 2016d; Harris et al; Howard, 1997, 2002; JCT, 































tax expenditures in the budget process.266 Not only are tax expenditures not readily 
identifiable in the budget, they are less transparent than direct expenditure entitlements 
because they often do not require reauthorization (CBO, 2012e and GAO, 2016d).  
Redburn, Posner and Breul (2014), for example, argued that “while new tax subsidies are 
subject to PAYGO like entitlements, their invisibility and institutional isolation makes 
them less subject to review and competition than other forms of spending” (p. 2). As in 
the past, some federal budget experts and policymakers argue a lack of budget 
recognition and control create a bias to use of tax expenditures over other policy tools, 
regardless of their relative effectiveness, thus distorting the size and efficiency of 
government 267  
These continuing concerns, at least in part, reflect skepticism about the 
effectiveness of the analytical tools established over the past several decades.  As noted 
earlier, despite their name, tax expenditure “budgets” are analytical tools, not budget 
rules.  Kleinbard (2010a) emphasized that the tax expenditure “budget” is “a separate 
and easily-ignored appendix” (p. 28). Howard (2002) argued that the original hope that 
                                                          
266 As examples: example (1), Burman (2011) outlines multiple aspects of the current budget 
process where tax expenditures are excluded, including: (a) total outlays and revenues; (b) 
functional displays of budget authority and outlays; (c) allocations to spending to committees; (d) 
reconciliation; (e) program budget accounts; and (f) explanations of the deficits; and example (2), 
GAO (2016) argues that the federal budget formulation processes include fewer controls and 
reviews, and provide less information on tax expenditures than for discretionary or mandatory 
spending.  
267 Burman (2011) finds that the exclusion of tax expenditures as spending underestimates the 
size of government by 7% of GDP. Burman and Phaup (2011) stress that the characterization of 
tax expenditures as tax reductions rather than spending is “...more than simply a matter of 
presentation” and “… has motivated and facilitated a shift in spending away from traditional 
forms and into the tax code.” Similarly, Kleinbard (2010b) argues that the current budget 
treatment “…. privileges tax expenditures over explicit spending.” GAO (2010) notes that “tax 
expenditures do not compete overtly with other priorities in the annual budget, and spending 
embedded in the tax code is effectively funded before discretionary spending is considered.” 




reporting would help control tax expenditures by improving budget transparency has not 
been realized.  GAO (2005d) reported that “[l}ittle progress has been made in the 
Executive Branch to increase the transparency and accountability of tax expenditures.” 
JCT (2008) concluded that there is “… scant evidence that tax expenditure analysis has 
succeeded in its first mission of ‘expenditure control’” (p. 5).  Dean (2013) concludes 
“…dragging tax expenditures into the budgetary daylight has eliminated neither 
policymakers opportunities nor incentives to exploit the fiscal advantage they provide” 
(p. 283). Zelinsky (2013) argues “…the procedural victory of tax expenditure analysis 
has not proved as substantively productive as Surrey and his supporters had hoped” (p. 
3).  Further, Zelinsky (2013) suggests that more than just being ineffective the tax 
expenditure budgets have contributed tax expenditure growth by publicizing and 
legitimizing them.   
Just as the recent concerns echo past concerns, some recent proposals echo past 
proposals.  Similar to the unified budget approach proposed by Surrey and McDaniel in 
the mid-1980s, several recent proposals recommend that tax expenditures be included in 
the budget as increases in spending, rather than as reductions of revenues (Burman, 2013; 
Burman and Phaup, 2011; Kleinbard, 2010, 2013; and Redburn et al., 2014).  These 
proposals would include tax expenditures as budget outlays along with imputed revenues.  
Tax expenditures would be added to both revenues and outlays so the net impact on the 
deficit would be the same, but, proponents argue, transparency would be improved.  
Other proposals call for tax expenditures to be further integrated into the budget 
resolutions.  Burman and Phaup (2011) suggest that tax expenditures could be treated like 




approach that would change budget decision rules to integrate tax expenditures into 
multiple aspects of the budget process.268  Redburn et al (2014) and GAO (2016d) 269 
outlined options to report tax expenditure along with program spending in the budget 
function allocations in the budget resolution.   
Another proposal is to establish a separate tax expenditure PAYGO regime that 
would require any new tax expenditures be paid for by reductions in other tax 
expenditures (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2010, and Rivlin and 
Domenici, 2011).  Some proposals include savings targets for tax expenditures or include 
tax expenditures in broader savings target (GAO, 1994c).  One option is for the budget 
resolution to provide a savings target to revenue committees requiring reduction of 
selected tax expenditures.  The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget suggests 
that after tax expenditures have been reviewed and reformed a hard cap should be placed 
on this area of the budget to limit future growth in tax expenditures (Committee for a 
Responsible Federal Budget, 2010).Other proposals suggests that tax committees should 
not enact tax expenditures without the direct involvement of authorization and 
appropriation committees with subject matter expertise (Kleinbard, 2010).   
                                                          
268 According to Burman and Phaup (2011) such an approach would include:  (1) scoring the cost 
of new tax expenditures as spending; (2) including tax expenditures explicitly in the budget 
resolution cap on total budget authority and outlays and in allocations by budget functions and to 
the committees of jurisdiction;  (3) including tax expenditures in reconciliation instructions and 
omnibus legislation and subject them to points of order and (4) requiring the President to revise 
budget accounts and functional allocation tables to include tax expenditures.   
269 Responding to continuing congressional concerns about tax expenditures, GAO released a 
2016 report that, among other things, outlines the board benefits and limitations of options to 
further incorporate tax expenditures into federal budget processes (GAO, 2016d). GAO discussed 
the following options aimed at increasing the review and control of tax expenditures: (1) 
including tax expenditures in the total spending levels and spending by function levels in the 
budget resolution; (2) directly involving authorizing committees in the development of tax 
expenditures related to their areas of expertise and (3) requiring all or some subset of tax 




Other recent proposals focus primarily on improving analytical information and 
tools, rather than establishing budget decision rules to more directly control tax 
expenditures.  GAO and others continue to recommend a combined presentation of the 
direct expenditures and tax expenditures in the federal budget be resumed (GAO, 2005e 
and Redburn et al, 2014).  In its 2005 report, GAO recommended that the Director of 
OMB in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury should present tax expenditures in 
the budget together with related outlay programs.  In its 2016 report, GAO reiterates its 
view that “presenting tax expenditures estimates alongside discretionary and mandatory 
spending levels could increase transparency and better communicate to the public the 
levels of spending being allocated to national priorities” (p. 33).  The Administration, 
citing conceptual and methodological issues, strongly disagreed with this approach and 
no executive action has been taken (Foster, 2005 and GAO, n.d.).   
 With some exceptions, recent legislative proposals have focused on expanding 
analytical tools and information, rather than establishing new budget decision rules.  The 
“Budget Process Improvement Act of 2013,”270among other things, would have required 
the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct performance reviews of JCT-identified tax 
expenditures on an ongoing basis.  The “Transparent and Sustainable Budget Act of 
2011”271 called for more oversight of tax expenditures, including requiring performance 
reviews of tax expenditures.  The bill also included the establishment of a point of order 
for legislation creating a tax expenditure which do not terminate within 10 years or if 
legislation did not the meet new requirements outlined in the bill.  The “Tax Information 
                                                          
270 H.R 1654 




for New Fiscal Oversight Act of 2010”272 would have required the JCT to analyze each 
tax expenditure identified in its annual tax expenditure report for equity, efficiency, and 
ease of administration.   
 The wide range of reform proposals and various revisions to the analytical tools 
for tax expenditure suggest competing objectives and a lack of clarity and agreement 
about the primary purpose of the tax expenditure concept.  From its inception, the tax 
expenditure concept has served dual purposes of supporting both tax and budget policy 
(Surrey, 1973; JCT, 2008, and Toder, 2005, 2009).  In introducing the concept, Surrey 
argued that it both would encourage “expenditure control” and “facilitate tax reform” 
(JCT, 2008 and Surrey, 1973).273  
 Early critics noted tension between these objectives and this tension remains 
apparent in the current debate.  Bittker (1969) argued that sometimes the emphasis was 
identification of deviations relative to a normative or “ideal” tax system and at other 
times the emphasis was on identifying tax provisions that could be substituted by direct 
expenditures.  Thuronyi (1988) argued that “[b]y defining tax expenditures as departures 
from a normative tax Surrey tried to cover all tax reform questions under the tax 
expenditure umbrella” (p. 1180).  More recently, Toder (2005) noted that “[t]ax experts 
in the United States and overseas have divergent views on whether the tax expenditure 
lists should be narrowly defined to focus on backdoor spending through the tax law or 
broadly defined to display the costs of departures from an ideal tax base” (p. 2).  While 
                                                          
272 H.R. 5291 
273 Surrey and Daniels (1985) reemphasized that “… those concerned with the growth in federal 
spending must also take into account the trend in tax spending” (p. 6). Surrey’s writing on the tax 
expenditure concept also indicates his desire to draw attention to preferential tax provisions as a 





tax expenditure lists include provisions that might otherwise be accomplished with direct 
expenditures these lists also include provisions that depart from an income tax baseline, 
but do not have a clear spending program substitute.   
 Debate continues about the primary purpose of the tax expenditure concept and 
whether it is best used as basis of a budget decision rule or an analytical tool.  The 
tension about the primary objective can be seen in the differing focus of the proposals 
seeking to redefine the tax expenditure concept.  Some proposals emphasized clarifying 
tax expenditures as a form of spending with the primary purpose being the identification 
of tax provisions substitutable by direct expenditures.274Conversely, other proposals 
focused on improving tax expenditure concept and analysis for purpose of supporting tax 
policy.275 Still other academic writings suggest “wholly different theories of tax 
expenditure analysis” which don’t fit neatly into either the tax policy or expenditure 
control objectives.276  
 Other reform proposals do not seek to redefine the tax expenditure concept, but 
rather focus on ways to better use it in the budget and policy process.  To help illustrate 
the varied approaches Table 7.5 sorts examples of recent proposals by the type of reform 
                                                          
274 McIntyre (1980), for example, argues that the tax expenditure concept should focus only on 
spending policy and not deal with the suitability of tax provisions for promoting tax policy goals.  
Similarly, Fiekowsky (1980) focused on the preparation and analysis of the federal budget.  He 
argues that tax expenditure analysis was not an appropriate context in which to make tax policy 
choices with respect economic efficiency or distributive issues. Thuronyi (1988) also viewed the 
key purposes of tax expenditure analysis as: (1) facilitating the replacement of tax expenditures 
with non-tax-based programs and (2) guiding budgetary choices between tax-based and non-tax-
based assistance. 
275 OMB (2003) emphasized improving “... understanding the effects of Federal income tax on the 
economy.”  JCT (2008) emphasized the value of the tax expenditure concept as an analytical tool.  
276 Shaviro (2004) attempts to redefine tax expenditures within the allocative and distributive 
framework developed by Musgrave (1959). Weisbach and Nussim (2004) argue that the tax 
expenditure decision is “solely a matter of institutional design” and has little or nothing to do with 
tax policy.  Dean (2013) argues the primary issue is not a leveling of the budget playing field, but 




(e.g.  enhance analytical tools vs.  establish decision rules).  Among proposals for 
decision rules, some suggest budget decision rules, which are the focus of this 
dissertation, but others call for decision rules outside the budget process.  While these 
types of non-budget decision rules are outside the scope of this dissertation they are 
included here to help illustrate the variation and scope of proposals to address tax 





Table 7.5 Selected Proposals to Improve Oversight of Tax Expenditures 
Proposal Type of 
Reform  
Source  
Enhanced coverage of tax expenditure in 
performance management and review  
 
Systematically evaluate some or all tax 
expenditures e.g.  effectiveness, distributional 




Present tax expenditures in the President’s 
budget together with direct expenditures  
Analytical 
tool  
GAO, 1994c, 2005e  
Direct the JCT, the CBO, or a bipartisan 
commission to develop rules for identifying 





Batchelder and Toder, 
2010  
Present, for informational purposes, tax 
expenditures alongside direct expenditures in 
the budget resolution  
Analytical 
Tool  
GAO, 2016d  
Include tax expenditures in “portfolio 






GAO (2016d) and 
Redburn et al, 2014  
Include tax expenditures in budget as budget 
outlays along with imputed revenues 
Budget 
decision rule  
Burman, 2011, 2013; 
Burman and Phaup, 
2011; Kleinbard, 2010; 
and Redburn et al. 2014 
Establish separate PAYGO regime for tax 
Expenditures  
 
Include tax expenditure under PAYGO 
sequestration   
Budget 
decision rule  
Committee for a 
Responsible Federal 
Budget, 2010; Gandhi, 
2010 and GAO, 1994c 
Establish hard cap on total allowable foregone 
revenues from tax expenditures 
 
Establish spending cap for tax expenditure in 
budget resolution 
Budget 
decision rule  
Committee for a 
Responsible Federal 
Budget, 2010 and GAO, 
1994c  
Require direct involvement of authorization 
committee(s) in enactment of new or expanded 
tax expenditures 
Budget 
decision rule  
Batchelder and Toder 
(2010); GAO, 2016d; 
Kleinbard, 2010; and 
Redburn et al (2014)  
Establish spending cap for specific tax 
expenditures or groups of tax expenditures 
 
Budget 
decision rule  
Halperin, 2012 
                                                          
277 Portfolio reviews would identify and review together all policy instruments e.g. grants, credit, 




Proposal Type of 
Reform  
Source  
Enhanced coverage of tax expenditure in 
performance management and review  
 
Systematically evaluate some or all tax 
expenditures e.g.  effectiveness, distributional 




Establish separate cap on tax expenditures or 
included tax expenditures as spending under the 
BCA caps  
Budget 
decision rule  
Harris et al., 2018 
Include in budget reconciliation a savings target 




decision rule  
GAO, 1994c  
Include tax expenditures in total spending levels 
and spending for allocation for each budget 
function in budget resolution 
 
Budget 
decision rule  
 
GAO, 2016d  
Establish “saving target” for tax expenditures in 




Apply reconciliation explicitly to tax 
expenditures and subject them to points of order  
Budget 
decision rule  
Burman and Phaup, 2011 
Establish multi- year ceiling on tax 
expenditures or some subset of tax expenditures 
expressed as a percentage of projected GDP 
Budget 
decision rule  
 
Kleinbard, 2010 
“Sunset” program growth in the absence of new 
legislative authority through formulas, such as 




Harris et.  al, 2018 
Limits on taxpayer use of individual tax 
expenditures  
Decision rule Penner and Steuerle 
(2016)  
Global cap on taxpayer use of tax expenditures 
as percent AGI  
Decision rule Feldstein, Feenberg, and 
MacGuineas (2011) 
 
Establish sunset rules to for tax expenditures i.e. 
make tax expenditures temporary and subject to 
periodic reauthorization  
 
Decision rule  GAO, 2016d; Harris et.  
al (2018); and Yin 2009).  
Establish requirement for periodic evaluations 
of tax expenditures  
Decision rule  Harris et.  al (2018) 
Convert all tax expenditures to refundable tax 
credits  
Decision rule Batchelder, Goldberg, 
and Orzag (2006)  






The differing focus and objectives of proposals supports the premise that 
challenges for establishing budget rules for tax expenditures begins at the most 
fundamental level of problem definition and conceptual rule design.  The debate about 
whether tax expenditure concepts is best used as analytical tool for tax policy as the basis 
of decision rules for expenditure control is far from settled.  While some experts 
emphasize the tax expenditure concept’s usefulness as a budget concept and measure, 
others strongly disagree and argue that its primary value is as an analytical tool for tax 
policy.  Aaron (1977) argued that “[t]he impossibly of constructing unambiguous budget 
should not divert attention from the immense value of program analysis that includes 
both direct and tax expenditures..” (as cited in Surrey and McDaniel, 1979, p. 239).  JCT 
(2008) stated that the tax expenditure concept’s “...  principal utility appears to have been 
as a tool of tax policy and tax distributional analysis” (p.6). Emphasizing its “analytical 
power,” JCT (2008) concluded “[w]e believe it’s appropriate to proceed on the basis 
that tax expenditure analysis today is most usefully described as primarily a tool of tax 
policy” (p.6). Fleming and Peroni (2010) also emphasized the value of tax expenditure 
analysis as an analytical tool (p.174).   
The debate the primary purpose of tax expenditure concept illustrates the tension 
between the desire to enhance analytical information and the need to narrow and clarify 
definitional issues to support a budget decision rule.  Proposals geared to informing tax 
policy, assessing efficiency and effectiveness, or broader institutional concerns tend to 
call for more and varied information.  Serving a multiplicity of objectives and 
incorporating a variety of perspectives may enhance tax expenditure analysis as 




approaches, and caveats may result in confusion and controversy.   As discussed in the 
next chapter, the tax expenditure concept involves significant conceptual, definitional and 
measurement challenges that increase the difficulty of gaining consensus on the 







Tax Expenditures, Conceptual, Definitional, and Estimation issues 
 
Identifying tax expenditures involves issues that are both technically complex and 
politically-charged, such as what constitutes government spending, what is a “proper” 
tax system, and what determines taxable income.  The debate about budget rules for tax 
expenditures is intertwined with unresolved, deeply-rooted ideological and political 
disagreements about fiscal policy issues and the role of government.  Persistent 
controversies and disagreements signal continuing and formidable barriers to the 
establishment and implementation of tax expenditure specific budget decision rules.  This 
chapter examines the scope and extent of disagreement on conceptual, definitional, and 
estimation issues and the role of these disagreements in explaining why the tax 
expenditure concept has not been formulated into a budget decision rule. 
 
 Disagreement about budget rules for tax expenditures begins with problem 
definition and conceptual design. 
While the tax expenditure concept is officially recognized and widely-used in the 
policy process278 its evolution reveals strong and persistent disagreement at the most 
fundamental levels of decision rule development, including:  
1. The “trigger” or problem definition: i.e. whether there is an identifiable and 
agreed-upon policy problem that warrants new rules  
                                                          
278 Burman, Toder and Geisser (2008) stated “[m]ost public finance economists believe that 
measuring tax expenditures is important for good budget management ...” (p.2). Zelinsky (2012) 
argued that proponents of the tax expenditure concept have had procedural success, noting that 
tax expenditure budgets are “ubiquitous.” The tax expenditure concept and its analytical merits 
have been recognized by other countries and international organization such as the World Bank, 




2. Conceptual framework i.e. the logic linking the problem to the solution provided 
by the proposed rule.   
 
Surrey and other proponents of the tax expenditure concept and its use in budget rules 
advance several central premises, including that:  
• tax expenditures are functionally-equivalent to direct expenditures  
• tax expenditure growth is a policy concern warranting more oversight, and  
• insufficient budget recognition and control is a key factor in policymakers’ 
choice of tax expenditures over other policy tools.   
 
Varying levels of disagreement, however, exist on each of these premises.  Conflicting 
views on these issues help explain why the tax expenditure concept has not evolved from 
an analytical tool to a budget rule.   
Some critics strongly attack the most basic conceptual underpinning of the tax 
expenditure concept – the functional equivalence of tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures.  Two aspects of this criticism are particularly relevant to the establishment 
of workable, sustainable budget rules.  First, a lack of political and public acceptance of 
tax expenditures as spending creates barriers to achieving support for tax expenditure 
specific budget rules.  In addition, substantive policy and implementation differences 
between tax expenditures and direct expenditures raise questions of whether equivalent 
budget treatment is appropriate and if so, how budget rules might be designed to 




The tax expenditure concept and its use in budget rules is grounded on the basic 
argument that money not collected by the government due to preferential tax provisions 
is no different from money collected from taxes and then outlayed by the government 
(Surrey, 1967, 1973).  In promoting the concept, Surrey (1973) stressed “it must be 
recognized that a tax incentive does involve the expenditure of government funds.” He 
explained:  
The tax expenditure concept in essence considers these special provisions as 
composed of two elements: the imputed tax payment that would have been made 
in the absence of the special provision (all else remaining the same) and the 
simultaneous expenditure of that payment as a direct grant to the person benefited 
by the special provision….  seen as a combined process of assumed payment of 
proper tax by the taxpayer involved and an appropriation by the government of 
an expenditure made to that taxpayer in the amount of the reduction in his actual 
tax payment from the assumed payment –that is the tax reduction provided by the 
special provision (Surrey, 1973, pp. 6-7). 
Building on Surrey’s concept, the late economist David Bradford (2003) 
illustrated how a spending program could be redesigned as a preferential tax subsidy.  In 
Bradford’s widely-cited example, rather than appropriating procurement funds, Congress 
would implement a “Weapons Supply Tax Credit (WSTC).” Weapons suppliers would 
deliver weapons meeting certain specifications to the government in exchange for 
certificates they could redeem against income taxes.  Under such a plan, the defense 
budget and tax revenues would be reduced.  The government would look smaller, but it 
would be supporting the same activities.   
Critics of the tax expenditure concept, particularly conservatives, strongly 
disagree with the fundamental premise that preferential tax provisions are government 
spending (Bartlett, 2001: Dubay, 2013; Fried, 1995: JEC, 1999; Ture, 1981: and Witte, 
1985).  One widely-cited critique – often referred to as the “last penny” argument -- is 




2008).  Fried (1995) claims “lurking behind the concept of the tax expenditure is a more 
sinister premise….to think of all income as virtual state property, and forbearance to tax 
away every last penny of it as itself a tax expenditure” (Fried, p.1 and cited in JCT, 2008, 
p. 35).  A 1999 Joint Economic Committee report argued: 
“The tax expenditure concept relies heavily on a normative notion that shielding 
certain taxpayer income from taxation deprives government of its rightful 
revenues.  This view is inconsistent with the proposition that income belongs to 
the taxpayers and that tax liability is determined through the democratic process, 
not through arbitrary, bureaucratic assumptions” (JEC, 1999, p.1).    
 
More recently, Chris Dubay, from the conservative-leaning Heritage Foundation, 
argued “if tax preferences are akin to spending, then it follows that all the income 
Americans earn is actually the government’s to begin with and that which it does not tax 
away and munificently lets citizens keep is really a cost to it” (Dubay, 2013. P.1). 
 Proponents of the tax expenditure concept counter that these “last penny” 
arguments misconstrue the concept and its purpose (JCT, 2008; Fleming and Peroni, 
2010; Surrey, 1973; and Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  JCT (2008) states “JCT staff 
believes the “last penny” argument is without merit” (p. 38).  Surrey and McDaniel 
(1985) argue that “[t]he view that all income belongs to the government confuses the 
issues of what is to be included in the tax base and what is the proper level of tax rates” 
(p. 60).  Fleming and Peroni (2008) explain that tax expenditure analysis (TEA):  
“…  cannot be interpreted as implying that this taxing power makes the federal 
government the owner of all income earned by U.S. residents unless TEA can be 
fairly understood as asserting that Congress has a normative obligation to adopt 
a generally applicable income tax and that 100% is the normatively correct rate 
for such a tax.  TEA does not, however, require the enactment of an income tax 
and it does not, in fact prescribe any particular level of general applicable 




Strong resistance to the idea that tax expenditures equate to government spending, 
however, has persisted for decades.279 In unpublished 1981 testimony, Undersecretary of 
the Treasury, Ture, argued “[t]he very term tax expenditure implies that the foregone 
revenue is essentially the same as a direct outlay by the government.  But this is basically 
incorrect.” Dr.  Allen Schick testified that “[m}ost people and most congressman regard 
tax expenditures as the retained income of taxpayers, not as a grant from the 
government.” (H.R.  4882, 1981. p. 170), More than three decades later, Michael 
Cannon, from the Cato Institute argued “[i}t is incorrect and dangerous to equate tax 
loopholes with government spending” (Cannon, 2010, p.1).    
More than a theoretical debate, the strongly divergent views on whether tax 
expenditures are spending have been on display in recent policy and budget reform 
debates.  In a 2011 floor speech on tax reform, Senator Hatch (R-UT) stated “[o]ne 
crucial myth that I would like to dispel is that tax expenditures are spending” (Hatch, 
2011, p.5).  At a May 2011 congressional hearing, former Senator Gramm (R-TX) argued 
that taxes should not be included under a budget control mechanism, noting that that 
public views lower deductions as a tax increase, not a spending cut.  At a May 2013 
Senate Budget Committee hearing, Ranking Member Jeff Sessions (R-AL) argued 
[w]hen you allow a person to keep money that they earn because of a certain 
deduction….  I don’t believe that is spending by the federal government” (as cited in 
                                                          
279 Numerous scholars note that a large segment of the public, lawmakers, and other policy 
participants view the enactment of tax expenditures as tax cuts, rather than government spending 
(Clarke and Fox, 2015; Garret, 1998; Tahk, 2013; Schick, 1981 and Zelinsky 2005).  Zelinsky 
(2005) argues that “[f]or a critical segment of the public, public subsidy framed as tax relief is 
different from, and less objectionable than, equivalent cash payment.” Clarke and Fox (2015) 
stated “… that the public strongly prefers tax expenditures even when the economic substance of 





Chokshi, 2013 and U.S. Senate Budget Committee, 2013).  Conversely, other witnesses 
stated that in their opinion budget enforcement mechanisms should include revenues 
(Irving, 2011 and Van De Water, 2011).  Van De Water argued that placing a cap on total 
spending (without including tax expenditures) would “…essentially absolve revenues – 
including tax expenditures – from playing any part of the effort to bring long-term 
deficits under control” (Van De Water (2011, p.2).  
Discussions about a controversy surrounding the ethanol tax credit highlights the 
high tension and conflicting views on whether tax expenditures are spending (Henchman, 
2011, Marron, 2011 and Bolton 2011) In the spring of 2011, Senator Tom Conburn (R-
OK) proposed an amendment to end the ethanol tax credit that was strongly opposed by 
the conservative group Americans for Tax Reform (ATR).  ATR’s opposition was not in 
reaction to the repeal of the ethanol tax credit (it supported the repeal), but to the 
amendment’s failure to provide an offsetting tax cut.  ATR condemned Coburn’s 
contention that the tax credit amounted to government spending and threatened that 
unless there was an offsetting tax cut, the amendment would violate the ATR Taxpayer 
Protection Pledge280 281(Bolton, 2011 and Henchman, 2011).  In his response to ATR, 
Senator Coburn argued: 
By opposing my amendment, you are defending wasteful spending and a de facto 
tax increase on every American.  Ethanol subsidies are a spending program 
placed in the tax code….”  (as cited in Schor, p. 1 and Bolton, 2011, p. 2)) 
 
                                                          
280 The ATR pledge asks candidates for public office to (1) oppose tax rate increases and (2) 
oppose the elimination of deductions and credits unless offset by other revenue reductions.   
281 In a 2009 web post, ATR stated its position that “Repealing the ethanol credit IS A 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX INCREASE and is therefore a PLEDGE VIOLATION unless the 




In a letter to the Senator, ATR’s director of tax policy, Ryan Ellis, countered that 
“the ethanol tax credit is not a spending program, despite your repeated attempts to 
claim that it is (Ellis, 2011, p. 1).  He argued:       
Spending programs and tax relief are not the same thing.  If the government lets 
Tom Coburn keep a dollar of his own money, that is not the same thing as the 
government stealing a dollar from Ryan Ellis and giving it to Tom Coburn.  The 
difference between tax relief and spending are unambiguous” (Ellis, 2011, p. 1).   
 
Clarity on the matter is not found in judicial reviews of tax expenditures.  Without 
going into details of case law, the courts do not appear to provide clear direction to help 
inform the policy debate about the equivalence of direct expenditures and tax 
expenditures.  The Supreme Court has at times accepted the economic equivalence of the 
two policy instruments and treated tax expenditures as it would direct expenditures.  
However, in other cases, the Court has rejected their equivalence.  In Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v.  Winn (decided in 2011), the Court ruled that the 
challenged tax credit was not government spending.282 Based on their review of case law, 
Hinz and Spivak (2016) conclude that “[t]hough recent cases have tended to distinguish 
more sharply between direct expenditures and tax expenditures, the proper legal 
standard is far from clear and appears to depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case” (pp. 27-28).  
Substantive policy and administrative differences between tax expenditures and 
direct expenditures also raise concerns about whether budget rules can be developed to 
adequately address these differences.  Schick argued “...  it is important to note that tax 
                                                          
282 In the 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that an Arizona tax credit differed enough from a 
comparable direct spending program to deny taxpayers the right to sue on the basis that the credit 




and direct expenditures are not pure substitutes” (Government printing office, 1981a, p. 
165). He cautioned “[o]ne should be very wary of pushing the tax expenditure concept to 
the point where no distinction is made between direct spending and revenues foregone” 
(Government printing office, 1981a p. 173).   OMB argued “[a]lthough tax expenditures 
can often be thought of as tax subsidies, they are frequently unlike any of the subsidies 
found on the spending side of the budget.”  
 Some opponents to new budget decision rules argue that tax expenditures have 
policy features and advantages which explain and justify their use and have nothing to do 
with their budget treatment (Bartlett, 2001; Tahk, 2013; Wiesbach and Nussim, 2004 and 
Zelinsky, 1993).  Rather than a problem stemming from slack budgetary oversight, tax 
expenditure growth is seen as sound decisions.  Harris (1997) argued that tax 
expenditures provide a “unique function rather than merely substituting for direct 
expenditures.” 283 (p. 390). King (1984) argued that continuing growth in tax 
expenditures in the presence of enhanced analytical tools suggest that many tax 
expenditures are “intrinsic to American tax policy” which helps explain “their endurance 
and resistance to reform” (p. 15). 
In this view, the tax expenditure concept is potentially harmful because it implies 
that all tax provisions with non-tax purposes are not good policy.  Tahk (2013) argued 
there are policy advantages associated with using the tax code for social policy that 
mitigate concerns over tax expenditure growth.  She noted that “[s]ince Surrey’s view 
first took hold in the 1960s, several tax scholars have begun to notice the positive 
features of tax expenditures that Surrey’s wholesale critique neglected” (p. 68). 
                                                          




Specifically, she argued that Surrey assumptions and arguments with respect to 
distributional fairness are outdated and no longer apply given changes in tax 
expenditures.  284 Zelinsky (2012) also argued that characteristics of tax expenditures 
justify their use, including lower transaction costs and the potential to reduce capture by 
special interests.285  
A closely related argument is that the focus on tax expenditure specific budget 
rules is misguided because the primary reasons driving tax expenditure growth are 
outside the budget process (Dean, 2013; Tahk, 2013; and Zelinsky, 2005).  In this view, 
factors (e.g.  psychological, policy, political, institutional, or economic) other than lax 
budget rules explain the use of tax expenditures (Buckley, 2011; Dean, 2013; Tahk, 2013; 
Schick, 1981; and Zelinsky 2005).  Dean argued that there are “…an array of pressures –
from parliamentary to psychological – that encourage policymakers to use tax 
expenditures…” 286 (Dean, 2013, p. 280).  Schick argued that there are significant 
differences in the distribution of costs and benefits between tax expenditures and direct 
                                                          
284 Tahk (2103) pointed to normative and administrative benefits of tax expenditures that counter 
distributive justice concerns. She argued that: (1) people who need benefits are more likely to 
apply for them through the tax code; (2) tax-embedded programs provide more resources to 
intended beneficiaries because they are not taxed and (3) tax-embedded programs fosters 
inclusion of potentially marginalized groups.  In addition, she argued that: (1) introducing the IRS 
into a substantive policy area helps laws in that area achieve their goals and (2) tax-embedded 
policies distribute power more equitably between federal and state governments.   
285 Widely discussed in the literature, the term capture refers special interest and other groups 
ability to have influence and control over policymakers or institutions.  Zelinsky (2013) argued 
that it more difficult for special interest to capture tax-writing committee than the specialized 
committees which handle direct expenditure programs.   
286 Dean (2013) describes three resistances – budgetary, cognitive, and procedural – that dissipate 
when tax expenditures are substituted for direct expenditures. Dean use the budgetary term to 
refer to the current tax expenditure budget.  However, this dissertation views the current tax 
expenditure budget as an analytical tool, noting that the term “tax expenditure budget” is a 
misnomer because it is not voted on and subject to budget controls.  Dean discusses some 
changes to budget process within his procedural category; these types of changes are similar to 




expenditures that  “[t]hese differences, more than the evasion of budget controls, account 
for the widespread use of tax expenditures (H.R.  4882, 1981, p. 165).  Dean argued that 
“[i]n the case of the tax expenditure budget, conceiving of tax expenditure abuse as mere 
accounting deficiency – to be addressed by fine-tuning the budget process – guaranteed 
the project’s failure” (Dean, 2013, p. 278).  Tahk (2013) argued that tax expenditures 
benefit from legislative advantages (beyond budgetary advantage), including, for 
example, the strength of Ways and Means Committee and formal procedural 
protections.287 For these reasons, some policy participants argue that budget rules for tax 
expenditures may not prove to be useful or effective.     
The issues raised above suggest that the challenges faced in establishing budget 
rules for tax expenditures extend beyond the widely-cited definitional and estimation 
issues discussed in the next subsections.  Disagreement about the tax expenditure concept 
begins at the most fundamental levels of problem definition and conceptual design.  
These disagreements about the fundamental logic of the tax expenditure concept have 
significant implications for key aspects of rule establishment, including: consensus 
building; the choice between analytical tool or decision rule; and budget rule design.   
The lack of conceptual and political agreement about whether tax expenditures 
are government spending is central to the fight about using the concept in budget rules.  If 
it is accepted that tax expenditures are government spending, then a budget process that 
does not directly recognize and control these tax provisions would be deemed 
incomplete.  However, for those who do not accept the premise that tax expenditures are 
                                                          
287 Tahk (2013) uses the example that bills from Ways and Means go to the floor under  a closed 
rule, which prevents other members of Congress from slowing the bill by trying to amend them 




spending, proposals to subject these tax provisions to “spending” controls are illogical.  
Significant disagreement about whether a problem warranting new budget decision rules 
exists helps explain the unresolved path of the tax expenditure concept from analytical 
tool to a workable and sustainable budget rule.   
 
  Definitional and estimation issues emerged immediately and remain controversial. 
Even when the conceptual logic and merits of the tax expenditure concept are 
accepted, significant definitional and estimation issues remain.  As posed by Surrey, the 
tax expenditure concept rests on the notion of a normative or “generally accepted” tax 
structure that serves as a baseline from which deviations or “special” provisions can be 
identified (Surrey, 1969 and Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  However, there has been 
persistent debate about which tax provisions are “special” and which tax provisions 
make up the basic tax structure (baseline) (GAO, 1994c; Surrey, 1973: and Surry and 
Hellmuth, 1969).   
The definitional and estimation difficulties associated with tax expenditures have 
long been recognized, even among supporters the concept.  In his 1967 speech 
introducing the tax expenditure concept, Surrey acknowledged “[w}e should not, of 
course, overlook, the difficulties of interpretation or measurement involved here”288 
(Surrey, 1967, p.323). The first official tax expenditure budget289 did not attempt to 
provide a complete list290 and acknowledged that “[i]t must be recognized that exclusions 
                                                          
288 In later works, Surrey modified his views about the extent of difficulties associated with 
identifying and measuring tax expenditures.   
289 Included in the 1968 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury, 1968).  
290 The Report notes “[v]arious items that would have been added have been excluded for one or 
more of several reasons: (a) Some items were excluded where there is no available indication of 




from the listing are to some extent arbitrary and some may prefer to add items that we 
have omitted or to omit items that we have included” (p. 329). The report’s stated 
intention was to provide a “minimum list rather than including highly complicated or 
controversial items that would becloud the utility of this special analysis” (U.S. Treasury, 
1968, p. 330).   
Based on my review of the voluminous government, academic, and stakeholder 
reports and literature, the following subsections examine issues and debates surrounding 
the identification and measurement of tax expenditures, including:  
1. whether it is possible to objectively define a normative tax baseline;  
 
2. which tax structure should be used as the baseline (e.g.  income or 
consumption); 
 
3. how to define a chosen baseline (e.g.  if an income tax baseline is chosen, then 
what constitutes income) and  
 
4. whether the tax expenditure concept could be redefined to decouple it from a 
normative tax baseline, and 
 
5. how to measure the cost of tax expenditures once they are identified.   
 
                                                          
their inclusion in the income base stands on relatively technical or theoretical tax arguments; and 
(c) Some items were omitted because of their relatively small quantitative importance” (U.S. 




In addition, to better understand the practical implications for budget rules, I 
examined, where feasible, the following: 
 
1. congruence of Treasury and JCT methodologies and resulting tax expenditure 
lists, and  
 
2. consistency in tax expenditure reporting over time.   
 
While examination of agreement between the Treasury and JCT tax expenditure 
lists provides some insights on the extent of consensus achieved among the two 
government entities likely to be charged with implementing new budget decision rules for 
tax expenditures, it does not fully capture the definitional and estimation challenges 
associated with the establishment and implementation of tax expenditure specific budget 
rules.  As noted by GAO, the tax expenditure lists as complied by Treasury and JCT 
generally are “…constructed by partisans of the concept, not by those who spurn it” 
(GAO, 1979, p. 8).  While Treasury and JCT reporting has reflected some definitional 
controversies and alternative methodologies over time, the scope of changes made by 
these entities has been influenced by their mission and the requirements and guidelines of 
the CBA and its legislative history.  As such, these list and discussions do not fully reflect 
controversies that would arise with the establishment of tax expenditure specific budget 





Disagreement over whether tax baseline can be objectively defined and whether the 
tax expenditure concept depends on it. 
Surrey described tax expenditures as deviations from a baseline tax structure; 
however, significant debate surrounds whether such a normative or “generally accepted” 
tax structure can be defined.  One widely-cited criticism of the tax expenditure concept is 
that it presupposes an objective standard or conceptual model for a tax structure which 
does not exists (Bartlett, 2001; Bittker, 1969a; Blum, 1955; Carroll et al.  2011; Feld, 
1975; Kahn and Lehman, 1992; Shaviro, 2003; Shoup, 1975; Thuronyi, 1988; and 
Weisbach and Nussim, 2004).  In this view, the tax expenditure concept and thus any 
budget rule based on it would simply reflect the arbitrary nature of and political bias 
inherent in subjective judgments about the tax system.   
Bittker (1969a, 1969b) provided one of the first and widely-cited critiques along 
these lines.  Emphasizing that it is essential to have some normative or accepted standard 
against which to determine what is (and is not) a tax expenditure, Bittker (1969a) argued 
that  
“..  a systematic compilation of revenue losses requires an agreed starting point, 
departures from which can be identified.  What is needed is not an ad hoc list of 
tax provisions, but a generally acceptable model or set of principles, enabling us 
to decide with reasonable assurance which income tax provisions are departures 
from the model, or set of principles, whose costs are to be reported as “tax 
expenditures” (p. 247). 
Bittker (1969a) concluded that a lack of “a conceptual model makes it impossible 
to say whether a large number of structural features of the existing federal income tax 
are, or are not, ‘tax expenditures’” (p. 258).  
 Similar arguments have persisted in the critical literature for decades.  Feld (1975) 




series of changing accommodations” (p. 1052).  Bittker (1969b) argued that “…every tax 
structure, whether on the books or projected is an assemblage of value judgments on 
scores of issues that could plausibly have been decided differently.  To bestow the label 
“correct” on any of these human creations is to misuse the term” (p. 542). In 1981 
unreleased testimony, Ture (1981), Treasury Undersecretary for Tax Economic Affairs, 
argued  
“Suffice it to say that classification of any provision or feature of the tax code as 
a tax expenditure depends critically on one’s views concerning what is the 
appropriate criteria for delineating the “right” tax base, the “right” rate or rates 
of tax, the “right” timing of liability and payment of tax, the designation of the 
“right” tax paying unit, etc.  There are in short, no unqualifiedly correct, 
unambiguously defined tax expenditures” (p. 1538).  
Kahn and Lehman (1992) stressed that the choice among different tax structures is a 
“contestable, contingent, political decision” (p. 1661). Bartlett (2001) argued that the 
“most fundamental problem is the implicit assumption that there is some ideal tax system 
against which to judge tax preferences.” Weisbach and Nussim (2004) argued that 
[t]here is no such thing as a normative tax base” (p. 976). Shaviro (2003) argued against 
“…a supposedly canonical yet in practice under-theorized and rightly controversial 
official definition of the normative income tax base” (p. 22). JCT (2008) argued that 
controversy over the composition of the normal tax base had significantly reduced the 
value of tax expenditure analysis.   
 Controversy continues about the choice of baseline tax structure.   
Even among those who accept that tax expenditures might be defined relative to 




baseline e.g.  income vs.  consumption.291This controversy is important because the 
choice of baseline tax structure influences which tax provisions are classified as tax 
expenditures.  As OMB (2008) noted, the choice of baseline tax is “…perhaps the most 
important in determining what is included as a tax expenditure” (p. 287).    
In the United States, the tax expenditure concept has relied on the comprehensive 
income tax as the starting point for developing the baseline tax structure.292 Under the 
comprehensive income tax, both amounts saved and consumed are treated as income.  To 
some researchers and policy participants, including McDaniel and Surrey, the choice is 
obvious given the Federal Government’s significant reliance on the income tax.293 
Critics, however, argued that the use of an income tax baseline does not sufficiently 
reflect the current U.S. tax system (Bartlett, 2001; Shaviro, 2003; Fleming and Peroni, 
2008).  Bankman, Shaviro, and Shark noted that “it is often said that our system is as 
much a consumption tax as an income tax, or more precisely some sort of impure hybrid 
of the two” (as cited in Kahn, 2013, p. 150).  OMB (2002) argued “…the growing 
presence of tax-deferred savings vehicles in the tax code suggest that these may today be 
part of the ‘normal’ income tax circa” (p. 96).   
                                                          
291 A broad-based consumption tax can be viewed as an income tax plus a deduction for savings 
(Carroll et al, 2011).    
292 Although, from the beginning, the tax expenditure concept was seen as relevant to other tax 
structures, the primary focus has remained on defining tax expenditures relative to the income tax 
(Surrey, 1973). 
293McDaniel and Surrey (1982) pointed out that a distinction needs to be made between the 
selection of a particular tax and the determination of the normal base for the selected tax. They 
argued that the Congress and public believe the United States has an income tax and thus it 
follows that tax expenditures would be defined against an income tax baseline.  Fleming and 
Peroni (2008) provided a similar view noting that “… that consumption with a general exclusion 
for savings has not been adopted as the baseline for the federal income tax and is unlikely to be 




The controversy over the baseline taPeronix structure is not surprising given that 
the choice is not simply an accounting matter, but rather can lead to significant 
differences in the way policy choices are framed.  Critics argue that using the income tax 
baseline to identify tax expenditures creates biases against and barriers to the adoption of 
a consumption tax (Bartlett, 2001; Fleming and Peroni, 2010; U.S. Joint Economic 
Committee, 1999; and Sullivan, 2001).  CBO (2013c) acknowledges that if a 
comprehensive consumption tax (rather than an income tax) was used as the baseline, 
some major tax expenditures would not be considered tax expenditures, with implications 
for its distributional analyses.   
 Specifically, if a consumption tax was used as the baseline, tax provisions that 
eliminate savings from the tax base or reduce the tax on investments would not be 
considered tax expenditures (Burman and Phaup, 2011; CBO 2013; Fleming and Peroni, 
2008; Burman, 2003; and Toder, 2005).  Table 8.1 provides examples of significant tax 
provisions that are considered tax expenditures relative to an income tax baseline but 
would be excluded relative to a consumption tax baseline (CBO, 2013c; OMB 2016; 
Sunley 2004; Burman, 2003; and Toder, 2009).  As can be seen, some involve significant 





Table 8.1 Select Tax Provisions Classified as Tax Expenditures Relative to Normal Tax 
but Excluded Relative to Consumption Tax 
Source: Author based on data included Table 14-3 in Analytical Perspectives, Budget of United 
States, Fiscal Year 2017 and analysis included in Analytical Perspectives, Budget of United 
States, Fiscal Year 2009.  Burman (2003) included a similar analysis.   
 
Further, the differences extend beyond the few examples shown in Table 8.1.  
From fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009, OMB discussed tax expenditures relative to the 
consumption baseline in an appendix to its official tax expenditure presentation (pp. 318-
321).296 In the fiscal year 2009 budget, OMB considered how the top 30 tax provisions 
would be treated relative to a comprehensive consumption tax baseline.  According to 
OMB, only one – the exclusion of workers’ compensation benefits - would clearly 
continue to be a tax expenditure relative to a comprehensive consumption tax baseline.  
OMB concluded that while another 14 might remain tax expenditures under a 
                                                          
294 Author’s calculation based on Analytical Perspectives, Budget of United States, Fiscal Year 
2017, Table 14-3.  Amount includes foregone revenue for net exclusions for (1) capital gains 
exclusion on home sales ($563.8 billion); (2) capital gains (except agricultural, timber, iron ore, 
and coal ($1,057.8 billion); and (3) capital gain exclusion from small corporation stock ($5.5 
billion) and Step up basis of capital gains at death ($776.6 billion) 
295 Author’s calculation based on Analytical Perspectives, Budget of United States, Fiscal Year 
2017, Table 14-3. Amount includes foregone revenue for net exclusions for (1) Defined Benefit 
employer plans ($622.5 billion); (2) Defined contribution employer plans ($921.5 billion) and (3) 
Individual Retirement Accounts ($197.4 billion).    
296 Other researchers have also used the OMB’s appendix on alternative baselines to consider the 
implications of the choice of tax baseline in determining tax expenditures (see Bartlett, 2001 and 
Burman, 2003).    





Exclusion for capital gains294  $2,403.7 
Net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings from tax-deferred 
retirement plans295 
$1,741.4   
Exclusion of interest on public purpose states and local bonds $501.2 




comprehensive consumption baseline their treatment was uncertain (OMB, 2008).297 The 
remaining 15 provisions would not be included as tax expenditures under a 
comprehensive consumption tax baseline, according to OMB.  Most of the excluded 
provisions involve savings and investment.  The OMB analysis also noted that the use of 
the consumption tax baseline may result in new tax expenditures.  Possible, additional tax 
expenditures cited by OMB include the exclusions for: (1) benefits paid by insurance 
policies, (2) in-kind benefits from government programs (e.g.  food-stamps, Medicaid, 
and public housing), and (3) benefits received from charities (OMB, 2008, p. 321).   
Given the policy areas and budget amounts involved, the treatment of these 
provisions under new budget rules is likely to be controversial.  While existing reporting 
practices could be used, the increased stakes associated with tax expenditure specific 
budget rules would likely heighten debate about the choice of tax baselines.  Debates 
over the tax baseline exemplify how a lack of consensus on tax policy issues spills over 
into debate about the legitimacy of the tax expenditure concept and complicates its use in 
budget rules.     
 Disagreement on how to define “normal” income.   
The current practice is to use the income tax as the basis for identifying federal 
tax expenditures, but persistent and significant debate surrounds just how to define 
taxable income and whether normative principles or standards exist for doing so.298As 
                                                          
297 Of the remaining 14 that might be included as tax expenditures, 6 provisions were listed as 
probably being classified as tax expenditures relative to a consumption tax baseline. The other 8 
provisions were listed as uncertain with respect to their treatment relative to the consumption tax 
baseline.   
298 The definitional issues ambiguities discussed in this chapter are not limited to using the income 
tax baseline; regardless of the baseline chosen similar issues will arise. Carroll et al. (2011) 
explained that a consumption tax baseline also is not a fully specified concept and thus adopting it 




discussed above, a central premise of the tax expenditure concept (as described by 
Surrey) is that the income tax consists of two parts: (1) structural provisions necessary to 
implement an income tax system and (2) a system of tax expenditures that provide 
financial assistance through the tax code (Surrey, 1967; Surrey, 1973; and Surrey and 
McDaniel, 1985).  The CBA codified this concept by formally defining tax expenditures:  
“those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which 
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability”299  
 While the theory behind the tax expenditure concept is relatively straightforward, 
distinguishing between structural provisions and programmatic provisions is not 
(Halperin, 2012, Schick, 1981; Maslow, 1991 and OMB, 1987).  It requires a workable 
agreement on what a “pure” tax system (i.e. one that only exists to raise revenue) would 
look like.  Schick cautions about the difficulties associated with this task:  
 “It turns out, however, that the structural and programmatic features are not 
separate from one another.  First, they are not separate because we would not 
tolerate the particular tax structure we had if we didn’t also have the tax 
expenditures….”  
 “…[i]f we were to abolish all tax expenditures we would be changing the 
structural system.  Conversely, if you change the basic tax structure you 
automatically change its value, that is the estimate of the expenditures as well” 
(H.R.  4882, 1981, p. 161). 
Critics of the tax expenditure concept are quick to point out that the meaning of 
“special” in the CBA definition is ambiguous and does not provide sufficient guidance 
for determining which provisions are part of the tax structure and which are deviations 
from it (Thuronyi, 1988).  CBA’s legislative history provides some additional guidance 
by indicating that Congress assumed tax expenditures represent deviations from the 
                                                          




normal tax structure for individuals and corporations300 (Altshuler and Dietz, 2011; JCT, 
2008; Hungerford, 2008, 2011; Surrey 1973; and McDaniel and Surrey, 1982).  The 
legislative history also refers to previously published compilations of tax expenditures 
prepared by the Treasury and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, stating that 
“the term ‘tax expenditure budget’ means the enumeration of tax expenditures as 
published by the House Ways and Means in ‘Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures’” 
(McDaniel and Surrey, 1982 and Senate Report No. 93-579).  This legislative history 
resolves the issue for some, but for others the reference to the normal tax structure does 
little to resolve the debate.  Because the normal tax structure is not specifically defined, 
what is normal income remains controversial.  And, some argue that an attempt to define 
it is simply a subjective and elusive exercise (Altshuler and Dietz, 2011 and JCT, 2008). 
In the first tax expenditure budget, the Treasury Department explained that the tax 
expenditure list contains “the major respects” in which the current income tax base 
deviates from: (1) “widely accepted definition of income;” (2) “standards of business 
accounting,” and (3) “the generally accepted structure of an income tax” (p. 327). The 
report, however, did not discuss these criteria in detail.  As noted by JCT (2008), the only 
features that the report explicitly included in the generally accepted structure of the 
income tax were: (1) personal exemptions; (2) graduated rates for individuals and (3) the 
separate corporate tax.    
                                                          
300 As noted JCT (2008), the original Senate provision (S.1541) defined tax expenditures using 
the words “… a deviation from the normal tax structure…” but the final statutory language 
dropped the reference to normal tax.  JCT, however, notes that the accompanying Conference 
Report stated that this shortening of the definition was a simplification with no intended change 
in meaning.  Senate Conference Report No. 93-924 to accompany H.R. 7139 Congressional 




Surrey and the 1968 Treasury report relied on the comprehensive Haig-Simon (H-
S) definition of income as the starting point for defining normal income.  301 While 
Surrey points to the “general acceptance” of the H-S approach in justifying its use, a 
voluminous literature reveals significant debate about its appropriateness as the starting 
point for defining tax expenditures (Bittker, 1969a, 1969b; Fleming and Peroni, 2010; 
JCT, 2008; OMB, 2003; Surrey, 1973; Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  Further, while 
comprehensive income is often held out an ideal, it is an economic concept that is not 
well defined for real world application (Bittker, 1969b; GAO, 1979; JCT, 2008; and 
OMB, 2009).  As expressed in Bittker’s widely-cited quote “many ambiguities…become 
apparent as soon as one attempts to apply the Haig-Simons definition to the protean 
stream of economic life” (Bittker, 1969a, p. 260).   According to GAO (1979),  
“[t]he Haig-Simon definition of income is recognized as being too comprehensive 
to be a practical basis for taxation; it is intended as a tool for analyzing or a 
standard for judging other concepts of income” (p. 10).  
Surrey rebutted critics by arguing that the comprehensive H-S income definition 
served only as a guide and has never been the sole criterion used in identifying tax 
expenditures (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  According to Surrey, to arrive at the normal 
income tax, refinements are made based on the historical treatment of provisions within 
the federal tax system as well as an understanding of the “general consensus” among 
economists and other tax experts about what constitutes “a politically and 
                                                          
301 Haig-Simon definition of income is the “the algebraic sum of the (1) market value of rights 
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between 
beginning and end of the period in question.” More simply, comprehensive income is the real, 
inflation-adjusted accretion to one’s economic power between two points in time (OMB, 2009). 
There, however, is no discussion of the source of income.  As noted by OMB (2014), it includes 
“[a]ll accretions to wealth, whether realized or not, whether or not related to market 
transactions, and whether returns to capital or labor.”  The concept of comprehensive income 




administratively realistic tax base” (Surrey, 1973: Surrey and McDaniel, 1985: and 
Thuronyi, 1988).   
 While refinements to the comprehensive income tax are necessary for its 
practical application, these refinements open the door to controversy.  In the end, under 
the normal tax, the determination of what is a tax expenditure is based on a concept of 
income that is larger in scope than what is defined by the federal income tax system, but 
narrower than a pure economic definition of income i.e. comprehensive H-S income 
(JCT, 2008).  Table 8.2 provides examples of differences between tax expenditures using 
the comprehensive income baseline versus the normal income tax baseline.  The bottom 
line is that while the H-S income definition is not the sole basis for defining normal 
income, its limitations as a definitional starting point and the necessary refinements made 
to address these limitations blurs definitional lines and disagreement remains about how 





Table 8.2 Selected Differences of Tax Expenditures Based on Comprehensive Income 
Baseline Compared to Normal Income Tax Baseline 
 
Source: Table compiled by author based on information and discussion included in GAO, 1979, 
2005c and OMB 2009. 
Surrey’s claims to “consensus opinion” on the appropriate parameters of an 
accepted tax structure have done little to satisfy critics.  My review of federal tax 
expenditure reporting over the past 50 years as well as the extensive academic and 
government literature on the subject reveals persistent and on-going debate about both the 
choice of H-S comprehensive income as a starting point and the adjustments made to it to 
 
Item  Tax expenditure 
relative to H-S income 
baseline 
Tax expenditure 
relative to normal 
income baseline 
Corporate Income tax  Unresolved a No 
Unrealized capital gains  Yes No 
Imputed income such as imputed rent 
from housing  
Yes  Treasury – yes  
JCT- no  
Imputed income such as imputed services 
from consumer durable goods 
Yes No 
Value of all goods and services (e.g.  free 
lunch) 
Yes No 
Value of (many) services received from 
state and local governments 
Yes No 




Gifts  Yes No 
Foreign income   Unresolved b No 
Standard deductions Unresolved c No 
Personal exemptions Unresolved c No 
 
a   Treatment corporate income is an area of debate.  Under a comprehensive income tax 
structure, income is to be taxed only once, suggesting that the H-S definition might call 
for an integration of individual and corporate tax structures.  Thus, separate corporate tax 
might be defined as negative tax expenditure.  Under the normal tax, the separate tax 
corporate structure is included in the tax structure because it is “accepted” as part of U.S. 
tax system.  However, some researchers and policy participants argue that neither 
economic theory nor common international practices justifies a separate corporate 
income tax (JCT, 2008 and OMB, 1987).    
b OMB (2009) notes that the foreign tax credit might be included as a tax expenditure 
under comprehensive income baseline.   






construct the normal income baseline.  Several key areas highlighted in the literature 
include:  
(1) the comprehensive income definition does not address some key structural 
issues necessary to define a tax system;  
(2) the comprehensive income definition is ambiguous about the treatment of 
certain tax items or its application is not practical; and  
(3)  the deviations made from comprehensive income tax are subjective and there 
are inconsistencies in the treatment of similar items (Bittker, 1969a, 1969b, 
and Thuronyi, 1988).    
 
To define a baseline income tax system, many structural issues,302 many of which 
are not fully addressed by the comprehensive income definition, must be decided.  Bittker 
again provided one of the first and most critical attacks along these lines, arguing that 
while the H-S definition might be a plausible starting point “… any system of income 
taxation is an aggregation of decisions about a host of structural issues that the Haig- 
Simon’s definition does not even purport to settle” (Bittker, 1969a, p. 260).   Similarly, 
Thuronyi (1988) argues that H-S definition is “ambiguous or silent” about some of a tax 
system’s basic features.   
                                                          
302 Examples of structural issues that a tax system must address include: the tax rate structure, the 
taxable unit, the basis for accounting, and the accounting period.  It must also determine how to 
define and tax certain legal entities, such as corporations and how to deal with transactions across 





In the absence of normative principles to guide decisions on structural issues, 
critics point to inconsistencies in the treatment of similar items.  As an example, the 
personal exemption303 and special rates applicable to married couples and heads of 
households are accepted as part of the normal income tax structure, based on the concept 
of ability to pay.  However, Bittker (1969a) and others pointed out that similar provisions 
are not treated in a similar manner.  Bittker (1969a) argued that the extra exemption for 
taxpayers who are blind or over 65 (which is classified as a tax expenditure) might 
arguably also be classified as structural provisions based on the ability to pay concept 
(Andrews, 1972 and Bittker, 1969a, 1969b).  Buckley (2011) pointed out that the foreign 
tax credit is not considered a tax expenditure because it is a structural feature of the tax 
system aimed at preventing double taxation, but the deduction for state and local income 
taxes is classified as a tax expenditure even though its legislative history indicates its 
policy rationale also is to avoid double taxation.  Toder (2003) pointed to the inconsistent 
treatment two provisions that deal with the time value of money -- accelerated 
depreciation of investments and the treatment of capital gains.  Accelerated depreciation 
is not included in the normal tax structure and is reported as a tax expenditure while the 
exclusion of unrealized capital gains is included in the normal tax structure and is not 
reported as a tax expenditure (Burman, 2003).   
For other tax provisions, the H-S income definition is fairly clear about whether 
the provisions should be considered income, but adjustments must be made to deal with 
practical, administrative, or political considerations.  One widely-cited example is the 
                                                          
303 Personal exemptions provide that only a person’s income above some defined basic level is 
subject to tax. The personal exemption has been part of the federal income tax system since its 




value of the use of owner-occupied homes.  Under a comprehensive definition of income, 
the amount of rent one would have had to pay or the “imputed rental value” would be 
considered income and the exclusion of this income would be a tax expenditure (GAO, 
1979 and OMB, 1987).  Prior to the fiscal year 2006, the budget did not include the 
exclusion of net implicit rental income on owner-occupied housing as a tax expenditure 
citing conceptual and estimation difficulties.  However, beginning with the fiscal year 
2006 budget, the Treasury added a tax expenditure for the net imputed rental income 
from owner-occupied housing (OMB, 2004, 2005).  304,305 JCT has never included a tax 
expenditure for the exclusion of imputed income from owner-occupied home and other 
durable goods citing administrative difficulty in measuring income (JCT 2008).  The 
estimate of foregone revenue for the exclusion of imputed rental income is significant, 
estimated at $101 billion for fiscal year 2016 and $1.2 trillion for 2016-2025.  If a budget 
decision rule were established treatment of this provision as a tax expenditure would 
likely be controversial given its abstract nature and significant budget impact.   
                                                          
304 The treatment of the imputed income for owner-occupied housing is a technical and 
controversial issue. Prior to the fiscal year 2006, the President’s budget did not include the 
exclusion of net implicit rental income on owner-occupied housing as a tax expenditure citing 
conceptual and estimation difficulties. It did include the deductions for mortgage interest and 
property taxes on owner occupied housing as tax expenditures (OMB, 2005).  In the fiscal year 
2006 budget, the Administration argued that while the tax expenditures for the deductions for 
mortgage interest and property taxes were legitimate given the current law’s failure to impute 
rental income, they were “…highly flawed as estimates of the total tax advantage to housing…” 
(p. 356).  Beginning with the fiscal year 2006 budget and continuing today, the tax expenditure 
list included in the President’s budget has reported as tax expenditures for both the exclusion of 
net imputed rental income of homeowners and the deductions for mortgage interest and property 
taxes (OMB, 2005).  
305 This estimate combines the positive tax expenditure for the failure to impute rental income 
with the negative tax expenditure for the failure to allow a deduction for deprecation and other 





Treatment of the realization of capital gains also differs under normal income 
versus comprehensive income.  Under a comprehensive income definition, increases in 
the value of assets (such as real estate and stocks) are considered income when the 
increase in value occurs, even if gain is not realized thought a market transaction.  Thus, 
under the comprehensive income structure, the exclusion of these unrealized gains would 
be classified as a tax expenditure.  Conversely, under the normal income structure, the 
exclusion of unrealized gains is not classified as a tax expenditure.  This adjustment was 
made due to the political and practical constraints of taxing income which has yet to be 
realized.   
The treatment of gifts and similar transactions is another area where there are 
differences in treatment.  Under the comprehensive income definition, gifts between 
individuals would be included in taxable income and their exclusion would be classified 
as a tax expenditure.  In contrast, under the normal income structure, gifts are not 
considered taxable income and their exclusion is not classified as a tax expenditure.306   
The ambiguities and complexities associated with the treatment of certain 
provisions under the comprehensive income definition carryover to the normal income 
definition.  The treatment of deductions for charitable contributions provides an example.  
Under a comprehensive income baseline, if charitable donations are considered 
consumption they would be included in the income base and considered a tax 
                                                          
306 This matter is further complicated by inconsistencies in the treatment of other tax provisions 
that are similar to gifts (GAO, 1979). For example, under the normal tax, fellowships and 
scholarships as well as some social security payments are considered income and thus their 
exclusions from taxable income are considered tax expenditures. As further indication of 
judgment involved, Treasury did not include the exclusion of fellowships and scholarships from 
income as a tax expenditure in fiscal years 1982 and 1983, but then resumed reporting it as tax 





expenditure.  However, if charitable donations are considered a transfer of purchasing 
power they would represent a reduction in the giver’s wealth.  As such, they would not be 
considered a tax expenditure.  While the treatment of the deduction of charitable 
donations under a comprehensive income baseline, is unclear, both Treasury and JCT 
include it as a tax expenditure based on normal income.   
Over time, the Treasury has revised its treatment of some significant and 
controversial tax expenditure provisions.  Prior to the fiscal year 2004 budget, the tax 
expenditure for accelerated depreciation under the normal tax approach was calculated 
based on an historical cost using a straight-line methodology with relatively long-
recovery periods (OMB, 2003).  Beginning with the fiscal year 2004 budget, the tax 
expenditures for accelerated depreciation has used a revised baseline depreciation rates 
and replacement cost indexes drawn from the National Income and Product Accounts.  
The new revised estimates differ significantly and are generally lower than under the old 
methodology (OMB, 2003).    
In terms of understanding budget rule development, an important consideration is 
the practical implications of these theoretical debates on identification of tax expenditures 
to be included under a budget decision rule.  The obstacles created these definitional 
debates to the establishment of a workable and sustainable budget rule depends in part on 
the tax provisions affected i.e. the budget amounts and stakeholders involved.  The larger 
the budget or political costs associated with provisions under question, the more likely for 
controversy about the design and implementation of the budget decision rule.   
As noted by other researchers, previous OMB reporting provides some useful 




OMB included discussions of tax expenditures relative to the comprehensive income 
baseline in appendices to its official tax expenditure presentations.307Under a 
comprehensive income baseline, many large tax expenditures would continue to be tax 
expenditures, but some would not.  OMB considered the treatment of 30 large tax 
expenditures for fiscal year 2009 and found 15 of the 30 provisions would continue to be 
classified as tax expenditures under a comprehensive income tax baseline (OMB, 2008, 
pp. 315-318).  OMB describes the classification of the other 15 provisions as possibly not 
being classified as tax expenditures.  Of these, OMB describes only one – the exception 
for passive loss rules for $25, 000 of rental loss – as probably not be a tax expenditure 
relative to a comprehensive income baseline.  OMB classified 8 of the remaining 14 
provisions as “possibly” tax expenditures relative to the comprehensive income tax 
baseline but noted that they raise difficult conceptual issues or inconsistencies (OMB 
2009).  OMB described the classification of the remaining 6 provisions relative to 
comprehensive income tax baseline as “even less certain.” In addition, OMB notes some 
significant provisions currently not included as tax expenditures would be included as tax 
expenditures relative to the comprehensive income tax baseline.308 Further illustrating the 
judgment involved, my comparison between the presentation in the fiscal year 2009 and 
the fiscal year 2004 budgets found that two significant provisions were reclassified from 
                                                          
307 Other researchers have used these OMB appendices on alternative baselines to consider the 
implications associated with the choice tax baseline used to determine tax expenditures (see 
Bartlett, 2001 and Burman, 2003).   
308 These included imputed return on certain consumer durables; unrealized capital gains (losses); 
private gifts and inheritance; in-kind government benefits; and the value of benefits received by 




the “probably not included” to the “probably included” categories309 (OMB, 2008 and  
OMB, 2003).   
 Despite all the controversy about the appropriate baseline for identifying tax 
expenditures both the JCT and Treasury, with limited exceptions, have consistently 
reported tax expenditures relative to a normal income tax baseline.  As discussed below, 
the President’s budget now the reports tax expenditures relative to two baselines, one of 
which is the normal tax baseline.  310 The JCT – except for a short-lived 2008 revision311 
-- has used a fairly consistent definition of normal tax (JCT, 2008).   
 Because the normal tax baseline used in identifying tax expenditures is not 
defined in law or based on a bright-line standard, JCT and Treasury staff must rely on 
professional judgment to determine it (JCT, 2008).  While both organizations present tax 
expenditures relative to a normal tax baseline, there are some differences in the way they 
define the normal tax baseline.  In general, the JCT’s methodology involves a broader 
definition of normal income than that used by Treasury includes some provisions that are 
not on the Treasury’s list (JCT, 2013).  There are also some items included on Treasury’s 
list but included not on the JCT’s list.  The fiscal year 2016 budget listed 169 tax 
expenditures while the JCT’s tax expenditure report issued in February 2015 included 
about 260 tax expenditures.312   
                                                          
309 These include (1) deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes and (2) 
deductibility of state and local property tax on owner-occupied homes, with foregone revenue 
estimates for fiscal year 2012 of $81.9 billion and $15.4 billion, respectively.  
310 As discussed below, for fiscal years 1983 and 1984, the President’s budget reported tax 
expenditures based on an alternative baseline, referred to as the reference tax.  Since 1985, the 
President ‘s budget has reported tax expenditures relative to two baselines, one of which is the 
normal tax baseline.   
311The JCT significant revised its baseline in 2008, but then reversed itself and returned to its 
traditional methodology in 2010.  




Understanding the differences between the JCT and Treasury lists is complicated, 
however, because they combine some tax expenditure items differently; use different 
thresholds for determining de minimis items; and describe some tax expenditures 
differently.  For example, Treasury displays tax expenditure estimates for capital gains 
and dividends for different activities and taxpayers separately while JCT combines them.  
With these caveats in mind, a comparison of the reported lists provides some insights into 
the degree of consensus achieved and the extent and the magnitude of disputed items.   
For several years, the JCT tax expenditure publications included a list of tax 
provisions that did not overlap between the Treasury list and the JCT list.313An 
examination of JCT’s list of non-overlapping items published in 2006 (the last available) 
shows significant overlap (greater than 80%) between the JCT and Treasury lists (JCT, 
2008).  314 JCT identifies 28 items that are on its list, but not the Treasury list and 14 
items that are included on the Treasury list that are not on the JCT list.  Of the 14 items 
on the Treasury list, but not included on the JCT list 9 are de minimis by JCT’s higher 
threshold.   
While most of non-over-lapping provisions are fairly-narrow, a few involve 
significant foregone revenues or politically sensitive items.  Further, the differences 
between the lists as well and changes in reporting indicate the level of judgment involved 
in defining tax expenditures.  Until recently, the JCT included tax expenditures for the 
exclusions of untaxed Medicare benefits for hospital insurance, supplemental medical 
insurance, and prescription insurance.  Treasury does not include these provisions as tax 
                                                          
313 JCT’s listing of the specific non-overlapping provisions was discontinued in its 2007 report.   
314 A similar analysis is included in Fleming and Peroni (2008) with similar, but with similar but 




expenditures.  The last time JCT included these exclusions, they had a combined 
foregone revenue estimate of $350 billion for fiscal years 2014-2018 (Altshuler and 
Dietz, 2011; JCT, 2006, 2014; and OMB, 2015a).315 Beginning with its 2015 report, the 
JCT opted not to include the Medicare provisions as tax expenditures.316 As discussed 
above, the exclusion of net imputed income for owner-occupied homes appears in the 
President’s budget, but in JCT’s report.317 For years, the deferral of gains on like-kind 
exchanges, a provision which has received significant political attention, was reported by 
JCT, but not by Treasury.  Treasury recently began reporting this tax expenditure with 
estimated foregone revenues for this provision as $92.2 billion over the fiscal year 2016-
2025 budget window (OMB, 2016, p. 243).   
The considerable overlap between the two lists suggest that sufficient consensus 
has been achieved on defining normal income to be make the tax expenditure lists useful 
as an analytical tool, especially when areas of conceptual and definitional differences are 
discussed.  As argued by Fleming and Peroni (2008):    
“This large area of common ground demonstrates that such definitional disputes 
are largely at the margins and that TEA has a settled core that make it a useful 
                                                          
315 $181 billion for Medicare Hospital Insurance, $128 billion for Medicare Supplemental 
Insurance, and $41 billion for Medicare Prescription Drug Insurance.   
316 JCT (2015) explained that it had historically include tax expenditures for some items for which 
no provision in federal tax law specifically allowing an exclusion.  However, beginning with its 
2015 publication the JCT adhered closer to the Budget act which defines tax expenditures as 
“revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax law (emphasis added) which provide 
a special exclusion, exemption, deduction from grow income or which provide a special credit, a 
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” There is no provision for the exclusion of 
Medicare benefits from income so JCT determine it would no longer include them as tax 
expenditures.  JCT also stopped reporting other tax expenditures citing the same issue, including 
the exclusion of: (1) investment income on life insurance and annuity contracts and (2) cash 
public assistance.    
317 This exclusion is not shown on JCT’s 2006 list of non-overlapping items but is currently 
included Treasury’s tax expenditure list and not JCT’s list. Treasury’s estimate of foregone 




analytical tool, notwithstanding the intense criticism that is has endured” (p. 
519).  
While reporting of different tax expenditures by JCT and OMB318 is workable, 
perhaps, even beneficial, as an analytical tool, the establishment of tax expenditure 
specific budget rules requires a choice about whether to include provisions that are not 
included on both lists and how to settle definitional differences.  Although the differences 
in the classification as tax expenditures involve a relatively small number of provisions 
and, in most cases, involve relatively small amounts, some of the affected provisions 
involve significant budgetary amounts or politically sensitive issues.  These larger and 
more controversial provisions increase the potential for controversy, especially if they 
were used as the basis for budget allocation and control purposes.   
The combination of lack of clear definitional parameters and the high stakes of 
the budget process increase the challenge of establishing a workable and sustainable 
budget rule.  JCT (2008) noted that “...  the “normal” tax is largely a commonsense 
extension (and cleansing) of current tax policies, not a rigorous framework developed 
from first principles” (p. 7). Thuronyi (1988) argues that the compromises made to apply 
the H-S income definition to the real world “… have made the idea of a normative 
income tax so inherently subjective that it deprives the tax expenditure concept of its 
persuasive force.” (p. 1155). OMB (2003) notes that deviations from comprehensive 
income to construct the normal tax “inject a degree of subjectivity that can limit the value 
of the underlying analysis” (p. 96).  These areas of conceptual and definitional ambiguity 
and controversy about the income baseline used to identify tax expenditures are barriers 
to the establishment and implementation of workable and sustained budget decision rule.   
                                                          




   
Attempts to decouple the tax expenditure concept from the normal tax 
structure. 
In response to persistent controversies about the baseline tax structure, some have 
suggested that the tax expenditure concept be redefined without reference to a normative 
tax structure.  While reformulations aim to clarify the tax expenditure concept, none fully 
address the subjectivity argument leveled against Surrey’s original formulation of the 
concept.   
Alternative formulations of the tax expenditure concept began to emerge shortly 
after the enactment of the CBA.  Blum argued that some tax provisions are “…clearly 
designed to accomplish a social or economic goal that is not related to the tax system” 
and a provision in this category “is correctly viewed as a tax expenditure … not because 
of any normative judgments about the proper contours of the income tax, but because it is 
universally conceded to be an incentive measure that has no tax justification (as cited in 
Thuronyi, 1988, p. 168).  Arguing that the tax expenditure budget rests on a “shaky 
foundation” Goode (1977) suggested “… a narrower tabulation including only those 
provisions for which there is evidence in the legislative history that the dominant 
motivation was to encourage or reward certain behavior or to compensate for a 
particular hardship by reducing income tax liability” (p.28).  McIntyre (1980) argued 
that the focus should be on whether the tax provisions were enacted to serve nontax 
purposes.  Under his approach, “…the bare assertion that the tax rule under examination 
promotes a spending goal” would trigger a tax expenditure (p. 100).  Thuronyi (1988) 




tax provisions that could be achieved as effectively by a nontax federal program (JCT, 
2008 and Thuronyi, 1988, p. 1156).  While these approaches have stimulated significant 
academic debate, none has resulted in legislative proposals. 
The 1980’s work of Seymour Fiekowsky, Assistant Director of the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s Office of Tax Analysis, laid the foundation for a significant change in 
Treasury’s tax expenditure reporting.  Fiekowsky argued that the primary focus should be 
on whether a tax provision could be substituted by a direct expenditure (Fiekowsky, 
1980; Fleming and Peroni, 2010; JCT, 2008; and Thuronyi, 1988).  Under Fiekowsky’s 
approach, tax expenditures, or “tax subsidies” as he referred to them, would be limited to 
those provisions that satisfy both of the following criteria:  
1. Absent the particular provisions, does the existing tax law provide a general 
rule by which the results of the transaction would determine the transactor’s 
liability?   
 
2. If the answer to question one is affirmative, is it possible to formulate an 
expenditure program administrable by a cognizant government agency that 
would achieve the same objective at equal, higher, or lower budgetary costs?  
(Fiekowsky, 1980, as cited in JCT, 2008, p. 30, and Thuronyi, 1988, pp. 1182-
1183)319 
 
                                                          
319 Using this approach, the tax expenditure list would have been narrower than those published at 
the time by either Treasury or JCT.  For example, Fiekowsky’s approach would have excluded 
accelerated depreciation as a tax expenditure, arguing that there is no general depreciation rule in 
its absence. It also would have excluded capital gains as a tax expenditure, arguing that because it 
applies to a broad class of taxpayers and activities it could not practically be replaced with direct 




In addition to the “tax subsidies” (tax expenditures) category, Fiekowsky’s 
approach included another category “tax policy” or “tax-structural issues.” This category 
would have included provisions with important tax policy consequences which are not 
“tax subsidies” 320 (Fiekowsky, 1980, as cited in JCT, 2008, p. 30).   
Beginning with the fiscal year 1983 budget and continuing today, the Treasury 
has used an approach somewhat similar to Fiekowky’s, referring to the approach as the 
“reference tax” baseline.321 Under this baseline, tax expenditures are “...limited to 
exceptions from a generally provided tax rule that serve programmatic functions in a way 
that is analogous to spending programs” (OMB, 2016, p. 226).  The reference tax 
baseline is based on two criteria: (1) the provision must be special in that it applies to a 
narrow class of transactions or taxpayers and (2) there must be a general provision to 
which the special provision is a clear exception (OMB, 1983).  OMB argued that if these 
two conditions are satisfied, the tax provision clearly has the characteristics of a direct 
expenditure program, including: (1) a program objective and (2) a method of reimbursing 
program costs (OMB, 1982, p. 5).   
Again, in terms of budget rule development, it is important to consider the 
differences in reported tax expenditures.  For the most part, tax expenditures are similar 
under the two baselines.  OMB notes that provisions considered tax expenditures under 
                                                          
320 Either because: (1) there is no clear general rule to which they are an exception or (2) because 
it was not considered feasible to formulate a direct expenditure program to replace the tax 
provision (Fiekowsky, 1980 and JCT, 2008).   
321 For fiscal year 1983 and fiscal year 1984, the President’s budgets presented tax expenditure 
list only relative to the reference tax baseline, increasing the differences between its list and the 
JCT list.  Beginning in fiscal year 1985 and continuing today, the President’s budget has reported 
tax expenditures relative to both the normal tax and the reference tax baselines.  With the 
exception of the limited period involving the 2008 revision, the JCT has reported tax expenditures 




the reference tax baseline are generally included as tax expenditures under the normal tax 
baseline, but the reverse is not always true (OMB, 2015a).  The tax expenditure listing in 
the Fiscal Year 2017 Analytical Perspectives, shows only 9 of the 169 tax expenditures 
are included based on the normal tax method, but excluded relative to the reference tax 
baseline (OMB, 2016).   
While only a small number of provisions are affected, some involve significant 
budget amounts, as shown in Table 8.3.  The most significant in terms of estimated 
foregone revenue over the fiscal year 2016-2025 budget window are: (1) the deferral of 
income from controlled foreign corporations ($853 billion) and (2) accelerated 
depreciation on machinery and equipment ($353 billion) (OMB, 2016, pp. 228-229).  
When ranked by projected revenue effects, these are among the largest tax expenditures.  
As with other differences in reporting, both baselines can be used as analytical tools, but 
the establishment of a budget decision rule would require determining which baseline to 




Table 8.3 Tax Expenditures Included Relative to the Normal Tax Baseline,  
but Excluded Relative to the Reference Tax 
 
Tax Provision Estimate 
FY 2016-2025 
(in Billions) 
Deferral of tax on income from controlled foreign 
corporations (CFCs)322 
 $852.6 
Accelerated depreciation on machinery and equipment323  $353.3 
Accelerated depreciation on rental housing $51.7 
Accelerated depreciation on buildings other than rental 
housing 
$-116.8 
Expensing of research and development expenditures324   $73.4 
Graduated corporate income rate325    $37.1 
Exclusion of scholarship and fellowship income    $37.5 
Expensing of certain small investments     $8.7 
Exclusion of public assistance benefits 326    $6.5 
Source:  Author compiled table from information included in Analytical Perspectives, Budget of 
United States, Fiscal Year 2017, Table 14-1 (pp. 228-232). 
                                                          
322 While both baselines allow a tax credit for foreign income taxes paid, under the normal tax 
baseline, CFCs are not regarded as entities separate from their controlling U.S. shareholders. As a 
result, the deferral of tax on income received from CFCs is a tax expenditure relative to the 
normal tax method.  Under the reference tax baseline, CFCs are considered separate entities 
whose income is not subject to U.S. tax until it is realized (distributed to U.S. taxpayers).  As a 
result, the deferral of tax on income received by CFCs is not a tax expenditure relative to the 
reference tax baseline (OMB, 2015a and Shepperd, 1984).   
323 Under the normal tax baseline, depreciation in excess of straight-line deprecation is treated as 
a tax expenditure. Under the reference tax baseline, no tax expenditure arises from accelerated 
depreciation based on the argument that absence the ACRS (Accelerated Cost Recovery System) 
provisions there is no general rule to which ACRS is an exception (OMB, 1982). 
324 Relative to the normal income baseline, the expensing of research and development (R&D) 
expenditures is included as a tax expenditure following the comprehensive income principle that 
these types of expenses should be capitalized and amortized.  However, the reference tax baseline 
includes R&D expenses citing a lack of clarity about the appropriate amortization period and the 
expensing of these items under general accounting principles.  As result, relative to the reference 
tax baseline, the expensing of R&D expenditures is not included as a tax expenditure.  
325 Separate tax rate schedules for various taxpaying units are included in the both the normal tax 
and reference tax baselines. However, by convention, the normal tax baseline specifies the current 
maximum rates as the baseline for the corporate income tax and thus includes corporate tax rates 
below the maximum as a tax expenditure. Under the reference tax baseline, corporate tax rates 
below the maximum rate do not give rise to a tax expenditure. 
326 Under the reference tax baseline, government transfers to private individuals (with the 
exception of Social Security) are not included as income and thus their exemptions are not 




In 2008, responding to criticism about the tax expenditure concept, the JCT 
revised its methodology for identifying tax expenditures.  The revised approach sought to 
decouple the identification of tax expenditures from the normal income baseline.  CT 
acknowledged that it revised approach built loosely on Fiekowsky’s work and resembled 
Treasury’s reference tax approach.327,328  At the time, JCT emphasized that while the 
revised approach covered many of the same provisions as its traditional approach it does 
so “without relying on the hypothetical “normal” tax to determine what constitutes a tax 
expenditure and without holding up that “normal” tax as implicit criticism of present 
law” (JCT, 2008).  The JCT, however, reversed its decision in 2010 and returned to its 
traditional analysis based on the normal tax.  It explained “…[g]iven the similarity of the 
two approaches, the generally more expansive list of provisions identified relative to the 
normal income tax baseline, and continuity with the historical approach of the Joint 
Committee staff since 1972, this pamphlet resumes implementation of the tax expenditure 
concept under a normal income…” (JCT, 2010, p. 10).   
Although the various reformulations of the tax expenditure concept are not 
dependent on defining a normative tax baseline, they still require interpretations and 
judgments in determining what constitutes a tax expenditure.  Depending on the 
                                                          
327 The approach divided tax expenditures into two categories: (1) “tax subsidies” and (2) “tax-
induced structural distortions.” A tax subsidy was described as “a specific tax provision that is 
deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a 
hypothetical “normal” tax) and that collects less revenue than does the general rule” (JCT, 
2008).  “Tax-induced structural distortions” were described as “structural elements of the 
Internal Revenue Code (not deviations from any clearly identifiable general tax rule and thus not 
Tax Subsidies) that materially affect economic decisions in a manner that imposes substantial 
economic efficiency effects” (JCT, 2008).  
328 In addition, the revised JCT approach identified “negative tax subsidies,” described as 
provisions that increase the tax burden above what a general rule would impose (JCT, 2008). 
Negative tax expenditures refer to tax provisions which result in a penalty from inclusion of more 




approach, judgments are required to determine whether a tax provision is, for example: 
“substitutable;” “…clearly designed to accomplish a social or economic goal that is not 
related to the tax system;” or “promotes spending goals” (Fleming and Peroni, 2010 and 
Thuronyi, 1988).329 Thus, these alternative formulations of the tax expenditure concept 
do not fully avoid the criticisms about the subjective nature of the tax expenditure 
concept based on the normal tax. 
The above debates foreshadow the potential for conflict on which tax provisions 
would be identified as tax expenditures under tax expenditure specific budget rules.  The 
controversy surrounding OMB’s adoption of the reference tax baseline provides an 
example.  In introducing the reference tax baseline, OMB (1982) took the position that 
the tax expenditure concept was flawed, arguing, that “[t]he very term tax expenditure is 
misleading in several respects and there are formidable difficulties in trying to define the 
underlying concept” (p. 1). Critics of OMB’s adoption of the reference tax baseline, 
however, viewed it as politically motivated and resulting in a subjective, inconsistent 
approach that failed to comply with CBA requirements.  Specifically, in discussing the 
treatment of the ACRS, McDaniel and Surrey (1982) argue “one can only conclude that 
with respect to the ACRS political pressure simply overwhelmed the technicians” (p. 
603). This type of controversy illustrates how debate about baseline tax structure reflects 
and becomes intertwined with the tax politics and policy. 
 
                                                          
329 Another example of the definitional challenges is the differing opinions on what might be 
included in a reference tax structure. For example, the Treasury’s tax expenditure list relative to a 
reference tax baseline includes the preferential treatment of capital gains as a tax expenditure 





 Estimation of foregone revenues also presents challenge for budget rules.     
The challenges do not stop once tax expenditures are identified.  Measuring their 
costs raises significant complexities and uncertainty.  The primary cost measure for tax 
expenditures, as required by the CBA, is a measure of revenue loss commonly referred to 
as foregone revenues (also referred to as revenue loss or revenue effects).  Foregone 
revenues provide an estimate of how much higher tax liabilities would be if a tax 
expenditure did not exist.  It is calculated for each tax expenditure separately as the 
difference between: (1) the tax liability without the single tax expenditure and (2) the tax 
liability under current law.   
In considering the use of foregone revenue estimates for budget rules, it is 
important to recognize that they differ from revenue and outlay estimates.  An estimate of 
foregone revenue is measured separately for each tax expenditure, assuming the rest of 
the tax code remains unchanged (GAO, 2005e).  Because possible interaction effects 
among tax provisions are not accounted for totaling these estimates may be misleading – 
the sum of revenue losses for tax expenditures measured separately may differ from the 
revenue loss from eliminating tax expenditures simultaneously.  330  
The magnitude of the difference is not known, but existing research provides 
some insights.  Research indicates: (1) tax expenditure estimates for multiple exclusions 
could be more than the sum of those tax expenditures for a given progressive rate 
structure and (2) tax expenditure estimates for multiple itemized deductions could be less 
than the sum of those deductions given the standard deduction (Burman, Toder, and 
                                                          
330 As noted earlier, even with these caveats CRS, GAO, and other researchers state the belief that 




Geissler, 2008 and Russo, 2012) 331 GAO (2005e) notes that eliminating several itemized 
deduction at the same time could cause a significant number of taxpayers to take the 
standard deduction which would reduce the revenue loss below what the sum of the 
estimated foregone revenues for each itemized deduction.332  
The imprecision associated with totaling foregone revenue estimates create 
challenges for budget decision rules aimed at controlling or limiting aggregated tax 
expenditures.  During congressional testimony on budget rules for tax expenditures, CBO 
Director, Rivlin cautioned that “…any limit on the total amount of tax expenditures must 
confront the fact the total itself is a somewhat artificial number” (Rivlin, 1981a, p. 9). 
She explained:   
 
“… Interactions can be taken into account if a limited number of tax expenditures 
are considered, but the calculation becomes increasingly more artificial as more 
items are included.  Including all tax expenditures and taking into account all of 
the interactions would require constructing a wholly new tax system without tax 
expenditures.  While it could be done, it would require making a large number of 
probably controversial assumptions.  In the end, it would still be no more than an 
idealized abstraction.  It would never have the reality that total budget outlays 
and revenues do [emphasis added]” (Rivlin, 1981a, p. 7).  
 
 Similarly, the 1968 Treasury report notes “an effort to take this interaction into 
account in the estimates of separate items would require arbitrary decisions as to which 
provision were taken into account before other provisions” (Treasury, 1968, p. 338).  
                                                          
331 The difference between the sum of the individual estimates and the estimate for all tax 
expenditure calculated simultaneously is not known, but some researchers, including Burman, 
Toder, and Geissler (2008), have tried to provide an idea of the magnitude.   
332 GAO (2005e) reported that analysis by the Treasury of five itemized deductions found about a 
25 percent difference between the sum of individual estimates ($175 billion) and the estimate of 
revenue loss assuming simultaneous repeal and interaction ($131 billion). According to GAO, the 
Treasury stated that this example cannot be generalized given that groups of tax provisions have 




However, Rivlin also noted the potential for careful budget rule design to help mitigate 
these problems.  Rivlin (1981c) testified that if a budget rule was based on incremental 
changes in aggregate tax expenditures many of the problems associated with summing 
tax expenditures could be reduced (Rivlin, 1981 and H.R.  4882, 1981).   
 Budget rules focused on recognizing and controlling tax expenditures separately, 
rather than by aggregated totals, also face cost estimation issues.  Foregone revenue 
estimates focus only on tax form behavior (Russco, 2012).  Unlike revenue estimates, 
they do not incorporate behavioral responses that are anticipated from the change.333 As a 
result, foregone revenue estimates provide information on the “general magnitude” of 
federal “spending” occurring from tax expenditures, but do not represent the amount of 
revenue that would be gained if a tax expenditure was repealed because the repeal would 
probably trigger behavioral responses that affect other federal spending or revenue 
(GAO, 2005e and OMB, 2002).334  
Further, although both the Treasury and JCT estimate foregone revenues they use 
somewhat different methodologies.  JCT measures each tax expenditure as the difference 
between the tax liability under present law and the tax liability that would result if the tax 
expenditure provision was repealed, assuming that taxpayers were allowed to take 
advantage of any of the remaining tax expenditure provisions that apply to the income or 
the expense associated with the repealed tax expenditure (JCT, 2017).  Conversely, under 
                                                          
333 Revenue estimates fully reflect anticipated behavioral effects of the proposal under 
consideration, except that they usually do not include any macroeconomic growth effects from 
the proposal (JCT, 2008). 
334 Sunley (2004) pointed out the foregone revenue estimates do not equate to potential revenue 
increase from repeal because repeal of a tax expenditure may be prospective only thus reducing 






the Treasury’s methodology, each tax expenditure is measured by the difference between 
tax liability under present law and the tax liability that would result if the tax expenditure 
provision was repealed, assuming taxpayers were prohibited from taking advantage of 
any of the remaining tax expenditures provisions that apply to the income or expenses 
associated with the repealed tax expenditure (JCT, 2017).  Treasury and JCT estimates 
also differ due to difference in data sources, baseline projections, and presentation (JCT, 
2017).335 Table 8.4 compares the fiscal year 2015 foregone revenue estimates for several 
tax expenditures included in both the President’s budget (normal tax baseline) and the 
JCT lists.    
                                                          
335 For example, the macroeconomic assumptions used differ.  JCT uses CBO assumptions which 
constructs it baseline projections using methods specified in the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985.  Treasury bases it assumption on OMB and Council of Economic 




Table 8.4 Treasury and JCT Estimates, Examples of Differences 
Treasury (OTA) 
Fiscal Year 2017 Budget 





(in billions)  
Exclusion of employer 
contributions for medical 
insurance premiums and medical 
care  
$201.5  Exclusion of employer 
contributions for health 
care, health insurance 
premiums, and long-
term care insurance  
$145.5 $56 
Accelerated depreciation of 
machinery and equipment 
(normal tax method)  
-$7.5 Depreciation of 
equipment in excess of 
the alternative 
depreciation system  
-$28.2 $21 
Deductibility of mortgage 
interest on owner-occupied 
homes 
$58.8 Deduction of mortgage 
interest on owner-
occupied residences  
$71.0 -12.2 
Step up basis of capital gains at 
death  
$54.9 Exclusion of capital 
gains at death  
$32.4 $22.5 
Deduction for charitable 
contributions, other than 
education and health  
$40.9 Deduction for 
charitable 
contributions, other 




Source: Author based on data included in Table 16-1 in Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the 
United States, Fiscal Year 2017 (published in February 2016) and Table 1 in Estimates of 
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2015-2019 (Published December 2015) 
 
 
The difficulties inherent in estimating the cost of tax expenditures impede efforts 
to establish and implement budget rules for tax expenditures.  Policy participants express 
a wide range of views with respect to how significant these estimation issues are to the 
legitimacy and usefulness of the tax expenditure concept and its use in budget decision 
rules.  Experts disagree about both the magnitude of issue as well as feasibility of 
improving estimates.   
Some policy participants acknowledge the measurement challenges, but do not 
view them as insurmountable for the tax expenditure concept or its use as the basis of 





“…not one factor bears on the integrity of the estimates.  The estimates do tell us 
what is being spent through the tax system.  Obviously, they do not tell us what 
would be spent if several items including other provisions of the tax law were 
changed at the same time.  Spending as well as revenue estimates suffer from this 
law” (p. 35). 
 
Even more strongly, Surrey proclaims that concerns about estimation issues are “wrong 
and irrelevant.” He noted that budget resolutions, which some propose could be used to 
increase control of tax expenditures, are based on estimates of revenues and outlays.  
Burman (2011) and Roin (2003) argued that budget spending estimates also are limited 
by issues of baseline disputes, the use of static measures, and limited interaction effects 
among policies. 
 However, while many of the estimation issues for tax expenditures are similar to 
those faced for other revenue and spending estimates, there are some important 
differences, especially for budgeting purposes.  Direct expenditures (cash outlay 
estimates) involve estimation uncertainties, but these cost estimates eventually result in 
cash outlays that are tangible and measurable.  There is a tangible measure of actual costs 
that can be used to retroactively evaluate and improve estimates.  Estimates for tax 
expenditures are different in that the actual costs are never really known.  Unlike direct 
expenditures, tax expenditures not only must be estimated, using a “somewhat artificial 
set of assumptions and estimating conventions” but the results are never actually 
observed (Rivlin, 1981).  Aaron (1977), a supporter of the tax expenditure concept and its 
use in analysis argued:  
 
“… It is futile to dream of a “grand budget” that sums direct expenditures – a set 
of affirmative actions actually taken – and tax expenditures – a set of actions not 





Chairman Jones argued:    
 
First, and foremost, is the problem that tax expenditures are never observable; 
they are always an estimate of what “might have been,” of the revenues that 
would have been collected in the absence of the special tax provision in question.  
In this, they differ fundamentally from spending.  Outlays are also estimates 
before the fact, and these spending estimates, as has been pointed out, suffer 
many of the same uncertainties as estimates of tax expenditures.  But after the 
fact, when the books on spending are closed, the bean counters at OMB and CBO 
can count the beans...With tax expenditures we can never count the beans – only 
the might-have-been beans.  As a result, one cannot readily evaluate and improve 
the estimates.  Since the estimates therefore have to be accepted more upon faith 
than experience, it subjects the process to an extra burden of credibility (as cited 
in McDaniel and Surrey, 1982, p. 612).   
 
More recently, GAO (2005e) states, “projections of the future costs of tax 
expenditures are more uncertain than projections for future tax receipts or outlays 
because it is not known with certainty, even after the fact, how much was spent for any 
given tax expenditure” (p. 21).    
While a stated objective of tax expenditure reporting is to allow for better 
comparisons between tax expenditures and direct expenditures, determining the 
appropriate cost measure and presentational format is a challenge.  The traditional cost 
measure for tax expenditures – foregone revenues -- does not provide a precise estimate 
of revenue gains from repealing a tax expenditure and these estimates are not directly 
comparable to the budget’s cash outlays for direct expenditures.  To try to better support 
comparisons, the President’s budget, from fiscal year 1983 to fiscal year 2006, included 
outlay-equivalent estimates in addition to estimates of foregone revenues.336 An outlay-
equivalent estimate is an estimate of the direct subsidy (cash outlays) that would be 
required to provide the taxpayer the same after-tax income (benefit) as would be received 
                                                          




through the tax provision (OMB, 2004).  Outlay-equivalent estimates are estimated in a 
similar manner to foregone revenues, but they are “grossed up” to include the extra 
amount that would be paid in income tax from the beneficiary under a direct expenditure 
program (CBO, 1982b, and GAO, 2005e).337   
While it is unclear whether outlay-equivalent estimates helped improve cost 
comparisons, it is clear they added another layer of complexity and subjectivity.  Some 
observers argue that outlay-equivalent estimates increased confusion about tax 
expenditures and their costs (Mackie, 2012; McDaniel and Surrey, 1982 and Sunley, 
2004).  McDaniel and Surrey (1982) argued that outlay-equivalent estimates are 
“crucially dependent on the proper income tax treatment of the comparable direct 
subsidy.” Again, the issue of the how to define taxable income comes into play.  As 
explained by McDaniel and Surrey (1982), if the funds received under a program are 
included in taxable income then gross up is necessary.  However, if the program is not 
included in taxable income, the gross up is not included and the outlay-equivalent 
estimate and the foregone revenue estimate would be the same.  Thus, disagreement 
about what items are included in taxable income carryover to the outlay-equivalent 
estimates.   
Mackie (2012) noted that outlays equivalent raised difficult questions, such as 
how equivalent spending would be designed, and which would be taxed?  Sunley 
explained that “[e]xcept for specialized economists, most observers, have trouble 
understanding the counterfactuals assumed for each direct spending program and why 
                                                          
337 Tax subsidies provide by tax expenditures generally are not taxable.  However, direct benefit 
programs often provide benefits that are taxable.  Outlay equivalent estimates are used to make 
tax expenditures (which are not taxable) more comparable to taxable direct expenditure programs 




for certain tax expenditures the outlay equivalent and revenue foregone estimates are the 
same and for others they are not” (Sunley, 2004, p.164). GAO (2005e) noted that “… tax 
experts do not always agree on whether specific tax expenditures should be grossed up or 
not” (p. 97). In discontinuing the reporting of outlay equivalent cost estimates, OMB 
(2007) explained “…they were often the same as the normal tax expenditure estimates 
and the criteria for applying the concepts and when they should differ were often 
judgmental and hard to apply with consistency across time and across tax expenditure 
items” (p. 286, note 1). There is currently no measure that allows for direct comparison 
of direct expenditures and tax expenditures   
 
 Summary Observations and Thoughts  
Persistent controversies and disagreements in conceptual and definitional 
ambiguity create obstacles to the establishment and implementation of tax expenditure 
specific budget decision rules.  A lack of agreement about whether tax expenditures are 
government spending is central to the fight over using the concept in budget rules.  If it is 
accepted that tax expenditures are government spending, then a budget process that does 
not directly recognize and control these tax provisions would be deemed incomplete.  
However, for those who do not accept the premise that tax expenditures are spending, 
proposals to subject these tax provisions to “spending” controls are illogical.   
However, even when the conceptual logic and merits of the tax expenditure 
concept are accepted, significant definitional and estimation issues remain.  Identifying 
tax expenditures involves issues that are both technically complex and politically-




The bottom line is that the normal tax structure is largely a “hypothetical construct,” or 
“abstraction” rather than a clear standard for assessing what is and is not a tax 
expenditure (GAO, 2005e).  Further, addressing areas of conceptual ambiguity and a lack 
of definitional parameters is made more difficult because these issues are intertwined 
with unresolved, deeply-rooted ideological and political disagreements about fiscal policy 
issues and the role of government.  Debates over the tax baseline exemplify how a lack of 
consensus on broader policy and political issues may spill over into debate about the 
legitimacy and design of a budget decision rule.     
  Cost estimation challenges and uncertainty also has implications for the 
establishment, design, and implementation of budget decision rules for tax expenditures.  
Tax expenditure estimates of foregone revenue are never observable.  In this way, 
foregone revenue estimates differ from cash outlay estimates, which while also fraught 
with estimation uncertainty, can be retroactively tracked and reviewed for accuracy.  In 
the contentious world of budgeting, the lack of hindsight and accountability creates the 





Tax Expenditure, Trends, Policy, Politics, and Institutions  
 
The level and composition of tax expenditures sets the stage for considering the 
development of budget decision rules.  The objective and design of budget decision rules 
for tax expenditures needs to be considered in the context of: (1) significant built-in, 
automatic growth; (2) large, long-standing, and politically popular tax expenditures; (3) a 
proliferation of smaller, niched tax expenditures; and (4) increased use of refundable tax 
credits.  The relationship between tax rates and the value of tax expenditures also is 
another complicating factor.  This chapter examines trends in the level and composition 
of tax expenditures and then considers the implications of the politics and institutional 
structures on efforts to establish budget decision rules for tax expenditures.   
 
Tax Expenditure Costs Are Concentrated in a Relatively Few Provisions 
 The project revenue effects of tax expenditures are concentrated in a relatively 
few provisions.  Of the 169 tax expenditures listed in the President’s fiscal year 2017 
budget the 7 largest account for 50% of the total for fiscal year 2015; the 15 largest 
account for 75% of the total; and the 30 largest account for about 90% of the total.338 
Thus, for fiscal year 2015, less than 20% of tax expenditures reported in the President’s 
budget accounts for over 90% of the sum of projected revenue effects.      
The distribution of the projected revenue effects of tax expenditures over the 
fiscal year 2016-2025 budget horizon further illustrates this concentration (See Figures 
                                                          
338 The concentration of tax expenditure spending is also evident, but not as quite as strong in 
earlier years. For fiscal year 1974, the top quartile and top half accounts for 78% and 94% of 
foregone revenues, respectively.  For fiscal year 1995, the top quartile accounts for 90% of 




9.1 and 9.2).  Ranked by projected revenue effect, the top quartile of reported tax 
expenditures (42 of 169 tax expenditures) account of about 95% of the sum of projected 
revenue effects.  The top half (84 of 169 tax expenditures) account for virtually all 
(99.9%) of the total projected revenue effect.  Each of the tax expenditures in the bottom 
half (85 of 169 tax expenditures) has a minimal affect (.03 percent or less of the total 
projected revenue effect) or a negative revenue effect.339   
 
Figure 9.1 Distribution of Tax Expenditures, Projected Revenue Effect, 2016-2025 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on analysis of OMB data included in Analytical 
Perspectives, Budget of U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2017.   
 
                                                          
339 Negative tax expenditures are provisions that result in an increase, rather than a decrease, in 








0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Number of Tax expenditures 




Figure 9.2 Distribution of Tax Expenditures, Projected Revenue Effects, 2016-2026 
 
Source: Graph created by author based on analysis of OMB data including in Analytical 
Perspectives, Budget of U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2017.   
 
 
The largest tax expenditure -- the exclusion of employer contributions for medical 
insurance premiums and medical care – dominates with projected revenue effects of $2.7 
trillion, accounting for 16.2% of the total projected revenue effects.340 Each of the other 
tax expenditures in the top ten has projected revenue effects of more than $600 billion 
over the 10-year budget window.  In contrast, half of the tax expenditures each has 
projected revenue effects of less than $6 billion over the 10-year budget window.  Each 
tax expenditure in the bottom fifty has projected revenue effects of less than $1 billion or 
negative revenue effects over the ten-year budget horizon.   
                                                          
340 When the controversial tax expenditure for the exclusion of imputed rental income of owner-
occupied homes is dropped from the analyses, the exclusion of employer contributions for 
medical insurance premiums and medical care accounts for 17.3% of the total projected revenues. 
Treasury’s recent inclusion of a tax expenditure for imputed rental income of owner-occupied 
homes is based on a definitional change (not a tax policy) and this treatment remains 
controversial. The overall outcome and message of the analyses is the same regardless of whether 
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Table 9.1 list the top 30 tax expenditures, ranked by projected revenue effect, 
fiscal years 2016-2025.  These 30 tax expenditures account for 90% of the projected 
revenue effects for fiscal years 2016-2025.  As indicated in the table, I traced each tax 
expenditure to the first statutorily-required tax listing to determine if it was included in 
that listing.341 I compiled additional information on each tax expenditure’s originating 
provision(s) by examining JCT’s report prepared for the Senate Budget Committee, Tax 
Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions and related 
legislative histories (CRS, 2014).       
About two-thirds of the 30 largest tax expenditures are long-standing provisions 
that have survived CBA reporting requirements, the TRA 1986, and the enactment of 
PAYGO rules (Buckley, 2011; Neubig and Joulfanain, 1998; and Witte, 2017).  Seven 
can be traced to provisions included in the income tax code as established in 1913.  
Another 13 were traced to originating provisions enacted before the 1974 statutory 
requirement for tax expenditure reporting.   
The largest tax expenditure - the exclusion of employer contributions for medical 
insurance premiums and medical care – can be traced to the early-to-mid 1900s.  The 
exclusion of compensation from employer-provided accident and health plans originated 
in the Revenue Act of 1918, but the issue was not fully settled until a 1956 IRS ruling 
(CRS, 2014).  Since then, employer contributions to accident and health plans have been 
considered deductible expenses for employers and non-taxable compensation for 
employees (CRS, 2014).  The special treatment for capital gains from the sale of assets, 
such as securities or real assets was enacted in 1921.  The exclusion for employers’ 
                                                          




contributions to pension funds was enacted in 1926.  The exclusion of capital gains on 
home sales (marked as partial in the table) has its origins in a limited deferral of capital 
gains from sale of principle residence beginning in the early 1950s.  However, this 
provision has been significantly revised and expanded over time342  While legislative 
changes and expansions certainly have been made to the largest tax expenditures, their 
origins can be traced to long-standing tax policy and their growth has been driven in part 
by exogenous factors, not legislative changes (such as economic conditions and 
population changes), as discussed below.   
                                                          
342 The tax expenditures related to home ownership have been significantly revised and expanded. 
The Revenue Act of 1951 introduced the concept of deferring the tax on capital gains from the 
sale of a primary residence if the proceeds of the sale were used to purchase another residence of 
equal or greater value.  In 1964, elderly homeowners were provided a one-time exclusion for 
some of their capital gains from the sale of their primary residence.  Over time, the exclusion was 
expanded to allow all taxpayers aged 55 years and older a one-time exclusion for up to $125,00 
gain from the sale of their primary residence (CRS, 2014). In 1997, the tax treatment of capital 
gains on primary home sales was expanded significantly (Hanlon, 2011). The tax code, with some 
exemptions and restrictions, now allows homeowners to exclude capital gains on home sales from 
gross income up to $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for married couples filing a joint 




Table 9.1 Top 30 Tax Expenditures, Ranked by Project Revenue Effect, FY 2016-2025 
















of total  
1 Exclusion of employer contributions 
for medical insurance premiums and 
medical care  
Yes 1918, 1954 2,742 16.1% 16.1% 
2 Exclusion of net imputed rental income First reported in 




than a policy 
change (see text) 
 
N/A 
1,179 6.9% 23% 
3 Capital gains (except agriculture, 
timber, iron ore, and coal) 
Yes 1921 1,058 6.2% 29.2% 
4 Deductibility of mortgage interest on 
owner-occupied homes  
Yes 1913 949 5.6% 34.9% 
5 Defined contribution employer plans First reported as 
separate tax 
expenditure in 
the fiscal year 
2001 budget 
1978 922 5.4%  
40.3% 
6 Deferral of income from controlled 
foreign corporations (normal tax 
method)  
First reported in 
fiscal year 1979 
budget for fiscal 
year 1977 
See discussion 
in text  
853 5.0% 45.3% 
7 Step-up basis of capital gains at death  First reported in 
the fiscal year 
1979 budget for 
fiscal year 1977 
See discussion 
in text  




















of total  
8 Deductibility of nonbusiness State and 
local taxes other than on owner-
occupied homes  
Yes 
 
1913 693 4.1% 53.9% 
9 Defined benefit employer plans Yes 1926 623 3.7% 57.6% 
10 Deductibility of charitable 
contributions, other than education and 
health 
Yes 1917 601 3.5% 61.1% 
11 Capital gains exclusion on home sales Partial, see 
discussion in 
text 
1951 564 3.3% 64.4% 
12 Exclusion of interest on public purpose 
state and local bonds  
Yes 1913 501 3.0% 67.4% 
13 Deductibility of State and local 
property tax on owner-occupied homes  
Yes 1913 453 2.7% 70.0% 
14 Self-Employed plans  Yes 1962 432 2.5% 72.6% 
15 Exclusion of interest on life insurance 
savings  
Yes 1913 371 2.2% 74.8% 
16 Accelerated depreciation of machinery 
and equipment (normal tax method)  
1977 1954 356 2.09% 76.9% 
17 Social Security benefits for retired 
workers  
Yes  1938; 1941 315 1.85% 78.7% 
       
18 Treatment of qualified dividends 2003 2004 307 1.81% 80.5% 
19 Child credit 1997 1997 243 1.43% 82.0% 
20 Individual Retirement Accounts  Yes   197 1.16% 83.1% 
21 Deduction for US production activities 2004 2004 193 1.13% 84.2% 
22 Exclusion of benefits and allowances 
to armed forces personnel  
Yes 1925  
(courting 
ruling) 
151 0.89% 85.1% 




















of total  
24 Medical Savings Accounts / Health 
Savings Accounts 
1996 2003 140 0.83% 86.8% 
25 Exclusion of workers' compensation 
benefits 
Yes 1918 103 0.60% 87.4% 
26 Social Security benefits for disabled 
workers 
Yes 1938; 1941 94 0.56% 88.0% 
27 Deferral of gains from like-kind 
exchanges 
First reported in 
fiscal year 2015 
budget  
Definitional 
change; not a tax 
policy change   
1921 92 0.54% 88.5% 
28 Credit for low-income housing 
investments  
1986 1986 88 0.51% 89.0% 
29 Self-employed medical insurance 
premiums 
1998 1986;1996 87 0.51% 89.6% 
30 Exception from passive loss rules for 
$25,000 of rental loss 1987 
1986 87 0.51% 90.1% 
      90.1% 
Source: Table compiled by author.  Data on tax expenditures and foregone revenues drawn from Analytical Perspectives, Budget of U.S. 
Government, Fiscal Year 2017, Table 3, p. 253.  Additional information drawn from Special Analysis of the Budget of United States Fiscal 
Year 1976, Table F-1; Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions CRS, 2014); and legislative 




 Further, some of largest provisions not reported in the first statutorily-required tax 
expenditure listing were determined to be grounded in long-standing tax policy or the 
result of definitional, rather than policy changes.  The largest tax expenditure not 
included in fiscal year 1976 budget - the exclusion of imputed rental income343does not 
represent a change in tax policy.  It is now included because of a definitional change to 
how Treasury identifies tax expenditures.  The reporting of this provision as a tax 
expenditure is controversial.  While the Treasury began reporting imputed rental income 
as a tax expenditure in 2004, the JCT has never included it as a tax expenditure.  In 
addition, the recent inclusion of a tax expenditure for the deferral of gain from like-kind 
exchange344 - is also the result of a reporting change, rather than a change in tax 
policy.345 As discussed in Chapter Eight, these issues provide examples of the 
definitional issues that would have to be addressed in determining which tax provisions 
are included under new budget decision rules for tax expenditures.  For purpose of this 
analysis, however, excluding the tax expenditure of imputed rental income does not 
significantly change the overall picture or conclusion.346 
                                                          
343 Imputed rental income refers to the implicit value of gross rental income on housing services 
earned on the investment in owner-occupied housing (OMB, 2016)  
344 The like-kind exchange tax expenditure occurs because no gain or loss is recognized (and no 
tax is collected) when a business or investment property is exchanged for a like-kind property.  
345 The Revenue Act of 1921 included a provision allowing tax-free exchanges of like-kind 
property as part of the first statutory rules for capital (CRS, 2014). This tax treatment has been 
continued in some form ever since. However, Treasury did not report a tax expenditure for the 
deferral of like-kind exchanges until the fiscal year 2015 budget. JCT first reported it as a tax 
expenditure in 2008.  
346 When the tax expenditure for imputed rental income is removed, the top 15 largest tax 
expenditures still account for 75% of total projected revenue effects. Accelerated depreciation for 
machinery, which is grounded long-standing tax provisions, becomes the 15th largest tax 
expenditure.  This tax expenditure can be traced to provisions first reported as a tax expenditure 




The stepped-up basis, which allows heirs to inherit property that has appreciated 
in value without paying taxes on the gains, was a long-standing provision that was not in 
effect for a brief period coinciding with the first tax expenditure budget.  347 Its reporting 
the next year in the fiscal year 1977 budget represented the restatement of long-standing 
policy rather than “new” tax policy.   
The tax expenditure for the deferral of income from controlled foreign 
corporations (CFCs) arises because the United States generally taxes the worldwide 
income of U.S. persons and business entities, but certain active income of foreign 
corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders is not subject to U.S. taxation when it is 
earned.  The income becomes taxable only when it is repatriated to the U.S. parent firms 
as dividends or other income (CRS, 2014 and OMB, 2016).  While the President’s budget 
did not report this as a separate tax expenditure until the fiscal year 1979 budget, the 
deferral has been part of the U.S. tax system since the origin of the corporate income tax 
in 1909 (CRS, 2014).348 349 
The other provision not listed in the first tax expenditure budget – the net 
exclusion of pension contributions and earnings for defined contribution plans - stems 
                                                          
347 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provided that property 
acquired from a decedent received a basis equal to the property’s fair market value on the date of 
the decedent’s death.  Section 1023 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 revised this treatment by 
providing that certain types of property acquired from a decedent would have the same the basis 
as the property had in the hands of the decedents.  By using this “carryover” basis, the unrealized 
appreciation of inherited assets would no longer permanently avoid federal taxation. In 1980, the 
Congress retroactively repealed section 1023, which had been found to be complicated and highly 
unpopular (Hanlon, 2011, Hightower, 2014 McElroy, 2015 and Md.L. Rev, 1977, and Zelenak, 
1993).   
348The general policy trend until recently had been towards restricting, rather than expanding, this 
deferral.  
349 The JCT reported a tax expenditure for this deferral in its first official tax expenditure budget 




from the Revenue Act of 1978.350  Its application to pension plans grew rapidly in the 
1980s and there have been several significant legislative expansions.  The Treasury, 
however, did not include a separate tax expenditure for defined contribution plans until 
fiscal year 2001, coinciding with legislation that, among other things, increased 
contribution limits and created the Roth 401(k).351 The JCT began reporting a separate 
tax expenditure for defined contribution plans in 2008.   
 Of the remaining seven tax expenditures, four were enacted before PAYGO352 
and three were enacted after PAYGO.  The three tax expenditures traced to originating 
provisions enacted after PAYGO include: (1) treatment of qualified dividends (ranked 
18th); (2) deduction of US production activities (ranked 21st) and (3) medical savings 
accounts/health savings accounts (ranked 24th).   
My review of all tax expenditures reported in the fiscal year 2017 budget provides 
further insights into the concentration and longevity of tax expenditures (Table not 
included).  Just over 75% of the total projected revenue effects over the fiscal years 2016-
2025 can be traced to tax expenditures first reported in the president’s budget in the 
1970s and early 1980s.  About 80% of total projected revenue effect can be traced to tax 
expenditures were first reported before PAYGO. 
                                                          
350 The Revenue Act of 1978 included a provision that became Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec. 
401(k) under which employees are not taxed on the portion of income they elect to receive as 
deferred compensation, rather than as direct cash payments. The law went into effect on January 
1, 1980  
351 Contributions to the Roth 401(k) are taxed, but qualified distributions are not taxed.   
352 Accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment can be traced to IRS rulings and 
legislation in the late 1940s and 1950s (CRS, 2014).  The credit for low-income housing was 
created by TRA 1986 to provide an incentive for the development or rehabilitation of affordable 
rental housing. The exception from passive lose rules for $25,00 of rental loss also was part of 




While the cost of tax expenditures is concentrated in a relatively few tax 
expenditures, many of which stem from long-standing tax policy, there have been some 
notable expansions and compositional shifts that have important implications for tax 
reform and the establishment of budget decision rules for tax expenditures.  Overall, tax 
expenditures for individuals have increased more than corporate tax 
expenditures.353Collectively, corporate tax expenditures are significantly smaller than tax 
expenditures for individuals.  The largest tax expenditure for individuals – the exclusion 
of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums and medical care -- with 
forgone revenues of $211 billion for fiscal year 2015 is larger than the sum of forgone 
revenues for all corporate tax expenditures of $143 billion.354 In comparison, the largest 
tax corporate tax expenditure - the deferral of income of foreign controlled corporation - 
has foregone revenues of $64.5 billion for fiscal year 2015.355   
In contrast to the tax expenditure growth leading up to TRA 1986, which was 
largely related to business activities, some of the significant, newly created or expanded 
tax expenditures since TRA 1986 have been in social policy areas, such as income 
                                                          
353 Existing studies discuss this trend. Rogers and Toder (2011) found that the share of tax 
expenditures claimed on individual returns increased after the 1986 reforms and has continued to 
rise, while the corporate share has declined. McBride (2013) notes that growth in tax expenditures 
since TRA 1986 has been in tax expenditures for individuals while corporate tax expenditures 
declined. Steuerle (2008) shows a decline of business tax expenditures and an increase of social 
tax expenditures from 1980 to 2006.   
354 Foregone revenues for health exclusion are drawn from information in Analytical 
Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017 Table 3. Income Tax 
Expenditures Ranked by Total Fiscal Year 2016-2025 Projected Revenue Effect. The sum of 
foregone revenues is author’s calculation based on information in Analytical Perspectives, Budget 
of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017 Table 2a.  Estimates of Total Corporate 
Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2015-2025.  
355 The next largest corporate tax expenditures based on foregone revenues for fiscal year 
2015 include: (1) deduction for U.S. production ($11.5 billion); (2) exclusion of interest 
on state and local public purpose bonds ($8.4); and (3) expensing of research and development 
($7.1). Only one of these the deduction for U.S. production, enacted in 2004, is a recent tax 




security, housing, education, retirement, and health.  The Child Tax Credit, which 
benefits middle-income families with children, was enacted in 1997.356 It is now one of 
the largest tax expenditures (ranked 19th).  Several tax credits have been enacted for post-
secondary education.357 The preferential tax treatment for medical health savings 
accounts was enacted in 2003.  The Affordable Care Act included refundable tax credits.   
There also have been notable legislative expansions in existing tax expenditures 
in social policy areas.  The Earned Income Tax Credit (ETIC), enacted in 1975, has been 
expanded significantly over time.358  The Child Tax Credit was expanded in 2001.359 
However, the refundable portion of these credits is included in budget outlays.  As 
discussed earlier, what began as a limited deferral capital gain from the sale of principal 
residence has been expanded over time to provide a broad exclusion of these gains.  
There also have been significant legislative expansions to the preferential treatment for 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and other retirement accounts.   
Despite these notable new and expanded tax expenditures, most of the increase in 
the number of tax expenditures stems from relatively small, niche tax provisions.  Of the 
                                                          
356 The child tax credit focuses tax relief on middle income families.  Taxpayers with income 
above a specified threshold cannot take the credit.  Many low-income families do not qualify for 
the credit because they don’t pay taxes and the credit is only refundable in special circumstances 
(CBO, 2000).  
357 The Hope Scholarship credit and Lifetime Learning Credit were enacted in 1997.  The 
Lifetime learning tax credit had foregone revenues of $2.3 billion for fiscal year 2015. The 
American Opportunity tax credit, enacted in 2008, replaced and expanded upon the Hope tax 
credit. The American Opportunity (AWOT) credit allows certain taxpayers to claim a refundable 
tax credit for qualifying higher education expenses. The AWOT had foregone revenues of $13.5 
billion and outlays of $4.1 billion for fiscal year 2015.  
358 The EITC provides a refundable tax credit to assist working families and individuals. While 
EITC was relatively small when enacted it been expanded on several occasions. The EITC is now 
the largest federal aid program targeted to the working poor. 
359 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-16) increase the child credit from 
$500 to $1000. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-27) accelerated the 2001 




169 tax expenditures reported in the fiscal year 2015 budget, 87 were first reported by 
Treasury after TRA 1986.  Almost all of these have projected revenues effects that are 
less than 1% of the total projected revenue effect over 2016-2025 period.  Further, some 
of the policy areas with the largest increase in number of tax expenditures were not large 
contributors to the net increase in the sum of foregone revenues between fiscal year 1986 
and fiscal year 2015.   
Growth in some of the largest, longest-standing, and politically popular tax 
expenditures results at least in part from built-in factors outside the direct control of 
lawmakers.  Many of these provisions began as small provisions and grew significantly 
due to factors other direct legislative actions (Howard, 1997).  One of the largest and 
fastest growing tax expenditures – the exclusion of employer health insurance – has been 
driven by expanding use of health insurance as a form of compensation and rising health 
care costs (CBO, 2013 and McBride, 2013).360 Howard (1997) found that the growth in 
the mortgage interest deduction stemmed not from deliberate legislative changes but 
rather from factors such as inflation in housing prices, demographic changes, and from 
the “ripple effects” of interest rates.  Penner and Steuerle (2016) discussed that when the 
mortgage interest deduction was established home mortgages were much less prevalent, 
but as homeownership and housing prices increased the deduction grew automatically.  
The costs for defined benefit plans also were affected by factors, such as performance of 
pension fund assets and inflation.  While there have been legislated expansions to the 
preferential treatment of defined contribution plans, growth also has occurred from 
                                                          
360 CBO (2013) reported that the exclusion has grown by more than two-thirds as a share of GDP, 




increases in 401(k) contributions due to employers’ shift towards these plans and 
improving economic conditions.   
Finally, a complete picture of tax expenditures needs to include another trend – 
the use of refundable tax credits.  Refundable tax credits reduce a taxpayer’s tax liability 
dollar for dollar, but the taxpayer also receives a cash payment for the amount of the 
credit in excess of their tax liability, The President’s tax expenditure budget includes only 
the foregone revenues associated with these credits with a footnote that they also involve 
cash outlays.361 In contrast, the JCT reports a combined amount which includes both 
foregone revenues and outlays.362    
In recent decades, refundable tax credits, have become an important part of the 
tax expenditure story.  When their “full” cost (foregone revenues and outlays) is 
considered, a few refundable tax credits are among the largest and rapidly growing tax 
                                                          
361 The outlay amounts are shown in separate Department of Treasury budget accounts include in 
the budget appendix. 
362 Determining how to deal with refundable tax credits when examining tax expenditure trends 
involved several considerations. Analysis including refundable tax credits is complicated because 
estimates of foregone revenues and outlays are not fully equivalent. Therefore, adding the two 
components of costs does not provide fully comparable cost measure.  Further, in thinking about 
this dissertation’s focus on budget rules, refundable tax credits the outlay portion of these 
programs is already included as spending in the budget. In effort to best understand and highlight 
the issues involved, the above analysis first focused on the information (foregone revenues) as 
reported president’s tax expenditure. Refundable tax credits are discussed to highlight these 




expenditures.363  Table 9.2 shows both the foregone revenue and outlays portion of the 
largest, permanent refundable tax credits.364  
Table 9.2 Largest Refundable Tax Credits, Fiscal Year 2015 (billions of dollars) 




Outlays  Total  
Earn Income Tax Credit (EITC) 1975 $2.1 $60.1 $62.1 
Child Care Tax Credit  1997 $24.0 $20.6 $44.6 
Refundable premium assistance tax 
credit  
2010 $2.0 $30.8 $32.8 
Small Business Health Credit 2010 $.03 .04 $.07 
American Opportunity Tax Credit 2009 $13.5 $4.2 $17.6 
 
Source: Table created by author based on OMB data included in Budget Appendix, Budget of the 
U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2017  
 
By providing an indirect rule, PAYGO arguably lessened pressure for stronger, 
more direct budget decision rules for tax expenditures and influenced the trend of tax 
expenditure growth.  PAYGO allowed for automatic growth in the cost of existing tax 
expenditures.  Some large tax expenditures have been enacted and significant legislative 
expansions made to some existing ones, but the increase in the number of tax 
expenditures stems from small, niche provisions.  This complex picture of: (1) automatic 
growth outside direct control of lawmakers; (2) large, long-standing and politically 
popular tax expenditures; (3) numerous smaller, niched tax expenditures; and (4) 
                                                          
363 The EITC was first enacted in 1975 and has been expanded several times since its enactment. 
Its “full” cost of $62.5 billion for fiscal year 2015 put it among the largest tax expenditures.  The 
Child care credit has also been expanded, including increases to the extent that it is refundable.  
Its foregone revenues of $24 billion are already significant and among the largest tax 
expenditures, but its “full” cost including outlays is nearly double at $44.6 billion. The 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) established refundable tax credits. The premium assistance tax 
credit’s total cost of $21.5 billion puts it among the largest tax expenditures for fiscal year 2015, 
with projected future growth if the ACA continues. The qualified small businesses tax credit is 
much smaller with foregone revenues of $1.9 billion and outlays of $38 million for fiscal year 
2015 (OMB, 2016).  
364 Several refundable tax credits were enacted in response to the nation’s fiscal crisis, but these 




increased use of refundable tax credits sets the stage for assessing efforts to establish 
budget decision rules for tax expenditures.    
The lack of success controlling the costs of major direct expenditure entitlements 
foreshadows challenges in designing budget rules to directly control tax expenditures.  
While steep growth in direct entitlement programs, particularly Social Security, Medicare 
and Medicaid, has attracted much concern, there has been a lack of political will and no 
consensus on budget rules to address these trends.  Thus, rather than having a model of an 
effective budget decision rule to follow, efforts to establish new budget rules for tax 
expenditures face many of the same unresolved obstacles which have confounded efforts 
to control entitlement spending.365 As with direct entitlements, new budget decision rules 
for tax expenditures would have to address built-in cost growth resulting from non-
legislative factors.    
The design and implementation of budget decision rules for tax expenditures also 
involves the complexity associated with the interrelationship between tax rates and the 
value of tax expenditures.  The interaction between tax rates and tax expenditures 
complicates understanding of tax expenditure growth and the costs of these provisions.  
The cost of tax expenditures changes with changes in the tax rate.  Reforms that change 
tax rates automatically change the cost of tax expenditures.  As discussed above, much of 
the reduction in tax expenditures from the 1986 tax reform came about because of lower 
tax rates.  Similarly, higher rates increase the cost of existing tax expenditures without 
                                                          
365 There is, however, limited experience with the capping tax expenditures. As noted by CBO 
(2013) some smaller tax expenditures enacted in 2009, including the low-income housing tax 
credit and some energy tax credits have budget ceilings and procedures to allocate funding among 




legislative changes to those tax expenditures.  Much of the increase in tax expenditures in 
the early 1990s stemmed from tax rate increases.   
The interaction between tax expenditures and tax rates complicates tax policy and 
budget rule design.  When tax rates increase, existing tax expenditures become more 
valuable to taxpayers and when tax expenditures become more valuable taxpayers are 
more likely to use them.  For refundable tax credits, a decrease in tax rates results in a 
taxpayer having a smaller tax liability before the credit is applied and a greater refundable 
portion (CBO, 2013).  While the overall cost of the tax credit to the government is the 
same, the budget account would show increased cash outlays.  As CBO (2013) pointed 
out, this may provide misleading signals because the budget only directly identifies the 
increase in outlays, which could lead to erroneous impression that cost of a refundable 
credit has grown, even when its total cost is the same.   
The significant variation in the scope and targeting of tax expenditures is another 
consideration.  As discussed above, tax expenditures are not monolithic; they vary greatly 
across factors, such as size, growth rate, purpose, and beneficiary.  This variation 
complicates tax policy reforms causing some researchers argue against a one-size fits all 
approach (CRS, 2014, GAO, 2012 and Marples, 2015).  Similarly, the varied nature of 
the tax expenditures complicates budget decision rule design and raises questions about 
the potential effectiveness of a one-size fit all approach and certain enforcement 
mechanisms.  The objective and design of budget decision rules for tax expenditures 
would to considered in the context of the challenges of controlling automatic growth in 




expenditures.  These issues complicate tax reform which in turn complicate forming 
consensus on whether and how to establish tax expenditure specific budget rules.   
  
Lack of Consensus on Budget Rules for Tax Expenditures Reflects Lack of 
Consensus on Tax Policy  
From the start, the tax expenditure concept has been intertwined with tax policy 
and politics.  Surrey’s passionate advocacy for the concept created a double edge sword; 
both serving to advance it, but also entangling it with his strong tax policy positions.366 
Surrey was known as an outspoken critic of tax breaks and Congressional concerns over 
his policy agenda proceeded the official reporting of tax expenditures.  Birnbaum and 
Murray (1988) note that “[c]ongressional opposition to Surrey’s appointment was 
intense” (p.14).  During his 1961 confirmation hearing, Surrey faced accusations that he 
did not believe Congress was doing its job on tax matters and contentious questioning 
about his positions on various tax expenditures (Birnbaum and Murray, 1988; Committee 
on Finance, 1961; and West, 1961).  One journalist described the tone of the hearing as 
follows:  
“They took Surrey line by line over his published opinions and demanded to know 
whether he still felt that way.  The professor, who probably was wishing he had 
never seen a typewriter, assured the senators that he would keep an “open mind." 
But that may not have been the right thing to say.  Some senators seem to think 
that an open mind means the same thing as a hole in the head” (West, 1961, p.1).   
The connection between Surrey’s tax policy agenda and the tax expenditure 
concept cast a shadow of political bias over the exercise.  While Surrey insisted that the 
tax expenditure designation is not intended to be negative, his works were generally 
                                                          
366 The tax expenditure concept come to fruition during Surrey’s tenure at Treasury during the 




critical of their use (Surrey, 1970a, 1970b, 1976; McDaniel & Surrey, 1982; Surrey & 
McDaniel, 1985).  Consistent with his preference for progressive and comprehensive 
taxation, he repeatedly condemned tax expenditures as inefficient, inequitable, difficult to 
administer, and generally inferior to direct expenditures in achieving societal goals.  In 
various academic works and speeches, he argued that “…  the case is very strong against 
the use of the tax device.”  He outlined his position as follows:   
 “In any particular situation – certainly any new situation – the first approach 
should be to explore the various direct expenditure alternatives.  Once the most 
desirable of these alternatives is determined, if one still wishes to consider the tax 
incentive method for the same substantive program, the question must be what 
clear advantages can be obtained by using the tax method.  Again, as a 
generalization, I think it unlikely that clear advantages in tax incentive method 
will be found.  Moreover, I stress strongly that the advantages must be clear and 
compelling to overcome the losses that accompany the use of the tax incentive, 
even the well-structured incentives.  The problem of achieving a well-structured 
incentive are in themselves formidable (Surrey, 1970b, p. 734).   
 
  Importantly, Surrey aligned the task of tax reform with the task of eliminating tax 
expenditures and, when deemed appropriate, replacing them with direct expenditures.  
Surrey (1970a) describes this recasting of tax reform as budget reform as follows:  
“For tax expenditure analysis conceives of the special provisions – the 
preferences and loopholes – as government financing assistance comparable to 
that contained directly in the Budget.  So viewed this aspect of tax reform 
becomes a review of budgetary programs” (p. 361).    
“Those urging reform must go on to say:  The financial assistance will be 
continued efficiently and effectively by a direct expenditure program, the specifics 
of which are described, and therefore the tax expenditure can be dropped -- i.e. a 
tax reform can be accomplished” (p. 362). 
 
 Surrey’s strong policy preferences led to suggestions that his primary motivation 
was to establish a tool to support a specific tax policy agenda, rather than to create a 
neutral, objective tool to support expenditure control.  Bittker (1960) argued “… it is not 




withstand public scrutiny if viewed as expenditures” (p. 248). Burkhead (1974) argued 
that “[a]t least Surrey does not leave … doubt where he stands; almost every conceivable 
exclusion and deduction with the exception of normal depreciation and one personal 
exception person is included as a tax expenditure” and “direct expenditure is preferable 
to tax credits in almost every case” (p. 1346). Feld argued that “…the tax expenditure 
budget appears to rest on a particular social-political view of the tax law” (Feld (1975, 
p.1051). 
 Similar concerns have continued for decades.  King (1984) noted an “implicit 
political premise” behind Surrey’s development of the tax expenditure concept – that tax 
expenditures have “no inherent place within the revenue system” (p. 14). Thuronyi 
(1988) argued that “[b]y incorporating “generally accepted” concepts though Surrey 
endeavored to shield this subjective vision behind the authority of a consensus of 
experts” (p. 1166).  Karson (1985) discussed Surrey’s dual and competing roles as “tax 
technician” and a “tax moralist” (p. 1411). Bartlett (2001), argued that “Surrey clearly 
intended the term “tax expenditure” to be pejorative, undermining political support for 
tax preferences” (p.2). Wiesbach and Nussim (2004) noted that 
 “Surrey’s arguments … generally condemn tax expenditures so such labeling 
becomes extremely important.  Being put on the tax expenditures list indicates 
that a provision is a subsidy or government largesse while staying of that list 
indicate that a provision have the patinas of good tax policy.” (p. 976). 
 
 
 As noted by Burman (2013), Surrey clearly saw the tax expenditure concept as the 
“pathway to tax reform” as indicated by the title of his 1973 book.  Surrey anticipated 
that identifying and presenting tax expenditures as substitutes for government spending 




this way, the tax expenditure concept was as much a device for advancing a desired 
policy path as an objective method for addressing budget reporting deficiencies.   
 The controversy over the expenditure concept and its use in budget rules 
continues to reflect (at least in part) deep political and ideological divides with respect to 
tax and spending policy.367 Some view the tax expenditure concept’s implicit assumption 
that there is some ideal baseline tax structure as institutionalizing a specific type of tax 
policy, and thus creating barriers to comprehensive tax reform (Bartlett, 2001 and 
Shaviro, 2003, 2011).  JCT (2008) noted that “the “normal” tax operates, at least in the 
view of some, as an implicit reproach to the current tax system, through being held up as 
an aspirational, but achievable superior tax system” (p.7). 
 Specifically, some critics argue that current tax expenditure analysis interferes 
with the establishment of a consumption tax.  Barlett (2001) argues that using the income 
tax base for tax expenditure analysis “reinforces the supposed superiority of an income 
base and is a barrier to adoption of a consumption-based system” (p. 12).  In considering 
the Bush Administration’s 2003 revisions to its budget’s tax expenditure presentation, 
Burman (2003) argues that one might suspect “… that the Administration’s preference to 
shift the focus of analysis from an income tax baseline to a consumption tax baseline is 
part of larger strategy to sneak a consumption tax in through the back door” (p.11).    
Both parties clearly have something to lose in the establishment of effective 
budget rules to control tax expenditures.  While one theory is that decision rules can be 
help “force” policy participants towards agreement, when the 2017 tax cuts resulted in 
                                                          
367 Other researchers have noted that there is a clear ideological aspect to the tax expenditure 
debate and the choice of the tax baseline used to identify them (Burman, 2003, Harris, 1997 and 




large increases in the deficit, lawmakers waived PAYGO to avoid sequestration.  The tax 
expenditure experience suggests that a lack of agreement on broad policy may serve as a 
major obstacle to the establishment of workable, sustainable budget rules.  Conflict over 
the tax expenditure concept and its use in budget rules reflects (and is seemingly 
inseparable from) the deeply-divided and highly charged tax policy and politics.  Burman 
(2013) notes reducing individual income tax expenditures “creates a daunting 
challenge.” Likewise, the establishment budget rules for tax expenditures, particularly 
those which attempt to explicitly treat tax expenditure as “spending” appears a similarly 
“daunting challenge.”   
 
Lack of Alignment with Existing Institutional Creates Obstacles to Budget Rules     
A lack of alignment with existing institutional structures creates obstacles for 
some budget decision rules which seek to facilitate tradeoffs between direct expenditures 
and tax expenditures.  Tax expenditures and direct expenditures follow different tracks 
through the budget and policy processes.  In the executive branch, tax expenditures are 
generally handled by the Treasury while direct expenditures are handled by other 
executive agencies.  In Congress, authorizing and appropriation committees handle direct 
expenditure programs within their jurisdiction while the two tax-writing committees – 
Ways and Means in House and Finance Committee in the Senate – handle revenues, 
including tax expenditures, and direct expenditure entitlement programs.  Hungerford 
(2006) describes the how these different tracks limit the prospects for trading off direct 
expenditures and tax expenditures as follows: 
“Appropriation committees can trade off one direct expenditure program for 




in a particular category.  The two tax writing committees could, however, replace 
a tax expenditure with mandatory spending programs with in their jurisdiction.  
But, typically replacing a tax expenditure with a direct expenditure would involve 
moving a bill through multiple committees” (Hungerford, 2006, p. 9)   
 Existing research provides examples of how the “institutional isolation” of tax 
expenditures and fragmented congressional and executive responsibilities have limited 
effectiveness of tax expenditure analysis as analytical tool (CBO, 1982b, 2012e; 
Hungerford, 2006; GAO, 1994c, and Redburn et al, 2014).  These issues foreshadow 
difficulties in establishing and implementing new budget decision rules designed to 
encourage (or force) policymakers to make explicit tradeoffs between tax expenditures 
and other policy tools (e.g.  direct expenditures or credit).   
 GAO (1994c) found that some tax expenditures, such as accelerated depreciation 
or the special treatment of capital gains, do not fit clearly within budget functions or 
within the clear jurisdiction of particular spending committees or agencies (GAO, 
1994c).368  While theoretically tax expenditures could be compared with and traded-off 
with direct expenditures institutional barriers make it difficult to do (GAO, 1994c, 2016; 
JCT, 2008; Marples, 2015; and Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  Thuronyi (1988) cited 
Birnbuam and Murray’s description of the impact of these institutional constraints during 
the 1986 TRA debate: 
In scrutinizing tax expenditures in areas where they considered some continued 
federal support appropriate the committees faced a Hobson’s choice: either 
retain the tax expenditure, perhaps in a restricted or more complicated form, thus 
failing to simplify the tax system or repeal it and withdraw government support 
from a worthy activity.  The best alternative – replacing the tax expenditure with 
a direct spending program, perhaps funded at a lower level – was, as a practical 
matter, unavailable because the President had not proposed it, and because it 
                                                          
368 GAO (2005e) and GAO (2016) also found that a lack of clarity about agencies’ roles with 
respect to tax expenditures is a key impediment to agencies identifying and including them in 




would involve the jurisdiction of other committees (Birnbuam and Murray, 1987 
as cited in Thuronyi (1988).   
In discussing the barriers created by the congressional committee structure, 
Sunley (2004) noted:  
“I can recall only one time when Congress traded off a tax expenditure for direct 
spending program, and that trade-off was possible only because the tax-writing 
committees also have jurisdiction over welfare and income support” (p. 166).  
 
New budget decision rules, especially far-reaching reforms that attempt to address 
institutional constraints, would threaten the existing power structure among congressional 
committees.  In arguing for stronger budget rules for tax expenditures, some proponents 
point to the considerable power to the tax committees under current rules.  One argument 
is that tax writing committees, in effect, serve as both authorizing and appropriations 
committees because a vote for a tax expenditure simultaneously authorizes it and funds it 
(Kleinbard, 2010 and Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  McDaniel and Surrey (1982) 
described tax writing committees “poaching on the jurisdiction” of committees as 
follows:  
 
“When the Tax Committees decide to consider expending funds on education 
through tuition tax credits, what has happened to the jurisdiction of the 
Committees responsible for outlays for education; when energy tax credits are 
voted by the Tax Committees, the jurisdiction of the committees responsible for 
outlays on energy are swept aside; when the Tax Committees decide they must 
rescue the savings and loans associations through the “all-Savers” interest 
exclusion, the jurisdiction of the committees charged with overseeing financial 
institutions is usurped (McDaniel and Surrey, 1982, p. 613).   
 
Not surprisingly, an examination of the evolution of the tax expenditure concept 




expenditures.  In their statement during hearings on H.R.  4882 before the House Rules 
Committee, Congressman Rostenkowski and Congressman Conable, Jr included the 
following:  
We want to express our strong opposition to H.R.  4882.  This bill would subject 
tax expenditures to the same congressional budget procedures that now apply to 
the aggregate level of budget receipts.  This could be an unwarranted extension of 
the budget process into an area which, until now, has been the exclusive province 
of the tax-writing committees (emphasis added) (Hearings on H.R.  4882, and 
McDaniel and Surrey, 1982, p. 612).   
Some recent reform proposals call for more directly involving authorizing 
committees in the development tax expenditures related to their areas of expertise (GAO, 
2016d).   These types of reforms would change congressional committee powers, such 
increases in the power of authorizing and appropriations committees and reductions to the 
power of tax-writing committees (GAO, 2016d).  Because these more far-reaching 
proposals threaten existing power structures and institutional norms they are likely to 
create complex political dynamics and resistance.  GAO (2016d) notes that one expert369 
raised possibility of untended consequences such as the potential of spreading 
responsibility for tax expenditures across multiple committees impeding fundamental tax 
reform.   
While these institutional issues amplify the need for reform they also create 
barriers to establishing workable and sustainable budget rules.  This is a conundrum for 
rule development.  Failure to recognize and address institutional issues threatens, at least 
to some extent, the potential effectiveness of new budget rules for tax expenditures, but 
more extensive rules that confront institutional issues are less likely to be enacted.   
                                                          
369 As part of its work for it 2016 report on tax expenditures, GAO conducted a one-day 
roundtable discussion with eleven experts to discuss the broad benefits and challenges of further 





Tax Expenditures, Summary Observations and Thoughts 
 
For more than half a century, there have been concerns about the budget oversight 
and control of tax expenditures.  While establishment of the tax expenditure concept as 
an analytical tool occurred relatively quickly, efforts to further integrate it into budget 
rules stalled.  There is now significantly more information on and attention given to tax 
expenditures.  Yet, contrary to proponents’ predictions that increased information on tax 
expenditures would curtail their use, today there is both vastly more information and high 
levels of tax expenditures.  After decades of debate, both concerns about the budget 
oversight of tax expenditures and the proposed solutions are eerily reminiscent of the 
past.  The same issues have been churned and debated for decades with little resolution or 
advancement towards establishing tax expenditure specific budget rules to more directly 
control these provisions or treat them as spending in the budget.     
The characteristics and composition of tax expenditures themselves compound 
these issues in establishing workable, sustainable budget rules.  The partial solution 
provided by PAYGO created an indirect incentive for policymakers to curtail enactment 
of large, new tax expenditures, but allowed significant, automatic growth in some 
existing tax expenditures.  There has also been a proliferation of smaller, more niched tax 
expenditures.  Those seeking to establish budget decision rules for tax expenditures are 
faced with deciding if and how to address various aspects of tax expenditures: (1) 
automatic growth in long-standing, politically popular tax expenditures; (2) legislative 
expansions to existing tax expenditures; (3) increasing number of smaller, targeted tax 




While the growth and changing composition of tax expenditures support the need 
for improved budget oversight and better coordination of direct expenditures and tax 
policy, those seeking to establish budget rules for tax expenditures face a complex 
combination of difficult definitional, estimation, and institutional challenges combined 
with the deeply-held political and policy differences on tax policy.  The lack of progress 
on budget rules for tax expenditures reflects a lack of consensus on tax policy.  However, 
even if the significant conceptual and political disagreements are overcome to garner 
support budget decision rules for tax expenditures numerous technical and 
implementation issues must be addressed.  This conceptual and definitional complexity 
and ambiguity arguably makes consensus on the relevance and objective of budget rules 
for tax expenditures even more important, but as shown in the case this agreement has not 
existed to date.  Together these issues help explain the stalled path of the tax expenditure 






Comparing the Cases: The Fragile Role of Budget Decision Rules  
 
 In this concluding chapter, I examine the case study findings about the factors and 
conditions that influence whether analytical information is formulated into a sustained 
and workable budget decision rule.  I also identify crosscutting themes that provide 
insights into the relationship between analytical tools and decision rules.  The first section 
compares the emergence and evolution of FCRA and budget rules for tax expenditures, 
and provides summary observations for each case.  The second section discusses 
crosscutting themes based on case study findings.  The third section outlines key 
considerations and indicators that provide a preliminary framework for assessing the 
establishment of budget decision rules based on analytical information.  The fourth 
section provides closing thoughts and observations.   
 
Comparison of Reform Efforts  
 In this section, I compare the factors and conditions influencing the evolution of 
FCRA and budget rules for tax expenditures.  Because of the significance of the debate 
about a fair-value approach for estimating the subsidy costs of credit programs, I treat 
this issue as a case within the FCRA study.  The dimensions and elements outlined in 
Chapter Two provided a starting point, but additional factors that became apparent during 
the case study research were also considered.  Table 11.1 provides an overview of my 
assessment of how some factors and conditions compare across the cases.  In discussing 
these issues, I refer to, but do not extensively repeat relevant supporting details and 




 The first dimension is the “trigger” i.e., the policy issue or event prompting the 
proposed rule, including the extent to which there was political and expert consensus that 
a problem warranting new decision rules existed.  FCRA grew out of long-standing 
concerns and elite consensus370 about the problem (the rapid growth and changing 
composition of federal loans) and a primary cause (the shortcomings of cash-based 
budgeting).  In sum, key policy participants, including members of the budget 
committees and budget experts, generally agreed on the problem they were trying to 
address and the logic of revising budget rules.  No such consensus exists for tax 
expenditures or for a fair-value approach.   
 After decades of debate, there is no workable agreement that tax expenditures are 
a “problem” or that new budget decision rules for tax expenditures are needed.  While 
reformers, including many prominent tax policy and federal budget experts, argue 
strongly that tax expenditures are federal spending in need of improved budget oversight 
and control, the issue has been highly controversial from the start.  Some policy 
participants view the use of tax expenditures not as the result of slack budget oversight, 
but as sound policy decisions.  Others argue that the primary factors driving tax 
expenditure growth lay outside the budget process.  For the fair-value approach, some 
disagreement surrounds the basic assertation that market risk is relevant to the Federal 
Government and significant disagreement surrounds the assertions that market risk is a 
                                                          
370 In this dissertation, elite consensus is used to refer to consensus among key political players 
associated with the rule’s establishment and implementation (such as Chairs and ranking 
members of relevant committees, such as the appropriations, budget or tax writing committees) 
and prominent experts and technicians (from government, e.g. CBO, OMB, and GAO; academia; 





budget cost and that its exclusion from the subsidy costs of federal loan programs creates 
policy problems e.g.  the overuse of credit programs, especially direct loans.   
Another trigger in the FCRA case was the presence of a related and more 
politically-engaging policy event that helped clarify the rule’s relevance and create a 
sense urgency.  Budgeting for credit programs had been debated for years, but the 
Savings and Loan and housing crises of the 1980s increased pressure on lawmakers to 
limit the government’s risk exposure.  This sense of urgency, which was evident during a 
1990 congressional hearing on credit reform, helped create momentum to pass legislation 
later that year.  Similarly, while research on applying a fair-value approach to federal 
credit programs had been underway for years, the nation’s fiscal crisis in the mid-2000s 
directed increased attention to the issue and provided an opportunity to apply the 
approach to select credit programs.  Proponents now point to these applications to argue 
for the extension of a fair-value approach to other credit programs.  While tax issues tend 
to be high profile and some recent budget process reform proposals have included tax 
expenditures, no key event has triggered momentum for action on new budget rules for 
tax expenditures.  To the contrary, the 2017 tax legislation resulted in lawmakers waiving 














Trigger: Analytical information preceded decision 
rule  
   
Trigger: Considerable consensus that a “problem” 
warranting new budget decision rules exists      
Trigger: Considerable consensus on underlying 
causes i.e. existing budget rules are primary cause    
Trigger: Impetus provided by concurrent policy 
event     
Conceptual framework and design:  
Considerable elite consensus on the rule’s 
conceptual framework and logic   
 
  
Conceptual framework and design:  
Considerable elite consensus on specific reform 







Conceptual framework and design:   
Rule is consistent with federal budgeting norms  
(Cash-based transactions) 
   
Conceptual framework and design:  
Rule is consistent with federal budgeting norms  




Conceptual framework and design:  
Considerable elite consensus on rules’ scope and 
objective   
  
Implementation:  
Analytical information for the rule is available and 
reasonably accurate 
All case studies involved estimation 
challenges to vary degrees (see 
discussion in text) 
Implementation:  
Rule aligned with (supported by) concurrent 
reforms   
   
Implementation:  
Rule consistent with existing institutional and 





  = factor or condition clearly present 
 = factor or condition generally present  
 = factor or condition generally not present  
 = factor or condition clearly not present  




 The next dimension is the rule’s basic conceptual framework and logic, including 
whether a considerable consensus exists on whether and how the proposed rule would 
address the identified problem.  The case studies varied significantly in terms of the level 
of consensus on the proposed rule’s conceptual framework and design, including its 
theoretical arguments and logic.  Seemingly technical debates often revealed deep 
differences in opinions about what information is most important to policy decision 
making and about the role, scope, and limits of the federal budget.   
 In FCRA’s case, considerable elite consensus emerged around the superiority of 
subsidy costs over net cash flows as the appropriate budget measure for federal credit 
programs.  In the years preceding FCRA’s enactment, key players including the Budget 
Committees, CBO, GAO, OMB, and the Federal Reserve had reached substantial 
agreement about FCRA’s conceptual framework and essential design elements.  This 
consensus was useful in articulating and promoting the rule’s relevance, especially given 
the technical complexity involved.  The solid consensus on the superiority of subsidy 
budgeting over the existing cash-based system provided motivation to move legislation, 
rather than getting mired in endless debate about design details.   
 In the cases of tax expenditures and fair-value, key policy participants, including 
lawmakers, economists, and budget experts, are divided on the merits of proposed 
changes to budget decision rules.  For decades, there has been serious, fundamental 
disagreement on the assertion that tax expenditures are equivalent to federal spending.  
The lack of political and expert consensus on this core premise creates a fundamental 
disconnect between proposals to revise budget decision rules for tax expenditures and the 




sustained.  For those who do not accept the premise that tax expenditures are spending, 
proposals to subject them to spending controls are illogical.   
 In the fair-value debate, policy participants, including budget experts, disagree 
about whether market risk is a budget cost.  The most contentious issue is not whether 
assessment of market risk for federal credit programs is of analytical value, but rather 
whether market risk is a budget cost.  While there has been vigorous debate in recent 
years, this is not a new issue.  It was a key point of disagreement before FCRA’s 
enactment.  Years of study and discussion have clarified some technical issues but have 
done little to resolve fundamental disagreements about whether subsidy costs should 
include market risk.    
  A closely related matter is the extent to which a proposed budget decision rule is 
aligned (or perceived to be aligned) with existing federal budget norms.  One long-
standing federal budgeting principle is upfront recognition of budget costs, i.e., budget 
costs should be recognized and controlled at the time decisions committing government 
resources are made.  All the case study reforms support the concept of upfront budget 
cost recognition.  In FCRA’s case, there was (and still is) widespread agreement that 
discounted cash flows for federal loan programs is consistent with upfront cost 
recognition.  However, FCRA creates another issue – how to most appropriately deal 
with upfront budget gains (i.e. negative subsides).  In the cases of tax expenditures and 
fair-value, the proposed rules also are consistent with upfront cost recognition, but as 
discussed above, there is not agreement on what constitutes a budget cost.   
 Another long-standing federal budget norm is the use of cash as a tangible, 




as measured by cash flows to and from the Treasury (GAO, 2016a and Marron, 2014).  
FCRA is a significant change because it requires budget costs to be measured on a net 
present value basis; however, over the course of the loan, these costs are reconciled in the 
financing account to the government’s actual cash transactions through an annual 
reestimation process.  Thus, the difference FCRA creates between the reported annual 
deficit and the government’s means of financing is one of timing.  FCRA does not add 
new, permanent, non-cash items to the budget.   
 Both tax expenditures and fair-value move further beyond traditional cash 
measures.  For tax expenditures, foregone revenues are measures of “actions not taken or 
revenues not collected” (Aaron, 1977, p.31).  As such, actual costs are never known.  
They cannot be observed or traced back to actual cash flows.  Some lawmakers and 
federal budget experts raise concerns that using these estimates as a measure for spending 
recognition and control would create significant transparency and implementation issues.  
The fair-value approach also would include a non-cash, non-observable risk premium for 
the cost of bearing market risk.  The inclusion of this risk premium would create 
additional, non-cash differences between the reported deficit and government’s financing 
needs.  The actual cost of the risk premium is never known with certainty.  Under fair-
value budgeting even if a credit program’s estimated cash flows turn out to be completely 
accurate, an adjustment would be required to get to the loan’s actual cash costs (Phaup 
2008).  Policy participants, including key federal budget experts, have divergent views 
about the implications of adding such non-cash costs to the federal budget.   
 The FCRA experience supports the importance of defining a rule’s objective and 




A series of compromises limited FCRA’s objective, scope, and budget impact in ways 
that eased its enactment and have supported its sustainability.  FCRA’s scope was limited 
to federal direct loans and loan guarantees and thus avoided addressing larger, more 
technically complicated and politically-charged programs, such as federal insurance and 
GSEs.  In addition, FCRA is a process rule.  It requires lawmakers to recognize and fund 
subsidy costs of loans, but it does not set pre-determined limits on the level or 
composition of federal loans.  During the pre-FCRA debate, some policy participants, 
including the OMB director, argued for limits on federal loan exposure, but it was not 
considered politically feasible.  FCRA’s resulting budget impact was relatively small at 
enactment and in the early years of implementation.  However, in recent years, FCRA’s 
recognition of large negative subsidies or “profits” has increased attention and 
controversy.   
 The tax expenditure case reveals the challenges associated with a lack of clarity 
and consensus on reform objectives, conceptual framework, and scope.  There are long-
standing, differing views about the primary purpose of the tax expenditure concept i.e., 
whether the main concern is spending control, tax policy, or some combination.  Some 
reformers call for incorporating the tax expenditure concept into spending rules to 
improve incentives for the oversight and control of tax expenditures.  Others, including 
the JCT (2008) emphasized its primary purpose as an analytical tool to inform and guide 
tax policy.  As discussed in the case, a wide range of reform proposals have differing 
focuses and objectives, and no consensus has formed around any reform approach.  The 
wide range of reform proposals and various expansions to analytical tools over the years 




purpose of the tax expenditure concept continue to complicate the establishment of new 
budget decision rules for tax expenditures.   
 Using analytical information, such as subsidy costs or foregone revenues, as the 
basis of budget rules inevitably introduces additional estimation complexity and 
uncertainty.  Each case study involved varying degrees of definitional and estimation 
challenges.  In FCRA’s case, there was general agreement on FCRA’s use of discounted 
cash flows, but there were significant data limitations and steep learning curves.  My 
examination and other recent studies of FCRA estimates found that in the aggregate 
subsidy cost estimates have been fairly accurate.  However, some credit programs, 
including the largest direct loan and loan guarantee programs, have had significant 
reestimates.  Although improvements in data and modelling are valuable and should be 
pursued, inherent estimation uncertainty and reestimation will remain due to the risks 
assumed by credit programs.  More recently, the fair-value debate shifted the focus from 
the accuracy of agency estimates based on FCRA estimation procedures to the 
sufficiency and completeness of FCRA’s procedures.   
 The tax expenditure case involves fundamental, significant, and controversial 
definitional and measurement issues, as discussed in the case.  Various definitional and 
measurement issues have been the subject of decades of unresolved debate and 
disagreement.  These fundamental disagreements create obstacles for establishment of 
new budget rules.  Cost estimation issues also potentially limit or increase complexity of 
some budget decision rules.  Proposed rules that seek to limit aggregate tax expenditures 
run into problems because estimates do not account for interaction effects, thus summing 




create a barrier for reforms which seek to facilitate comparison and tradeoffs between 
direct expenditures and tax expenditures.  Overall, the conceptual, definitional, and 
estimation issues for tax expenditures appear less resolved and more complex than those 
faced for credit programs immediately prior to FCRA’s enactment.   
  During implementation, FCRA benefited from a general alignment with 
administrative and institutional frameworks as well as alignment with concurrent 
reforms, FCRA was aligned with the CFO Act’s emphasis on financial management and 
its requirement for the financial statement audits.  In some cases, FCRA was designed to 
mitigate administrative and institutional conflicts.  Administrative costs are excluded 
from FCRA’s subsidy estimates, thereby avoiding issues of congressional control and 
administrative capacity (CBO, 1992).  Some proposed budget rules for tax expenditures 
face potential conflicts with existing institutional and administrative structures.  While an 
objective of some proposed rules is to improve coordination and tradeoffs between direct 
expenditures and tax expenditures, existing structures of congressional committees and 
federal agencies would make these tradeoffs difficult. 
 
Summary Observations: Factors and Conditions Influencing FCRA’s 
Establishment and Sustainability 
  Although significant debate occurred prior to its enactment, FCRA’s approach 
was ultimately deemed sufficiently politically acceptable and technically feasible to be 
enacted.  FCRA’s approach grew out of years expanded information, expert analysis, 
experiment, debate, and compromise.  FCRA’s path was advanced by its alignment with 




loan crisis.  Its drafters included (some opponents would say buried) this somewhat 
obscure, technical legislation in a large and controversial Omnibus bill.  There were no 
specific roll call votes on the 1990 federal credit legislation.  Importantly, however, 
considerable consensus had emerged among key players (both political and expert) at the 
most basic levels of problem definition and conceptual rule design.  Over time this solid 
consensus about FCRA’s superiority over the cash-based system provided: (1) 
momentum for compromise on technical details during the legislative stage; (2) reason to 
overcome estimation challenges during implementation stage; and (3) support during 
recent controversy about its estimation procedures.  Arguably, FCRA’s relatively small 
budget impact in initial years allowed time for the rule to become embedded in the 
routines of budgeting and financial management and reporting.  In summary, FCRA’s 
enactment and sustainability were supported by: 
 
• Considerable elite consensus on problem to be addressed, its causes, and the 
proposed rule’s conceptual framework  
• The rule’s limited objective, scope, and initial budget costs  
• The impetus and political climate created by recent financial crises 
• The rule’s general alignment with existing budget norms  
• The rule’s general alignment with concurrent reforms and existing 
institutional and administrative structures   
• The rule’s integration into the routines of budgeting and financial 





 However, in the areas where solid consensus did not (and still does not) exist – 
the treatment of market risk – FCRA has not been able to produce acceptance of its 
estimates.  Although this issue was legally settled when FCRA was enacted, 
disagreements about the treatment of market risk have never been fully resolved.  FCRA 
estimates, using the Treasury discount rate, are the official estimates, but these estimates 
have been increasingly challenged. 
 
Summary Observations: Factors and Conditions Influencing Budget 
Decision Rules for Tax Expenditures  
  For tax expenditures, there is no clear path to new budget decision rules.  The 
early history of the tax expenditure concept and its evolution as an analytical tool over 
almost half a century reveals persistent conflict at each level of rule development.  
Proposed budget decision rules for tax expenditures faces almost every obstacle a budget 
rule could face:  
 
• Disagreements about whether a policy problem warranting new budget 
decision rules exists;   
• Significant and long-standing disagreements about the tax expenditure 
concept’s logic and basic premise 
• Significant and long-standing conceptual and definitional disagreements about 
methods used to identify tax expenditures 
• Inherent definitional and estimation ambiguity and uncertainty;  




• Unclear and sometimes conflicting reform objectives; and  
• Deeply-rooted policy and political differences about tax policy.   
 
Conceptual and definitional ambiguity; the inherent measurement challenges; and deep 
political, ideological, and policy divides on tax policy all help explain why the tax 
expenditure has not been transformed from analytical tool to a budget decision rule, and 
create a difficult path for those seeking to treat tax expenditures as spending in the 
budget.   
 
Crosscutting Themes Provide Insights on Analytical Tools and Decision Rules  
 Crosscutting themes and observations drawn from the case study findings provide 
insights on both: (1) how factors and conditions influence whether analytical information 
is reformulated into a sustained, workable decision rule, and (2) connections between 
analytical tools and budget decision rules, and their roles and limits.  The crosscutting 
themes or working hypotheses outlined in Table 11.2 are discussed briefly in the text 




Source: Table created by author. 
Table 11.2 Crosscutting Themes 
 
• Inherent tension exists between analytical information and decision rules.  
 
o Decision rules force choices about what information is deemed 
most “important” in the policy and political process. 
 
• Budget decision rules are intertwined with broader political and policy 
debates.  
 
o Adoption of budget decision rules is advanced when expert 
consensus is coupled with rule’s alignment with a focusing event.   
 
o Budget decision rules will not end and may heighten conflict.  
 
o Budget decision rules may become weapons in the political and 
policy process. 
 
o Budget decision rules affected by state of budget politics and 
existing fiscal and foundational budget rules.  
 
• Expert input and consensus facilitate workable, sustained budget decision 
rules; lack of expert consensus impedes adoption and functioning of 
budget decision rules.  
 
o Complex conceptual and technical issues heightened the 
importance of elite consensus.  
 
• Workable, sustained budget rules are “imperfect compromises” that 
mitigate technical issues and reduce political costs.  
 
o Process rules are more easily enacted and sustained than 
outcome-based rules, especially those that seek to constrain built-
in cost increases.  
 
• Rules create new biases and challenges; they are not static and require 
continuing oversight and modifications.  
 
• Budget decision rules matter, but some benefits are indirect and other 
factors influence policymakers’ decisions. 
 
o Budget decision rules are better at highlighting issues and 





Inherent tension exists between analytical information and decision rules.   
 The case studies illustrate how decision rules and analytical information are 
intertwined and interdependent.  Rules are dependent on available, high-quality 
information, but absent a rule there may not be strong incentives to improve information.   
Additional information may provide more perspectives and address areas of uncertainty, 
but decision rules require a choice about what information will be used in the rule.  
Overall, the cases revealed an inherent tension between a desire for more analytical 
information to comprehensively measure costs and provide robust analysis versus the 
need to select one basis for use in a budget decision rule. 
 Over time, FCRA’s budget rule was impeded, advanced, and challenged by the 
availability and quality of analytical information and tools.  Despite FCRA’s objective of 
providing complete budget costs, administrative costs were excluded at least in part 
because of limits in data and analytic processes.  Prior to FCRA’s enactment 
supplemental reporting allowed time to develop and experiment with subsidy cost 
estimates before these estimates were used for budget funding and control.  However, in 
the absence of a budget rule, incentives were limited to significantly verify and improve 
the quality of these estimates.  During early implementation, oversight agencies raised 
significant concerns about the accuracy of subsidy cost estimates and OMB modified 
accounting requirements due to a lack of detailed accounting data.  In some cases, 
especially early in the implementation process, information was not sufficiently complete 
or accurate to fully support analysis or decision making.371  
                                                          
371 A 1998 GAO report found discrepancies between the subsidy rates reported in the President’s 
budget and those provided to GAO by agencies. CBO’s early work analyzing subsidy cost 




 FCRA’s budget rule, however, heightened the stakes associated with subsidy cost 
estimates, leading to more attention and resources being given to improving the quality of 
cost estimates.  By calling attention to information deficiencies, FCRA’s budget rule both 
encouraged and benefited from improvements in data collection, financial management 
systems, and estimation methods.  FCRA’s budget rule also shaped the financial 
reporting standards for federal loan programs and, in turn, the pressure of financial 
statement audits increased agencies’ incentives to improve subsidy cost estimates.  
Further, over time, FRCA’s budget rule prompted the inclusion of more detailed 
analytical information and tools (e.g.  default rates, components of subsidy costs, and 
factors leading to reestimates) in both the budget and financial statements.   
 While some advancements in data and analytical techniques have supported 
FCRA’s budget rule, others, such as fair-value costing, have challenged it.  Advances in 
financial economics and the application of fair-value costing to federal credit programs 
have provided additional insights on the costs and risks of federal credit programs, but 
also raised questions about the adequacy of FCRA’s budget rule.  Competing subsidy 
cost estimates have led to debate about what costs should be included in the budget and 
what information is more appropriately left outside the budget rule to be used as a 
supplemental analytical tool.   
 The tax expenditure case provided insights into the different roles of and the 
potential tension between analytical tools and budget decision rules.  From the beginning, 
there have been differing views on whether the primary purpose of the tax expenditure 
concept is to support tax policy, control tax expenditure spending, or some combination.  




primarily on identifying tax expenditures and their associated costs, has limits as an 
analytical tool.  It does not, for example, consistently provide comparative listings of tax 
expenditures relative to alternative tax structures; distributional analyses, or evaluations 
of efficiency and effectiveness.  At the same time, the tax expenditure “budget” does not 
have the force of a true budget; it is not voted on and it is not recognized and controlled 
in the budget process.  While reform proposals seek to address these concerns, different 
objectives – strengthening analytical tools to support tax policy or establishing a budget 
decision rule to directly control tax expenditure spending – pull reforms in somewhat 
different and potentially competing directions.   
 
Decision rules force choices about what information is deemed most important 
in policy and political processes   
 Although multiple streams of information can be used simultaneously as 
analytical tools, decision rules generally require a narrowing of information to clearly 
define a rule’s basis.  For example, budget estimation uncertainty might be improved by 
providing more information, such as confidence intervals or a range of results based on 
varying assumptions.  For decision rule purposes of funding or enforcement, a 
determination must be made about which estimate will be used (Crippen, Diamond and 
Orszag, 2004; Schick, 2007; and Yin, 2009).372 Many measures (e.g.  face values, cash 
flows, FCRA’s subsidy cost estimates, fair-value estimates, or expected values) might 
                                                          
372 As Yin states “[i]f budget rules were amended to allow a more nuanced presentation of 
estimates it is unclear how such information would be understood and used in the legislative 
process and whether it would result in improvement in the quality of decisionmaking” (p.210).   
Diamond and Orszag (2004) argue “… the more sensitive a measure is to reasonable variations 
in assumed parameters the more important it is to provide a range of estimates rather than just a 




inform decisions about federal loan programs, but only one can serve as the primary basis 
for budget recognition, funding, and control.   
 Debate about FCRA’s subsidy cost estimation procedures highlights the issues 
faced in defining a rule’s parameters.  Even after key policy participants reached 
consensus that subsidy cost was the appropriate budget cost measure for federal loan 
programs, significant definitional issues remained.  During the pre-FCRA debate, the 
question of how to define subsidy costs was closely tied to debate about what was most 
important to improving the oversight of the federal credit programs.  As noted by Gale 
(1989), how subsidy costs are defined and measured involves conceptual questions about 
the budget rule’s objectives.  If the primary concern is to better measure and control the 
impact of credit programs on borrower behavior, then defining subsidy costs in terms of 
benefits to borrower would be appropriate.  However, if the objective is budget parity 
then developing a spending-equivalent measure reflecting the cost to the government 
would be appropriate.  In the debate leading up to FCRA, the issue was furthered 
complicated because CBO did not make the distinction between these two methods that 
was common at the time.  In CBO’s opinion, these two approaches – market approach 
and cost-of-government -- are the same if a market rate is used to calculate the 
government’s costs, as CBO thought should be done.  As noted, this debate continues 
today.     
 The tax expenditure case also involved difficulties narrowing information and 
gaining consensus on what information should be used as the basis of a budget decision 
rule.  As discussed in the case, the development of the tax expenditure concept and it 




conceptual, definitional, and measurement issues.  Some policy participants and reform 
proposals suggest the answer is more information.  Examples include the use of: multiple 
tax structure baselines or estimation methodologies to highlight different ways of framing 
the policy debate; detailed information on distributive costs and benefits; and footnotes 
explaining the implications of a chosen definitional or cost estimation approach.  By 
expanding the scope of tax expenditure analysis and providing varied perspectives, these 
reforms acknowledge disagreements about definitional or estimation issues and seek to 
clarify areas of dispute or uncertainty.  While the inclusion of various perspectives can 
result in more robust analytical tools, it also may increase confusion and controversy 
about what information is most relevant, which creates obstacles to the establishment of 
budget decision rules.   
 In an information-rich world, decision rules force choices on what information is 
deemed most “important” in the policy process.  Using information as the basis of an 
authoritative budget decision rule elevates its status.373 In this way, budget decision rules 
help policy participants sort through the increasingly vast amounts of available formation.  
However, because of the high stakes involved, budget decision rules may also serve to 
heighten conflict, as discussed below. 
 
                                                          
373 Joyce (1994) notes that cost estimation and scorekeeping became much more important as 





Budget decision rules are intertwined with broader political and policy 
debates  
 Decision rules are sometimes portrayed as based on an externally and objectively 
defined standard that floats above the political and policy fray; however, while budget 
decision rules are grounded in expert-opinion, they are endogenous to the policy and 
political processes in which they operate.   
 
Adoption of budget decision rules is advanced when expert consensus is 
coupled with a rule’s alignment with a focusing event374  
 In FCRA’s case, considerable expert consensus on FCRA’s objective and basic 
conceptual framework helped advance political consensus on the rule.  Consensus among 
key experts and their involvement in communicating the relevance’s and details helped 
cultivated lawmakers’ interest in, understanding of, and support for what was, at least 
initially, perceived by some as a technical exercise.  However, while expert consensus 
was important, it may not have been sufficient without the rule’s alignment with 
lawmakers’ immediate political interest.  The political climate and urgency created by 
recent financial crises arguably provided impetus to resolve disagreements on “second 
order”375 design details in order to enact legislation (C-SPAN, 1990).  Similarly, as 
discussed, while research on using a fair-value approach for estimating federal credit 
subsidy costs had been underway for years, the financial crisis of the mid-2000s provided 
the opportunity and political incentives to apply the approach.  Further, the financial 
                                                          
374 This idea and word choice are similar to Kingdon (1984), who provided a well-known and 
comprehensive analysis of how focusing events and policy windows advance policy items.   
375 Term used by OMB Director, Richard Durman, during congressional hearing on crediting 




crises and the selective use of the fair-value cost estimates has renewed debate about the 
budget treatment of certain GSEs.   
 
Enactment of rules will not end, and may heighten, conflict 
 The case studies’ decision rules (or proposed rules) increased attention to policy 
issues in beneficial ways but also increased conflict.  From the start, the tax expenditure 
concept has been linked to policy and political debates.  Surrey’s development and 
promotion of the tax expenditure concept grew alongside (and perhaps more accurately 
out of) broader tax policy concerns.  In the 1960s, Treasury’s position was generally 
against the use of tax incentives for social policy objectives based on the argument that 
direct expenditures generally are a more efficient and appropriate policy tool (Surrey, 
1985).  Surrey‘s speeches and academic works were broadly critical of tax expenditures.  
Citing Surrey’s role, critics of the tax expenditure concept have long argued policy and 
political bias.  For these critics, the tax expenditure concept is no more than a thinly 
veiled tool to support a specific tax reform agenda (Bartlett 2003; Bittker, 1969; Feld, 
1975; and JCT, 2008).  While many policy participants point to benefits of the tax 
expenditure concept and analysis, for others, its connection to the tax policy agenda 
continues to cast a shadow of subjective bias over the exercise.   
 As discussed in the case, choices about the various definitional, conceptual and 
measurement issues have implications for which tax provisions would be recognized and 
controlled as tax expenditures under a budget decision rule.  While many of the tax 
provisions affected by these definitional decisions are narrow and involve relatively small 




Further, some policy participants view the choice of the tax structure baseline used for 
identifying tax expenditures as potentially biasing debate about fundamental, 
comprehensive tax reform.  As the stakes associated with being classified as a tax 
expenditure increase with a new budget decision rule, controversy about the methods for 
identifying and measuring tax expenditures would likely increase too.    
 Budget decision rules increase conflict by calling attention to budget and policy 
choices.  FCRA and the fair-value debate raised significant questions about whether some 
loan programs, especially student loans, provide government subsidies to borrowers and 
whether these loans cost or make money for the government.  The tax expenditure 
concept and proposed budget rules based on it, reflect deep ideological divides on tax 
policy and the role and scope of government.  The case studies found that arguments 
about the rule (or proposed rule), even seemingly technical disputes, often reflected 
broader policy and political disagreements.  Policy participants fight over the decision 
rule (or proposed rule) because they are fighting over policy and programs. 
  
Decision rules may become weapons in the political and policy process 
 Debate on FCRA’s estimation procedures demonstrates how budget decision rules 
get pulled into the political process and how they may be used as a “political 
weapon.”376 While an objective of FCRA was to support and clarify decision making, it 
has become increasingly intertwined with the political and policy debates it was intended 
to clarify.  The significant differences between FCRA and fair-value estimates make 
powerful sound bites.  Dueling subsidy cost estimates and the resulting confusion, even 
                                                          
376 Joyce (2008) discussed how information may provide policymakers with “shinier 




when the result of a serious, professional technical debate, has created opportunities to 
use FCRA as a political weapon to support policy and political positions.  As discussed in 
the case, some policy participants used strong rhetoric attacking FCRA’s legitimacy and 
its estimates, especially in the debates about the student loan program and the Export-
Import bank.  With FCRA estimates showing “profits” and fair-value estimates showing 
costs, these competing estimates bolstered policymakers’ different ideological and policy 
positions.  Similarly, some policy participants described the tax expenditure budget as a 
“hit-list” or a “weapon of political combat” (Bartlett, 2003; Shaviro, 2007, and 
Thuronyi, 1988). 
 The FCRA estimation debate shows how increased political stakes increase 
conflict over a budget decision rule.  While debate about the treatment of market risk is a 
long-standing and important issue, FCRA’s recent recognition of large negative subsidy 
costs for political-charged loan programs sparked political attention.  The current debate 
differs from the one immediately preceding FCRA’s enactment in several respects.  
There have been advancements in the application of a fair-value approach to estimate 
subsidy costs.  The debate has moved from theoretical to practical and political: (1) a fair-
value approach has been adopted for several programs; (2) supplemental fair-value cost 
estimates are increasingly available for other programs; and (3) FCRA and fair-value 
approaches result is significantly different cost estimates for some large, politically-
charged loan programs.  Republicans currently control Congress and support amending 
FCRA to adopt a fair-value approach.  Finally, while during the pre-FCRA debate, there 
was significant pressure to compromise to enact some form of subsidy budgeting, the 




 The case studies also found that budget decision rules can easily get mired in 
prolonged debate that (intentionally or not) delays action on the rule or more importantly 
on the underlying policy issue.  A difficult issue in assessing budget decision rules based 
on analytical information is figuring out when technical, definitional and measurement 
issues reflect valid (perhaps insurmountable) concerns and when these issues have 
become an opportunity for delay. 
 
Budget decision rules affected by the state of budget politics and existing fiscal 
and foundational budget rules.   
 The program- or policy- specific budget decision rules that are the focus of this 
dissertation are influenced by the state of the budget politics and existing fiscal and 
foundational budget rules.  Process budget decision rules that require the inclusion of 
costs in the budget are based on the premise that there will be negative political 
consequences for higher spending and deficits, and that the threat of these consequences 
will change lawmakers’ incentives.  Consequences may stem from pressure of a fiscal 
rule or from voters’ preferences for fiscal discipline.  When these conditions are credible, 
the budget decision rule is made stronger; when these conditions are weak, the rule is 
weakened.   
 FCRA was enacted in the same legislation as BEA.  BEA provides “teeth” for 
FCRA.  With BEA discretionary spending caps in place, credit subsidy costs for 
discretionary loan programs must compete with other spending priorities.  BEA also 
increased the importance of enacting FCRA because discretionary caps would have 




budgeting for guarantees would have provided a “loophole” to avoid discretionary 
spending caps.  On the other hand, BEA caps would have made it more difficult absorb 
cash outlays for the face value of direct loans in the year loans were issued.  By reducing 
budget outlays for direct loans, FCRA enabled more direct loan spending within the 
discretionary caps.  While discretionary caps provide teeth to FCRA’s budget rule, in 
recent years Congress has lifted the discretionary caps.377 
 PAYGO’s offset rule indirectly influences lawmakers’ choices about tax 
expenditures.  PAYGO, however, can be waived by 60 senators and the majority of house 
of representative, as was done to prevent sequestration resulting from the 2017 tax bill.  
During the debate over the 2017 tax bill, the threat for PAYGO sequestration caused 
some political pressures, but assurances were made that it would be waived, and the 
Congress passed legislation to waive PAYGO requirements.   
 Some proposals call for new budget decision rules to incorporate tax expenditures 
into existing budget process as a means of increasing oversight and control.  However, 
these proposed budget decision rules are premised on the budget process being followed 
and credibility enforced.  A tax expenditure specific PAYGO rule will not be of much 
value if the Congress is not committed to the PAYGO process.  Including tax 
expenditures in the budget resolution will not have much impact if Congress fails to pass 
one.  In recent years, Congress has routinely failed to pass a budget resolution either on 
time or at all.  Further inclusion of the tax expenditure costs in budget totals will not exert 
much pressure if the political climate is apathetic to larger government and increased 
deficits.   
                                                          





Expert input and consensus facilitate workable, sustained budget decision 
rules; lack of expert consensus impedes budget decision rules 
 The case studies found that experts played key roles identifying the problem and 
the analytical information used in the budget decision rule (or proposed rule).  For FCRA, 
the fiscal agencies -CBO, GAO, and OMB- called attention to the issue of the rapid 
growth and changing composition of federal loan programs and the role of the cash-based 
budget.  Experts from these agencies were active in communicating the problem, the 
rule’s relevance, and the conceptual and technical issues involved.  Experts also provided 
extensive input on technical details with respect to subsidy cost estimation, the rule’s 
specific design elements, potential new biases, and other implementation issues.  Some of 
the issues that experts identified and advised on included: the budget account structure; 
the choice of discount rate; whether financing accounts were included in the deficit; the 
reestimation process; and the entity responsible for subsidy cost estimates.  Experts also 
helped anticipated potential biases and perverse incentives. 
Academics have been central to the emergence and evolution of the tax 
expenditure concept and the application of a fair-value approach to estimating credit 
subsidy costs.  After leaving the Treasury Department, Surrey refined and advocated for 
the tax expenditure concept in series of academic works.  Much of the debate about the 
purpose of and possible refinements to the tax expenditure concept, including its use in 
budget decision rules, has occurred in academic or “grey” literature.  Prominent 




methods for applying a fair-value approach to subsidy cost estimation for federal credit 
programs (Lucas, 2014; Lucas and Phaup, 2008, 2010; and Phaup, 2012).   
 The case studies also showed how a lack of expert consensus may impede the 
enactment and functioning of a budget decision rule.  As discussed, divergent expert 
opinions on the value of a fair-value approach for estimating credit subsidies and 
competing subsidy cost estimates opened the door for confusion and controversy.  The 
issue is intensified because the key fiscal agencies- CBO, OMB, and GAO – are divided 
on the issue.  CBO – often considered the budget umpire -- has raised concerns about the 
official budget estimates based on FCRA procedures in favor of a fair-value approach.  
However, even further, confusing the matter, past and present CBO leaders and staff have 
expressed conflicting views.  OMB’s position has changed with administrations.  The 
Obama administration strongly supported FCRA, but the Trump administration has 
indicated support for adopting a fair-value approach.  Especially in the absence of 
considerable expert consensus, conceptual ambiguity and technical complexity may 
increase the vulnerability of a budget decision rule to misinterpretation, conflict, or 
manipulation.   
 Budget decision rules based on analytical information by necessity involve 
numerous assumptions and judgments.  Complex and sophisticated information and 
budget structures increase reliance on experts and technicians to generate, verify, and 
explain the information.  The case studies, however, also reveal divergent views and 
comfort levels with respect to the increased role (and potential power) of experts and 
technicians.  Some policy participants expressed skepticism about this increased role in 




revealed resistance by some to a shift of what they considered essential political and 
subjective decisions to technical experts.  While Surrey often pointed to a “general 
consensus” of experts378 other policy participants questioned why these expert 
agreements should override the political agreements as reflected in the existing tax code.  
Conversely, other policy participants questioned political inference in what they viewed 
as a technical enterprise.  For example, one policy participant questioned FCRA’s 
requirement to use the Treasury rate, arguing that non-partisan budget experts and 
technicians should determine which discount rate is most appropriate for a given loan 
program (Delisle, 2015).     
 
Complex conceptual and technical issues heightened the importance of elite 
consensus.   
The case studies show how complex, technical issues, including the presence of 
definitional or methodological ambiguity or uncertainty, make a budget decision rule 
venerable to conflict, misinterpretation, and manipulation.  While a strong elite consensus 
about a rule’s objective and basic conceptual framework may provide an opportunity to 
address and mitigate technical and implementation issues, a lack of such consensus not 
only increases the difficult addressing these issues but makes the rule venerable to being 
used as a weapon in the political process.  Finally, the cases indicate that to the extent 
technical disputes reflect boarder policy, ideological, or political disagreements, 
achieving consensus on the rule is not likely be any easier than reaching consensus on the 
underlying policy and political debates.   
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Workable, sustained budget rules are “imperfect compromises” that mitigate 
technical limitations and reduce political costs  
 The case studies illustrate that the path from enriched information to a workable 
and sustained decision rule is not straightforward.  The case studies found budget 
decision rules (or proposed rules) involve numerous tradeoffs and compromises to 
accommodate an array of conceptual, technical, implementation, institutional, and 
political factors.  In the end, budget decision rules are imperfect compromises, requiring 
on-going adjustment and oversight. 
 FCRA’s experience illustrates how a sustained, workable budget decision rule 
may result from “imperfect compromises” designed to mitigate implementation 
limitations and reduce political costs.  While these compromises limited FCRA’s 
objective, scope, and ultimately its impact, they helped forge a workable budget decision 
rule that has been sustained for almost three decades.  As discussed above, FCRA’s 
design reduced political costs by: (1) not establishing hard limits on government lending 
and (2) not including larger, politically-charged programs, such as deposit insurance.  
Although FCRA’s intention was to provide complete budget costs, administrative costs 
were excluded for a variety of reasons including, political and institutional concerns 
related to congressional oversight and practical constraints, such as data limitations 
(CBO, 1992).  After enactment, several administrative and legislative adjustments were 
made to accommodate limitations in data or technical capacity, as discussed in the case.   
 A budget rule for tax expenditures also would require significant compromises to 




concept and its use in budget rules demonstrate the need for compromise between 
economic theory and the practical, political constraints of budgeting.  While the 
comprehensive income baseline would classify imputed rental income from 
homeownership as a tax expenditure including this provision as government “spending” 
under a budget decision rule would conflict with public perception and political 
feasibility.  Reforms attempting to cap or limit aggregate tax expenditures would require 
modifications to address estimation issues.  Schick (1981) and Rivlin (1981), for 
example, testified that the estimation concerns associated with the aggregation of tax 
expenditures could be lessened if reforms were designed to control the incremental 
growth in the level of tax expenditures.   
 The conflict between some proposed budget rules for tax expenditures and 
existing institutional structures demonstrates another conundrum for rule development.  
Failure to recognize and address institutional issues, such as the isolation of the tax 
writing committees, reduces the potential effectiveness of some proposed budget decision 
rules, but more extensive rules that confront institutional issues are less likely to be 
enacted and sustained. 
 To help illustrate the number of decisions and the level of consensus needed to 
arrive at a budget decision rule for tax expenditures, Figures 11.1 and 11.2 revisit some of 
the factors outlined in Chapter Two.  Each decision point in the figures represents an 
opportunity for political or expert disagreement.  Such a framework may be useful in 
evaluating other proposed budget decision rules.   
 For tax expenditures, disagreement begins at the fundamental level of problem 




case.  If consensus is achieved that problems exist, then decisions need to be made with 
respect to whether the reform should be: (1) an analytical tool or decision rule; (2) a 
spending or revenue rule; and (3) a process or outcome rule.   
 Some researchers, such as, Surrey, Burman, and Phaup emphasize tax 
expenditures as a form of spending and propose ways to better incorporate tax 
expenditures into spending rules and processes.  Others, including Schick (1981) discuss 
the tax expenditure concept as potentially useful for informing, coordinating, and 
controlling different aspects of the revenue side of the budget (e.g.  tax rates versus tax 
expenditures).  Proposed budget decision rules that treat tax expenditures as spending 
vary based on objective.  Some reforms propose outcome-based rules, such as hard limits 
on aggregated levels of tax expenditures.  Other reforms propose process rules, such as 
requiring that both imputed revenues and outlays for tax expenditures be recorded in the 
budget.  As shown in the figures, regardless of approach, establishing a budget decision 
rule for tax expenditures would require addressing and reaching workable agreement on 








Decisions Associated with the Establishment of Budget Rule for Tax Expenditures379   
 
  
                                                          
Source: Figures 11.1 and 11.2 created by author. 
379 For decisions associated with definition and measurement of tax expenditures, see Figure 11.2.  
 
Conceptual Framework:  
Is the primary issue a budget recognition and control problem?  
 (i.e., current budget rules do not provide sufficient budget 
recognition and control of tax expenditures 
 YES 
Disagree with tax 
expenditure 
concept and 
analysis   
Is the problem a spending issue? 
(tax expenditures = spending) 






Define as a spending problem. 
Rule designed to incorporate tax 
expenditures into budget rules 
and processes for spending 
What is the objective, e.g. (1) budget 
parity between tax expenditures and 
direct expenditures or (2) limits on 






Is the use of tax expenditures a problem warranting an analytical tool or 
budget decision rule?    
No 
Focus on development of 
analytical tool to support tax 





How will tax expenditures be identified and 





What is the objective, e.g. 
(1) control level of 
aggregate tax expenditures 
or (2) coordinate, or 
control different aspect of 
revenue policy (tax rates 









Definitional and Estimation Issues Surrounding the Tax Expenditure Concept  
and Its Use in Budget Rules 
Define tax expenditures relative to 
“normative” tax structure  
Alternative definitions of tax 
expenditure concept  
No 
Yes 
Choice of tax baseline 
(e.g. income vs. consumption) 
How is the chosen tax baseline 
defined?  
(e.g. If income tax, what 
constitutes taxable income)  
How are cost of identified tax expenditures 
measured?  To what extent is cost information 
available?  
  
     How will tax expenditures estimates be includes 
and controlled in the budget? (e.g. aggregated, 
disaggregated levels, or incremental growth)    
What resources and processes are needed to 





Process rules are more easily enacted and sustained than outcome rules, 
especially those that seek to constrain built-in cost increases  
 An important decision (and potential area of compromise) is whether a budget 
decision rule is a process rule or an outcome rule.  As discussed in Chapter One, the 
history of U.S. fiscal rules shows the difficulty sustaining an outcome-based rule like 
GRH.  The case studies and illustrative budget decision rules outlined in Chapter One 
also indicate difficulties gaining and maintaining support for outcome-based rules.  
Before FCRA was enacted, some policy participants, including the OMB Director, 
argued for direct limits on the government’s exposure from federal lending, but this type 
of outcome rule was not considered politically feasible.  While some tax expenditure 
proposals call for limits on the level of tax expenditures many call for process reforms in 
part due to the political and implementation difficulties associated with placing limits on 
aggregated tax expenditures.  Even with automatic cost increases built in, PAYGO rule 
has been waived when the policy and political costs of sequestration were deemed to be 
too high.  Several outcome-based rules highlighted in Chapter One – the SGR, NCLB, 
and the Medicare Trigger -- faced difficulties achieving pre-determined targets and failed 
to be sustained as intended or abandoned.     
 
Budget decision rules create new biases and challenges; they are not static 
and require continuing oversight and modifications 
 The FCRA experience shows that even with a strong and agreed-upon conceptual 
framework translating budget decision rules from theory to practice raises new issues and 




operationalizing and implementing FCRA had to deal with numerous issues that were not 
directly addressed in FCRA’s legislation and its implementation has required on-going 
refinements and oversight.  Further, FCRA’s experience indicates that decision rules and 
the debates surrounding them are not static.  Budget decision rules change, but do not 
eliminate, budget biases.  In FCRA’s case, there were early concerns that FCRA’s 
provision of permanent indefinite budget authority to cover subsidy cost reestimates 
would create incentives for agencies to underestimate initial subsidy costs.  Reformers 
sought to mitigate this concern by requiring annual reestimates as opposed to requiring a 
one-time aggregate reestimate at the end of the loan.  The issue of negative subsidies was 
not directly addressed by FCRA and caused some early implementation issues (GAO, 
1994c).  In recent years, large negative subsidies have raised concerns about: (1) the use 
of uncertain “savings” to offset current budget costs and (2) the creation of incentives 
that encourage use of credit programs as income generators.  Further, as discussed in the 
case, some policy participants argue that FCRA’s exclusion of market risk and 
administrative costs create a new bias to use direct loans over loan guarantees.   
 
Rules matter, but some benefits are indirect and other factors influence 
policymakers’ decisions. 
 The FCRA experience provides a mixed picture of the benefits, challenges, and 
limitations of budget decision rules.  On the positive side, FCRA’s subsidy estimates and 
reestimates called attention to policy and oversight issues, including the risks inherent in 




impetus to improve the data, systems, and processes necessary to better identify and 
understand the costs and risks of federal credit programs.   
 The case provides a mixed picture of FCRA’s role in shaping budget outcomes 
with respect to the level and composition of federal credit programs.  While it is 
impossible to know FCRA’s impact without a counterfactual, my review of credit 
programs trends provides some support for the premise that budget decision rules 
influence decision about federal loan programs.  Declining subsidy costs and the 
emergence of large negative subsidies and “self-financing” loan programs indicate that 
FCRA has influenced the choices about the design of loan programs.  However, while my 
review of trends across pre- and post- FCRA periods provides some support for the 
premise that FCRA influenced budget decisions, it also indicates that additional factors 
such as: (1) program dependency, (2) credit market conditions, and (3) political and 
policy preferences for particular policy instruments (beyond budget advantage) play roles 
in shaping policymakers’ decisions.   
 
Decision rules are better at calling attention to issues and supporting existing 
consensus than generating consensus.   
 The case studies support the view that decision rules are better at calling attention 
to and supporting existing consensus than at generating consensus.  In FCRA’s case, an 
area of strong (albeit not universal) elite consensus -- the superiority of a net present 
value approach over net cash flows as the budget cost measure for credit programs -- has 
been supported and sustained.  However, in an area that was not fully resolved when 




Disagreement and debate about FCRA’s exclusion of market risk intensified as FCRA’s 
subsidy costs became more relevant in policy debates (i.e. “profits” for some politically-
sensitive credit programs and creation of “self-financing” direct loan programs).  While 
FCRA is the official budget decision rule and provides the official budget estimates, it 
has not resolved fundamental disagreements either about the rule or the affected 
programs.   
 Similarly, some of the illustrative case discussed in Chapter One suffered from a 
lack of consensus on the policy details necessary to meet the rule.  Lawmakers routinely 
circumvented the SGR when they could not achieve consensus on policy details and cuts 
become too politically difficult.  In the end, the SGR was repealed.  The Medicare 
Trigger has largely been ignored.  As argued by one policy participant, rules are not 
substitutes for policy consensus (Posner, personal communication, November 12, 2016). 
 
Considerations and Indicators for the Establishment of Budget Decision Rules  
 Although policy participants remain divided on the role and value of both 
analytical tools and decision rules, proposals for new budget decision rules continue.  
Tables 11.3 to 11.5 outline considerations and indicators that provide a preliminary 
framework for assessing proposed budget decision rules.  These considerations and 
indicators were developed based on the case study findings, the themes discussed in the 
previous section, and the extensive literature review and illustrative cases discussed in 
Chapter One.  For consistency purposes, they are roughly organized by the dimensions 




 While these considerations and indictors reflect primarily a technician’s focus on 
sound budget practices, the case studies demonstrate that a proposed budget decision rule 
cannot be fully assessed in isolation of the political and policy environment in which it 
would be enacted and operate.  The case studies show how complex, technical issues, 
including the presence of definitional or methodological ambiguity or uncertainty, make a 
budget decision rule venerable to conflict, misinterpretation, and manipulation.  While a 
strong elite consensus about a rule’s objective and basic conceptual framework may 
provide an opportunity to address and mitigate technical and implementation issues, a 
lack of such consensus not only increases the difficult addressing these issues but makes 
the rule venerable to being used as a weapon in the political process.  Finally, the cases 
indicate that to the extent technical disputes reflect boarder policy, ideological, or 
political disagreements, achieving consensus on the rule is not likely be any easier than 
reaching consensus on the underlying policy and political debates.   
 A first order principle is to avoid overburdening the federal budget.  Budget 
decision rules based on analytical information add complexity and potential confusion to 
the budget.  While complexity itself is not necessarily a reason to abandon reform efforts, 
it does suggest a reason for caution.  The case studies indicate that enacted and sustained 
budget decision rules are facilitated by a “trigger” that is clearly understood, articulated, 
and supported by considerable elite consensus.  The concern or “trigger” for the rule 
should be an identifiable shortcoming of existing budget rules (e.g.  the budget provides 
misleading cost information or otherwise distorts incentives for sound budget decisions).  
The desire to make potentially useful analytical information more relevant and powerful 




 An important assessment is the extent to which the problem is truly a budget 
problem and whether the issue might be more appropriately addressed by a supplemental 
analytical tool or a decision rule outside the fiscal budget.  While information related to 
financial management, performance, and social costs may provide valuable insights, the 
desire to incorporate this information in the budget needs to be considered carefully 
against the primary objectives of the federal budget, and not just based on the desire to 
increase incentives for policy participants to use this information. 
 The issue of social costs helps illustrate.  A regulatory budget has been proposed 
in various forms for decades.  Some recent proposals call for the cost of regulations to be 
incorporated as spending and imputed revenues in the budget.  However, including these 
non-cash, social costs in the budget would increase the complexity and reduce the 
transparency of the budget, and may fail to provide adequate understanding and oversight 
of these costs.  Others have proposed that a regulatory “budget” be provide as a 
supplemental analytical tool or decision rule separate from the fiscal budget.  As 
discussed, the inclusion of market risk raises similar issues about whether the cost of 
market risk is most appropriately addressed by an analytical tool, such as supplemental 
cost-benefit analysis, or by inclusion as a budget cost in FCRA’s budget decision rule. 
 While there are valid concerns that supplemental analytical tools and decision 
rules not directly linked to resource allocation decisions may not be taken seriously, 
inclusion in the budget also does not guarantee that information will be valued and used, 
especially if it does not meet the needs of key budget users.  For example, while 
performance information can provide valuable insights for many users of the budget, 




justifications and appropriation accounts to better align budget resources to results did not 
meet certain needs of the congressional appropriation subcommittees (p.  92).  The effort 
was abandoned.          
 Another consideration is how well existing budget rules and processes are 
currently functioning and how the proposed rule fits with existing fiscal and foundational 
budget rules.  The current federal budget process is not functioning, and some would say 
is completely broken.  Continuing to expand the scope and complexity of a budget 
process that is not functioning does not seem to provide a prudent path forward.  Aligning 
new budget decision rules with existing budget rules and processes makes sense when 
existing rules and processes are functioning.  However, integrating program- or policy- 
specific budget decision rules into fiscal and foundational rules that are not functioning 
may not only reduce the ineffectiveness of the new budget decision rule, but also may 
further impede the existing process.  While new program- or policy – specific budget 
decision rules could be a useful part of comprehensive budget reform, careful 
consideration should be given to how they fit with other reforms aimed at strengthening 




Table 11.3 Considerations and Indicators for Assessing Proposed Budget Decision Rules (Trigger and Conceptual Framework) 
Source: Table created by author
 Select Considerations and Indicators 
Trigger  The “trigger” or problem prompting the proposed budget rule is clearly understood, articulated, and supported by 
considerable elite consensus. 
 
o Is the issue clearly a budget issue e.g.  is there an identifiable shortcoming of current budget rules?  
o Have analytical information and tools been available for “adequate” period?  Is it clear that information alone is 
insufficient? 
o Would a decision rule outside the budget process be more appropriate? 
o Is there considerable expert consensus on the problem and the need for a new budget decision rule?   
Conceptual 
Framework 
and Design  
The rule’s objective and conceptual framework is supported by considerable elite consensus. 
 
o Is the underlying logic, including how the rule, will address the problem clear? 
o Has the proposed rule’s basic conceptual framework and design been well-vented?  
 
The rule is aligned with existing federal budget primary purposes, norms, and conventions.   
 
o Is rule consistent with federal budgeting principles? Or, is there elite consensus that change is necessary?    
o Have the tradeoffs among the purposes of the budget and various user needs been communicated and debated?  
 
The rule is aligned with existing foundational budget and fiscal rules.   
 
o How will the rule support (or be supported by) existing budget and fiscal rules? What are potential tensions or 
conflicts?   
o Is the budget decision rule dependent on certain aspects of the existing budget process? Are these processes 
functioning?  
o Is the budget decision rule credible and enforceable within the existing budget process?   
 
The rule is designed to mitigate misinterpretation and manipulation.   
 




 A central issue is the availability and quality of analytical information needed to 
support the rule, but reformers may not adequately address the need for increased staff 
levels and technical skills.  While resources to support the development of needed 
analytic information are likely to be significant, the information required by the rule may 
be needed to support effective management and oversight.  In FCRA’s case, experts 
testified that while the resources necessary to support credit budgeting, especially the 
generation of the subsidy cost estimates, would be significant, this information and the 
data and systems needed to generate it were necessary to improve the management and 
oversight of the federal loan programs, regardless of whether a budget decision rule was 
established (C-SPAN, 1990).    
 Another consideration is the extent to which rule design and supporting processes 
may mitigate the potential for misinterpretation and manipulation.  An obvious, often 
recommended, and laudable criteria is that analytical information and budget rules are 
accurate, understandable and transparent.  While it is easy to agree with the merits of 
these criteria, understanding and defining them in a way that fits with the realities of 
federal budgeting and the technical complexity involved is more nuanced.  The use of 
more sophisticated and complex techniques (such discounted cash flows, foregone 
revenues, fair-value estimates, and options pricing) inevitably increase the complexity 
and reduce the transparency of the budget.  Decision rules based on more sophisticated 
methods and models may not be fully understood by lawmakers, their staff, or the public, 
with the extent of understanding varying significantly across policy participants.  CBO 




less transparent than FCRA estimates and thus “could be more difficult to communicate 
to policymakers and the public” (p. 2).  
  A way of assessing this issue is the extent to which adequate structures and 
processes have (or will be) established to communicate, document, and oversee the rule 
and the information used in it.  Careful consideration needs to be given to the structures 
and processes supporting the budget decision rule, including, for example: the level of 
expert input and consensus; how the rule will be tracked and documented; how the rule 
will be communicated and explained to various audiences; the responsibility for the 
generation of cost estimate; and the oversight process, including the credibility, 
independence, and the role(s) of nonpartisan oversight entities.  One issue discussed in 
the debate prior to FCRA was whether the responsibility for subsidy estimates should be 
in the executive branch, the legislative branch or both as means of providing a cross-
check.  Another issue consideration of enforcement mechanisms to be used and how it 
will work with affected programs and policies.  Previously used enforcement mechanism 
may have to be modify or may not work given the affected programs and policies.  In 
discussing reform options, GAO (1994) found the characteristics and diversity of tax 
expenditures would create barriers to using a sequestration mechanism for tax 




Table 11.4 Considerations and Indicators for Assessing Proposed Budget Decision Rules (Technical and Implementation) 
 Select Considerations and Indicators 
Technical and 
Implementation  
Analytical information (cost estimates) necessary for the rule is (or will be) available and reasonably accurate.   
 
o Have cost estimates (or other information) to be used in the rule been previously reported?  If so, to what 
extent have they been reviewed for accuracy? 
o If information is not currently available, is there expert consensus that needed information can be 
produced reasonably accurately?  
o Are the methodologies used to generate cost estimates (or other information) been well vented and 
supported by considerable expert consensus? Are methodologies considered generally accepted and 
credible?  
o Should an incremental approach be used to allow for more experience with the cost estimates (or other 
information)?  
o Can cost estimates (or other information) be generated within the time constraints of the budget process?  
 
Administrative and institutional infrastructure exist (or will be established) to support operationalization, 
implementation, and oversight of the rule.   
 
o What will the division of responsibility be for implementation of rule, including the generation, review, 
and oversight of cost estimates (or other information)? Will these responsibilities reside in one entity, or 
be shared to provide crosschecks?  
o What additional staffing levels and skills are necessary to support the rule? 
o What structures and processes will provide oversight of the rule? Do proposed processes appear 
sufficient to mitigate misinterpretation and manipulation?  
o Does the budget decision rule complement or compete with concurrent reforms?   
o Will information be subject to external review, e.g., financial audit? 
o To what extent will documentation and data be available for external review by interested parties, such as 
private market participants, academics, and nongovernmental researchers? 
 
  




Table 11.5 Considerations and Criteria for Assessing Proposed Budget Decision Rules  
(Political and Institutional) 




Cost estimates (other information) are understandable to congressional 
members and staff and other policy participants. 
 
o How will the rule and its technical issues be communicated to 
Congressional members and staff? 
o How will key technical issues, including areas of conceptual and 
estimation ambiguity, be communicated and documented? 
 
Rule is credible and enforceable within the political process.   
 
o Under what conditions will lawmakers be able to waive the rule?  
o What aspects of the rule are most likely to be subject to gaming?  
What processes or checks have been established to mitigate 
political gaming? 
o What will be the enforcement mechanism? Has chosen method of 




Elite consensus on the rule’s relevance, objective, and conceptual 
framework.   
 
o Is there elite consensus on the need for a new budget decision rule 
and its objective?  
o Has the rule been discussed with key users that will be affected by 
the budget decision rule? 
o Does the rule reflect and reinforce an existing agreement? Or, is it 
expected that the rule will generate consensus?    
 
Budget decision rule meets (or, at least, does not interfere with) the 
needs of lawmakers in carrying out their responsibility for budget 
oversight and control.   
 
o Has the rule and the information used it in be discussed with key 
congressional users?  
 
 
Rule is aligned with existing institutional structures (or there is 
considerable elite agreement that changing institutional structures is 
feasible and necessary) 
 
 




Closing Thoughts, Key Challenges and Potential Pathways for FCRA and 
Budgeting for Tax Expenditures.   
In the case of tax expenditures, significant concerns about budget oversight and 
control continue, but there does not appear to be a clear path toward a workable, 
sustained budget decision rule.  While much debate surrounds the primary purpose of the 
tax expenditure concept and its underlying premise that tax expenditures are spending, it 
is clear is that these provisions reduce revenues and thus make addressing the nation’s 
significant fiscal challenges more difficult.  In this sense, and despite a lack of consensus, 
tax expenditures are a budget control issue.  However, the need for a budget rule for tax 
expenditures does not make it (especially a spending rule) political acceptable or 
technically feasible.  While some options for budget decision rules for tax expenditures 
have merit, they face substantial political, technical, and implementation hurdles.  For the 
reasons discussed below, the most productive path forward at this time may be to use the 
tax expenditure concept to strengthen analytical tools and shape decision rules outside the 
budget process.   
 A new budget decision rule for tax expenditures must be designed and considered 
within the context of the conceptual, definitional, and estimation issues involved.  An 
aggregate cap on tax expenditures appears both politically and technically infeasible.  
Other proposals call for process rules that would explicitly treat tax expenditures as 
spending by, for example, including tax expenditures as both imputed revenues and 
budget outlays (spending).  While the objective is to increase the visibility of these tax 
provisions and expose their contribution to the overall size of government, this type of 




measurement challenges associated with the identification and measurement of tax 
expenditures, the added complexities of this approach - use of the imputed revenues, the 
treatment of non-cash costs as budget outlays, and the disconnect between budget totals, 
government’s financing needs -- all open the door to confusion and controversy.   
An alternative approach would be to build on the existing identification of tax 
expenditures and the PAYGO system to establish a PAYGO rule specific to tax 
expenditures.  The objective would be to heighten attention to tax expenditures, 
encourage tradeoffs among tax expenditures, and sharpen tradeoffs between tax rates and 
the value of tax expenditures.  While still likely to meet political resistance, this approach 
treats tax expenditures as a revenue issue, and thus avoids conflict over explicitly treating 
them as spending.  In addition, it would provide more direct control over tax expenditures 
than a process rule.  However, this approach faces significant unresolved enforcement 
and implementation issues.  While tax expenditures are currently listed for informational 
purposes, the establishment of a constraint would likely increase conflict over long-
standing conceptual, definitional, and measurement disputes.  In addition, as discussed in 
GAO (1994), there are significant difficulties associated with applying a sequestration 
enforcement mechanism to tax expenditures (p.  69).   
Finally, one cannot avoid recognizing the lack of political support and 
commitment to the PAYGO process.  The PAYGO rule has become increasingly 
politicized and lawmakers have periodically waived PAYGO to avoid sequestration.  
Most recently, lawmakers waived PAYGO to avoid sequestration triggered by the large 




incorporate tax expenditures into the budget resolution, which the Congress has 
increasingly failed to pass either on time or at all.   
 While a tax expenditure specific PAYGO rule might be explored, it appears that, 
especially given the current political environment, the most valuable role for the tax 
expenditure concept lies in supporting stronger analysis of tax expenditures and tax 
policy.  The tax expenditure listing alone is insufficient as an analytical tool, but it 
provides a foundation for stronger analytical tools.  One option would be to establish a 
more systematic approach for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
expenditures (GAO, 1994c and Harris, et.  al, 2018).  These analyses would help identify 
and support design changes in tax expenditures, and perhaps assist in the establishment of 
decision rules outside the budget process, such as the conversion of some tax 
expenditures into refundable tax credits and requirements for periodic review and 
reauthorization.  However, close examination of the merits and challenges of these 
specific approaches lies outside the dissertation’s scope 
 FCRA has been a workable and sustained budget decision rule for almost three 
decades, but significant concerns are being raised about the sufficiency of its subsidy cost 
estimates.  The central and most controversial issue is whether subsidy cost estimates for 
federal loan programs should include the cost of market risk.  This long-standing debate 
concerning whether market risk is a budget cost is not merely a technical issue about 
discount rates but raises important questions about the purpose and scope of the federal 
budget.   
 The inclusion of market risk in the budget would add a non-cash measure of 




measuring and controlling fiscal effects (as measured by cash flows to and from the 
Treasury) (GAO, 2016a and Marron, 2014).  Opponents argue that the inclusion of 
market risk adds additional, non-budgetary costs to the budget, but proponents argue that 
market risk is a budget costs and its inclusion is necessary to comprehensively and 
correctly measure the cost of federal loan programs.  This debate about what constitutes 
the government’s cost of lending long preceded FCRA and has never been fully resolved.   
 There are reasons, however, for caution in amending FCRA to include these costs 
directly in the budget.  There is no consensus on the existence of a problem warranting 
new budget rules.  Proponents argue that FCRA’s exclusion of market risk from subsidy 
costs understates the cost of loan programs, and thus creates a bias for the overuse of 
federal loans over other policy instruments and for the use of direct loans over loan 
guarantees.  While there are some indicators that support this premise (declining subsidy 
costs; the emergence of negative subsidies, the creation of “self-sustaining” loan 
programs, and the creation of some new direct loan programs, most notably the 
replacement of the student loan guarantee program with the direct loan program), 
research on and understanding of FCRA’s role in policy participants’ choices about 
federal programs is only beginning.  There is no elite consensus that a problem 
warranting new budget rules exists.   
  While assessment of the social costs (and benefits) can provide valuable insights 
on government policies and programs, including federal lending, these types of analyses 
have traditionally fallen outside the scope of the federal budget.  The merging of the 
analysis with the budget’s role as the measure of fiscal effects has the potential to 




to a range of federal program and policies beyond federal credit.  Opening the door for 
the inclusion of social costs has the potential to greatly increase the scope and analytical 
complexity of the budget while fundamentally changing its role in the political and policy 
process.   
  Such fundamental and significant change warrants renewal of comprehensive 
study and debate, especially given the current lack of political and expert consensus.  It 
seems reasonable to continue with the supplemental reporting of fair-value cost estimates 
as an analytical tool.  Doing so would allow more time for a comprehensive debate while 
also allowing time to gain experience with and understanding of fair-value estimates and 
their role in the policy and political process.  The debate about market risk is long-
standing, but the application of fair-value to credit subsidy estimates and (especially) the 
more systematic reporting of fair-value estimates is relatively new.   
 While competing subsidy estimates have helped call attention to the costs and 
risks of federal credit programs, there still appears to be lack of understanding of the 
differences between FCRA and fair-value estimates, including how each measures the 
risks involved and the extent of subsidies provided.  One point of confusion is how the 
government can “profit” while providing positive subsidies to borrowers.  Further, a 
review of recent legislative proposals indicates confusion between CBO’s application of 
the fair-value approach to federal credit programs and the use of GAAP fair-value in the 
private sector.  In addition, the integration of fair-value subsidy estimates into the budget 
raises significant implementation issues that have not been fully assessed and addressed.   
 Continuing to provide fair-cost estimates as an analytical tool will not be without 




subsidy estimates caused controversy and confusion.  One can hope that over time this 
attention may eventually lead to improved understanding of the issues, but there is the 
danger that competing estimates will be increasingly used as political weapons or will fall 
into the realm of a technical and ignored exercise.  However, an incremental approach 
will provide time to assess the usefulness of these estimates to various users. 
The supplemental approach also does not deal with an issue facing FCRA, i.e. 
whether and how to address the treatment of the large, negative subsidies in the budget.  
If FCRA’s approach is continued, there is the danger that incentives created by negative 
subsidies will encourage the overuse of credit programs as “income generators” which 
offset current cost with uncertain gains.  While a full examination of the issue is beyond 
the dissertation scope, the issue also warrants attention.   
 In closing, the combination of long-standing policy problems and the increasing 
availability of analytical information and tools increase the temptation to use information 
as the basis of budget decision rules.  The history of reform and the case study 
experiences, however, suggest that both too much and too little is expected of budget 
decision rules.  While budget decision rules influence incentives, they are not objective 
standards that rise above the political fray to make lawmakers to do what they otherwise 
would not.  While budget decision rules may provide more comprehensive cost measures, 
they involve compromises that deviate from the theoretical ideals in order to address 
political and practical limitations.  While budget decision rules are facilitated by expert 
opinion and consensus, they are shaped by and require political consensus.  While budget 
decision rules can play a valuable role in calling attention to policy and management 




address some budget biases, they will raise new ones.  While budget rules may better 
serve the needs of one set of budget users, they may also interfere with the needs of 
others.     
 These issues highlight the need for careful consideration of whether a new budget 
decision rule is necessary and if so how it will be designed and implemented.  The logic 
behind proposed budget decision rules is often relatively straightforward making it easy 
underestimate the challenges associated with effectively translating a proposal from 
theory to practice.  The case study experiences suggest a cautioned approach to the 
establishment of budget decision rules with a first principle of avoiding overloading the 
budget and budget processes, especially when the existing processes are not fully 
functioning.   
 While sound budget principles and technical expertise certainly help shape budget 
decision rules, their design and implementation cannot be assessed in a vacuum.  To 
varying degrees, the dimension outlined in Chapter Two (trigger, conceptual, technical, 
and political) were factors in each case.  The issue is not whether these factors matter, but 
rather how they interact to influence whether analytical information is transformed into a 
workable, sustainable decision rule.  The quest for analytical improvement must be 
balanced with the institutional, political, and implementation realities in which the budget 
decision rules operate.  While the case studies indicate that analytical information and 
budget decision rules matter and have role in the policy and political process, those 
seeking to establish new budget decision rules need to consider the fragile role they play 
and avoid overpromising benefits and underestimating the need for careful design and 
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